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33 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Europeanisation
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Europeanization consists of processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalization of formal and informal styles rules paradigms. "ways of doing things."
which are consolidated in the eU policy process and incorporated in the logic of domestic and national and subnational discourse, identities, political structures and public policiescgc Europeanization is the process that enlarge the scope of the relevant unit of policy-making and hence NOT only transform economic governance, but also push social actors out of the scope of the nation state. Europeanization is not only about enlargement of the EU but also of ideas… |
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policy transfer
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hard and soft transfer (programs vs. ideas, concepts, attitudes)
no coercive means goodness to fit institutional isomorphism--political institutions are more like one another Agenda setting Scale of Europeanisation…transofrmation-adaptation-inertia-retrenchment-hostility |
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Copenhagen criteria
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In Copenhagen, 3 membership criteria were laid down
Politically: democracy, rule of law, minority and human rights protection Econ: (functioning market economy, being able to stand competitive pressure Implementation of full EU law Negotiations begin if a country satisfied political and economical. |
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Europeanization of foreign policy
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What is Europeanization of foreign policy according to Ruben Vaughn
common foreign security policy in the EU defense 27 national foreign policies Common European foreign policy affects each nation-state member There is no clear chain of command. He divides scholars into two different camps. There is one main actor in foreign policy…. downloading, cross-loading, uploading What is cross-loading…imagining others' point of view…national preferences bringing states policies and priorities to the supra-national level. down-loading is that each state should give percentage of GDP to EU for development aid (redistribution) Its hard to go from being a receiver to a donor country. |
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Czech Republic and Slovakia
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SLOVAKIA
1992 declared itself a sovereign state 1.01.1993: "Velvet Divorce" 2004 member of NATO joined EU--93% voted to join in 2003 referendum 2009-adopted the euro Strategic priorities of Slovak foreign policy NATO EU OSCE Council of Europe Other priorities: Balkans, energy security, Eastern dimension, Regional dimension MFA reforms |
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What are the main interests of Czech foreign policy?
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Russia
Europe |
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What kind of activities have been undertaken in which areas?
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Russia Europe
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external incentives model
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The external incentives model is a rationalist bargaining model. The actors involved are assumed to be strategic utility-maximizers interested in the maximization of their own power and welfare. In a bargaining process, they exchange information, threats and promises; its outcome depends on their relative bargaining power.2 According to the external incentives model, EU external governance mainly follows a strategy of conditionality in which the EU sets its rules as conditions that the CEECs have to fulfil in order to receive EU rewards. These rewards consist of assistance and institutional ties ranging from trade and co-operation agreements via association agreements to full membership.
Under this strategy, the EU pays the reward if the target government complies with the conditions and withholds the reward if it fails to comply. It does not, however, intervene either coercively or supportively to change the cost–benefit assessment and subsequent behaviour of the target government by inflicting extra costs (‘reinforcement by punish- ment’) or offering extra benefits (‘reinforcement by support’). The analytical starting point of the bargaining process is a domestic status quo, which differs to some extent from an EU rule. This status quo is conceived as a ‘domestic equilibrium’ reflecting the current distribution of preferences and bargaining power in domestic society. EU conditionality upsets this domestic equilibrium by introducing (additional) incentives for compliance with EU rules into the game. Conditionality can affect the target government either directly through intergovernmental bargaining or indirectly through the differential empowerment of domestic actors. |
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social learning model
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The social learning model
The social learning model follows core tenets of social constructivism. It has informed studies of international socialization in general (Checkel 2001) and constitutes the most prominent alternative to rationalist explanations of conditionality (Checkel 2000; Kahler 1992) and Europeanization (Bo ̈rzel and Risse 2000). In contrast to the rationalist model of conditionality, the social learning model assumes a logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989: 160–1). According to this logic, the actors involved are motivated by inter- nalized identities, values, and norms. Among alternative courses of action, they choose the (most) appropriate or legitimate one. Correspondingly, arguing about the legitimacy of rules and the appropriateness of behaviour (rather than bargaining about conditions and rewards), persuasion (rather than coercion), and ‘complex’ learning (rather than behavioural adaptation) characterizes the process of rule transfer and rule adoption. In this perspective, the EU is the formal organization of a European international community defined by a specific collective identity and a specific set of common values and norms. Whether a non-member state adopts EU rules depends on the degree to which it regards EU rules and its demands for rule adoption as appropriate in light of these collective identity, values, and |
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appropriateness
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The most general proposition of the social learning model therefore is: a state adopts EU rules if it is persuaded of the appropriateness of EU rules.
