Employment Law - Cases

Front 1

Bammert

Back 1

Facts:
At will employee. Her husband was a police officer who pulled over her boss’s wife and gave her a DUI. The boss then fired the employee.
Holding:
This was ok because it was at will, and there was no statute saying that there was a public policy reason for why she couldn’t be fired.
Rule:
It is really easy to fire someone at will, and very hard to show a retaliation claim. A state’s public policy does not protect an at-will employe who is fired in retaliation for the acts of his or her non-employee spouse.

Front 2

Lemmerman Case

Back 2

Facts:
Kid does odd jobs where his mom works, and the owner pays him a few bucks to do so. Kid is then hurt
Holding:
The kid is an employee because 1) he was paid, 2) the employer refused an offer by the kid to work for free, and 3) the person paying the kid had the authority to hire people.
Rule:
technical procedure is not controlling on an issue of whether an employee-employer relationship exists.

Front 3

Starbucks Case

Back 3

Rule:
If you allow someone to waive answering a question about their criminal history, you can’t put it at the end of the application when they have already answered the question.

Front 4

Kotch v. Bureau of River Pilots

Back 4

Rule:
When it is a private action you have to show intent not disparate impact (without business necessity) for discrimination.

Front 5

EEOC v. Consolidated Service Systems

Back 5

Facts:
Korean immigrant owns a Laundromat and only does word of mouth hiring. Hired 81% of new employees were Korean.
Holding:
Word of mouth is ok and does not give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination. Businesses should not be punished for using the most efficient means absent a more insidious reason.
Rule:
This type of hiring can be ok, and businesses shouldn’t be punished for being efficient.
However it is not always ok, and it is based on the facts of the case. It is likely more ok for small businesses.

Front 6

Hoffman Plastics v. NLRB

Back 6

Facts:
Illegal alien was wrongfully discharged. Sued for back pay.
Holding:
Don’t get backpay because he could not legally work in the US during that time, i.e. foreclosed by immigration law.
Rule:
Can’t get back pay if you could not have been legally employed because of a law.

Front 7

Walters v. City of Atlanta

Back 7

Rule:
Generally the courts will not displace an innocent individual who benefited from discrimination (i.e. the other person hired). However, if the job is unique enough they will do it.

Front 8

Maloney v. B&L Motor

Back 8

Facts:
Shipping company did not check whether he had a criminal history. He did have one for aggravated sodomy of teenagers while he was a truck driver before.
Holding:
under these facts there was a question of fact to be determined. But they do have a duty to investigate.
Rule:
For each employee hired you have to do a thorough investigation for relevant criminal history. Don’t have to foresee the precise injury, just have to make an investigation.

Front 9

Donovon v. Dial America

Back 9

Facts:
Dial America was paying less than minimum wage to two classes of its workers claiming that they were independent contractors. One were researchers, the other were distributors who distributed numbers/tasks to researchers.
Holding:
Based on factors the distributors were independent contractors and researchers were not.
Rule:
To determine whether someone is an employee or independent contractor the most important factor is the employers right to control their actions, but it is not dispositive. The other important factors are:
1) Degree of employer’s right to control the manner in which the work is performed: MOST IMPORTANT
2) The employee’s opportunity for profit or loss depending on his managerial skill
3) Employee’s investment in equipment or materials required for their task, or their employment of helpers
4) Whether the service renders requires a special skill: More specialized means more likely to be IC
5) The degree of permanence of the working relationship
6) Whether the service rendered is an integral part of the employer’s business.

Front 10

Novartis Case

Back 10

Facts:
A class of sales reps demanded overtime pay. Novartis agued that they were exempt from FLSA under the outside sales exemption
Holding:
They are not exempt under outside sales exemption because they are not actually making the sale.
Rule:
Must have the primary duty for making a sale. An employee who merely promotes sales is not enough.
Employee must:
1) have the primary duty for making sales.
2) be customarily and regularly engaged away from the employer’s place of business.

