International Organizations

Front 1

What are the two forces present in the global world?

Back 1

(Lecture)

1. The 'pushing force' is the 'prevalence of the modern state'. This means that no territory belongs to no state; state is the only form of organization; it was established by the treaty of Westphalia in 1648; the state has become the universal form of political organization; the state is a territorial unit (with the exception of failed states); sovereignty means the absence of a superior authority; IOs are intergovernmental in nature; IOs replicate states based on bureaucracy.

2. The 'pulling force' is 'globalization'. Globalization defines an environment of deterritorialization, and a process driven by technological change -- but also a political project; it encompasses the skill revolution where private citizens can now be a part of global change and have a political impact. Globalization generates a new kind of transnational challenges: for example, global warming, the Asian Financial Crisis of the 1970s, HIV/AIDS, and nuclear smuggling.

Front 2

Globalization

Back 2

(Lecture)

"Globalization refers to the process whereby many social relations became relatively delinked from territorial geography, sot hat human lives are increasingly played out in the world as a single place." (Scholte)

Front 3

Global Governance Gap (GGG)

Back 3

(Rosenau)

The GGG is the gap caused by the pushing forces of the state and the pulling forces of globalization: ideally, we need to create an instrument between the emerging global problems and the existing forms of political rule. This is easier said that done, however, as is exemplified by the global warming intergovernmental meetings which always fail. As a result, we use IOs to mediate negotiations and agreements -- to fill the global governance gap.

Two problems: how do we ensure efficiency, and how do we establish legitimacy?

Front 4

Global Governance

Back 4

(Rosenau)

Global governance comprises "systems of rule at all lengths of human activity - from the family to the international organization - in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions."
Global governance is NOT global government; it is the process of purposely ordering, in the absence of a sovereign authority, relationships that transcend national borders.

Challenge to global governance: the effect of changes at the personal/familial level can ripple out to affect the regional/provincial level, etc.

Front 5

What are the transnational governance mechanisms?

Back 5

(Rosenau)

1. Top-down process in which "states create new institutional structures and impose them on the course of events."

2. "Bottom-down process of evolutionary stages wherein nascent dynamics of rule-making are sponsored by publics or economies that experience a need for repeated interactions that foster habits and attitudes of cooperation, which in turn generate organizational activities that eventually get transformed into institutionalized control mechanisms."

Examples:
- Transnational Social Movement Organization (TSMOs)
- Issue Regimes
- Credit-Rating Agencies
- Crime Syndicates
- External Monitoring

Front 6

What are the defining features of an IO?

Back 6

(Lecture)

IOs are:
1. Founded by states;
2. States are the members; &
3. Independent corporate personality.

(Hurd)

IOs are founded by states with an explicit interstate treaty, states as members, independent corporate personality.
IOs are NOT international order, international institutions, NGOs (private), or other private actors (e.g. MNCs).

There are global (e.g. UN), regional (e.g. EU), subregional (e.g. Mekong Group) IOs.

Front 7

What are the functions of an IO?

Back 7

(Hurd)

IOs are actors, forums, and resources.

- IO as an Actor: they have independent legal standing (they can be sued), they require social recognition. Example: the ICC indicted the Sudanese President, its jurisdiction was based on the Rome Statute.
- IO as a Resource: IOs are political resources states use as they pursue their goals. Example: Security Council refers Darfur Conflict to the ICC.
- IO as a Forum: IOs are physical structures, they have a plenary body (has a strong legitimizing effect), this is the most basic function of IOs. Example: 2005, the General Assembly adopts the norm of R2P and R2I in a lieu.

Existential paradox of IOs: IOs powers and existence derive from the same actors (states) that they are supposed to regulate, govern, and influence.

Front 8

What are the three methodologies for studying IOs?

Back 8

1. Contractualism;
2. Regime Theory; &
3. Constructivism

Front 9

Methodology for studying IOs: Contractualism

Back 9

(Hurd)

IOs are contracts made between states.
- States make up the organization, and studies their choices, options, and behaviors;
- States are the active agents (very agent-centric);
- The power of international rules comes from state consent and state choices about compliance.

Problem: theory is too static; we need conceptual tools that can accommodate more of the complex interactions between states and international law.

Front 10

Methodology for studying IOs: Regime Analysis

Back 10

(Hurd)

- What are the rules?
- Do they have any impact on state decision-making?
- Travels from rules to states
- Regime-analysis is a structuralist counterpart to contractualism's agenticism.
- Rules cannot be avoided by states.

