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144 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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what is waltz theory called
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structural realism/great power politics
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what are waltz three points
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ordering principles, unit characteristics, distribution of capabilities
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how isdomestic politics structured
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hierarchical
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how is international politics structured
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anarchy
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distribution of capabilities
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ability of a unit to perform a specific task and survival is based on military power
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effects of anarchic orders
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self help, not violence but how to deal with it
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why is cooperation difficult
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relative gains, fear of interdependence
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what is mearshiemers theory called
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offensive realism
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what are mearshiemers 5 points
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1. anarchy 2. offensive capability 3. uncertain about intentions 4. survival is primary motive 5. rational actors
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what is mearshiemers arguement
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states behave because of fear, self help, power maximization
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what is mearshiemers goal
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to become most powerful
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uncertainty of intentions+self help
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power maximization
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security dilemma
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measures a state takes to increase its security and decrease others. defensive weapons with offensive purposes
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hegemonys limits
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no other state has military capabilites to put up a fight, global hegemons, us is regional hegemon in west. global hegemony is impossible because of water. exception is nuclear superiority
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powers goals
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become hegemon, stop others from becoming hegemon.
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according to mearshiemer why gain power?
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anarchy, uncertainty, defensive capability
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according to waltz why gain power?
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anarchy
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how much power should a state seek according to waltz
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enough to balance
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accoring to morgentheau why gain power?
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human nature
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prisoners dilemma
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based on mearshiemers thoery. the dominant strategy is both states take negative consequence and split benifits later
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chicken
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no dominat strategy, nuclear war is example
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staghunt
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cooperation is the dominant strategy, defensive realism and arms races
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what are problems with cooperation
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relative gains, public goods (freeriding) incentive to defect
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how to solve the problems with cooperation
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redistribute extra gains
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Public goods
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benefits everyone, cannot exclude anyone, who bears cost? incentive to free ride
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How can we stop war?
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raise cost, increase transparency, provide outsice enforcement of commitments, divide apparently invisible goods
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who things that distribution of power leads to war?
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mersheimer
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balanced bipolarity
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stable
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unbalanced multipolarity
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wont last long
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unbalanced multipolarity
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most conflict prone
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balanced multipolarity
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in the middle
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which is more conflict prone? multi or bipolarity
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multi
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why is multipolatiry more conflict prone
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inbalances of power, more great powers, uneven distribution of wealth and power
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unitary state
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coherent actors with a set of national interests
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who benefits from wars within a state
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only some of the actors
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general or national interest
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somethin that most actors share
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narrow or particularistic interests
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only interests a small number of actors
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what are the three types of actors
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leaders who make decisions, organized groups within state, the general public
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what are some of the leaders interests
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ideology, wealth, power, influence
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rally effect
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people become more supportive of government during a crisis
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how are leaders approval ratings eeffected at the onset of a war?
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they jump up
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what can wars do?
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increase patriotism, ease criticism of gov. create diversion from other problems, leaders blame countries problems on foriegners.
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what were some popular wars in us
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ww2, persian gulf, afghanastan
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military industrial complex
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an alliance of military leaders and arms manufacturers
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bureaucratic organizations
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bigger budgets, personal promotion and defense spending
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hawkish domestic interests
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more opportunities for bargaining failure
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alliances
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small numbers of like minded states, form when states have common interests, facilitate cooperation,
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collective security organizations
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one for all, all for one. promise intervention if any state attacks any state, form around a public interest in promoting peace, facilitates collective action,
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offensive alliances
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states pledge to join one another in the attack of another state
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defensive alliances
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requires states to come to the aid if attacked by another state
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what do states find threatening?
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geographical proximity, ideological and cultural dissimilarity, the existance of high power disputes
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hard balancing
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military power
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soft balancing
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using international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements, to delay, frustrate other states policies
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what are the two effects of alliances
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deter challanges, embolden states to demand more from adversaries
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what are the two outcomes of successful alliances
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increase odds that each state will fight on the others behalf, convince adversaries that they will in fact fight together
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what is the percentage of alliances that are honored
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about 75%
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institutions
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maintain the balance of power
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ikenberry and wright
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rising states can be integrated into into existing institutions
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power transitions
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they do not always lead to war.
