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57 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Correlation
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When two or more events occur together in time
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Causation
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When one event causes another one to occur
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3 things to demonstrate causality:
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1. Cause has to precede effect
2. Cause & effect covary (measure of how much two variables change together) correlation/pattern 3. Have to rule out other alternative explainations |
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Primary actors in Realism:
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States
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Primary actors in Liberalism:
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People and groups
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Where do Realists preferences come from?
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State interests are in maintaining survival; becoming hegemon
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Where do Liberals preferences come from?
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Interdependence (sharing a common set of principles) with other states & interests of the people/groups
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Realism preferences:
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Fixed (unchanged) & conflictual (zero sum); not many opportunities for cooperation; one sides gain is another's loss
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Liberalism preferences:
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Based off of some subset of society; state is a vehicle; gov policy is run by outside groups who put demands/pressure on gov; ex- religious figures, ethnic groups, & social classes
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Realism factors that shape & limit state behavior:
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Limited to military and economic ability; might makes right; subject to another state's sovereignty (ability of state to regulate its own internal/external affairs)
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Liberalism factors that shape & limit state behavior:
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No real limitations due to intl' order and push for greater good
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Ideational Liberalism:
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Preferences from domestic and social identities; ex- legit borders & citizenship, political institutions, & socioeconomic regulation
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Commercial Liberalism:
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Derives from market incentives and the ability/want to make money; ex- trade liberalism, opening borders
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Republican Liberalism:
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Domestic political institutions shape state behavior in world affairs; through gov't representation the political interests shape political policy.
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Alternative Theories of IR:
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Constructivism & Marxism
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Constructivism:
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Repeated interactions -> specific identities -> preferences are formed -> lead to state behavior
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Marxism:
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Abolishment of private property & social work for the commonality of the working class
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Rationalist Explanations for War (Fearon 1995):
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1. Private information
2. Incentives to misrepresent 3. Commitment problems 4. Issue Indivisibility |
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Power:
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Ability to achieve one's goals; military and economic ability
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Measures of Power:
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GDP, GDP per capita, military strength, etc
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Balance of Power:
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Realist theory; states work together to prevent any one dominant power
1. Limited Goals: status quo states, generally satisfied w/ existing intl' order 2. Defend status quo: no permanent enemies/friends, just interests, constantly changing alliances |
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Power Transition Theory:
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Satisfaction: tau-b; degree of overlap between alliance partners, especially with USA.
How to measure it: occurrence of rapid military build-up |
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Stages of economic war:
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1. Slow/No growth
2. Rapid fast pace growth 3. The now much more powerful state tapers off and returns to slow growth reminiscent of the first stage |
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Hegemonic War
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Power parity + Dissatisfaction
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Democratic Peace Theory:
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Great powers and democracies aren't more peaceful, they just don't fight with each other
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Diversionary Theory:
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State leaders may use or create intl' conflicts to distract their state's population from their own internal issues and unite them against a common enemy
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Refined version of Diversionary Theory put forth by Morgan & Bickers (1992):
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Diversion= hostile activities short of war; look at smaller levels of foreign policy; create a 'perception' of war; a treat of war is enough to divert from problems.
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Measure of domestic political problems & diversionary conflict used by Morgan & Bickers (1992):
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Domestic political problems and a lack of support for the winning coalition/executive
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Conventional Deterrence:
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Limitations & structures that prevent people form acting in a negative/violent way that disturbs status quo; ex- jail, speeding tickets, death penalty
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Nuclear Deterrence:
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The threat of nuclear weapons/arms to prevent an actual attack by another state
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Credibility:
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Need a credible threat of retaliation for deterrence to work
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Coercion:
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The threat of force to push a state to act in a specific manner.
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Problem with no nuclear coercion:
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People do not find nuclear weapons a credible threat because the idea of total destruction & human annihilation is not favorable; no state would ever use nuclear weapons
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Nuclear Weapons & the stability/instability Paradox:
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Nuclear weapons are stable in the idae that sheer force and destruction would never be a reasonable option. Can be unstable in the case that an unreasonable/illogical leader might take power and fight over an indivisible issue
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Similarities & Differences between India/Pakistan & US/USSR nuclear rivalries:
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Similarities: Both maintained the 'threat' of nuclear war, neither used such weapons.
