Intelligence

Front 1

Command and control is about __ __. The main purpose of intelligence is to support the __ process.

Back 1

making decisions-decisionmaking

Front 2

The primary objective of intelligence is to support decisionmaking by reducing uncertainty about the __ __ to a reasonable level – recognizing, of course, that the __ __ __ renders anything close to absolute certainty impossible.

Back 2

hostile situation-fog of war

Front 3

The secondary objective is to assist in :

Back 3

protecting friendly forces through counterintelligence.

Front 4

What attribute of war can never be eliminated and pervades any battlefield;

Back 4

uncertainty

Front 5

To achieve this reduction in the commander’s unknowns - intelligence must accomplish (4) specific actions:

Back 5

1. Identify and evaluate existing environmental conditions and threat capabilities.
2. Estimate possible enemy courses of action (both present and future) based on environmental conditions and enemy capabilities.
3. Identify friendly vulnerabilities that the enemy may exploit in their Course of Action (COA).
4. Using this intelligence, assist in the development and evaluation of friendly
COAs.

Front 6

Intelligence Functions (6):

Back 6

1. Support the commander’s initial estimate of the situation to support decisionmaking and planning.
2. Develop the situation — provide the commander continuous situational awareness to permit flexibility or exploitation of opportunities.
3. Provide Indications and Warning (I&W) to help prevent the enemy from achieving surprise and allow the commander to be proactive vice reactive to enemy actions.
4. Support force protection — identifying - locating, and countering the enemy’s reconnaissance and surveillance
assets- intelligence apparatus- and sabotage/terrorism capabilities.
5. Support the targeting process — identifying targets- target systems- critical nodes- and high-value/high payoff targets.
6. Support combat assessment — essential to determining the overall effectiveness of combat operations.

Front 7

Information vs. Intelligence: Information is ___ material of every description, including that derived from observations, reports, rumors, imagery, and other sources which, when processed, __ produce intelligence.

Back 7

unevaluated-may

Front 8

Intelligence is “the product resulting from the(5):

Back 8

1. collection 2. evaluation 3. analysis 4. integration 5. interpretation

Front 9

To be considered intelligence, data must be placed in a context to provide an accurate and meaningful image of the __ __:

Back 9

hostile situation

Front 10

Combat information is unevaluated data, gathered by or provided directly to the __ __ because of its highly __ nature, or the __ of the situation; cannot be processed into tactical intelligence.:

Back 10

tactical commander-perishable-criticality

Front 11

Tactical intelligence is the (3):

Back 11

1. knowledge of the enemy 2. weather 3. geographic features-Terrain.

Front 12

Tactical intelligence should (5):

Back 12

1. Describe the operational environment.
2. Identify key factors in the operational environment that could potentially influence operations.
3. Define and evaluate threat capabilities (strengths and weaknesses).
4. Identify the enemy’s center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities.
5. Assess potential enemy intentions.

Front 13

Terrain and weather are the __ modifiers of doctrine
and plans - while terrain and
weather are __

Back 13

greatest-neutral, as they affect both the enemy and us.

Front 14

When determining how weather will affect friendly/enemy operations consider the following 4:

Back 14

1. Personnel 2. Tactics 3. Logistics 4. Terrain

Front 15

Winds, precipitation, visibility, and temperature will impact such logistics minded factors as 4:

Back 15

1 Amphibious offloads.
2 Resupply route trafficability.
3 Procurement of specialized equipment.
4 Types and amounts of supplies necessary to conduct operations.

Front 16

The __ will determine enemy capabilities against the unit
in light of the friendly mission and will propose the __ to the commander.

Back 16

S-2- enemy’s most probable course of action (EMPCOA)

Front 17

The S-2 then identifies __ __ associated with this EMPCOA, and again recommends these to the commander to aid in planning a friendly COA that will maximize effects against that critical vulnerability.

Back 17

exploitable vulnerabilities

Front 18

The __ is ultimately responsible for deciding what the likely enemy actions will be and how he will tailor his operations to exploit the enemy’s vulnerabilities.

Back 18

commander

Front 19

Intelligence operations in regard to the Marine Corps’ Warfighting philosophy (2):

Back 19

1 Remain flexible.
2 Use imagination.

Front 20

“Intelligence push”

Back 20

sends critical intelligence to the tactical commander

Front 21

“intelligence pull”

Back 21

allows the commander to receive additional intelligence support as needed from higher
sources.