Front 11

Methodology for studying IOs: Constructivism

Back 11

(Hurd)

The agency of states and the structure of rules cannot be separated.
- Focuses on the processes that link states and international rules or practice
- People interact with rules in everything they do -- social actions outside of rules is impossible.

The appeal of the constructivist method lies in its effort to consider at once the strategic choices of actors and the conditioning environment of IOs.

Front 12

Why states use IOs: Rational-Institutionalist Perspective

Back 12

(Abbott & Snidal)

Sees IOs as enabling states to achieve their ends. States use IOs because the latter allows from the centralization of collective activities through a concrete and stable organizational structure and as a supportive administrative apparatus. IO independence is highly constrained by member states.

- States are the principle actors;
- States use IOs to create social orderings appropriate to their pursuit of shared goals.

(Lecture)

Coaste theorem: microeconomics could not explain how firms existed. People create firms because the benefits exceed the costs; transactions costs: time could be a variable. Provides information to the states about their reliability/trustworthiness. IOs reduce trasnaction costs.

Front 13

Why states use IOs: Regime Theory

Back 13

(Abbott & Snidal)

Based on regime analysis provided by Hurd's reading.
Problem: deals with institutions at such a general level that it has little to say about the particular institutional arrangements that organize international politics. It pays insufficient attention to issues of power and distribution in international politics, and it barely considers the role of ideas and norms in international politics.

Front 14

Why states use IOs: Decentralized Cooperation Theory

Back 14

(Abbott & Snidal)

Collective action is required.
- Assumes anarchy
- States cooperate through strategies of reciprocity and other forms of sel-fhelp
- Cooperation is unlikely without an adequate institutional context.

Front 15

Why states use IOs: Legal Scholarship

Back 15

(Abbott & Snidal)

Offers descriptive accounts of the history and institutional architecture of IOs, as well as doctrinal analysis of norms and texts, especially the normative output of organizations.

Front 16

Why states use IOs: Realist Theory

Back 16

(Abbott & Snidal)

Believes that states would never cede to supranational institutions the strong enforcement capacities necessary to overcome international anarchy. IOs merely reflect national interests and power and do not constrain powerful states.

(Lecture)

Neorealism: anarchy leads to self-help. To ensure your security, you must maximize power as a state in order to protect yourself. As a result, they cannot bind themselves against the logic of self-help, to things like IOs and other states. Therefore, the distribution of material capabilities is key: great powers create IOs to foster their interests. IOs are TOOLS. States are reluctant to create IOs because of twin problems of relative gains and cheating. The former is when states worry about the distribution of gains from cooperation. You can match the gains you win versus another state -- if you win less, however, you can choose to no longer cooperate. This is not the same thing as absolute gain, which is when states cooperate together and create a community. The latter occurs when states worry others will defect from the organization.

Front 17

Why states use IOs: Neoiberalism

Back 17

(Lecture)

Prisoners' Dilemma: if two people are in separate jail cells, theoretically they both care about themselves more than the others' well-being. If you ask them to give up the other, there are several options: the first is that both remain silent (best option), and the charges are dropped. The second is that both confess, and so each have early parole (second best option). The third/fourth options include when one confesses and the other remains silent; the one who remains silent gets thrown into jail whereas the other one walks free (worst option for the jailed one, best option for the free one). This is a classic example of cooperation and defection. IOs therefore deliver functions that help mitigate the consequences of political failure.

Front 18

Neoliberalism: Political Market Failure

Back 18

(Lecture)

How do IOs mitigate the consequences of political failure?

1) Increased # of transactions: the more you create and build alliances and create codependency and trust, you have cooperation. This allows you to punish defectors. Cooperation is more beneficial in the long run.
2) Issue-linkage: states are inclined to cooperate on issues that they don't really care for, because IOs make it so that states' codependency will cause actors to deal with all sorts of issues to help others.
3) Increased information: more information makes non-compliance much harder to do because everyone will know who is defecting or not. The costs of defecting are much higher.
4) Reducing transaction costs: if they want to cooperate, states know exactly where to go. IOs reduce transaction costs by providing the infrastructure and manpower necessary for states to cooperate.