Front 11

IBP v. Alvarez

Back 11

Facts:
Meat packing employees argued that they should be paid for the time walking from locker room, where they put on safety gear, to the plant floor and then back to the locker room at the end of the day.
Holding:
Yes, covered.
Rule:
Any activity that is “integral and indispensable” to work is part of working. Anything after the work day starts before the workday ends is compensable, including the time it takes to don and remove protective gear.

Front 12

Wernsing v. DHS

Back 12

Facts:
W’s starting salary was less than the starting salary of a male coworker who was hired at the same time as W’s. DHS was based in part on the salary history. Woman’s salaries would thus be less.
Holding:
Does not violate the equal pay act.
Rule:
An employer that bases pay scale on employee’s wage history does not violate the equal protection pay act even if the practice results in different pay for doing the same job as long as there is a reason that is not discriminatory, then it doesn’t have to be a good difference for a pay difference.

Front 13

McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green

Back 13

Facts:
Green (black man) was a former employee, and was denied based on his participation in illegal protests of discriminatory employment practices.
Holding:
if a prima facie case of racial discrimination is rebuuted by the defendant then the complainant must show that the reason for rejection was just pretext for discrimination. Here the s. ct. said that Green must be permitted to do this.
Rule:
To show discrimination:
1)Employee has burden: to show prima facie case of racial discrimination. Can be done by
a. They belong to a racial minority;
b. They applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
c. Despite his qualifications he was rejected; AND
d. After rejection the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainants qualifications
2) Burden shifts to employer: to show a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the rejection.
a.Legitimate: Does not have to be good, just legitimate. Based on legitimacy of reason not the facts, so a good faith belief trumps facts.
3) Burden shifts back to Employee: To show that the reason was just pretext for discrimination.

Front 14

PWC v. Hopkins

Back 14

Facts:
Woman was not promoted for partnership because of a variety of reasons, including bad interpersonal skills and because she was a woman. Other partners said that she should act more femininely.
Holding:
Remanded for further proceedings. Based on the idea that once H proved that her sex was a motivating factor the burden to disprove discrimination shifts back to the employer to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision if they had not taken gender into account.
Rule:
When an employee proves that her gender played a motivating part in an employment decision her employer may avoid liability ONLY by proving by a PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE that it would have made the same decision had it not take gender into account.

Front 15

Preston v. Wisconsin Health Fund

Back 15

Facts:
Male employee was fired and replaced by a female lawyer with substantially less experience. There was evidence that the employer was having an affair with the woman.
Holding:
Not a triable issue because there has to be something beyond the fact that he was fired and a woman got the job. Favoritism here was not enough to be bias based on a belief that woman are better workers than men.
Rule:
Title VII only applies to discrimination, not favoritism. When no reason is given why men might be expected to discriminate against men the plaintiff must present some evidence beyond the bare fact that a woman got a job that a man wanted to get or keep in order to raise a triable issue of discrimination.

Front 16

Griggs v. Duke Power

Back 16

Facts:
There were hiring and testing requirements, which included high-school diploma and passing scores on a test, which prevented black workers from transferring or getting a better job.
Holding:
This is not ok. Here the requirement had no relationship to job performance, and resulted in discriminatory result, so were not ok.
Rule:
Even practices and procedures that are neutral on their face and intent cannot be maintained if they operate to freeze the status quo of prior discrimination.

Front 17

Wards Cove Packing v. Antonio

Back 17

Facts:
Employees of a packing cannery alleged that hiring/promotion practices resulting in the hiring of whites for non-cannery jobs, and non-whites for cannery jobs were discriminatory.
Holding:
Here, there was not discrimination based solely on the statistical discrepancy. The court said that the proper comparison must be made to show discrimination, and of the workforce represents to pool of applicants then there is no discrimination regardless of the disparity. Remanded to determine whether the statistics show this.
Rule:
Statistical evidence comparing an employers practice of hiring nonwhite workers in one position to a low percentage of workers in other positions does not by itself establish a prima facie case of disparate impact. There must be proof that a specific practice by the employer causes this discrepancy.

