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26 Cards in this Set
- Front
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Determinism: |
an event (such as a choice or action) is determined if . . .“there are conditions obtaining earlier (such as decrees of fate or theforeordaining acts of God or antecedent causes plus laws of nature) whoseoccurrence is a sufficient condition for the occurrence of the event” Reworded: If these earlier determining conditions areobtained, then the determined event will occur (Kane Ch. 1 p 5-6). Reworded by me: state of the world at time 1 + laws ofnature= state of the world at time 2 |
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Indeterminism: |
The future is not determined given the past. |
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AbsoluteNecessity |
An event has to occur no matter what elsehappens (Kane p 6) |
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Conditional Necessity |
An event does not have to occur, no matter what else happens,but it must occur when the determining conditions have occurred. |
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Compatibilism: |
Free will is compatible with determinism. |
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Incompatibilism |
:Free will is not compatible with determinism. |
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Libertarianism |
Free will is not compatible with determinism, but free willexists, so determinism is false. (Kane 32-33) |
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Hard Determinism |
: Free will isnot compatible with determinism, but determinism is true, so free will does notexist. |
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Hard Incompatibilism |
Free will is not compatible with determinism, and free willis not compatible with indeterminism. Therefore, free will does not exist. |
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What is determinism?What does it mean to say that determinism is a thesis about “conditionalnecessity”? What is the difference between determinism and fatalism? |
Determinism is the idea that events have a cause from theconditions that precede it. The state of the world at a time t1 plus the laws ofnature equal the state of the world at time t2. If certain determiningconditions are obtained, then the determined event will occur. Determinism is athesis about conditional necessity because determinism is basically a summationof if/then statements. If a certain set of sufficient antecedent causes occur,an event will occur. Determinism is different from fatalism because withdeterminism, your actions are still part of the causal chain. In fatalism,nothing you do can change the future. |
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Put, in your ownwords, the classical compatibilist definition of free will as expressed byThomas Hobbes. |
Hobbes’ definition of free will word for word: “the libertyof man . . . consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he hasthe will, desire, or inclination to doe.” Free will means having no impediments to doing what youwant. What you will, you can accomplish. Liberty is the absence of oppositionto any attempt. |
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Ayer maintains theability to do otherwise is compatible with determinism. How does he define theability to do otherwise? Describe one objection that has been raised to thisdefinition. |
Ayer defines the ability to do otherwise as meeting thefollowing characteristics:1. I would have acted otherwise if I chose to2. Actions are voluntary—I chose them3. No one compelled me to do what I didAn objection that has been raised to this definition is thatthe moralist wishes to imply that it is my actions that are the result of myown free choice, and it is because they are the result of my own free choicethat I am to be held morally responsible. (Not sure if this is right but whatever). Ayer responds that either a choice is an accident or not,and if it is not a choice, then a person cannot be morally responsible. If itis a choice, then there must be some causes for it. AKA DETERMINISM. |
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What does van Inwagenmean by saying that “the laws of nature impose limits on our abilities”?Summarize, in your own words, the basic reasoning behind the consequenceargument, and how it depends on this point. |
The Consequence argument in his words: “If determinism istrue, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events inthe remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, andneither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequencesof these things (including our present acts) are not up to us. (FW 39). My words: State of the world then + laws of nature = stateof the world now (including our own acts). We can do nothing to change thestate of the world before we were born, and we can do nothing to change thelaws of nature. Therefore our acts are not up to us. (Kane 24). This dependsupon the point that the laws of nature impose limits on our abilities becausewe can do nothing to change the laws of nature. The laws of nature, van Inwagenstates, would be the same whether humans existed or not, and while there arecertain propositions that could be falsified if someone took the time to do so(such as read aloud the OED), there is no possible way for a human to falsify alaw of nature) such as the Principle of the Conservation of Angular Momentum).(FW 42). |
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Describe oneobjection that a compatibilist might raise to the consequence argument. |
Compatibilists often raise a question to the definition ofthe word “can” in many of van Inwagen’s arguments. They interpret “can” by themeans of hypothetical analysis as “having the power to do so.” Basically, infollowing van Inwagen’s argument, wherever the word “can” appears, they insertthe phrase “would be able to” in order to make the phrase hypothetical. For thecompatibilists, saying “you can do something” means that there “were noimpediments to you doing so.” Therefore, by changing van Inwagen’s argument’s“cans” to “would be able to” if “you had so chosen,” it is not saying that theperson in question could have changed the laws of nature (that would be a falseclaim; one cannot change the laws of nature). However, to say “if you wouldhave so chosen, you would have done otherwise” is not a false claim. It is notsaying “You can change the past so you would have done otherwise,” it is simplystating that “had you so chosen, you would have done differently” Anyway, by running the premises through this hypotheticalanalysis, they come out true. However, the conclusion comes out false, becausesince there was no impediment to a person’s having done otherwise if they hadso chosen to do so at the time, it is wrong to say that “a person could nothave done otherwise if they had so chosen” Someone can do otherwise than theyactually do, because nothing prevented them in the hypothetical sense. This happens because of Rule Beta—if there is nothing we cannow do to change the past and laws and nothing we can now do to change the factthat our present actions are the necessary consequences of the past and thelaws, then we cannot now do otherwise than we actually do. On the compatibilist hypothetical analysis ofcan, the premises of this inference (we can’t change the past or laws of nature)is true, but the conclusion (we can’t change ordinary actions (we can)) isfalse. (Kane 27-28). |
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What is the“libertarian dilemma” according to Kane?P 33 |