Based on Abbott & Snidal's two conditions for IOs:
1) Centralization: the idea of establishing an organization that can provide a stable negotiation forum;
2) Independence: IOs have the ability to act with a degree of independence, which serves the purposes of efficiency.

Front 19

Neoliberalism: Tragey of the Commons

Back 19

(Lecture)

When players are in a situation where they can use a public good, they will use it regardless of collective needs, eventually to the detriment of these public goods. Public goods are non-rivalrous, where the marginal cost of production is zero, or non-excludable, where it's impossible to prevent enjoyment -- you cannot prevent people from consuming it. (e.g. air quality, the high seas, world peace, etc.)
There is the problem of free-riding. IOs help mitigate this problem by: (1) providing a guaranteed context for bargaining; (2) reducing cheating through monitoring and punishing defectors; (3) facilitating transparency; (4) providing focal points for coordination; (5) facilitating credible commitments.

Front 20

Why states use IOs: Principle-Agent (P-A) Theory

Back 20

(Lecture)

The principals (the states) hire an agent (an IO) to perform some function. States delegate functions to agents because they think IOs will be more efficient and effective (and have better expertise). The principals do not pay significant costs associated with micromanaging the agent.
Problem: there is 'agency slippage' (the agent/IO takes advantage to act in ways that states did not have in mind at the time of delegation). States can prevent this through oversight, procedural checks and balances, and threats to redraft contracts.

(Nielson & Tierney)

P-A Theory is an extension of neoliberal institutionalism. It explains how member governments "sometimes empower their agents with real decision-making authority."
Principals must overcome the following problems to constrain agent behavior: (1) collective-action problems; (2) multiple principals; & (3) agent proximity. These can be overcome through: (1) "screen & select IO personnel more carefully; (2) "oversight" monitoring through "police-patrol oversight" (direct monitoring of agent behavior) & "fire-alarm oversight (enlisting the aid of 3rd parties); (3) "procedural checks and balances"; and (4) "drafting new contracts" with personnel with the incentive of an award for their modified behavior.

P-A Model: "member governments (making up the principal) hire an IO (the agent) to perform some function that will benefit the members. [...] Member governments establish the goals that IOs will pursue and then allow the IO to pursue those goals with little interference most of the time."
Agency slippage has a tendency to occur when there is a long delegation chain in the IO.
Terms: multiple principals = when an organization has a contract with two or more principals; collective principal = when an organization has one contract with one principal, comprised of numerous actors (most common one).

Case Study: World Bank.

Front 21

Why states use IOs: Organization Theory

Back 21

(Lecture)

IOs are used as bureaucracies. IOs are purposive agents, they have four main features:
1) Hierarchy (division of labour; chain of command)
2) Continuity (have a material existence that allows it to persist over time)
3) Impersonality (chains of authority - not who you are but what you can do)
4) Expertise (meritocracy).

By examining IOs as bureaucracies, you can understand their authority (based on principal-agent theory), their power (ideas shape and restrain public policies), their goals ("iron law": any IOs will ensure its survival before its goal), and their behavior (bureaucratic behavior that doesn't always make sense).

Front 22

Why states use IOs: IOs as Social Environments
(Constructivism)

Back 22

(Lecture)

States are socialized into IOs, and states don't emerge the same after entering one.
Socialization process:
1) Source of state interests;
2) Socialization "thick and thin" (thick: persuasion; thin: social influence);
3) Social pressure/influence;
4) Audience: NOT tragedy of the commons -- the more actors there are involved, social mechanisms work much more efficiently through backpatting, shaming, etc.

Front 23

IO "Pathologies"
(Constructivism)

Back 23

(Barnett and Finnemore)

How do IOs have power as bureaucracies?
1) the legitimacy of the rational-legal authority they embody; and
2) control over technical expertise and information.

Why IOs as bureaucracies risk uncontrolled growth and unhealthy path dependence:

1) Irrationality of rationalization: rational procedures that IOs develop often become irrational;
2) Bureaucratic universalism: bureaucracy as the rational way to govern can create lack of attention to a specific context;
3) Normalization of Deviancy: IOs as bureaucracies start to bend the rules and entrench new norms (that were never meant to exist) in order to ensure its organizational survival;
4) Insulation: people on the ground vs. bureaucrats back at home will have different outlooks;
5) Cultural contestation: IOs are not just one single bureaucracy - each are different with different norms.