Front 18

Crawford v. Metro Government

Back 18

Facts:
Woman answered questions about sexual harassment of another employee during an investigation. Provided information of alleged harassment. Later terminated. Filed retaliation claim.
Holding:
Employee response to questions are covered by opposition clause. Here because she participated in an internal investigation regarding discrimination.
Rule:
Supplying information is enough to trigger the opposition clause.

Front 19

Burlington v. White

Back 19

Facts:
Woman was transferred to worse job (from forklift to track laborer), suspended without pay after complaining of harassment. Employer argued that there was no adverse employment action because she was not fired, demoted, denied a promotion, or denied wages.
Holding:
This was an adverse action because it was a materially adverse employment action.
Rule:
Retaliation claims include actions that are “materially adverse” enough to “dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”

Front 20

Ricci v. DeStefano

Back 20

Rule:
a public employer may engage in intentional discrimination to remedy an unintentional disparate impact only when the employer can show a strong basis in evidence that it will be subject to disparate impact liability if it fails to take the discriminatory action.

Front 21

Smith v City of Jacksonville

Back 21

Facts:
Police department employee argued that the department’s policy of giving officers with five or fewer years of tenure with the department bigger raises than those with more than five years violated the ADEA.
Holding:
Even though it is possible to make a disparate impact claim in an ADEA case, no discrimination here because the employees could not identify any specific practice that had an adverse impact on older workers. AND the plan was based on reasonable factors other than age.
Rule:
A disparate impact claim can be made under ADEA. Analyzed different than title VII because there is the RFOA exception, which is more lenient.

Front 22

Phelps v. Field Real Estate

Back 22

Facts:
Phelps was working for Field as VP of commercial real estate, where he received average evaluations. He found out he had aids but didn’t disclose it. Employer found out about it. Phelps was later fired because of poor performance and company restructuring. Sues alleging ERISA discrimination.
Holding:
While ERISA does prohibit termination of employees to interfere with their rights under a benefit plan, this was not proven here. Here, P did not meet the required burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the termination was motivated by the fact that he had aids. Instead the court bought the story that it was based on poor performance, and not the cost of health care, since he wasn’t terminated for 14 months and there was a reorganization.
Rule:
In order to show this type of discrimination must show the employer acted with the intent to deprive the employee of health benefits. Generally must show:
1) Discharge shortly after notifying employer of disease
2) Failure to follow normal termination procedures
3) Incentive to avoid high medical costs

Front 23

McDowell V. Krawchison

Back 23

Facts:
M worked for K, and when terminated sought to have his health insurance continued and told by soon-to-be former employer that this would be fine. He signed a release. His wife had cancer. K terminated health insurance, of both wife and M, and said that waiver covered it.
Holding:
This is not OK, because the spouse is a qualified beneficiary under COBRA and they require separate notice. The waiver was also not valid against the wife because he could not waive her rights.
Rule:
Qualified beneficiaries, such as spouses, are entitled to notice of their rights under COBRA.

Front 24

New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.

Back 24

Facts:
There was a state law that imposed a surcharge on hospital bills covered by commercial insurers and self-insured plans, and imposed surcharges on HMOs that do not enroll a sufficient number of Medicaid recipients. to off set costs of treating indigent patients. The insurance industry said that this was preempted by ERISA.
Holding:
Not preempted because it does not have a sufficient connection with ERISA covered plans. The impact here was only indirect impact by creating rate variations, which was not enough of an economic impact to be preempted.
Rule:
For state laws to be preempted there must be a “sufficient connection” to ERISA-covered plans.

Front 25

Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc.

Back 25

Facts:
Woman had cancer and took unpaid sick leave that she was eligible for. She then requested even more leave. The work was ok with this, but did not notify here that 12 of those weeks would come out of her FMLA leave. Secretary of labor passed a regulation saying that they have to provide this notice or give back pay.
Holding:
This is outside the scope of the Sec.’s power. The court held that because she would not have to show any impairment to their rights or predjudice, and they would get back pay unfairly this was not ok. Can require notice, but went too far with the penalty.