If free will is not compatible with determinism, it does notseem to be compatible with indeterminism either. Events that are indeterminedhappen merely by chance. If free actions must be undetermined, then they toowould happen by chance. How can chance events be free and responsible actions?(Kane 33) |
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Why is indeterminismthought (by some) to undermine control? |
Determinism is thought by some to undermine control becauseif something happens merely by chance, and it is not under the control ofanything, then it is not under the control of the agent. It is not “up to”agents whether undetermined events occur, and therefore they cannot be free orresponsible actions. (35). |
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What is the “rationalexplicability” problem for libertarianism? |
The rational explicability problem can best be explainedthrough an example. Consider someone who wants to go on a trip, and needs todecide between two locations. During the process of choosing, this person comesup with a list of pros and cons for each location. One location is clearly morepreferable. If libertarianism is true, and he really had the ability to choosehowever he wanted, and he chose the place he clearly did not favor, we wouldnot consider him rational. (Kane 35-36). |
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Why does Kane thinkthat mind-body dualism does not solve the libertarian dilemma? |
Placing an agents thoughts and deliberations in adisembodied mind/soul does not eliminate the problems associated with anundetermined free will; it simply transfers them to another entity. It tries tosolve the problem by tossing in another factor without explaining how thisfactor is not affected by the same problem. He also does not like thisexplanation because it appeals to mystery and is not testable (Kane 42). |
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What isagent-causation? |
Agent-causation is the view by Chisholm that libertarianfree actions cannot be completely caused by prior circumstances, events, orstates of affairs; and neither can they be uncaused or happen nearly by chance.Free actions are indeed caused, but they are caused by the agent or self, whichis not a circumstance, event, or state of affairs at all, but a thing orsubstance with a continuing existence. Free actions are self-determined oragent-caused even though they are undetermined by events. (Kane 45). |
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Describe how Chisholmresponds to one of the following objections: (a) thatwe can’t, or don’t, control events in our brains |
We docontrol events in our brains, even when we are not aware of them. Chisholm usesthe example of the man moving the staff and being unaware of the otherconsequences of moving the staff (FW 31). When the man is willing something, heaffects the brain through immanent causation. |
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Describe how Chisholmresponds to one of the following objections:(a) that,on the agent-causal view, there is no difference between a person’s causing anevent and the event’s just happening |
“Thedifference between the man’s causing A, on the one hand, and the event A justhappening, on the other, lies in the fact that [when the event is caused],there was a brain event A; the agent caused the brain event; but there wasnothing that he did to cause it . . . This is a problem for everyone besidesthe complete indeterminist. |
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Why does Kane thinkthat agent-causation does not solve the rational explicability problem? Whydoes he think that agent-causal theorists solve the control problem by “doublestipulation?” |
By introducing a special agent-causal relation defined insuch a way that it (1) cannot by its nature be determined, but (2) cannot byits nature be random either. He notes that many critics think that agent-causetheories either lead to infinite regresses or solve the problems aboutlibertarian free will by defining them out of existence (they make up newdefinitions/insert new factors to make their arguments work rather than comeabout them by “honest toil”). (Kane 51). |
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O’Connor says thosewho think the “commonsense picture of agency” is unintelligible are “deeply inthe grip” of a certain metaphysical view of the world that has yet to besubstantiated empirically. What is this metaphysical view? Why does O’Connorthink that (non-dualist) libertarians must give up this picture in order tomake sense of free agency? |
In order to make sense of the picture, one must understandthat inclination is not necessitation. Things can influence our actions withoutcausing them. While an event’s causation may be necessary or probabilistic, anagent’s causation is an exercise of the will. |
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What is Dennett’sproposed model for free decision-making? Why does he think that this “installsindeterminism in the right place for the libertarian?” Why does he think hisview might make sense from “the point of view of strategies for biologicalengineering?” |
When we are faced with a decision, a consideration-generatorwhose output is to some degree undetermined produces a series ofconsiderations. Some of these are immediately considered unimportant, but thosewho are considered to be more than negligible on the decision are put through areasoning process. If the agent is reasonable, then these considerations willbe the predictors/explicators of the agent’s final decision. It putsindeterminism in the “right place” for the libertarian because a libertarianwouldn’t want the indeterminism, or “coin flip” to be at the end of thedecision making process. In this model, the indeterminism deals with what typesof reasoning are taken into consideration. He thinks this view makes sense from“the point of view of strategies for biological engineering” because humans attimes may favor a decision making style that is expedited, swift, and reliespartially on chance because for many decisions they do not spend enough time ona decision to properly deliberate between all available options. (Dennett 245). |
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At the end of hisessay, Dennett says that “the very feature of [his model of free will] thatinspired its promulgation is “apparently” either gratuitous or misdescribed orboth.” What feature is that, and what are the implications of this point forlibertarianism? |
That feature is known as the “causal indeterminancy of thegenerator.” It has been said that this feature is just a fancy way to say“random,” and if the generator were truly to be random, it would bepatternless, and therefore it wouldn’t make sense to base reasoning anddecision making off of such generated considerations. (Dennett 245) |
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In what way does Kanethink Dennett’s model does not give libertarians what they want? |
Even though an agent may not have completecontrol over what chance images and other thoughts enter his mind, that is theonly part where the situation is indeterministic, and it is not indeterministicin the sense that Libertarians want because the agent in this instant does nothave control. After the chance thoughts are present, he does have some control,but at this point what happens is determined by the desires/beliefs he alreadyhas, and therefore it is not everything that libertarians want. In order tohave what they need for free will, the agent would have to be able to controlwhich of the chance events occur rather than just reacting to them |