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why is the current us order easier to join and harder to overturn
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existing powers provide security for rising powers, institutions are easier to operate, existing institutions have incentives to accomodate rising states
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collective security
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all states have a common interest in preventing war and aggression, an attack on one member is an attack on all
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what are some collective security organizations
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the league of nations 1919, un 1945
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what are other benefits of collective securities
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help states identify mutually beneficial trades, provide peacekeeping toops to enforce peace agreements
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how to CSO's prevent war
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raise the chance of outside intervention, help resolve committment problemsby enforcing agreements, serve as neutral observeers and peace keepers
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what are two major challenges with CSO's
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collective action problemss, joint decision making problems
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collective action problem
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international peace and security is a public good, member states are tempted to freeride and put responsbilities on others
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challanges of joint decision making problems
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which acts are considered threatening to the community,which states are considered aggressive, selecting a response to aggression
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when does collective securty work best
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when all are satisfied with the status quo
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what are advantages of giving most power to powerful states
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reduce cost of coming to an agreement, fewer decision makers means quick responses, actions have consent of strongest powers
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veto
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biases policy outcomes
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when do collective security agreements succeed?
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powerful states agree on the desirability of collective action, enough members value the collective good to pay the cost of action
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what can the un do?
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a peace enforcing operation and a peace keeping organization
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peacekeeping
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a peace keeping operation typically requires a host nation to let the un in
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peace enforcing
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mroe heavily armed, targeted against perceived aggressors
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from what dates was the un incapable
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1946-1989
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why does un have a hard time?
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institutions have a hard time mediating between great powers
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mercantalism
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a system by whic imperial governments used military power to enrich themsleves and their supporters, then used those riches to enhance their military power.
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Peace of Westphalia
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1648
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Seven Year's War
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1756
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World War I
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1914
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Central Powers
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Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria
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Allied Powers
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Britain, France, and Russia- and most of the rest of Europe.
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Treaty of Versailles
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June 28, 1919
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World War II
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1939
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U.S. dropping nuclear weapons on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
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August 1945
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization
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1949
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Berlin Airlift
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1949
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Cuban Missile Crisis
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1962
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the Soviet Union dissolved into independent non-communist states
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1991
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Interests
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what actors want to achieve through political action
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interests are grouped in three categories
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Power or security Economic or material welfare Ideological Goals
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Actors
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unit of political analysis emerging either as individuals or groups of people with common interests
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State
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central authority that has the ability to make and enforce laws, rules, and decisions within its territory
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interests are grouped in three categories
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Power or security Economic or material welfare Ideological Goals
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Actors
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unit of political analysis emerging either as individuals or groups of people with common interests
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Sovereignty
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the expectation that states have legal and political supremacy within their boundaries.
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State
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central authority that has the ability to make and enforce laws, rules, and decisions within its territory
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Interactions
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the ways in which the choices of two or more actors combine to produce political outcomes.
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Sovereignty
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the expectation that states have legal and political supremacy within their boundaries.
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Strategic Interactions
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each actor's strategy, or plan of action, depends on the anticipated strategy of others.
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Interactions
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the ways in which the choices of two or more actors combine to produce political outcomes.
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Best Response Strategy
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the actor's plan to do as well as possible, in light of the interests and likely strategies of the other relevant actors
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Strategic Interactions
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each actor's strategy, or plan of action, depends on the anticipated strategy of others.
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Cooperation
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occurs when two or more actors adopt policies that make at least one actor better off than it would be otherwise
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Best Response Strategy
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the actor's plan to do as well as possible, in light of the interests and likely strategies of the other relevant actors
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Bargaining
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an interaction in which actors must choose outcomes that make one better off at the expense of the other
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Cooperation
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occurs when two or more actors adopt policies that make at least one actor better off than it would be otherwise
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Pareto Frontier- Cooperation
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At any moment in time, past policy combinations have produced an outcme referred to as the status quo (q). Any policy combination that leads to an outcome in the area qba would make both actors better off than they are under the status quo.