Front 26

In re Union Pacific Railroad Employment Practices Litigation

Back 26

Facts:
Woman alleged Title VII and PDA discrimination because employer didn’t provide health care coverage for contraceptives:
Holding/Rule:
Not discrimination because contraception is not related to pregnancy for purpose of the statute because it is a treatment that occurs before pregnancy.

Front 27

Kelly v. Johnson

Back 27

Facts:
Police depart had regulations establishing grooming standards, including style and length of facial hair.
Holding:
This is ok, because the state has a duty to keep the peace and can place special demands on the police force. Department only ha to demonstrate a rational connection between its grooming regulations and the promotion of safety.
Rule:
Law enforcement organizations may regulate personal appearances of officers.

Front 28

Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc.

Back 28

Facts:
Harrahs had a make-up policy for women that did not apply to males, as well as other requirements that were different for men and women. Women sued.
Holding:
This was not discriminatory because there was not an unequal burden on men or woman, and there was no evidence to suggest that Harrah’s motivation was to stereotype women bartenders.
Rule:
Company dress codes that are not motivated by gender stereotypes and that do not cause burdens to fall unequally on men or woman do not constitute sex discrimination under Title VII.

Front 29

Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc.

Back 29

Facts:
After suspecting that someone was using an employee’s computer after hours to view porn, employer installed a video camera in the shared office of two employees. Camera was only viewed at night, and was never operated while the employees who used the office were at work. Employees brought a claim for intrusion.
Holding:
No, even though the intrusion violated a reasonable expectation of privacy, it was not highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Rule:
For the tort of intrusion the plaintiff must prove BOTH:
1) Defendant intentionally intruded into an area where the plaintif had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Look to
a. Identity of the intruder
b. Extent to which others had access to the area
c. Means of the intrusion
2) The intrusion was highly offensive to a reasonable person.
a. Degree and setting of intrusion
b. Motives of the intruder

Front 30

Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Academy

Back 30

Facts:
Private catholic school teacher was fired when she signed her name to a pro-choice newspaper advertisement commemorating roe v. wade.
Holding:
Did not violate Title VII. Because the stance was unconnected to mployment.
Rule:
The basis for the discrimination has to be connected to employment to trigger title VII protection.

Front 31

Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp.

Back 31

Facts:
Female IBM employee fired for relationship with former IBM employee who now works for competitor company. Woman sued claiming wrongful discharge and IIED. Employee was generally honest about the association but invoked her right to privacy when officially asked.
Holding:
Not ok, because the relationship did not present a conflict of interest or interfere with employee’s work.
Rule: ??????

Front 32

Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc.

Back 32

Facts:
Woman working with youth promoting female empowerment and trying to reduce teenage pregnancy through private non-profit got pregnant outside of marriage and was fired.
Holding/Rule:
Role model rule is consistent with title VII because it is a business necessity/BFOQ.

Front 33

Benzene Case

Back 33

Facts:
OSHA promulgated a new safety for benzene levels, that was the lowest technically possible. The industry fought it saying that it was unreasonably strict and employers can’t be expected to eliminate every risk of harm.
Holding:
It was too strict.
Rule:
- Feasibility: standard must be reasonable, and should be what is feasible for a business or industry, not what is technically feasible or possible.
- Safe: The act does not require that the standard makes the workplace “risk free” only that it is safe.
- OSHA must prove: Significant risk of material impairment of health or functional capacity.
o Does not have to show the exact mathematical probability
o Can err on the side of safety
o Can require a monitoring below whatever the level they set it at to gather evidence for revision
o Doesn’t have to be anything approaching a scientific certainty
o Can use conservative assumptions

Front 34

Durez v. OSHA

Back 34

Facts:
Durez makes a chemical compound which contains a variety of hazardous chemicals, and is itself hazardous. There is a requirement that the health risks for the chemical mixture as well as the chemicals in the mixture are disclosed clearly to all downstream users. Here , they did not do that for certain risks. Durez claims that at the levels they would be exposed to it would not be an actual hazard.
Holding/Ruling:
Not good enough. You have to disclose everything and the downstream user can judge how to instruct.

