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102 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
STEGANOGRAPHY?
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The practice of communicating secret data
that has been concealed in an innocuous cover-medium |
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Encryption aims
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protect data by making it
unintelligible |
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Steganography aims
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protect data by making
it undetectable |
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Steganography by cover selection
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Sender selects a cover from a large set of available covers so
that the required message is communicated (e.g. Book titles, newspaper headlines). |
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Steganography by cover synthesis
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Sender creates the cover that communicates the desired
message (e.g. mimic functions, crafted photographs) |
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Steganography by cover modification
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Sender modifies an existing cover in order to convey the
required message (e.g. modify LSBs in images) |
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Secret
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E.g. image, document, audio, video file
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Cover-medium
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E.g. File, Data Packet, file slack,
volume slack etc |
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Carrier-medium
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i.e. Cover-medium + Secret =
Carrier-medium |
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Stego-key
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Method or key required to access the
Secret from the carrier-medium (e.g. instructions, key, password) |
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Steganalysis
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Study, detection and recovery of carrier medium
payloads (i.e. secrets) |
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Secrecy
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Considers the effectiveness of concealment.
For example: – What is the probability of the secret data being detected by casual observation? |
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Capacity
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Considers the limitations of storage space for
Secret data within a cover-medium. – What happens to the cover-medium if a capacity threshold is exceeded. |
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Robustness
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Considers the limitations, thresholds and
vulnerabilities of a carrier-medium. For example: – Does secret data survive when the carrier-medium is converted, cropped or scaled? |
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Steganographic Techniques
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• Substitution
• Transform domain • Spread spectrum • Statistical • Cover generation • Distortion |
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LSB Embedding
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A method of steganography that embeds the
binary digits of secret data, into the least significant bit positions of cover-medium bytes. |
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LSB Embedding
BENEFITS |
Exploits deficiencies in HVS
• Easy implementation • Good capacity • Good secrecy for general use (Cannot be casually browsed when used with 24 bit images) |
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LSB Embedding
LIMITATIONS |
Robustness performance is poor (although
alternate LSB methods have improved this) • Can easily be detected by Steganalysis |
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Cloud Computing
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computing paradigm, involving data and/or computation outsourcing.
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Software as a Service
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Access to software that runs on top of a cloud. Typically, only a browser is required.
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Platform as a Service
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Access to a configurable platforms and APIs
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Infrastructure as a Service
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Access to virtualised hardware
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Cloud Computing Security Concerns
Confidentiality concerns |
Will sensitive data stored in the cloud remain confidential?
•Will cloud compromises leak confidential client data (i.e. fear of loss of control over data) |
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Cloud Computing Security Concerns
Integrity concerns |
How do I know that the cloud provider is under taking computations correctly?
•How do I ensure that the cloud provider really stored my data without tampering with it? |
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Cloud Computing Security Concerns
Availability concerns |
Will critical systems go down at the client, if the provider is attacked in a Denial of Service attack?
•What happens if the cloud provider goes out of business? |
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Cloud Computing Security Concerns
Privacy concerns |
The cloud now stores data from a lot of clients, how can I mitigate data mining algorithms that collate large amounts of information on my clients and my business?
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Cloud Computing Security Concerns
Increased attack surface concerns |
In a cloud computing model, an entity outside the organisation now stores and computes data, therefore:
•Attackers can now target the communication link between the cloud provider and client |
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Cloud Computing Security Concerns
Auditing and forensic concerns |
Difficult to audit data held outside an organisation in a cloud.
•Forensics also made more difficult since now clients don’t maintain data locally |
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Cloud Computing Security Concerns
Legal and transitive trust concerns |
Client is in one country, cloud is in another:
•Which laws apply to data in the cloud, laws from the country of origin or laws where the data is hosted? –E.g. NSA, prism and patriot act in the USA |
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Threat Model
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threat model helps to analyse a security problem, design mitigation strategies, and evaluate solutions
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Threat Model
Typical steps: |
–Identify and categorise threats to assets
–Attacker modelling (identify potential attackers) –Rank the threats –Choose mitigation strategies –Build solutions based on the strategies |
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Identify and Categorising Threats
Use STRIDE to categorise threats |
•Spoofing identity
•Tampering with data •Repudiation •Information disclosure •Denial of service •Elevation of privilege |
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Threat type
Spoofing identity |
Mitigation technique
•Authentication •Protect secrets •Do not store secrets |
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Threat type
Tampering with data |
Mitigation technique
•Authorisation •Hashes •Message authentication codes •Digital signatures •Tamper-resistant protocols |
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Threat type
Repudiation |
Mitigation technique
•Digital signatures •Timestamps •Audit trails |
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Threat type
Information disclosure |
•Authorisation
•Privacy-enhanced protocols •Encryption •Protect secrets •Do not store secrets |
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Threat type
Denial of service |
•Authentication
•Authorisation •Filtering •Throttling •Quality of service |
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Threat type
Elevation of privilege |
•Run with least privilege
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Attacker Goals - Confidentiality
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Access:
•Data stored in the cloud •Configuration of VMs running on the cloud •Identity of cloud users •Location of the VMs running client code |
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Attacker Goals - Integrity
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Modify
•Data stored in the cloud •Computations performed on and in the cloud |
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Attacker Capabilities Outside Attacker
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Capabilities?