Front 24

Why states use IOs: Collective Security

Back 24

(Lecture)

Regulate the use of organized violence. The notion of a group of political units joining forces to address threats from the inside ("one for all, all for one"). This is NOT collective defense.
Against realism. You only see this happening when it fails.

Front 25

Evolution of IOs

Back 25

1. The Hanseatic League (13th-17th): lasted 400 years. Protestant Europe was trying to facilitate trade amonsgt themselves.
2. Treaty of Westphalia (1648): Collective Security ideas are being thrown around.
3. The Concert of Europe (1815): "Definitive settlement" reorganized collective security, multilateral diplomacy occurred, met over thirty times to deal with complex issues, hierarchy was established.
4. The Hague Conferences (19th century post-Concert of Europe): ad-hoc problem solving, near-universality of participants, preventive approach (it's now about how to prevent wars vs. how to win them).
5. League of Nations (1919): Woodrow Wilson and his 14 points, standing committees were created, UN had an executive council, a general assembly, and a permanent secretariat.
6. Kellog-Briand Pact (1928): agreement by most League of Nations members banning war. UN charter today is similar, with two exceptions: war can occur if you are attacked, or under mandate use Chapter 7.
7. Japanese Invasion of Manchuria (1931): forbidden by the league, but it occurred anyway --first failure of the League to ensure order. LACK OF REACTION by the int'l community.
8. Italian Invasion of Ethiopia (1935): Second League of Nations to react.
9. Spanish Civil War, Remilitarization of Rhineland, Occupation of Austria: League of Nations is constantly challenged and the pact is never upheld. WWII begins in 1939.

Front 26

Why did the League of Nations fail?

Back 26

(Lecture)

1. Incomplete membership (Americans never joined, USSR joined only in the end, Germany marched out as soon as they came to power);
2. Different views of the League's purpose (the French wanted vengeance on the Germans, the British were passive and reluctant);
3. Close associations with WWI settlements (document didn't identify the winners or losers, caused grievances);
4. Collective security w/o teeth (Security Council resolutions were never implemented);
5. Rule of consensus (today it works as a qualified majority, but before, for example, Belgium could veto anything).

Front 27

Key Principles of the UN Charter

Back 27

(Lecture)

- Closest thing to a global constitution without establishing global governMENT;
- Preamble: "we the people";
- Freedom, human rights, gender equality, etc;
- Sovereign equality: 1 state = 1 vote;
- Hierarchy: states need to fulfill certain requirements;
- No threats allowed;
- Paragraph 7: the UN should not intervene in domestic issues of any one state (the norm of non intervention).

Front 28

Tensions in the UN Charter

Back 28

(Lecture)

- Human Rights Protection vs. Non-Interference in domestic affairs;
- "We the people" vs. State Centrism;
- Supranational Authority vs. Self-Defense;
- Veto vs. Flexible Responses

Front 29

Peacekeeping

Back 29

(Lecture)

Peacekeeping is not actually outlined in the Charter, Instead, it is humorously referred to as Chapter "6 1/2": located somewhere between the non-military tools of Chapter 6 and military forces of Chapter 7 of the Un Charter.

Peacekeeping works along 3 principles:
1) Keep the consent of local parties;
2) Neutrality and Impartiality; &
3) Force used only in self-defense.

Front 30

Evolution of Peacekeeping

Back 30

(Lecture)

1. Traditional Peacekeeping: defined by the UN (1991) as an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the UN to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. Changed as conflict transformed from inter-state conflict to intra-state conflicts. Before it was more about peaceKEEPING, today UN forces enter places of military warfare to ESTABLISH peace.
2. 2nd and 3rd generations of peacekeeping have two chief characteristics: (1) complex humanitarian emergencies, and (2) taking sides. (Rwandan genocide showed the latter's catastrophe when no one took sides.) Charter is all about state sovereignty - but conflicts are more about human security.
3. Fourth generation: We need a much more 'muscular' peacekeeping force - now it is about 'peacebuilding'. Problem: how do we measure if peacebuilding was a success?

(Kristensen)

Peacekeeping from 1956-1983:
1) Consent of the parties were required;
2) Lightly armed troops;
3) Limited observation mandate;
4) Use of force, only in strict self-defense; &
5) Absolute neutrality.

Changing landscape post-Cold War:
1) Cold War ended which led to a more cooperative climate;
2) Democracy and human rights were embraced by previously authoritarian countries; &
3) The ability to travel quickly and media had public opinion reacting to crises by telling their governments to "do something."