Front 35

Pepperidge Farm

Back 35

Facts:
Employees wanted OSHA to bring an action because they were sustaining repetitive injury injuries. P-farm took some actions, but OSHA claimed that they should have taken more.
Holding:
This is under the purview of the general duty clause because there was actual or potential physical harm (28 of 42 employees underwent surgical procedures, 32 of which were for carpal tunnel), it was attributal to the workplace (shown by expert testimony). P-Farm was aware of the injury, as they were document by P-farm physicians. However OSHA could not show that there were actions that were not taken, which were materially likely to reduce the possibility of injury.
Rule:
To enforce the General duty clause:
1) Existence of a hazard:
a. Actual or potential Serious physical harm: this has to be enough harm to prevent an employee from doing their job. Harm “likely to cause death or serious physical harm.”
b. A sufficient causal connection between the harm and the workplace
2) Recognition of a hazard
3) Specific Feasible remedies for abatement: OSHC has to come forth with specific items that employers should have done to eliminate or materially reduce the hazard, that are feasible and utile.

Front 36

Mandolidis v. Elkins

Back 36

Facts:
Man was injured while using a table say, with an unguarded blade. The employer had removed the guards numerous times, and had told employees that they would be sent home or fired if they refused to use the saw without the guard. Man wanted common law tort action instead of workers comp.
Holding:
The case was remanded, saying that it is reasonable to believe that the employer acted in a way that constitutes an intentional tort or willful, wanton and reckless misconduct.
Rule:
An employer loses immunity from common-law actions where its conduct constitutes an intentional tort or willful, wanton, and reckless misconduct.

Front 37

Weinstein v. St. Mary’s

Back 37

Facts:
Woman who worked at hospital sought compensatory damages for an accident that occurred when she was receiving treatment for an injury suffered while she was working.
Holding:
Workers comp was not the exclusive remedy because at the time of the accident she was not working in her employee capacity, but instead the hospital owed her a seprate duty of care arising out of the fact that it was providing treatment.
Rule:
An employee can bring a claim outside of workers comp if the employer has a duty of care that arises independently of any employment relationship. Must show:
There was an independent duty of care: That they were not injured in their capacity as an employee. Turns on whether:
a. The employee was on or off the clock
b. Whether the business was open to the public

Front 38

Guess v. Sharp

Back 38

Facts:
Woman was working next to a gay man, and he was cut on the line and she got blood on her. Filed for workers comp based on mental trauma from her thinking she was exposed to/got AIDs from the incident.
Holding:
She could not collect because there was no RATIONAL connection between the work and the injury. Her subjective belief that he had AIDs was not enough, he would actually have to have it for this to be actionable.
Rule:
There must be a rational connection between work the injury and the work/employment. i.e. there has to be some reasonable connection, not just one that a specific person freaks out about, between the injury and the work.

Front 39

Eckis v. Sea World

Back 39

Facts:
Employee was a secretary that was asked to swim with a killer whale. They knew that the whale had issues, and even knew that he was getting angry, but kept on having her do it. She sued, saying that she should be able to get tort damages instead of workers comp.
Holding:
Workers comp is the exclusive remedy because it was in the course of business. That it was outside her normal duties is irrelevant, since she was on employer premises, during normal work hours, at the request of her employer.
Rule:
Even if the act where the employee is injured is outside of their normal duties it is still exclusively covered by workers comp.

