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65 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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current world population |
7 billion |
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general trajectory of world pop growth |
1800: 1B 1960-2000: doubled form 3B to 6B |
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components of population change (4) |
1. birth 2. death 3. in-migration 4. out-migration
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origin of population growth |
excess of in flows over out flows |
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Malthus |
too many people- worried about death by famine, not enough resources to sustain the population |
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Neo-Malthus |
not worried about feeding ppl bc better ag. technology, rather concern over development economics- too large a pop. would trap poorer countries in poverty bc any economic gains would be negated by growing pop. which would consume resources |
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4 evolutions in human pop growth |
8000 BC: local agriculture 1750 AD: global agriculture 1950 AD: public health 1970 AD: fertility dec./family planning |
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doubling time |
at what point in time will population equal 2x the level at which we started
t=.69/r |
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convergence |
when the death rate goes up and birth rate goes down -way to stop pop. growth @ unsustainable rate |
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What's going on w/ current world population growth? |
+2% in recent yrs, but hides huge regional differences -high rates concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa (developing countries have more pressing priorities than pop. gorwth) -negative rates in E. Euro -slowing rates in Asia |
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The global urban transition |
more than 50% of world pop now lives in urban areas |
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The ageing world population |
Developed countries: mean age of pop being skewed in older direction as ppl living longer
Developing countries: absolute size of pop growing along with # of ppl 65+ |
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mortality-fertility equilibrium |
point at which life expectancy at birth (x) and total fertility (y) balance each other so that the growth rate of the pop= 0 |
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crude death rate |
# of deaths in given yr/population size that yr [expressed as deaths per thousand] |
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pros of using CDR |
-easy to calculate -can use to estimate pop growth (growth rate=CBR-CDR) |
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cons of using CDR |
-not a very intuitive measure -depends on age distribution |
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When life expectancy is long (like in US)... |
mean & mode of age of death converge |
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When life expectancy is short... |
means lots of child/infant deaths, those who do actually survive to adulthood live to normal age at death |
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Starting year of world population growth on huge scale |
1880 |
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What explains high variation in Euro. pop growth before 1880? |
epidemics, cycles of food availability/prices- after 1880, more abundant, diverse food production, transportation innovations enabled importing food in case of low yield year
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epidemiological transition |
increase in world pop originates in falling death rates, not increasing birth rates, decreased mortality due to infectious disease (explaining both decline in level & variability) |
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What caused decreased in mortality due to infectious disease? (3 hypotheses) |
1. Big medicine 2. Public health innovations 3. Social & economic development |
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examples of big medicine |
prevention (vaccines), scientific knowledge, treatment (antibiotics), surgical procedures |
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examples of public health innovations |
sanitation, health care, etc. |
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examples of social & economic development |
agricultural technology, food production stability, trade, transport, education |
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How do we know that big medicine didn't cause the epidemiological transition? |
first rule of causality- cause must precede effect, not met in this case, deaths by infectious disease begin to drop around 1910, whereas widespread immunization doesn't begin until the 1960s, when spread of disease already lessened dramatically |
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Argument for economic development as cause of epidemiological transition |
ability to fight infection depends on personal health/strength- better fed individuals= more resistant |
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Empirical evidence to support economic development/nutrition as cause of epidemiological transition |
-measure past nutritional levels based on anthropometric measurements- esp. stunting data -increase in BMI over time to optimal level for lower mortality |
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germ theory (1880) |
scientific understanding of how infection occurs/is transmitted- gov'ts initiate public health policies (before advent of big medicine) |
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Features of countries whose life expectancy is high relative to their wealth |
-universal primary ed. for girls (nutritional choices, good domestic practices, etc.) -public health expenditures (esp. private) -effective governance -human capital rather than resource dependence -ethnic homogeneity |
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crude birth rate |
number of births in given yr/size of pop that yr [expressed as births per thousand] |
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total fertility rate (TFR) |
hypothetical average # of live births per woman at current rates (by age) if she survives to the end of female reproductive span (but doesn't include mortality- we're assuming she and all her kids survive) |
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net reproduction rate (NRR) |
tendency of a generation to replace itself- combination of mortality & fertility rates over female reproductive life span i.e. # of daughters that would survive to become mothers
NRR=1 indicates perfect replacement of a generation |
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current worldwide range of TFR |
1/1000-5/1000 |
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Why are high birth rates so low? (by the numbers) |
female reproductive span= 30 yrs average birth interval= 2 yrs max. average fertility= 15 -duration of breastfeeding, social norms reduce further |
