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92 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Johnson v. State
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Cocaine in baby's system at birth - distribution to a minor because gave cocaine through umbilical cord for a few seconds between birth and severing of umb cord?
Statutory interpretation (define "baby," define "delivery") |
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Queen v. Dudley & Stephens
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Cannibals; necessity not a defense to homicide; rationale: while we may understand where they were coming from, don't want to create a people-eating loophole
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Cabarga
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Teen pedophile raised by a pedophile in van; in order to assess blameworthiness, we must accept free will; mitigating factors in culpability
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Apprendi
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Gun fired at black family that had moved into white neighborhood - hate crime; Other than prior conviction, any fact that would increase penalty beyond statutory max has to be run by a jury (reasonable doubt)
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Blakely
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Kidnapped estranged wife; The stat max is the most a judge can sentence based on the facts reflected in the jury verdict (or admitted by the D)
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Booker
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Elevated drug sentencing; Jury has to look at any fact that pushes sentence over max in Federal Sentencing Guidelines
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Cunningham v. CA
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Determinate Sentencing Law killed as presumptive sentence is determined to be the max (Blakely) - judge (not jury) would be doing fact finding to give the mitigating/aggravated sentence; sentencing guidelines now advisory
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Ewing v. CA
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Stolen golf clubs - 3rd strike (25 - life); Found const (not cruel/unusual); Punishment must be "grossly disproportional" to be unconst. Supreme Court example: unconst if got life sentence for a parking ticket
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Rummell v. Estelle
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Third time petty theft, life sentence; not unconst - possibility of parole after 12 years. States can make utilitarian punishments, even if it's retributively disproportionate
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Solem
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writes check from fake account, 7th non-violent felony, gets life in prison; sentence overturned by SCOTUS; court declines to call mandatory minimums for recidivism unconst, but says court reserves right to make exceptions
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Harmelin v. Michigan
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Life sentence w/no parole for possession of coke found to not be cruel and unusual; six justices agree that there should be a proportionality test for the cruel and unusual punishment clause, but 3 want a highly deferential test and 3 want a more stringent test
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Kansas v. Hendricks
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Habitual pedophile getting out of jail, state is going to lock up again - civil commitment; as long as is incapacitation/rehab and not deterrence/retribution, is ok
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Proctor v. State
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Kept a boozy place; actus reus of a crime must be a commission or omission, not a status. an unexecuted criminal intent is not a crime.
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People v. Decina
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Long history of seizures, had seizure while driving; while the seizure itself may not have been a voluntary act, getting behind the wheel knowing the risks was a voluntary act
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U.S. v. Maldonado
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Drugs in hotel room are sufficient to establish constructive possession (even though not physically possessed and no specific act)
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Chicago v. Morales
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Anti-gang loitering; vague ordinance that didn't specifically define what was prohibited; not enough notice to citizens, too much discretion for police; struck down
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Pope v. State
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Devil in the baby; No omission liability unless a duty to act created by statute or special relationship
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Jones v. United States
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Failed to feed baby; a legal duty to act must be established before can be convicted for omission
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People v. Rypinski
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Brandished gun - thought was unloaded; mistake of fact negatives the mens rea for recklessness (1. awareness 2. conscious disregard)
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People v. Ryan
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Mushroom Possession; mens rea terms assumed to apply to all elements of crime; here knowledge applied to possession and specific weight of the mushrooms; travelling rule
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Regina v. Faulkner
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Accidental boat fire; arson conviction reversed where intentionally stole rum but accidentally set fire to ship by lighting matches to see; criminal intent to steal did not transfer to intent to set fire
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United States v. Balint
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Selling opiates without gov't order form; strict liability offenses are const;
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Morissette v. United States
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Took spent metal bomb casings from gov't testing ground for scrap; Common law crimes will be assumed to have a mens rea (not strict liability)
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People v. Taylor
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Cane sword; possession of a cane sword is not a strict liability offense because one could possess it without knowing it, don't want to an "innocent mind."