Peacekeeping post-Cold War:
1) The UNSC began to give PK mission more ambitious mandates;
2) the UNSC deployed PK forces in situations where combat was still raging.
3) Numerous PK failures: Somalia, Yugoslavia, Rwanda.

Front 31

Why the Security Council has become the most impressive source of legitimacy for the use of military force

Back 31

(Voeten)

Problems:
1. It has been inconsistent in applying legal principles.
2. Member state do not actively look for an independent judgement on the appropriateness of an intervention; instead, they want political reassurance about the consequences of proposed military adventures.

SC's actual authority over uses of force:
1. Article 51 of the Charter: inherent right of states to use force in individual or collective self-defense against armed attacks. You do not need explicit UN approval -- however, states exploit this rule.
2. Resolution 1373: reaffirms the right of the USA to forcefully in its self-defense against terrorist activities and de facto legitimizes the US military action in Afghanistan.
3. Chapter VII: more active role for the SC in the management of international security. The SC can authorize uses of force in response to the existence of any threat tot he peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.

Legitimacy resides entirely in the subjective belief of actors. Contrasts with the conception that legitimacy properly signifies a evaluation or normative grounds, usually derived from democratic theory.
Legitimacy of international institutions resides in their ability to appear depoliticized by faithfully applying a set of rules, procedures, and norms that are deemed desirable by the international community.
Legal consistency: "to maintain its standing as a legitimate conferrer of legal judgements, an institution must thus strive for consistency in its rulings and motivate deviations from past practice with developing legal principles.

Security Council as an effective forum.

Security Council as an Elite Pact: central coalition of great powers. Citizens of states do not need to know what decision to make -- instead, they should rely on the knowledge that SC authorization = no costs, vs. SC unauthorization = costly.

Front 32

R2P

Back 32

(Lecture)

Responsibility to Protect (R2P) serves to protect civil population from crimes against humanity when the domestic authorities fail to do so.

Criteria:
- Right authority
- Just cause
- Right intention
- Last resort
- Proportional means
- Reasonable prospects

It was adopted in the UN World Summit Document 2005

Case study: Libya and Ivory Coast. SC used R2P to intervene. Used Chapter 7, even without consent which indicates the urgency of humanitarian actions. Regional organizations played the role of doorkeepers. SC has legitimate authority - ethical protection of populations.

(Bellamy)

Case study: Libya. Protests due to regime crackdown and establishment of armed opposition group under Interim Council; Qaddafi vowed to kill any resistors. Regional organizations set out conditions for force: League of Arab States (LAS) suspended Libya. [SIDENOTE: LAS is a Chapter VIII organization which can ask the UNSC to take enforcement measures against its own member states, but it can also undertake enforcement action on its own with UNSC authorization.] the UK and France took a tough stance; the US was more reticent in regards to military options; Russia, India, Brazil, Germany used restrictive measures but did not join sanctions or interfere directly as this could prolong conflict - this raised practical and procedural questions. UN referred to ICC Qaddafi, imposed travel bans on 16 regime leaders, froze assets, established sanctions. UN used force. NATO helped. Genuine humanitarian solidarity and opportunism and media coverage.

Front 33

ICC

Back 33

(Lecture)

International Criminal Court, established in 2002 under the 1998 Rome Statute. Everyone who signed this statute pledged to fully cooperate with the ICC - the later relies on countries, doesn't have a police, prisons, etc. It is a body of international criminal law used as a last resort.
Three tests to jurisdiction:
1) The person must be suspected of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide.
2) The person must be connected to an ICC state.
3) Show that the country is failing and that the domestic judicial system is not able to deal with the issue.

States refer a person to the ICC through the state itself, the UNSC, or as a result of the independent prosecutors/investigators.

Doesn't always work. Helps condemn criminals, however: Bashar al-Assad (when he wanted to gas his population); Gadhafi: already cornered.

Front 34

UN Security Council needs to be reformed

Back 34

(Hurd)

Needs to be reformed due to:
- Geopolitical changes;
- Systemic changes after decolonization; and
- Normative changes.
Council needs better credibility, legitimacy, and representation.

Legitimacy: a belief of states of how they should contribute; a belief held BY states on how it perceives the UNSC to operate; the belief about the right of the body to make decisions; the legal structures of the Charter set a limit on the areas over which this right extends.

