Democracy As A Dv

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Dahl 1985?

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Democracy as requiring contestation and inclusiveness

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Lakoff 1996

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Liberal democracy as a shift from agricultural economies in Europe to balanced market economy and increased emphasis on trade and manufacturing. Major changes in social structure and values also occurred

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Collier and Levitsky 1997

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democracy with adjectives. efforts to promote analytic differentiation and conceptual validity lead scholars to define democracy in increasingly diverse ways. Defining democracy shouldnt be an end in itself, rather a definition should be analytically useful and promote a greater understanding of democracy as an outcome to be explained. Focus on the creation of a procedural minimum.

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Munck and Verkulien 2002

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framework to assess the usefulness of well-known democracy indices. All measures are flawed. See problem of conceptualization and measurement as being equally serious to that of causation.

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Coppedge 2002

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support Munck and Verkuilen's attempts to analyze democracy indices and argue especially that Dahl's polyarchy is inaccurate--only two dimensional. dichotomy can also be useful at times, but it throws away so much information. democracy is multidimensional, so we have trouble capturing it in a single indicator.

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Schedler 2006

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electoral authoritarianism. prior to third wave were few democracies in the world but were all liberal. today, this isnt true. many hybrid regimes have developed and should be be studied either as illiberal democracies or generic hybrids. instead should recognize them as new forms of authoritarianism. institutional trappings of democracy with none of the substance.

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Geddes 1999

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assesses literature on transitions since beginning of 3rd wave and offers a summary of what we know about transitions as well as a new theoretical model based on understanding how the type of authoritarian regime influences the variables that ultimately cause breakdown.

types of authoritariansim often differ across regions, which is one reason why we have trouble finding a few agreed upon explanations for transitions.

1. military regimes-carry seeds of own disintegration and splits result from splits w/in ruling faction. typically take power when feel military institutions threatened and eventual rivalries cause breakdown and transitions to democracy can occur with negotiation and bargaining.
2. personalist regimes--depend upon an individual leader, often fail when leader is overthrown or dies. especially vulnerable during economic collapse. most likely to end in violent overthrow.
3. single-party regimes--dominated by a party. tend tor be resilient and only brought down by exogenous shocks. elites simply want power. very stable and least likely to transition.

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Diamond 2002

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hybrid regimes. we dont know what democracy is or isnt and the existence of ambiguous regimes makes this even more difficult. questions of definition important because of existence of regimes in form but not function. echoes geddes in that to understand chances for regime change we much appropriately understand the various types of authoritarianism. we should try to understand and respect messiness among regimes. democracies are often mixed as well.

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Levitsky and Way 2002

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existence of illiberal democarcies doesnt mean that these regimes are still transitionsing. literature on hybrid regimes suffers from two biases: 1. democratizing bias and 2. terms like semi-democratic are often used to gloss over important differences between regime types.
what is their 'competitive authoritarianism? formal institutions widely viewed as means of obtaining and exercising political authority but rulers violate them so often that they dont meet minimal standards for democracy

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Bratton and Van de Walle 1994

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examines recent patterns of political change in Africa and on that basis proposes revisions to the theory of political transitions. Africa hasn't been immune to global challenge to authoritarianism. nature of preexisting regime shapes the dynamics and outcomes of political transitions. neopatrimonial character of authoritarian regimes makes african transitions distinctive. tend to be driven from below rather than initiated by elites and marked by factional struggles over patronage rahter than by divisions in political ideology.

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Ziblatt 2009

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why so much electoral fraud in new democracies? look at german parliamentary elections and find that fraud increases alongside inequality in landholding. socioeconomic inequality makes elections endogenous to preexisting social power and can be an under appreciated barrier to long term democraization.

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Blaydes

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do authoritarian regimes manipulate economic policy in run up to elections? yes, but in many of the same ways that democratic politicians do--political business cycle. however, authoritarian leaders have a significant advantage as they arent subject to the same institutional constraints as are democratic leaders. tend to create election year inflation, drain reserves, and have a higher level of per capita calorie consumption in election years

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Moore 1966

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how do class relations impact the transformation of agrarian societies into modern industrial onces. explaining historical development of three paths to modern liberal democracy, fascism, and communism. aristocracy can support or oppose commercialization and their reaction may determine future political development. peasants can revolt or adapt.