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State v. Cameron
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Girl got drunk, attacked bf with broken bottle; intox is a defense to specific intent crime only if couldn't have formed the requisite intent
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Watson v. United States
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split second cop killer; premeditation can be just a few seconds, if evidence that D gave thought and considered decision to kill (1st degree murder)
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Ex parte Fraley
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Western Pa revenge for son's murder (a year later); when have time to cool off, then not in heat of passion, can't downgrade from murder to manslaughter
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People v. Walker
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Gambler dealt raw hand; physical attack can mitigate murder down to manslaughter
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Rowland v. State
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catches wife in act of cheating, shoots her to death (although was aiming for her lover); adultery (in flagrante delicto) can mitgate killing her, the lover, or both down to MS
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People v. Berry
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Wife taunted him about her new lover, hot/cold treatment, he strangles her; an extended provocation without time for cooling off could be adequate provocation
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Director v. Camplin
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15 year old killed a middle aged man after the man sodomized him and laughed about it; standard - reasonable adult standard or reasonable 15 yo standard?; age is found to be legitimate consideration for subjectivizing the objective reasonableness standard
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Commonwealth v. Welansky
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Nightclub fire; where there is duty of care (business owner to business customers), then wanton or reckless conduct can make for involuntary manslaughter
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State v. Williams
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couple failed to take baby to doctor because thought would have baby taken away, baby dies from tooth infection; civil negligence was sufficient to support claim of IMS; this overturned by statute
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Mayes v. the People
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drunk husband throws glass of beer at wife holding oil lamp, she drops lamp, burns to death; Reckless murder: illegal act done intentionally with mischief in mind and without regard to whether might cause death, is murder
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Commonwealth v. Malone
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russian roulette case; when commit act of gross recklessness and can reasonably anticipate death is likely to result, then reckless murder
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People v. Watson
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reckless drunk driver found to be eligible for second degree murder charge (reckless murder); acted wantonly and with conscious disregard for human life (CA)
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People v. Knoller & Noel
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Pit bulls killed neighbor; pitbull owners found to be eligible for reckless murder
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Pitbull Case 2
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???
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People v. Stamp
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robbery, mgr has heart attack; death doesn't have to be foreseeable for felony murder (strict liability for all deaths resulting from felon or accomplice when committing felony)
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People v. Gladman
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Commits robbery, hides behind car; felony murder - duration: felony ends when felon reaches place of temporary safety; res gestae
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People v. Washington
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Victim shoots D's accomplice during a robbery; Provocative Act Doctrine (CA) - exception to the agency limitation; if felon's provocative act results in cop or victim shooting 3rd party, then bypass agency
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People v. Hansen
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Meth deal gone bad, D fires gun into house, supposedly as a warning and under the impression the house was empty, but kills young girl; unenumerated felony, inherently dangerous in the abstract - 2nd degree felony murder
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People v. Cavitt
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He plots w/gf to invade the home, take jewelry, during commission they beat and hogtie stepmom, who asphyxiates. D says gf suffocated her for personal reasons; court says was to kill witness or was accident, but says there should be logical nexus; possible exception/defense to FM - accomplice spots lifelong enemy out the window and shoots them
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Commonwealth v. Root
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drag racing, victim tries to pass and hits oncoming truck; causation - if independent, intervening force (the victims own free will, novus actus) then chain of causation cut
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United States v. Hamilton
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stomped on guy's face, the semi-comatose guy while in hospital either consciously or unconsciously pulls his breathing tubes out and dies; dependent (because probably not aware enough to realize what he was doing), intervening act does not cut chain of causation
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Stephenson v. State
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Abducts woman, assaults her for days, she poisons herself to death; dependent, intervening act because she did this in response to the harm. Also, some level of foreseeability (?)
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People v. Kevorkian
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furnish means for people to kill themselves; passive participation not enough; independent, intervening act; in response states have passed assisted suicide statutes (usually lesser sentence); counter argument: kevorkian influenced them into doing it
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People v. Barnes
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woman raped when goes to get weed from unstable neighbor; reasonable resistance - she tried to leave and showed distaste for his advances, finally complying out of fear of serious bodily injury
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People v. Warren
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D meets V near forest, makes ambiguous statements, carries her into forest and rapes; doing nothing, even out of terror, not sufficient for reasonable resistance
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State v. Powell
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raped in car after she rejects him, he acts like he has a gun; court finds no reasonable resistance because not enough proof of a gun (she never actually saw it)
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People v. Dorsey
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elevator rape; even though threat was implied and V did not resist, reasonable resistance met
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Brown v. State
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girl raped by neighboring farm boy; utmost resistance - screaming and struggling was not sufficient, have to make it look like he hugged a bobcat, apparently
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Commonwealth v. Berkowitz
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dorm room rape; rape shield laws/evidence of promiscuity; D wanted to intro evidence that she had been fighting with her bf about whether she had been cheating; presumption against allowing this type of evidence
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In the Interest of MTS
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17 year old boy living at the house; 15 yo girl/daughter of owner; court said physical force requirement can be established by act of nonconsensual intercourse
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People v. Mayberry
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Mayberry assaulted V and forced her to have sex, but she says she at one point "put on an act" to try to fool him so she could escape later, Mayberry says she was willing; honest and reasonable mistake of fact (belief that there was consent) held to be a defense
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Commonwealth v. Lopez
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foster kid gets the girl to follow him into the park, violently rapes, but says he thought she consented; court says in MA, no mistake of fact defense - strict liability for issue of non-consent
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People v. La Voie
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Getting run off road by group of men, D stops car, shoots leader of advancing group of men; deadly force is ok for self defense if believe risk of death/serious bodily harm; even ok if belief is reasonable but mistaken
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State v. Leidholm
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Battered wife stabs husband to death while he sleeps; battered woman syndrome allowed as evidence; remand because jury instruction for objective reasonable standard rather than subjectivized: was it reasonable as a battered woman?