-Policies along the line segment qa improve A's welfare at no loss to B, and policies along the line segment qb improve B's welfare at no loss to A. |
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Bargaining
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an interaction in which actors must choose outcomes that make one better off at the expense of the other
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Pareto Frontier- Cooperation
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At any moment in time, past policy combinations have produced an outcme referred to as the status quo (q). Any policy combination that leads to an outcome in the area qba would make both actors better off than they are under the status quo.
-Policies along the line segment qa improve A's welfare at no loss to B, and policies along the line segment qb improve B's welfare at no loss to A. |
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Pareto Frontier- Bargaining
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When actors bargain, they move along the Pareto Frontier (line connecting B axis with A axis).
-Any improvement in A's welfare comes strictly at the expense on B's welfare. |
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Types of Cooperation
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coordination and collaberation
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Coordination
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situation in which actors simply must coordinate their actions and there is no potential benefit to defect.
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Collaboration
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: situation in wich actors gain from working together, but have a unilateral incentive to defect.
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Iteration
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interactions with the same partners
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Linkage
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linking of cooperation on one issue to interactions on a second issue
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Effects of Bargaining
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Reversion Outcome and power
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Power
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ability of Actor A to get Actor B to do something that B would not otherwise do
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Reversion Outcome
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occurs when no bargain is reached, and in some cases is the same as the status quo.
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Coercion
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the threat or imposition of costs on others to reduce the value of the reversion outcome and thus change their behavior
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Outside options
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alternatives to reaching a bargain with a particular partner that are more attractive than the status quo
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Agenda-setting power
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power derived from actions taken prior to or during bargaining that make the reversion outcome more favorable for one party
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Institutions
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sets of rules, known and shared by the community, that structure political interactions in specific ways; many are embodied in laws or organizations and generally serve to facilitate cooperation among their members
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Anarchy
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characterized, on the international level, as the abscence of formal government.
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War
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an event involving the organized use of military force by at least two parties that satisfies some minimal threshold of severity
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Interstate war
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a war in which the main participants are states
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Civil war
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a war in which the main participants are within the same state, such as the government and a rebel group
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Crisis bargaining/Cooercive diplomacy
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bargaining under the threat of war
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Bargaining range
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set of deals that both parties prefer to the reversion outcome, when this is war, it is the set of deals both sides prefer to war
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Compellence
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an effort to change the status quo through threat of force
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Deterrence
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to preserve the status quo through threat of force
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General deterrence
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an effort to deter an attack on one’s own country
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Extended deterrence
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effort to deter an attack on an ally or friend
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Incomplete information
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a situation in which parties in a strategic interaction lack information about other parties’ interests and/or capabilities.
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Resolve
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refers to a state’s willingness to bear the costs of fighting and how much the state values the object of the dispute relative to those costs
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Risk-return tradeoff
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in crisis bargaining, the tradeoff between trying to get a better deal and trying to avoid war.
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Credibility
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a credible threat is a threat that the recipient believes will be carried out. A credible commitment is a commitment or promise that the recipient believes will be honored
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Brinkmanship
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a strategy in which adversaries take actions that increase the risk of accidental war, with the hope that the other will “blink”, or lose its nerve, first and make concessions
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Tying Hands
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making threats in ways that make backing down difficult
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Audience costs
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negative repercussions that arise in the event that the leader does not follow through on the threat
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Preventive war
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a war that is fought with the intention of preventing an adversary from becoming relatively stronger in the future
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First-strike advantage
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the situation that arises when there is a considerable benefit to being the first to launch an attack.
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Preemptive war
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a war fought with the anticipation that an attack by the other side is imminent.
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Indivisible Good
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good that cannot be divided without destroying its value
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