Several groups of factors impinge upon the persuasive power of the EU: legitimacy, identity, and resonance. Legitimacy refers to the quality of the EU rules, the rule-making process, and the process of rule transfer. In this perspective, the legitimacy of EU rules and, as a result, the likelihood of rule adoption, increase if rules are formal, member states are subject to them as well, the process of rule transfer fulfils basic standards of deliberation, and EU rules are shared by other international organizations. As for identity, the likelihood of rule adoption is expected to increase with the identification of the target state and society with the EU community. Finally, rule adoption will be facilitated if conflicting domestic rules are absent or delegitimated and if EU rules tie in with existing or traditional domestic rules (resonance). |
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lesson drawing model
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According to the lesson-drawing model, non-member states adopt EU rules without EU incentives or persuasion. Lesson-drawing is a response to domestic dissatisfaction with the status quo (Rose 1991: 10–12). Policy-makers review policies and rules in operation elsewhere and make a prospective evaluation of their transferability, i.e. whether they could also operate effectively in the domestic context (Rose 1991: 23–4). The most general proposition of the lesson-drawing model is: a state adopts EU rule, if it expects these rules to solve domestic policy problems effectively.
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Baltic States
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Baltic States
1991-2009 Main challenges in 1990 Internal Problems Minority issues EU pre accession conditionality Primary foreign policy objectives Cooperation in the region EU Integration Relations with Russia - Latvian foreign policy Goals after accession in 2004 Goals before and after Evolving nature of cooperation and conflict on the threshold between East and West |
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Visegrad 4
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Baltic States
1991-2009 Main challenges in 1990 Internal Problems Minority issues EU pre accession conditionality Primary foreign policy objectives Cooperation in the region EU Integration Relations with Russia - Latvian foreign policy Goals after accession in 2004 Goals before and after Evolving nature of cooperation and conflict on the threshold between East and West |
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Bulgaria and Romania
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Experience of EU differentiation can be understood by 3 main axes:
iconic acts of differentiation- delay of climbing up EU ladder…longer to reform, in this sense..Bulgaria and Romania "failed to meet the first implicit conditionality for advancing their relations within the EU…no 'clean break." emergence of reform minded gov'ts…slower to come enhanced conditionalities Not until after Visegrad 3/4…after 1993 failed economic criteria set in Copenhagen securitization of EU marginalization |
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EU's Role in post-conflict resolution
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SAP
Stabilisation and Association Agreements SAAs part of the EU SAAs declare will to conduct political economic trade or human rights reforms Future Enlargement Albania applied for membership 2009 BiH Associate state 2008 Iceland candidate since 2011 Kosovo early talks Macedonia candidate since 2005 Montenegro candidate fro 2010 Serbia candidate from 2012 Turkey candidate since 1999 different history "twin-track" EU integration--Serbia and Montenegro Judy Batt Turkey Stability Pact for SEE 1998 Brussels strengthen region for peace, democracy, human rights Regional Co-operaiton Council in 2008 Comparing to Central European experience, what are the main factors that can explain divergence from Central European patterns and or experiences? -cultural- -history -economics -geography -religion |
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Poland, EU Accession
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Downloading and Uploading in agenda of
Michael Smith said there are four major indicators: 4 major socialization, elite socialization bureaucratic reorganization constitutional change public opinion support for the CFSP Origins of the ESDP 1954 WEstern European Union….. 1992 adopted Petersberg tasks -humanitarian and rescue -peacekeeping -combat forces in crisis management, peacemaking 1997: TUE Treaty of Amsterdam 1996: NATO's European Security and Defence Balkans Poland as "Trojan donkey." Solidarity Clause in the Treaty of Lisbon European Defence Agency less approachable than "what we can" with willing partners… |
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New member states
Frosty and Friendly CAtegories "New Cold War" warriors |
Much to the disappointment of the new Cold Warriors, all talk of sanctions against Russia at tomorrow's EU summit has now ceased. In what some saw as a rebuke to Mr Miliband, Downing Street said yesterday: "We have support for Georgia's membership in principle. There is a process in place to enable that to happen, should Georgia meet the conditions of Nato membership." The statement did not convey an urgent desire to welcome Mr Saakashvili into the alliance.