Process:
INEQUALITY -> LOSS OF LEGITIMACY
LOSS OF LEGITIMACY -> LOSS OF POWER OR EFFECTIVENESS

How fix this:
CHANGE IN STRUCTURE -> INCREASE IN LEGITIMACY
INCREASE IN LEGITIMACY -> INCREASE IN EFFECTIVENESS

How to gain legitimacy:
- More representation;
- More diversity;
- Having your own country occupy a seat on the Council.
- Potentially deliberation -- Hurd, however, disputes this even though it improves the distribution of info between debaters so that they can make better decisions. This is because more interests due to increased representation reduces the possibility of consensus in decisions.

Deliberation hypotheses:
H1: the membership of the Council is representative of the General Assembly membership;
H2: the membership of the Council is diverse;
H3: the state is a member of the Council;
H4: the state has an opportunity to participate in deliberations at the Council;
H5: the level of deliberation at the Council is high.

Front 35

Intergovernmentalism vs. Transnationalism

Back 35

(Cronin)

United Nations is not just a forum for negotiation, but also the embodiment of the international community.
Tensions between intergovernmentalism and transnationalism: (1) they have different sets of interests; (2) they have distinct constituencies: member states vs. humanity ("common good").

Problem: states are often unwilling to promote transnational goals serving an "international community", especially when these goals don't benefit the states' domestic constituencies.

UN must figure this out: it has two roles, a role as a intergovernmental organization coordinating the activities of its membership vs. its role as a transnational network promoting some type of common good.
Who will the UN eventually end up serving?

Front 36

Public Unions

Back 36

(Cronin)

The first bodies that, like the UN, dealt with transnational issues such as the Industrial Revolution.
Examples of functional IOs: Interpol, ITU, Bank of International Settlements, etc.
Examples of transnational organizations: Red Cross, International Chamber of Commerce, etc.
All private organizations.

Front 37

ILO

Back 37

(Cronin)

International Labour Organization: started in 1919 and survived WWII. Became a UN body in 1946. It fosters cooperation, and addresses socioeconomic issues (such as working conditions).

Its peculiarities include:
1. Its tripartite structure (unionists and workers can voice their opinions in Geneva; but who is going to enforce these laws? Who will turn them into laws?) Tripartite structure: made of three constituencies (government, employer, worker representatives).
2. Deliberative process to induce compliance (UN resolutions are a legal obligation; ILO works upfront; the only thing member states have to do is consider ILO conventions, NOT adopt them). Deliberation works in this sense because if you give enough time for member states to voice their opinions, they'd be more likely to adopt the conventions because they reflect their interests. However, you have to water down the agreement to get compliance.

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ECOSOC

Back 38

(Cronin)

Economic and Social Council:
Deals with any matters pertaining to social and economic issues. It implements "soft laws" (quasi-legal instruments which do not have any legally binding force) -- has the largest number of programmes in the UN. Spends the most amount of money in the UN. Has 54 members elected by the General Assembly for three-year terms. There are 25 specialized organizations under ECOSOC control. Set arrangements of consultations with NGOs. NGOs go to ECOSOC readings.

Problem: the more NGOs are represented in ECOSOCs, the more diluted their influence becomes and the less efficient ECOSOCs becomes.

Front 39

Ottaway: "Global Corporatism"

Back 39

(Cronin)

Government will appoint separate representatives for each interest group and they will meet and interact. Just like ECOSOCs use NGOs to represent special interest groups, which then meet to reach a consensus. However, this type of global corporatism has issues:
1) there's a lack of direct representation (the interest groups aren't always consulted);
2) NGOs tend to be self-appointed.

Global conferences are to make sure norms are upheld and to create new agendas. However, there are drawbacks to this: narrow objectives may be targeted; they have their own way of doing things.

Front 40

Complex Multilateralism

Back 40

(Cronin)

Multilateralism, despite its name, runs into certain pitfalls.

1) Limited pluralism:
- Who gets to make the decisions?
- Who gets to participate?
- Unbalanced relationships: members don't have the same amount of resources.
- E.g. Global Compact: who monitors compliance?
2) Marriage of convenience:
- Members are in a competitive relationship for resources;
- They have different constituencies;
- They have different recruitment methods (UN vs. NGOs);
- NGOs are more flexible and would like to adapt more quickly than the UN, which changes slowly;
- They have different definitions of success (NGOs highly depend on donors);
- IOs have to respect national sovereignty, NGOs don't.