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People v. Goetz
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NYC subway, guy shoots 4 kids after 2 of them demand money, he had been mugged twice before so started carrying gun; D's belief that deadly force was necessary was unreasonable; self defense claim must be reasonable (D still gets off on jury nullification)
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People v. Ceballos
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Trap gun for burglars, set to go off if someone lifted the garage door, it gets burglarizing neighborhood teen; D not present, so no risk of death/serious injury, so no deadly force allowed; if D had been present, may have realized deadly force not necessary - machines are without mercy or discretion
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People v. Unger
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escapes prison to avoid rape; D found entitled to submit necessity defense because he reasonably believed that such conduct was necessary to avoid harm greater than harm which might result from his conduct
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State v. Warshow
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Rally to stop nuclear plant from going online, jumped fence; necessity is not a defense to future harms (dissent would have allowed defense, allowed jury to decide if was or was not imminent as D claims); political necessity
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M'Naghten Test
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D will be deemed insane if
1. he did not know of the nature and act he was doing or 2. if he didn't know his act was wrong (this is the cognitive test); and 3. There is some show of mental disease |
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People v. Gleghorn
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D shouts at guy he's going to kill him and sets his bed on fire, guy shoots D with bow and arrow, D beats the crap out of guy; initial aggressor: if you started it, can't say was self defense if counter attack when they retaliate, UNLESS have attempted to withdraw from combat and notified other party of withdrawal
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United States v. Bray
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Carrying a weapon after having been convicted of a felony; one must have knowledge of the circumstances giving rise to a cause of action (?); mistake of law, mens rea
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People v. Snyder
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got a felony conviction for sale of marijuana, no jail time, her attorney told her it was not a felony - felons can't carry concealable weapons, she was busted carrying a concealable weapon; court is a mistake of law, not a mistake of fact, so not a defense (dissent says her mistake is not ignorance of the law, but mistaking her own status, which would be a mistake of fact)
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United States v. Baker
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Counterfeit watches; where a D has requisite mental state and has performed requisite conduct, but claims ignorance of the law, mistake of law is no defense
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Hopkins v. State
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Violated statute against signs advertising marriage services; even in relying upon advice of state's attorney, mistake of law is not a defense (D knew of the penal statute enacted by legislature); contrary advice of counsel does not excuse you from the law
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Commonwealth v. Twitchell
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Christian Scientists withheld medical care for son, who died; IMS convictions reversed, as they relied upon a document based in part upon official opinion by Attorney General, which may have invited the interpretation by the maker of the pamphlet that the Twitchell's relied upon; should have been able to present this affirmative defense to the jury
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Cheek v. United States
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convicted of willfully failing to file for income tax; mistake of law can also be a defense where complex legal code is involved (like IRS code)
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State v. Lyerla
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Reckless and negligence crimes cannot support attempt liability because attempt requires intent and intent to commit a reckless or negligent act is a legal impossibility
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People v. Murray
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Attempt at incestuous marriage; attempt is found in acts that would end in consummation of offense, not in plans or mere preparation
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McQuirter v. State
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pre civil rights south, black guy said something to a white woman walking by then gets out of truck and walks after her; charged with attempt to commit an assault with intent to rape (assault here defined as attempt to harm, so attempt to attempt? trying to get within reach such that one might attempt?)
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People v. Rizzo
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Driving around town with accomplices, looking for man carrying the payroll who they intend to rob; arrested before they even see intended victim; attempted robbery? acts are attempts if in all reasonable probability the crime itself would have been committed but for timely interference
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People v. Staples
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attempted bank burglary by mathematician drilling holes in floor of apt above vault; D says he decided not to; P says he involuntarily quit when landlord found out; court says it doesn't matter, if have fulfilled attempt elements; abandonment not a defense.