Possibly optimistically, observers have also detected a new, slightly more temperate approach from Moscow. On Friday, Vladimir Putin called for the EU to be "objective", and denied previous defiant claims that Russia did not care if sanctions were imposed. This may reflect alarm following a summit between China and four Central Asian nations, at which Moscow's plea for support was ignored. Old-fashioned diplomacy, it turns out, could have a role to play after all. It might come as a disappointment to the new kids on the bloc, but the thoughts of that great Cold Warrior, George Kennan, could soon be back in vogue. He called for "long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment" of the Kremlin, rather than confrontation – unlike the approach of the current administration in Washington. But that could all change in November. |
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"New Cold Warriors"
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New Cold Warriors' (Lithuania and Poland) who have an overtly hostile relationship with Moscow and are willing to use the veto to block EU negotiations with Russia.
Broadly speaking, the EU is split between two approaches – and each of the five groups tends towards one of the main policy paradigms. At one end of the spectrum are those who view Russia as a potential partner that can be drawn into the EU’s orbit through a process of 'creeping integration'. They favour involving Russia in as many institutions as possible and encouraging Russian investment in the EU's energy sector, even if Russia sometimes breaks the rules. At the other end are member states who see and treat Russia as a threat. According to them, Russian expansionism and contempt for democracy must be rolled back through a policy of “soft containment” that involves excluding Russia from the G-8, expanding NATO to include Georgia, supporting anti-Russian regimes in the neighbourhood, building missile shields, developing an “Energy NATO”, and excluding Russian investment from the European energy sector. Both approaches have obvious drawbacks, making them unpalatable to a majority of EU member states. The first approach would give Russia access to all the benefits of co-operation with the EU without demanding that it abides by stable rules. The other approach – of open hostility – would make it hard for the EU to draw on Russia’s help to tackle a host of common problems in the European neighbourhood and beyond. The EU badly needs a new approach to deal with the new Russia. Ultimately, this fragmentation of EU power does not serve the strategic interests of any of these five groups. No single country can shape the EU’s Russia policy on their own, and the different approaches end up cancelling each other out. No single EU government is influential enough with Russia to withstand bilateral pressures, or to push Moscow to implement existing commitments and deals. This was shown aptly by Russia’s recent attempt to revise some of its energy deals with friendly states, such as Bulgaria and Germany |
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"Frosty and Friendly" pragmatists
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"Trojan Horses" willing to sabotage EU positions outright, through "Strategic Partners" whose commercial ties with Russia trumped any allegiance to common EU positions. "Frosty and Friendly" pragmatists who maintain practical relations with Russia but have varying willingness to speak out on human rights issues, and lastly…"New Cold Warriors"
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"origins of frosty and friendly pragmatists"
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These divisions were created in the first half of 2008 when Medvedev entered the Kremlin who appeared to be liberal. He had no KGB background and his tastes and hobbies were "Western."
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Eastern Partnership
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project initiated by Poland and a subsequent proposal was prepared in cooperation with Sweden.[1] It was presented by the foreign minister of Poland and Sweden at the EU's General Affairs and External Relations Council in Brussels on 26 May 2008.[2] The Eastern Partnership was inaugurated by the European Union in Prague on 7 May 2009.[3]
The first meeting of foreign ministers in the framework of the Eastern Partnership was held on 8 December 2009 in Brussels.[4] |
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countries of Eastern Partnership
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post-Soviet states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and the European Union. There was much debate over whether to include Belarus, which the EU considers to be an authoritarian dictatorship. Belarus was eventually invited to participate due to EU concerns of too much Russian influence.[10]On 30 September 2011 Belarus seemingly withdrew from the initiative because of: "unprecedented discrimination" and a "substitution" of the principles on which it was built two years ago.[11] However three days later Foreign Minister of Belarus Sergei Martynov refuted this.[12]
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Eastern Partnership Questions
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Eastern Partnership
What are the main aims of EaP? Why is the EU interested in this part of the world? Is this project anti-Russian? Does the EaP mean that the EU will offer an enlargement perspectivee to all of its Eastern neighbors? Why was Poland so involved in creating EaP? |
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Conditionality and the Western Balkans
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The Western Balkans:
conditionality towards Balkan States How does the EU affect policies of the Balkan countries? -->internal domestic policies --> diplomacy between these countries--> high representative and commission How does the EU Commission affect EU integration of the Balkan States OHR obstructs democracy in Bosnia. OHR must close in order to for BiH to apply to be member of EU Integration..disintegration Serbia--recognition of Kosovo, stabilization agreement Bosnia..disintegration to join eu possible? |
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Broker Role
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xpanding scope of Community competencies the broker role furthermore increased in importance. A good broker is able to listen to the various national positions and can formulate compromise proposals reflecting more than the lowest common denominator.