Front 40

Perry v. State

Back 40

Facts:
Woman who worked at a nursing home violated a policy by lifting a patient alone. She was injured. Tried to get workers comp, but was denied because she violated a rule.
Holding:
Not eligible for workers comp because when she violated a restriction imposed by the employer she was working outside the scope of her employment.
Rule:
An employee acts outside the scope of employment by violating a work restriction if:
1) The employer tells them about the restriction
2) The employee understands the restriction
3) Employer didn’t knowingly accept the benefit of the rule breaking
4) The injury resulted from the rule breaking.

Front 41

York v. Union Carbide

Back 41

Facts: York was cleaning a vessel. There was a test taken to see if the argon gas levels were safe to enter that was done incorrectly. York died. Widow tried to sue under tort against manufacturer of gas. UC argued that it was preempted by workers comp.
Holding: Tort law is not preempted by workers comp because there is no preemption in a general duty clause setting. The warning here was sufficient because the negligence was independent of any impact the duty to warm would have.
Rule: State tort law is not preempted by the savings clause because there is not preemption in general duty clause setting.

Front 42

Bard v. Bath Iron Works

Back 42

Facts:
A quality assurance inspector told his supervisor and the employer’s client that he believed processes employee by the employer were in breach of its contract with the client. He was fired, and brought a retaliation action under the state’s Whistlblower Protection Act.
Holding:
Here, there was no protection because he could not show that he believed they actually violated a statute, only that he thought a violation might have occurred.
Rule:
To establish a claim of retaliation for whistle blowing, the employee must show:
1) Employee had reasonable cause to believe that the employer violated a law or rule.
2) Employee engaged in activity protected by whistleblower statute
3) Employee was the subject of adverse employment action; AND
4) There is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employee action.

Front 43

Gordon v. Matthew Bender

Back 43

Facts:
Gordon had an at will contract. His was given a letter placing him on probation and saying that his employment was conditioned on him having satisfactory and acceptable sales performance.
Holding:
A condition is not enough to take a contract out of at-will.
Rule:
Just because a contract has a condition does not mean that it is not a contract at will. Requiring “acceptable/satisfactory” performance does not take the contract out of at will.

Front 44

Scribner v. World Com

Back 44

Facts:
Man had contract with stock options that would be invalid unless he was terminated “with cause.” They fired him for business reasons.
Holding:
He was not fired “with cause” because the reason was not related to his performance.
Rule:
The words “with cause” take a contract out of the realm of at will, and mean that there has to be a reason “related to performance” for the discharge.

Front 45

Woolley v. Hoffman

Back 45

Facts:
There was an employee manual that had procedures that said employees would only be fired for cause. Argued that this created an employment contract.
Holding:
The manual created a unilateral contract, which prevented them from firing him without cause, and without going through the procedures outlined in the manual.
Rule:
Absent a clear and prominent disclaimer, and implied promise in an employment manual will be enforceable unless no one could reasonably have thought it was intended to create legally binding obligations.

Front 46

Pugh v. See’s Candies

Back 46

Facts:
Man was fired after 32 years of employment during which he worked his way up the corporate ladder. There was a company practice not to terminate administrative personnel except for good cause. Argued that he was fired because he of a union contract he negotiated. He never received criticism or anything. Brought a public policy wrongful termination suit.
Holding:
This was wrongful termination because there was an implied from conduct contract based on the policies of the employer, the longevity of service, and assurances given.
Rule:
Contract may be shown by the acts and conduct of parties, interpreted in the light of the subject matter and of the surrounding circumstances. The relevant factors are:
1) Duration of employment
2) Commendations/promotions
3) Lack of criticism
4) Personnel policies or practices
5) Actions or communications by the employer reflecting assurances of continued employment
6) Industry practices

Front 47

Fortune v. National Cash Register

Back 47

Facts:
Man was fired after receiving only part of the bonus due to him. Alleged bad faith.
Holding:
This was bad faith, because all at will contracts have an implied good faith provision. Trying to deprive him of his commission was acting in bad faith.
Rule:
When an employer’s termination of an at-will contract is motivated by bad faith or malice, such termination constitutes a breach of the employment contract.