Dilemma: the privatization of global governance highlights the lack of accountability when you give more power to private organizations.

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The North-South Divide: INEO

Back 41

(Lecture)

1947: 13-1 disparity income per average on a global scale.
1991: 60-1 "".
For the south, a deeper change was needed.
Result: a New International Economic Order (NIEO) was created in 1974 which, instead of asking for new organizations to deliver immediate results, it would abolish all kinds of structural barriers to development. Dominated the UN agenda for a decade and contributed to alienating rich countries at the General Assembly. Part of the reason that the (rich) West is no longer as interested in the General Assembly - it feels alienated. The INEO is:
1. Revised terms of international trade (link commodity prices to the prices of finished products that were being imported from the North. We keep on losing exchange when the imported goods values rises and the exported goods values decreases).
2. More control over resources and investment (Still a problem to this day: but if the North invests in the South, this investment isn't channeled towards need, buts its profit opportunities for the North).
3. Increased foreign aid
4. Debt relief
5. Reform of IOs.

In reality, the INEO did not produce much. Many ideas, few results. It was due to bad coincidence: in 1973, there was the first oil shock; later on, a major recession across the West (turned attention away from development aid); so long as there is debt, development remains a remote possibility.

Front 42

The North-South Divide

Back 42

(Lecture)

The South loses its united front that it had in the earlier 1970s; it split into mini-camps:
1. Successful Asian Countries (not just the Asian Tigers, e.g. South Korea);
2. Oil producers; and
3. The poor, the still porr, no successful economic boot. LDCs.

In the North, there is a change in terms of ideology: WWII = welfare state; late 1970s = neoliberalism and the "Washington Consensus."

Front 43

The North-South Divide: Washington Consensus

Back 43

(Lecture)

Washington Consensus consists of:

1. Pro-growth public expenditures;
2. Fiscal discipline (so you don't get deficits and you don't raise taxes);
3. Privatization of industry;
4. Liberalization of trade and investment;
5. Deregulations; and
6. Tax reform

Front 44

The North-South Divide: HDI

Back 44

(Therien)

Human Development Index: UNDP created it in the early 1990s. Canada was number one - the HDI created a normative shift in how we perceive development: it's a more economy-based understanding of development.

It's a market-friendly alternative to neoliberalism. Appeals to the south.

It has three pillars:
1. Health and education;
2. Equitable economic growth; and
3. Democratic governance (whole world that everyone would democratize -- did not really happen).

Political empowerment, human rights, gender disparities, and sustainability all came onto the UN agenda. UN problem: lack of resources.

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The North-South Divide: MDGs

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(Lecture)

Millennium Development Goals:
1. Eradicate extreme hunger and poverty;
2. Achieve universal primary education;
3. Promote gender equality and empower women;
4. Reduce child mortality;
5. Improve maternal health;
6. Combat HIV/AIDs, malaria, and other diseases;
7. Ensure environmental sustainability; and to
8. Develop a global partnership for development.

These goals are a compact between the rich and the poor – it’s not the poor asking for stuff and the rich not giving it, it’s about direct investment and technology transfer which is a very important issue in development.
Certain objectives have been pretty successfully met – on the whole. However, some countries haven’t met any requirements, whereas others have met all of them. This is the same problem we had in the 70s and 80s, where countries come out of the LDC status, and others don’t.
MDGs are a one-size-fits-all initiative.

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The North-South Divide: Global Compact

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(Lecture)

Corporate-citizenship initiative. Essentially what it does is that it invites (voluntary) the private sector, in this case, to support the core values of the international community or the United Nations. You have ten principles of the Global Compact (all drawn out of existing international or business conventions; and you have four general areas:
1. Human Rights;
2. Labor;
3. Environment; &
4. Anti-Corruption.

What these stakeholders have in common: a join interest in sustainable development.

Arguments for the global compact:
1. Substantive argument: the current global compact model is sufficient. E.g. Coca Cola implements anti-child labor procedures. Trade is better than aid. Instead of giving, you should trade with people.
2. Political process: the global compact is much more inclusive than anything else that has been done before.

Arguments against the global compact:
1. Substantive argument: it actually aggravates inequalities in the South. The private sector on its own is unable to address the biggest problem: distribution. How do you distribute money?
2. Tramples on democratic principles.