Differences: conflict was smaller; involved in 4 wars whereas US/USSR never fought each other; India/Pakistan share borders, US/USSR do not |
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A Nuclear Iran:
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Wants equal rights to nuclear fusion. Have the incentive to mislead baout their nuclear program. Gives more power of coercion & deterrence. If Iran is able to gain nuclear weapons there is a threat to Israel & other nations that Iran finds in a negative light
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Alliances:
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Purpose- Security & Economic Factors (trade/tariffs)
Why states deter from alliances?- Costly! 2 reasons states make formal alliance commitments- Deterrence/Burden Sharing |
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Sanctions:
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Purpose- coercive measure adopted by a state against another state in order to elicit a change in their behavior
Effectiveness- based on a cost that limits the things people see of value & demands that are made Targeting winning coalition- must do in order to get attention of executive Effects on rent-seeking- individual/state seeks to earn income by capturing economic rent thru manipulation/ exploitation of economic/political environment, rather than earning profits thru economic transactions |
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Terrorism:
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Violence/threat of violence for a political aim; violence by an org'z other than a ntl gov't to cause fear/intimidate a target audience
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Terrorism vs. State Violence vs. Guerrilla Warfare
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State violence- used to make money; legit set of rules recognized by the population and intl' community; allowed to take force to maintain status quo
Guerrilla Warfare: use similar tactics (assassination, kidnappings, violence); military unit- organized, attempt to govern territory they attack |
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Suicide Terrorism:
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Part of a larger campaign for terrorism; targeted against democracies (soft & easily coerced)
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Democracy relating to more/less terrorism:
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Terrorism is more common in democracies
Most terrorist groups see democracies as the problem; even if showed their concerns with peaceful actions it still would not be successful |
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State Weakness/Failure:
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Cause- economic downturn, political corruption, & violent revolts against the state. Occurs when physical infrastructure is lacking; lack of social services, no public goods & lack of reliable judiciary
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Intrastate/Civil Wars:
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Cause- when conditions of insurgency rise
1. Poverty 2. Rough terrain 3. Political Instability 4. Large populations |
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Democratic Peace Theory in Constructivism:
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Repeated interactions > identities > preferences > determine state behavior
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Democratic Peace Theory in Liberalism:
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Factors of democracy that lead to peace:
1. Veto-power: more ppl that have to approve war, the more peace via cautious decision making. 2. Norms: contribute to non-violence 3. Elections: war=debt/loss of life/social ills; ppl won't vote for war; elections align ppl who make decisions with those who bear the consequence of decision 4. Audience Costs: making a statement & going back on it; non-credible 5. Freedom: of speech, association, press, etc; ppl have better idea of gov's actions Rotation in Office: more depth/power/manipulation prevented; limits personal animosity over intl' politics |
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Democratic Peace Theory in Realism:
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1. Nuclear Weapons: no conflict is worth the threat of nuclear war
2. American hegemony: USA's sphere of influence allows them to control allies/enemies with power |
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"Most Americans die in hospitals" is an example of:
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Correlation
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Realism claims that state preferences are shaped by:
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Systematic factors; maintaining survival/becoming hegemony
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Varient of liberalism that focuses on the ways in which domestic institutions aggregate societal demands and turn them into state policy:
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Republican liberalism
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Dispute over Golan Heights (Fearon 1995) is rooted in:
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Commitment Problems
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Democratic peace theory suggests that democracies act less aggressively towards other states than dictatorships:
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False
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People who have a legal role in choosing the executive:
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Selectorate
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High degree of overlap of deviance partners between the hegemon:
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Status quo states
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What 2 factors are jointly necessary for war to occur in power transition theory:
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1. Power Parity
2. Dissatisfaction |
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Which type of state is most likely to renege on its alliance commitments:
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Dictatorships
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Why did separatist Kurdish group leaders attack Turkey & not Iraq:
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Turkey is a democracy which would lead to coercive violence, Iraq was not
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