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46 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
Backward induction
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Solution principle according to which one starts by solving the last stage of a game, then the penultimate stage, and so forth, up to the first stage. The solution for each stage is the Nash equilibrium in that stage, where players take into account the actions that will be chosen in later stages of a game.
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Bertrand game
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Model of competition, named after J.L.F. Bertrand, used to describe an industry structure in which firms set prices and customers choose quantities at the prices set.
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Bertrand paradox
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The outcome of the Bertrand game in which, despite higher market concentration compared to perfect competition, the price in the Nash equilibrium equals marginal costs.
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Best response (Game theory)
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Action that results in at least as high a payoff as any other action the player can choose from given the choices by the other players.
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Comparative performance evaluation
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Situation in which a worker’s payment is based on his performance relative to the performance of other workers.
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Competition policy
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Policy and law that promotes or maintains market competition by regulating anti-competitive conduct of firms.
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Consumer surplus
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Net value gained by consumers. In the price-quantity space, it is equal to the surface enclosed by the price-axis, the inverse demand curve, and the line representing the product’s price.
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Coordination costs
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Particular costs that parties incur to complete a transaction. These include the costs trading partners incur to learn about each other’s existence, to determine the price and the other terms of the transaction and to come together to complete the transaction.
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Cournot competition
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Model of competition, named after A.A. Cournot, used to describe an industry structure in which firms compete on the output they produce, which they decide on independently of each other and at the same time.
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Differentiated goods
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Goods that are not homogeneous.
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Double marginalization problem
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Occurs when both the upstream and downstream firms have monopoly power and each firm reduces output from the competitive level to the monopoly level, thus creating two deadweight losses.
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Economic regulation
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Part of competition policy that enforces regulation into specific markets.
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Efficient (allocation)
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An allocation of goods and services is efficient if no reallocation of goods and services exists that makes somebody better off without making someone else worse off.
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Equal compensation principle
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Economic principle, which refers to the case that an agent can expend effort on two tasks and that the principal cannot monitor how he divides his efforts over the two tasks. It states that an agent will only expend effort on both tasks if their marginal rate of return is the same. Otherwise, he will exert zero effort on the task with the lower marginal rate of return.
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Externality
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Cost or benefit which results from an activity or transaction and which affects an otherwise uninvolved party who did not choose to incur that cost or benefit.
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Fundamental theorem of welfare economics
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Economic principle, which states that an efficient allocation of goods emerges at a competitive equilibrium.
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Herfindahl-Hirschman index
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Most commonly used measure of market concentration. It is equal to the sum of the squares of the market shares of the firms active in the market.
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Hotelling game
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Game that models firms’ location choice, either literally or in terms of product positioning.
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Imperfect commitment
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Situation in which trading partners cannot bind themselves to fulfil promises they would like to make before a transaction takes place.
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Imperfect performance measure
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Measures of performance that result to the agents’ output not being perfectly measurable by the principal.
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Incentive intensity principle
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Economic principle, which states that the optimal intensity of incentives is higher the more responsive the agent is to incentives, the greater the principal’s incremental profits from additional effort, the more precisely performance can be measured and the greater the agent’s risk tolerance.
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Information asymmetry
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Situation in which one party engaged in a transaction has more or better information than another.
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Informativeness principle
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Economic principle, which states that the total value is increased by correcting for events beyond the agent’s control in such a way that the error with which the principal measures the agent’s performance is reduced.
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Lerner Index
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Measure of a firm’s market power.
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Market
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Place (in the broadest sense of the word) where buyers and sellers can trade goods and services, usually in exchange for money.
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Market concentration
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Measure of the number of firms and their respective shares of the total production in a market.
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Market power
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Ability of a firm to sell its products at a price above marginal costs.
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Multiple tasks
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When an agent performs more than one task simultaneously.
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Nash equilibrium
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Players’ strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium if none of the players has a reason to choose another strategy given the other players’ strategies.
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Network externality
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A consumer purchasing the product has an impact on the product’s value for other consumers.
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Objectively measurable output
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When a court can verify the output of an agent.
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Organization
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Entity in which people interact to reach economic goals.
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Principal-agent problem
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Problem arising in motivating one party (the agent), to act in the best interests of another (the principal) rather than in his or her own interests.
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Producer surplus
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Net value gained by producers. It equals the sum of the profits of the firms that are active in the market.
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Product differentiation
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The process of distinguishing a product or service from others (for firms). Also, the setting where consumers differ in terms of preferences over products (for consumers).
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Ratchet effect
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Instance in which the principal can partly take away the risk of uncertain future performance by letting the agent’s performance standards depend on his performance in early periods.
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Risk averse
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Aversion of a person in accepting a lottery with an uncertain payoff rather than another lottery with a more certain, but possibly lower, expected payoff.
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Search costs
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Costs the consumers incur to find out about the existence of firms supplying the goods they need.
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Simultaneous move game
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Games where both players move simultaneously, or if they do not move simultaneously, the later players are unaware of the earlier players' actions.
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Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
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Players’ strategies form a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if the players play a Nash equilibrium in each ‘subgame’ of the entire game.
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Switching costs
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Costs incurred by consumers when having to change supplier.
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Tournament
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Participants in a tournament compete for one or several prizes that will be allocated to the best performer(s).
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Transaction cost
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Cost incurred in making an economic transaction.
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Value maximization principle
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Economic principle, which states that an allocation of goods and services is efficient (only) if it maximizes the total value among the affected agents.
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Vertical chain
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Series of firms, starting with the firms exploiting raw materials to firms selling the final products to end consumers.
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Welfare (economic)
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Total value that a market generates. It is equal to the sum of the consumer and producer surpluses.
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