Front 48

Cleary v. American Airlines

Back 48

Facts:
Employee was fired after he worked for a long time, and there was a regulation that had procedures for discharge that included not discharging without good cause.
Holding:
This was not ok. Because he worked there for 18 years, and there was no legal cause for discharge.
Rule:
Longevity of employee service together with the expressed policy of the employer to resolve employee disputes in good faith and fair dealing precludes discharge without good cause.

Front 49

Gantt v. Sentry

Back 49

Facts:
Employee was forced to quit after refusing to give false information or withhold information from the public agency investigating another employee’s sexual harassment claim.
Holding:
This was wrongful discharge because it violated public policy.
Rule:
Termination in retaliation for supporting a coworkers harassment claim is wrongful discharge against public policy.

Front 50

Arres v. IMI

Back 50

Facts:
Human resource director disagreed with her employers approach to imemgration related discrepancies in W-2s. She refused to follow their approach because she thought it was illegal
Holding:
Not ok, firing was justified. It was not ok for her to follow her own idiosyncratic view of the law.
Rule:
Employees “can pursue public policy, but they have to do it the right way.” Employee has to follow policies and procedures unless the company is explicitly violating a statute or public policy.

Front 51

Gardner v. Loomis Armored

Back 51

Facts:
Armored truck driver left car in contravence of company policy to save a woman who was being attacked.
Holding:
This is ok, because he was saving a life.
Rule:
There is a public policy exception when someone breaks a work rule to save a life.

Front 52

Lingle v Norge

Back 52

Facts:
There was a discharge that for allegedly filing a false workers comp claim. The union also filed a grevience. Lingle filed a wrongful termination claim in state court before the final arbitration of the union claim. Norge argued that the state law claim was preempted because there was a collective bargaining agreement.
Holding:
Not preempted because it only referred to the CBA.
Rule:
State law will only be preempted if application of state law requires interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. Just referring to it doesn’t count.

Front 53

Wilson v Monarch

Back 53

Facts:
Because of his age a vice president was demoted to an entry level job (which was really humiliating) to force him to quit. He filed an IEED claim
Holding:
IEED was ok here, because of the outrageous way he was degraded and humiliated.
Rule:
An employee may sue an employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress if the employer’s actions are so outrageous that they are utterly intolerable in civilized society.

Front 54

Lukaszewski

Back 54

Facts:
Woman signed a contract to work at a school 45 min from her house. Then got a better job closer to home. Original school would not let her out of her contract. She worked there for a while, then she quit. School found a replacement that was more qualified, but that they had to pay more. Sued woman for the difference. Woman argued that she quit because of high blood pressure caused by her having to travel there and work there.
Holding:
She was liable for damages. The health stuff can be an excuse for nonperformance of a contractual obligation, but here it was her fault so it doesn’t work.
Rule:
When you breach a contract you are liable for the costs of replacement, even if the cost is more than you.

Front 55

LaMorte Burns v. Walters

Back 55

Facts:
While still employed employees took steps to establish a competing business . They took the client list from the original employer and faxed them to tell them they were the ones handling their claims and that they could seamlessly transfer them to the new company. Employer sued.
Holding:
Here, this was impermissible competition because they used the customer list, which was confidential and proprietary information. Since they obtained this list while they were still employed and used it to develop their own company they breached the duty of loyalty.
Rule:
You cannot solicit an employer’s clients for a competing business while you are still an employee for that company.

Front 56

Mercer Management v. Wilde

Back 56

Facts:
Three employees of a consulting firm had a two non-compete agreements, one that had a “zipper clause” saying that the first one was still in effect. The employees made plans to compete, but did not disclose them, and they continued to service clients and build customer relationships (as was their job). The firm sued when they left to make their own business because they said it was in violation of duty of loyalty and the original non-compete agreement.
Holding:
There was no breach of duty, because they were just making arangements and this plus non-disclosure is not enough to breach the duty of loyalty. The first non-compete clause however was breached because they started a business within an impermissible time.
Rule:
Employees can make preparations to compete while still working. You can continue to build relationships with clients as long as your actions do not constitute solicitation or other improper actions.