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The North-South Divide: Rio

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(Andonova & Hoffmann)

1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro: unleashed new energy in environmental governance (RIO+20). Multilateralism was seen as the way to govern global problems (e.g. climate change, biodiversity loss, desertification, etc).
Sustainable development was the focus -- inextricably linked to development and trade.

Two intergovernmental conventions adopted in 1992 at Rio:
1. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Kyoto Protocol created under this); &
2. The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).
Result: transnational city networks emerged to prepared local gov'ts for climate action, and community-based efforts for conservation and livelihoods proliferated.

Why it (partially) failed: there is a mismatch between a single, centralized, top-down global governance system and the inherently complex nature of environmental problems.

How we can get better outcomes: to generate processes consciously that lead to coordinated innovations. Int’l integration of private and hybrid governance solutions that are up to the task, and facilitate their up-scaling and more equitable distribution. Cooperation can be coordinated around issue clusters with compatible structures, whereby international institutions and rules can serve as anchors eliciting action by multiple constituencies. Such reorganization of the global governance space will not provide a magic bullet to collective problem solving. It could start a new legacy of collective wondering and multiple pathways to a greener future.

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Civil society and democracy

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(Scholte)

Civil society has the potential to detract from as well as add to democracy in ways that global affairs are regulated.

Crises of Democracy:
- Crisis of democracy caused by structural problems (how to protect yourself as a nation-state vs how to accept transnational globalization);
- Crisis of democracy caused by institutional deficiencies (lack of legitimacy, lack of public consent, lack of consultation, lack of popular referendum).

Civil society can promote democracy:
- Gives voice to stakeholders (people can address their grievances);
- Enhances public education activities (raises public awareness);
- Fuel debate about global governance (advances more critical and creative policy discussions);
- Civic mobilization increases public transparency;
- Increases public accountability of the regulatory agencies concerned (monitoring system to the institutions involved);
- Legitimacy occurs when people acknowledge that an authority has a right to govern and that they have a duty to obey its directives.

Civil Society might hurt democracy:
- It might under-perform in the functions mentioned above;
- Lack of education to educate others;
- Lack of funds;
- Civic activists may compromise their potential to promote plural views and provide space for dissent;
- Civil society may fail to meet standards of openness in its own activities.

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Good Governance

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(Woods)

Good governance is defined by 3 overlapping principles:
1) Participation: gives people a sense of ownership and a stake in its success;
2) Accountability: requires institutions to inform members of decisions and the grounds on which they were taken. Needs transparency and flows of information;
3) Fairness: Procedural fairness requires rules and standards be created and enforced in an impartial and predictable way; substantive fairness requires equitable outcomes and general equality and distribution of power, influence, and resources.

There is a democratic deficit: lack of direct representation and accountability for decisions taken on an international level (e.g. EU).
Good governance is needed in order to increase legitimacy.
IOs need to balance these three groups: (1) those with resources, (2) those whose compliance is needed, & (3) those who represent affected groups.

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Models of Global Democracy

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(Bexell, Tallberg, and Uhlin)

1. Representative Democracy: citizens choose between competing political elites with alternative political agendas and hold decision-makers accountable for their actions through electoral contest. At the international level, calls for establishment majoritarian institutions and it strengthens participation of transnational actions. PROBLEM: no global elections, very indirect chain of accountability. Undemocratic governments and little public oversight.
2. Participatory Democracy: direct citizen participation as prerequisite for proper democracy; concerned about avoiding exclusion/marginalization based on gender/class etc. PROBLEM: many votes left out, practical limits to inclusiveness (trade-off with efficiency).
3. Deliberative democracy: deliberation among citizens and their representatives as the mode for realizing democracy. Democratically legitimate decisions are best achieved through informed public debate, opinions, consensus and legitimacy. PROBLEM: no global public sphere and transnational elites can claim to speak for the majority of the world's population.

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Cooperation and Sanctions

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(Drezner)

Both are not correlated:
1. Cooperation fails because it is associated with tough bargaining strategies between the sanctioning states and the target;
2. Cooperation fails because successful bargaining between the primary and secondary sanctioners makers it impossible to compromise with the target country;
3. Cooperation fails because the primary sanctioner is unable to enforce the application of sanctions, due to defections by private rent-seeking actors or by nation-states.