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Booth v. State
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Guy thinks he's buying a stolen coat, but has been recovered by police already; defense of legal impossibility - can't buy a stolen thing that is no longer stolen
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People v. Lubow
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D owes 30k to a jeweler, comes up with a plan involving D and jeweler - jeweler to borrow a bunch of money, declare bankruptcy, run off with money, jeweler turns D in; solicitation as stop gap measure; no dangerous proximity needed here: ask someone else to do the crime, and have mens rea for the crime
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State v. Ochoa
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Guy jailed, group want to free him, huge melee during prisoner transport, ends with sheriff getting shot, everyone gets charged with murder, including group leader who doesn't seem to have touched a gun; encouraging actions can be seen as accomplice, but must also have underlying intent of the crime accomplice to (which court says he doesn't)
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People v. Beeman
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Helped plan a robbery, but then decided he wanted no part of it (said he thought they were just joking around or that they wouldn't go through with it) and twice told the others involved he wanted no part of it; if he didn't want any part of it, he didn't have the mens rea (no intent or purpose to commit the crime); jury instruction had no mens rea attached, convictions reversed
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State v. Verive
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witness intimidation; conspiracy can be used as a distinct charge (here, D indicted for conspiracy and attempt to dissuade a witness, both stemming from the same set of actions, but deemed not considered double jeopardy)
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Griffin v. State
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Group of people jump officers who arrive at scene of accident (D had been driving wrecked car and was feeling excitable, apparently, and attacked officers screaming something about how he'd been in war and wasn't afraid); group of people never had official meeting, but still can find agreement as part of conspiracy - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove that an agreement exists
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People v. Lauria
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Call girls using the message service; may have had a mutual understanding that could be called but no intent to further the crime, just trying to run a business; there's nothing inherently inherently in furtherance of crim to run a message service (unlike making loaded dice)
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United States v. Diaz
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Drug dealer, meets with supplier for a sale, supplier carrying a gun; D, not carrying a gun, gets hit with 5 year penalty for drug sale with gun - use of Pinkerton doctrine here: Act reasonably foreseeable and in furtherance of the conspiracy agreement
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Pinkerton doctrine
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Each conspirator is liable for the acts of the other conspirators, as long as the act is reasonably foreseeable (which is a civil negligence standard) and the act is in furtherance of the conspiracy agreement; useful in large drug cartel situations, where minions may know very little, other than who their immediate higher up is - one minion can be charged with bad acts of other minions - deterrence, incapacitation, retribution
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McVay
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Kelley charged as accessory before the fact, knew boilder was unsafe, encouraged workers to make steam, steamboat boiler explodes, kills a bunch of people; can be an accessory to manslaughter through criminal negligence (you can be an accessory, no intent required, one can plan to be negligent ahead of time)
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Gladstone
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D was asked if he could sell some weed, D says no, but I can point you in the direction of someone who sells, charged with aiding and abetting the sale; not an accomplice TO THE SALE because at no point did he have any contact with the seller, did not aid in any way (but he aided the purchase...may have been more successful if the DA had prosecuted aiding and abetting the purchase of weed); only described the seller as someone who sells weed, didn't intend to assist in making the sale (or did he? dissent thinks he did intend)
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Luparello
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Wants his ex-gf back, so tells buddies to rough up friend of her new husband to find out where she is, one of the buddies kills the friend of the husband; D didn't do it, so accomplice liability? encouraged to take action, yes, intended to assist, sure, but mens rea of underlying crime? doesn't seem like it...but could have reasonably foreseen this happening (this looks a lot like felony murder...a felony murder using assault as the underlying felony?)
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Commonwealth v. Levansque
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Hobos accidentally set fire, but don't report fire, firemen killed while putting out; conduct reckless and wanton because high degree of certainty that harm would result from failure to report fire
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People v. Lewis
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D wounds victim, who is in so much pain kills himself by stabbing self in throat; dependent intervening act
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Commonwealth v. Millenarch
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pedo-foster parent says will send her back to juvie if she doesn't have sex with him; court finds that the girls' deliberate and ultimate choice did not meet requirement for forcible compulsion
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Crenshaw
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Man beats his wife senseless, then goes and gets a knife and stabs her to death, and then goes and gets an ax to chop her head off with; under m'naghten test, may have history of mental illness, but knew it was morally and legally wrong; feeling a duty to his faith does not exculpate; may have been exculpated if he'd said that god told him to, though
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Long v. State
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Man commits unintentional bigamy after receiving clearance from attorney; no reliance on erroneous legal advice
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