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political leader
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A third role associated with the presidency is that of political leader. Providing leadership means that the county at the helm is able to act in the general European interest and steers the debates in the direction of well-defined objectives that further the European integration process.
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organisational
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In the early years the tasks of the presidency were primarily organisational. The country prepared and convened the meetings, guaranteed that the required documents were translated and available in time and chaired the sessions at different Council levels,
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weighed system of elections and Nice protocol
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ice protocol
-->gave principles to relocate or change the institutions settings of new member states new principle--calculated later 3 major elements: 1. European Parliament because it expanded significantly. relocated places. number of seats changed and fluctuated…population proportionate. Germany has 99 seats 2. Weighted vote system (to be returned to) Rough estimations of population Germany is numbah one. (size) Penrose method=square root system, narrow weighting of votes between largest and smallest countries in terms of population….every citizen's voting power is equalized. Reform of the voting system Lisbon Treaty Hagemann say stat this is not the votes that matter in the Council… Qualified majority will be reached if the two candidates are met majority of member states approve (2/3) minimum of 255 votes is cast in favor of the proposal out of 345 votes |
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populism and far right
Hungary |
adical in their stances but they still operate within the political system.
-->criticize everyone but within their strain do not want to operate within existing system -radical change how do parties communicate with their supporters? --whats the difference? --talking down process --knowing real desires of the real people --anti-intellectual --pure citizens --based on emotions --Jobbik, Party for a Better Way, Smallholders Party --"Greater Hungary" Right wing foreign policy agenda: Turkey--fears of EU enlargement (less money for everyone else) Roma--societal isue Enlargement Immigration--societal, fear, of other, Economy Hungary Hungarian Truth and Life Party (MIEP) Movement of a Better Hungary (Jobbik) Foreign policy issues -Hungarian fate -Anti-semitism (connected w the latter) (foreign investment….buying up property fears) -Anti-americanism -Security issues -EU and enlargement -Economy Hungarian citizenship, fear of the "other" non-Hungarians fear of Russia, China |
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Reconciliation
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Reconciliation is a societal process that involves mutual acknowledgment of past suffering and the changing of destructive attitudes and behavior into a constructive relationship toward sustainable peace.
Official level society |
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Deep vs shallow reconciliation
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Deep Reconciliation
implies the process at both official and societal level and embrace all aspects of reconciliation such as interest-driven actions and also socio-emotional and trust-building routes toward reconciliation and ultimately toward the change in construction of community. Shallow Reconciliation is the transfer of a manifest conflict to a latent phase and does not imply either a change in the self-perception or long-term building of mutual trust and identity built on overcoming "us versus them" dichotomy. It rather stays on a level of official declarations and is often strongly driven and easily reversible. |
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EU impact on reconciliation
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EU impact on reconciliation
1. compulsory impact--direct rand indirect conditions…promising carrot…positive reinforcement 2. enabling impact--influencing particular actors and enhancing their desecuritising moves: is the EU..enables through financial help and favors actors who go along with their expectations of the EU. awarding those who go more into reconciliation.. favor less those who have conflictual positions (Serbia) 3. connective impact--faciliation of contacts between actors through financial and organizational means The EU is actually for…trying to make the divisions between borders as visible as possible. Financial instruments..cross border cooperation…pre-accession phase. . Connecting the regions. 4. constructive impact--targeting deeper structures and transforms identity reconstruct sense of community |
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Conflicts in CEE in reconciliation
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Conflicts in CEE and case studies
Taking into account the history of the region (one can list two dominant types of conflicts..some of them frozen) --conflict with two major actors: Germany and Russia --conflict between CEE states based on border or minority disputes Selected cases: Polish-German reconciliation Polish-Lithuanian reconciliation Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation (also Polish-Russian reconciliation) clear link between minority issues and position towards European integration… still needed..arguments..reconciliation you need to defend Poles against Germans |