•Listen to network traffic (passive) •Insert malicious traffic (active) •Probe cloud structure (active) •Launch DoS/DDoS attack |
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New Threats
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Clouds allow co-tenancy
Multiple independent users share the same physical infrastructure |
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Secret Sharing Overview
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Terminology: given some secret s, a dealer will divide it into shares amongst n shareholders/players
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(t,n)-threshold scheme
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–Individual shares do not reveal s
–If at least users combine their shares, they can reconstruct s If t=n: Secret Splitting, otherwise: Secret Sharing |
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Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme
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Idea: a polynomial f of degree t-1 is uniquely determined by t different points
•We share n such distinct points (xi, f(xi)) amongst players The secret will be f(0) |
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Lagrange Interpolation
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Goal: given (x1, y1), ..., (xt, yt), explicitly construct polynomial f of degree t-1, satisfying f(xi) = yi for all i
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Dealer-Free (Distributed/Random) Secret Sharing (RSS)
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Goal: create and distribute shares without the need for centralised dealer
Ideal in peer-to-peer scenario. Principle: each player Pi creates random value and distributes its shares to all other players |
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Proactive Secret Sharing (PSS)
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Goal: prevent leakage of information in long-term secret sharing
Important application: key distribution in (wireless) sensor networks, MANETs Classic scheme: Herzberg |
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Herzberg’s Scheme
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Each player Pi creates a random polynomial with constant term 0
Robust and secret in the presence of passive adversaries |
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Dynamic Secret Sharing (DSS)
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Goal: adapt to dynamic environment
–Change of number of players –Change threshold value t |
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Secret Sharing Applications
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•Cloud computing
•Virtual private social networks •Peer-to-peer networking, MANET (Mobile Ad-hoc Network) |
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Ramp Secret Sharing Schemes
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current active research
This would allow for a larger secret (shorter shares), useful in applications |
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Security Goals
•Privacy: |
protect individuals against harm caused by leakage of their (personal) information
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Impact of Privacy Loss without Identification
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Damage arises due to data aggregation and the potential of linking together user actions
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Security Goals
•Privacy: |
protect individuals against harm caused by leakage of their (personal) information
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Anonymity Goals
•Sender anonymity: |
Remove identifying information from user requests
–Is a difficult task, whether or not servers require authentication |
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Receiver anonymity:
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–Impossibility of identifying the recipient of a message
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Unlinkability = Sender and Receiver Anonymity:
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–Ensure that attacker is unable to trace the server(s) a given user is talking to
–Cannot distinguish between single user running multiple sessions with single server OR multiple users, each running a single session |
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Anonymous Routing
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mechanism for establishing unlinkability
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Mixed Nets
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•First method published for anonymous routing
•Idea: network packets are sent through a special service (“mix”) •This permute the output order of packets •Encryption prevents tracing back the packets |
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Onion Routing
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Popular technique for implementing anonymous routing
Routing path is unpredictable •Encryption works in layers •To some extent, resistant to compromise |
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Crowds
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achieve anonymity by blending in with a crowd
all users form a crowd send message to random crowd member randomly forwards to another member, or the server |
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Anonymous Authentication Protocols
Secure authentication |
no unauthorised user should get access by the server, except with a very small probability
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Anonymous Authentication Protocols
Anonymity: |
the server should not know which of the user it is interacting with
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Verifiable Anonymity
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if a malicious server can reveal user identity, this will always be detected by the user
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Ring Signatures
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–Guaranteed that signer belongs to a specific set of users
–However, impossible to detect which particular user signed |
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Anonymous Authentication Using Ring Signatures
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1.Server sends a random challenge w to user
2.User then returns a ring signature on w 3.Server grants access if the signature is valid |
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Confidentiality:
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to prevent unauthorised
disclosure of the information |
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Integrity:
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to prevent unauthorised modification of
the information |
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Availability:
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to guarantee access to information
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Authentication:
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to prove the claimed identity can
be Data or Entity authentication |
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Non repudiation
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to prevent false denial of
performed actions |
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Authorisation:
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What Alice can do”
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• Auditing:
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to securely record evidence of
performed actions |
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Attack-tolerance
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ability to provide some degree
of service after failures or attacks |
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Disaster Recovery
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ability to recover a safe state
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Types of attack
• Passive |
the attacker can only read any information
– Tempest (signal intelligence) – Packet Sniffing |
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Types of attack
• Active: |
the attacker can read, modify,
generate, destroy any information |
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Wireless Sensor Network
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network of hundred/thousand constrained sensor devices
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Node Replication Attack
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an attacker captures a node, clone it and
distributes the cloned nodes in the network area. |
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Clone Detection - The RED Protocol
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A random value, rand, is shared between nodes.