Front 57

Estee Lauder v. Batra

Back 57

Facts:
Senior exec had a global 12 mo. Non-compete clause, that said he could not work for any business in competition with the company in the geographic areas he worked in. He violated it. They sued.
Holding:
The court held that the geographic limitation was reasonable, but the time was not. So the court changed it to 5 months.
Rule:
A non-compete clause has to be reasonable in scope and duration.

Front 58

1330 steel workers

Back 58

Facts:
After U.S. Steel announced the closing of two steel plants in Youngstown the Union sought to get an injunctive order to keep them open or to sell the plants to the Union. They made two claims: 1) estoppel based on a promise to keep it open if it was profitable; and 2) there was a community property right to the plant.
Holding:
The court said that there was no promissory estoppel claim because they were not actually profitable. The court also refused to find a community property right.
Rule:
Courts will not force unprofitable businesses to stay open.

Front 59

Gross v. Hale-Halsell

Back 59

Facts:
A grocery store laid off all of its employees after they lost their biggest client, and could not get a loan from their bank. They only gave one week notice, not the 60 days required by WARN.
Holding:
This was ok because the layoffs were the result of business circumstance that was objectively unforeseeable. The court held that after reviewing the history of the business and the industry the grocery store losing their client was not reasonably foreseeable.
Rule:
The 60 day notice requirement of WARN may be shortened if the layoffs are the result of business circumstances that were objectively not reasonably foreseeable.

Front 60

Zambrano v Reinert

Back 60

Facts:
A worker, who worked seasonally at a cannery was denied unemployment because under state law he was not eligible due to a “cannery rule.”
Holding/ Rule:
This was ok because states are free to determine eligibility standards for unemployment.

Front 61

Pesce v. Bd. of Review

Back 61

Facts:
Employee was discharged after backing his vehicle into a stationary object four times (more than the employer was supposed to allow before firing). Employer then fired him, and objected to him receiving unemployment benefits, arguing that he was ineligible because he was fired for cause.
Holding:
Just because he was fired for cause does not mean that he is ineligible for benefits.
Rule:
A justifiable discharge does not necessarily disqualify the discharged employee from receiving unemployment benefits. The misconduct must evince a willful or wanton disregard of the employers interest, carelessness or negligence of such a degree or recurrence as to manifest equal culpability.

Front 62

Solon v Gary Sch. Dist.

Back 62

Facts:
School district had an incentive plan for early retirement that paid extra benefits if people retired between 58 and 62. Teachers filed an ADEA claim saying that it was age discrimination.
Holding:
This was age discrimination because the incentive was based solely on age. This is not ok.
Rule:
Early retirement plans cannot be based solely on age.

Front 63

LaRue v. DeWolff

Back 63

Facts:
An individual participant in a defined contribution pension plan brought a suit under ERISA because he told them to make changes to his investments and they did not. He alleged that the plan administrator owed him a fiduciary duty.
Holding:
The administrator did owe him a fiduciary duty because it was a defined contribution plan.
Rule:
An individual may bring a claim for breach of fiduciary duty that alleges impaired plan value for the participants individual account with a defined contribution plan.

Front 64

Vallone v. CNA

Back 64

Facts:
Insurance company offered a voluntary special retirement plan. The program included a monthly healthcare allowance, and employees were told orally and in writing that it was a “lifetime benefit,” but they were not told that it was irrevocable. There was also a reservation of rights clause in an earlier retirement program, and the new plan was a modification of the old plan, not a new plan. The employees were never told that the plan was irrevocable. After new management took over they terminated the program. The beneficiaries sued.
Holding:
Did not violate ERISA by terminating the benefits. Even though they said that they were lifetime benefits that did not mean that they were vested or irrevocable. There is a presumption against vesting unless the plain states they are vested in clear and express language.
Rule:
Lifetime does not mean vested, and for something to vest it has to be explicitly stated.