Front 22

Intelligence collection activities require centralized
__ and decentralized __

Back 22

management-execution

Front 23

The (6) interdependent phases of the intelligence cycle:

Back 23

1 Planning and Direction.
2 Collection.
3 Processing and Exploitation.
4 Production.
5 Dissemination.
6 Utilization.

Front 24

The key to organizing and prioritizing your limited assets is an understanding of 3:

Back 24

1 Your mission.
2 The commander’s intent.
3 The use of priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and intelligence requirements (IRs).

Front 25

Priority Intelligence Requirement (PIR).

Back 25

An intelligence requirement associated with a decision that will critically affect the overall success of the unit’s mission. PIRs are always listed in priority order.

Front 26

In designating PIRs, the commander establishes 4:

Back 26

1 What he wants to know (intelligence required).
2 Why he wants it (linkage to operational decisionmaking).
3 When he needs it (LTIOV [Last Time Information is Of Value]).
4 How he wants it (format and method of delivery).

Front 27

Intelligence Requirement (IR):

Back 27

are “stuff we’d like to know,” but usually will not affect mission accomplishment if we don’t know. IRs

Front 28

Common Characteristics of PIRs/IRs.

Back 28

1 Focuses on a specific fact
2 Is tied to a specific decision
3 Provides concise statement of what intel is required
4 Contains geographic and time elements

Front 29

Second phase of the intelligence - Processing and
Exploitation Phase 3:

Back 29

1. The collection operations are planned.
2. Assets are positioned to perform their responsibilities of collecting the information and
reporting it back to the appropriate unit/section.
3. PIRs/IRs are re-evaluated and updated.

Front 30

During the processing and exploitation phase, collected
information is converted into:

Back 30

a man readable format more suitable for the production of intelligence.

Front 31

The fourth phase of the intelligence cycle is production-where information is 5:

Back 31

1 Evaluated to determine relevancy, reliability, and
accuracy.
2 Analyzed to isolate specific, significant elements.
3 Integrated with other information and previously
developed intelligence.
4 Applied to estimate possible COAs.
5 Produced in a format that will be usable by all who
need it.

Front 32

Commanders must 5:

Back 32

1 Focus the intelligence effort.
2 Participate in the intelligence process.
3 Use intelligence in decisionmaking.
4 Support the intelligence effort.
5 Evaluate the results of intelligence activities in the
form of feedback.

Front 33

S-2 (Unit Intelligence Officer) Responsibilities (6):

Back 33

1 Assist the commander in developing PIRs/IRs.
2 Ensure the command’s intelligence requirements are received, understood, and acted upon by organic and supporting intelligence assets.
3 Monitor the effective flow of intelligence throughout the command.
4 Provide battle damage assessment (BDA) and functional system assessment data and analysis to aid the combat assessment process.
5 Provide functional area support to intelligence operations.
6 Submit requests for intelligence support (e.g., maps, imagery, specific data/information/intelligence), as well as any IRs, which are specific to their mission or taskings.

Front 34

Situation Report (SITREP)

Back 34

Used to give a brief synopsis to higher of a unit’s:
o Location.
o Past and planned activities.
o Any support requirements.

Front 35

Contact Report (CONTACREP):

Back 35

Used to report briefly and concisely any enemy contact by consolidating the most important elements of the SITREP and CASREP, while allowing the unit commander to focus on resolving the present situation.

Front 36

Enemy Sighting Report (SPOTREP):

Back 36

Commonly referred to as the SALUTE report, the SPOTREP provides for detailed reporting of:
o Size.
o Activity.
o Location.
o Unit.
o Time.
o Equipment.

Front 37

Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) 4:

Back 37

1 The type of fire received or observed.
2 Duration of fire.
3 Estimated bearing and distance of firing unit.
4 Any battle damage sustained.

Front 38

Frequency Interference Report (FIRREP):

Back 38

Provides only the most essential elements of the MIJIREP and decreases transmission time.

Front 39

Report discrepancies between weather briefed and weather encountered and its effects on:

Back 39

o Friendly operations.
o Aircraft.
o Vehicles.
o Equipment (specifically weapon systems).
o Personnel.
o Estimated effect on enemy operations.

Front 40

Report discrepancies between terrain briefed, terrain seen on maps/imagery, and the actual terrain encountered, such as:

Back 40

o New hazards to navigation.
o Effect on friendly operations.
o Estimated effect on enemy operations.