Each node broadcasts its claim (ID and location). Each node that hears a claim sends (with probability p) this claim to a set of g 1 pseudo-randomly selected network locations |
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Virtual Private Social Networks
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A VPSN, in analogy with VPN, leverages an already existing host social network.
Nodes of a VPSN are users that share information (profile) confidential with regard to other users not part of the VPSN. |
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OSN
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Much of this data is shared via Online Social Networks (OSNs) : Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, and Google+.
Host vast quantities of user generated content (UGC) |
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Dichotomy of Security Goals – OSN Host
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Mitigate risks of false account registrations, identity masquerading, account compromising (e.g. hacking), and threats from malware.
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Dichotomy of Security Goals - Users
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Ideally, users want to use trusted OSNs that implement the security goals of confidentiality, integrity, and availability to UGC.
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UGC Data Threats
Data Exploitation |
An OSN host may impose the right to use UGC for commercial or marketing purposes, without the need to consult, or compensate the user
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UGC Data Threats
Data Censorship |
An OSN host may impose the right to modify or remove UGC for reasons of censorship or violation of terms and conditions.
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UGC Data Threats
Data Sanitisation |
OSN hosts may sanitise user data prior to publication, in order to protect themselves and other users from malware.
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VPSN Characteristics
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hidden to users that are not part of it, as well as the OSN provider.
VPSN inherits security mechanisms from the OSN. User profile information can be hidden from any non-intended audience |
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VPSN Confidentiality
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Our approach is based on combining two fundamental cryptographic techniques:
- information distribution (secret sharing) - information hiding (steganography). |
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Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs)
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•Peer-to-peer, decentralised network architecture
•Nodes are self-organising and (highly) mobile •They can send, receive or route data •No fixed infrastructure •Communication uses wireless links |
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MANET Routing Protocols
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–Proactive (table-driven)
–Reactive (On-Demand) –Hybrid –Flow-oriented –Hierarchical –Power-aware –Multicast |
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Cryptographic Tools
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•Information Protection (Encryption/Decryption)
•Information Fingerprinting (Hash Functions) •Information Distribution (Secret Sharing) •Information Hiding (Steganography) |
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Key exchange and management protocols
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SSL,
TLS, HTTPS, IPSec |
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Secret Sharing
• A (t, n) perfect threshold scheme |
–The secret s can be divided into n parts (shares)
–Less than t shares to not reveal any information about s –Equal to or more than t shares allow reconstructing s |
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CIA
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•Confidentiality
•Integrity –Data Integrity, Origin Integrity (Authentication) –Non-Repudiation •Availability |
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Aspects of MANET Security
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•Secure Routing
•(Specific) Attack Prevention •Intrusion Detection •Key Management |
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Aspects of MANET Security
Secure Routing |
MANETs do not have any pre-deployed infrastructure
•Nodes cooperatively form the network by agreeing to certain routing messages •Thus, intermediate nodes must route the packets |
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Specification-based Intrusion Detection
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Hand-made model of states and transitions. Detect:
–A node moves to an illegal state –A node makes an illegal transition (input missing) –A node transitions without proper output –Messages sent don’t follow expected model |
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Statistical-based IDS
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Can find attacks where state is not violated
–Flooding –Dropping –Partitioning |
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MANET - Joining the Network
–A new node can join the network by securely contacting t member nodes and receiving all required information |
•Its share of the network-wide private key
•Its own private key •The network-wide public key •Capability to compute public keys •Capability to compute shared symmetric keys |
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MANET
Saxena Approach |
–A verifiable secret sharing scheme is used in order to distribute the security parameters
–Each node has a share of the network-wide private key |