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social norms & fertility reduction |
childbearing socially restricted to marriage, celibacy reduces total fert., "maidenhood" period- women don't marry as soon as their enter reproductive ages
ex- if mean age @ marriage= 25, 1/3 reduction in total fertility |
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What brings fertility down from 6-8 kids (natural fertility) to 1-3 kids? |
CHOICE- couples' control of their fertility |
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demographic transition |
descriptive representation of decline in mortality followed by decline in fertility |
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demographic transition theory |
as countries become richer, mortality declines, people move to cities, fertility also declines as part of the "path to development" (urbanization, education, economic change as proxies for modernization) |
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main problem w/ demographic transition theory |
lacks specific, testable hypothesis |
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The European Fertility Project |
*seeks to precisely track onset of fert. transition in relation to modernization indicators result= doesn't hold, richest euro countries didn't necessarily experience fert. decline first |
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Preconditions for sustained decline in fertility (Coale) |
1. "ready": shift in way of thinking, couples ready to make decisions about fam. size, rather than relying on traditional, religious norms 2. "willing": have to be real/perceived benefits of having fewer kids- advantageous 3. "able": have means to achieve goal of fewer kids, available effective contraception |
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Was coitus interruptus always known? |
possibly (euphemisms), but gap btwn knowledge and practice- morally unacceptable bc either for non-reproductive purposes or extra-marital sex |
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"unmet need" for contraception |
even more fertility declines, people wanted to have fewer kids, but didn't have knowledge or effective means |
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When is controlling # of kids you have advantageous? |
- reversal of wealth flow (kids more of economic burden after development, consumers of family resources) - quantity-quality tradeoffs (invest more resources, higher return on investment) |
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Strong evidence for #1 ("within the calculus of conscious choice") for main cause of ONSET of demographic transition |
-happens w/i 1 generation- pace of decline more consistent with innovation & diffusion rather than with gradual changes in structural factors |
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diminishing returns & population growth |
Malthus' concern that population growth would exponentially outpace food production, leading to famine |
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How can nuptiality act as a check on population growth in land-based societies? |
negative feedback loop when mortality declines (due to exogenous forces): decreased mortality > increased pop. > higher food prices > lower real incomes > lower nuptiality > fewer children > decreased pop.
*ppl tend not to get married until have means to provide for family |
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Family size & land dependency |
i. if family/pop grows, can expand to new land (no pop pressure) ii. when all good land used, divide existing plots (pop pressure, prices go up, marriage delayed) iii. if land can't be further divided, second/third born kids celibate (army, priesthood) |
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Migration as a response to population pressure |
spread pop out by moving from high (eg. place w/ good crop year=low mort.) to low pressure areas (eg. place w/ bad crop year= high mort.) |
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Types of migration that can ease population pressure |
1. rural-rural migration 2. conquest of additional land 3. expansion of non-agricultural economy (urbanization, industrialization) 4. international migration |
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Massey's additions to economic theories of migration (4) |
1. wage differential neither necessary nor sufficient 2. migration doesn't stem of lack of ec. development 3. risk-sharing 4. labor-saving changes |
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risk-sharing (Massey) |
diversifying a family's income sources by spreading members across different locations, working in different economic sectors (evidence that migration often a collective family decision, rather than a rational, individual economic one) |
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urban/rural ratio (URR) |
annual growth rate of urban population - annual growth rate of rural population |
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mega-cities |
cities with 10M+ people in mid- to low-income countries (large cities used to correspond to high national wealth, indicators of advanced economic development)
ex- Mumbai, Buenos Aires, Shanghai |
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Levels of foreign born as % of US pop over time |
Late 1800s-1920: 10-15% 1920-1970: dips to 5% 1970-today: back up to 10% |
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Johnson-Reed Act (1924) |
created quotas restricting immigration by origin to a fraction of population in US, favoring northern Euros over southern/western (esp. Italians, Greeks)
-abolished 1965 w/ Immigration & Nationality Act |
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Where do most immigrants to US come from today? |
Asia, the Americas |
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"numerically exempt immigrants" |
immediate relatives of 21+ US citizens (spouses, children, parents) - family unification takes precedent |
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"numerically limited" immigrant categories |
-permanent resident aliens, their immediate relatives -more distant relatives of US citizens -members of professions of exceptional abilities -workers in fields experiencing labor shortages |
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Immigration Reform and Control Act (1986) |
amnesty provisions for 2.7M undocumented foreign US residents |
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4 main phases of US immigration |
I. frontier expansion- n/w euros II. industrialization- s/e euros III. pause- w/ euros IV. post-1965- asia/latin america |
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largest immigrant sending countries to US today |
Mexico China India Philippines Dom. Republic Vietnam |
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largest US destinations of immigrants |
NY LA Miami |
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Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (2013) |
-provides 13 yr path to US citizenship for unauthorized foreigners been here since 2011 -creates new low skilled guest worker program -increases temp. work visas for foreigners w/ college degrees |