Front 41

Reconnaissance can be broken down into 3 categories:

Back 41

1 route
2 zone
3 area

Front 42

A route reconnaissance may be oriented on a:

Back 42

road or an axis or direction of attack. Route reconnaissance is faster than zone reconnaissance because effort is concentrated along the route and its controlling terrain.

Front 43

A zone reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed information concerning all

Back 43

routes, obstacles (to
include chemical or radiological contamination), terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries.

Front 44

A zone reconnaissance normally is assigned when:

Back 44

o The enemy situation is vague.
o Information concerning cross-country trafficability is desired

Front 45

level intelligence units are concentrated in the:

Back 45

intelligence battalion and radio battalion to enhance centralized command and control of these limited assets.

Front 46

The organic intelligence assets in the Marine Corps are
categorized as 4:

Back 46

1 Ground combat element intelligence assets.
2 Radio battalion (RadBn).
3 Intelligence battalion.
4 Air combat element intelligence assets.

Front 47

In line Companies/Battalions -All Marines must understand their role as:

Back 47

information collectors, and the benefits they reap if they remain alert and aware of their surroundings, and report their observations to higher.

Front 48

Division Reconnaissance Battalions mission includes:

Back 48

to conduct pre- and post-assault reconnaissance for the ground combat element
(GCE).

Front 49

Division Reconnaissance Battalions taskings include:

Back 49

o Reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) of GCE objectives.
o Limited hydrographic studies.
o Confirmatory beach reporting.
o Boat initial terminal guidance (ITG).
o Route reconnaissance.
o Helicopter Landing Zone studies and ITG.
o Terminal control of supporting arms.
o Most importantly, observation and reporting
on the command’s PIRs/IRs.

Front 50

Scout Sniper Platoon

Back 50

Battalions have one scout sniper latoon which is GS to the battalion. Although the eyes nd ears for the battalion commander, the scout sniper latoon may be put in direct support (DS) of a company based on the priority given to that unit’s mission.

Front 51

Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (LAR) generally operate as

Back 51

another maneuver force. However, its missions of conducting route, zone, and area reconnaissance make it a vital intelligence collection asset.

Front 52

The LAR battalion is particularly suited for:

Back 52

o Highly mobile ground reconnaissance.
o Deep reconnaissance.
o Counter-reconnaissance.

Front 53

Radio Battalion (RadBn) provides:

Back 53

groundbased and limited aerial-based signals intelligence (SIGINT) and electronic warfare (EW) capability to support MAGTF operations.

Front 54

Some of the RadBn missions are to:

Back 54

Conduct interception, radio direction finding (DF), recording and analysis of
communications intelligence (COMINT) and non-communications signals (ELINT), and all SIGINT processing, analysis, production, and reporting.
o Conduct EW operations to include electronic attack (EA), electronic support (ES), and electronic protect (EP), against enemy C2
architecture.
o Conduct communication security (COMSEC)monitoring of friendly forces to protect
communications.
o Provide radio reconnaissance teams (RRT)
with special nsertion/extraction capabilities to provide specified SIGINT and EA support during advance force, pre-assault, and postassault
operations.

Front 55

The intelligence battalion resides:

Back 55

under MEF command and is GS to the MEF.

Front 56

The intelligence battalion provides:

Back 56

o Imagery intelligence (IMINT).
o Sensor employment.
o Human intelligence (HUMINT).

Front 57

The intelligence battalion
establishes and mans an:

Back 57

intelligence operations center and surveillance and reconnaissance center (SARC) under the staff cognizance of the G-2/S-2, providing centralized command and control of MAGTF organic collection assets and all-source fusion of the information collected and reported.

Front 58

Some of the units within the intelligence battalion are the:

Back 58

Counterintelligence (CI)/HUMINT Company.
Imagery Intelligence Platoon (IIP).
Ground Sensor Platoon (GSP).
Topographic Platoon.

Front 59

Ground Sensor Platoon (GSP)

Back 59

Formerly called sensor control and management platoon (SCAMP), employs numerous types of sensors, including seismic, magnetic, infrared, and thermal, to provide indications and warning (I&W), targeting information, and queuing for intelligence collection.

Front 60

Topographic Platoon

Back 60

This platoon provides 3-D and other visual graphic intelligence products to support operation planning.

Front 61

Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC)core capabilities include:

Back 61

direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, information
operations, and unconventional warfare.

Front 62

MARSOC is comprised

Back 62

Foreign Military Training Unit (FMTU)
Marine Special Operations Battalions (MSOB)
Marine Special Operations Support Group (MCSOSG).
Marine Special Operations School (MSOS).