Game Theory Quiz

Front 1

Best response strategy

Back 1

· a plan to do as well as possible given one’sexpectations about the interests and actions of others

Front 2

Define Bargaining

Back 2

compel another to act in a certain way

Front 3

For bargaining to happen you need...

Back 3

compulsory power:

1. agenda setting

2. coercion

3. other options

Front 4

reversion outcome

Back 4

outcome you’d get if you don’t agree/ refuse to bargain

Front 5

coercion:

Back 5

diminishing the value of reversion outcome

Front 6

why would peopledefect:

Back 6

lack of information /misinformation

commitment issues

lack of trust

indivisibility of a good

time inconsistency problems

Front 7

how can you promotecooperation:

Back 7

1. international institutions

2. provide more information

3. value for the future

4. fewer actors

Front 8

value for future:

Back 8

iteration: stopping a country from cheating by threateningto withdraw cooperation in the future

Front 9

international institutions:

Back 9

1. repeated games

2. inspect compliance

3. established issue linkage

4. resolvedisputes

5. standard of behavior

6. reduce the cost of joint decision making

Front 10

in a single round bargain – why does war still happen?

Back 10

1. indivisibility of issue

2. commitment problems

3. incomplete information

Front 11

incomplete information

Back 11

1. incentive to misrepresent – self help anarchic

2. credibility issue

Front 12

to increase credibility – costly signal (3 kinds)

Back 12

1. tying hands

2. paying for power – sinking cost

3. brinkmanship

Front 13

commitment problems (types of war)

Back 13

1. preventive war – you can’t credibly commit tonot using the power shift to your advantage

2. preemptive war – a war is fought in anticipationof an attack

Front 14

first strike advantage

Back 14

military, geography gives an advantage to offensive attacksas opposed to defensive attacks

Front 15

indivisibility issue

Back 15

the fact that some issues can’t be bargained over becausethey are indivisible the issue here is usually the enforcement mechanism: a thingcan be divided equally but no body will enforce that it will

Front 16

Define Power

Back 16

Compellance: get someone else or another country to dosomethingDeterrence: not do something Physical assets: (control over resources) , form of armiesmilitary and weaponry or other things that help a country get what it wants

Front 17

expected utility

Back 17

A(probability) x B(probability)

Front 18

Game examples

Back 18

Stag hunt – risk of defationPrisoner dilemma: arms raceChicken: Cuban missile crisisCoordination; a couple going on adate