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Gerschenkron 1970

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shouldnt generalize when discussing industrialisation of advanced and backward countries. need to look at speed of development, differing institutional instruments, differing intellectual climates, and variation in cases.

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Huntington 1991

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democracy occurs in waves. why do we see waves? economic growth, political and military factors. in 3rd wave though the regimes that transitioned were many different types of authoritarian and many had democratic instiuttions in the past.

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Lipset 1959

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What are conditions associated with the existence and stability of democracy? takes a socialogical and behavioral approach and discusses the social requirements. two caracteristics are important: 1. economic developemtn and 2. legitimacy. also, evidence suggests democracy more sucessful when social groups of a society have a number of cross cutting cleavages. two party systems better, also federalism

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Boix and Stokes 2003

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are rich or poor dictatorships more likely to collapse and be replaced by democracies? Prz and Limongi say no, that economic development only makes democracies less likely to fall into dictatorship. boix and stokes say that when the status quo is democracy income growth does icnreas stability. but when status quo is dictatorship, results are the same. economic growth increases the incentives for the ruling faction to democratize

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Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2003

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what is relationship between modernization and democracy in Latin America? level of development has modest impact on likelihood for democracy in LA and per capita income a worse predictor of democ in LA than elsewhere. what explains LA exceptionalism?
is a product of both democratic overachievers and underachievers.

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Almond and Verba 1965

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civic culture. why do we see dem in some states and not in others? role of societal factors. collective predisposition of politics and extent to which individuals see themselves as participants can help explain why some democracies are stable while others are at different levels. 3 types of political culture--parochial, subjective, participatory

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Saideman et al 2002

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what types of democratic political instiutions are best in ethnically divided or highly cleavaged societies. find that federalism and pres may not be as bad as some argue, the PR does help. ethnic security dilemma

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BDM et al 2005

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selectorate theory. citizens of a iven state are part of a selectorate which results in winning coalitions for politicians to attempt to win over when elections take place. politicians allocate verying degrees of public and private goods in order to satisfy demands of winning coalition. when coalitions are small leaders can provide access to greater amounts of such goods and when coalitions are larger goods will still be divided by in lesser amounts.

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Linz 1978

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political factors that may account for democratic breakdown. chooses to focus on elites. democratic governments depend upon support for activation of commitments and decisions. three dimensions 1. legitimacy, 2 efficacy, and 3 effectiveness. legitimacy is key to survival. governments cannot survive if most do not see it as legitimate.

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Lake and Baum 2001

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examine whether we should expect differences in goods provision and rents across regime types. government like a firm and subject to constraints of market. politicians are utility maximizers. democracies will provide higher levels of public services than autocracies and this will be reflected after regime changes as well.

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Boix 2003

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criticizes previous theories of transition and consolidation for lacking sufficient causal mechanisms to explain why they support democracy. Boix assumes that regime choice is determined by the aggregation of individual preferences for regime types based on expected asset distribution. argues that level of income inequality, mobility of capital, and cost to rich to repress determines type of regime chose

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Linz and Stepan 1996

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see transition and consolidation as two different processes upon which the same variables can have different impacts.

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Hagiopan and Mainwaring 2005

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why democratic electoral regimes have survived in LA despite poverty, inequality, and poor economic performance. highlights importance of attitudes and international factors. if main actors are commited to democracy and if international environment is favorable, democracy will survive. inadequacy of structural factors and economic performance to explain. also, factors contribute to transitions and survival may not contribute to democratic quality. to explain quality we often need to bring structural and economic factors back in.

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Haggard and Kaufman 1995

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examine role that economic crisis played in 3rd wave. critique existing literature as having ignored economic variables in favor of purely political explanations. see politics and economics as impossible to separate and maintain that we must examine constraints on choices/agency. assume that opportunities for political elites to mobilize public suport or opposition depend on how economic policy and performance affect the income of different social groups.

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Whitehead 2008

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argues that potential for international influence over the direction of democracy in LA has shifted dramatically since hte apparent convergence in the 90s. looks at 4 types of influence;;control, conditionality, contagion, consent.
us bad policy, interest pursuit, hypocrisy has damaged ability of all these to work.

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Diamond 1999

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hollowing out of third wave. 4 types of political regimes:
1. liberal democ
2. electoral democ
3. pseudodemoc
4. nondemoc
transitions not linear. consolidation required to increase democratic quality. requires transformation of political culture, better institutions, and effective govt performance.