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47 Cards in this Set
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1. Prioritizing national security & defense strategies: allocating funds |
Decide on the relative importance of the different elements of defense and security strategy & the appropriation and distributing of resources to each element. Deterrence, punishment, denial, nuclear force structures, and conventional forces. |
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Defense investments |
Have to be made many years in advance of the threats & therefore defining threats & challenges into the future in as accurate a manner as possible is essential. US has a defense budget of unrivalled proportions & is thus free to put money in a hugely diverse spectrum of D&S strategy programs. |
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Prioritizing national security & defense strategies: Conventional forces: |
land, maritime, airpower, and growing technologies. |
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Prioritizing national security & defense strategies: Nuclear force structures: |
the triad: strategic significance of air power, ballistic missiles, BMD, defense against rockets, and mutual assured destruction [extended deterrence]. |
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Prioritizing national security & defense strategies: What must be considered? |
Diplomatic, economic, tactic threats, "sticks & carrots", doctrines, fall-back positions, default options. Identify the adversaries, rogue states, terrorist networks, near-peer adversaries, & regional conflicts. Radical Islam & its potential for containment & deterrence. |
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Prioritizing national security & defense strategies: Bush/Neo-conservative view |
Rumsfeld report in 1998: set out the challenges of US, identifying friends & enemies. Iraq was dealt with. Present threats: Iran & NK. Axis of Evil must be rolled back. Deterrence is unreliable, focus on prevention & preemption. The adversary isn't rational, acts with divine guidance & authority. Views the West as declining and defeatable, Islam is dominating, they aim to undermine the status quo. Liberals are naive & bound to fail bringing worsening safety, security, and economic crises. |
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Prioritizing national security & defense strategies: Obama/Rejectionist school |
Aware of challenges, WMD terrorism, radical islam, near-peer competition. Cairo speech 09: need to engage moderate Muslims in order to fight extremism. Nuclear solutions are dead last. Rejects almost entirely the use of force as a dominant element, US will never initiate force except in extreme circumstances. Containment & deterrence can be assured by keeping the Triad. Soft/smart power is ideal. Success of the CW is applicable to current agenda. Flexible response over Eisenhower's massive retaliation approach. Seeks to change Bush's approach. |
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Prioritizing national security & defense strategies: Obama versus Bush |
Obama believed Bush's strategy degraded America's standing in the world & produced less security. US must repair damage he caused. Obama believes in diplomacy, negotiation, engagement, cooptation, economic incentives, etc. If diplomatic means fail the US will use force to prevent the emergence of Iranian nuclear weapons, believes if Iran is attacked by a nuclear weapon, they will act rational and can be deterred & contained like USSR. Optimistic school. |
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Prioritizing national security & defense strategies: Changes in the US: |
Bush was skeptical if deterrence would work on the relevant adversaries. 2010- continued reliance on nuclear deterrence however they are viewed as somewhat unreliable. Focus of Pre-emption, active & passive defense, & denial. Obama emphasized loose nukes, WMD terrorism, engagement, soft/smart power, carrots & sticks, building an alliance of moderates to marginalize extremists, & a continued dedication to force structure to meet entire spectrum of threats. 2012 defense budget was 4.7% of GDP over $7billion. |
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Prioritizing national security & defense strategies: UK & France |
Problems with identifying & defining threats/challenges - similar to US. continued reliance on nuclear deterrence along with a modest review of deterrence. Defined minimum deterrence. Struggled to define/coping with terrorism [WMD]. Use of conventional fallback structures, joint forces, NATO. UK defense budget was 2.7% of GDP over $60billion. France 2.5% GDP almost $60billion. |
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Prioritizing national security & defense strategies: EU in general |
Prefers non-military solutions like diplomacy. Economic prowess used to enhance success of soft power strategies. Maintain minimal force structures to meet spectrum of challenges [NATO]. Defense budget over $40billion. Reserved support for US strategies of confronting threats [case by case]. Participation in US sponsored efforts [Iraq, NATO in Afghanistan, anti-piracy]. |
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Prioritizing national security & defense strategies: Israel |
Confront entire range of threats & challenges: nuclear, WMD, & SSM. Conventional- maintain qualitative edge. High tech solutions. Active & passive defense. Pre-emption: moral & legal right, strategies, methods, consequences. Unique solutions for defense, denial, punishment, & deterrence for low-intensity threats [Hamas, Hezbollah]. Geographic, demographic realities. Defense budget 6.9% GDP $16billion. US partnership- strategic advantages, restraints imposed. |
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2. Nuclear weapons have prevented the outbreak of major wars but have not prevented conventional regional wars: TRUE |
nuclear weapons were effective as a deterrent between US & USSR. Containment & deterrence were successful & the assumptions of deterrence theory are generally correct & valid. This is how we should proceed in the future. Assured destruction with survivable 2nd strike capabilities were effective in deterring the use of nuclear weapons. |
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Nuclear weapons have prevented the outbreak of major wars but have not prevented conventional regional wars: TRUE. nuclear weapons impose... |
Rationality & considerable caution, deterrence stability can be maintained, while no decision-maker will be likely to risk his own country, cities, infrastructure, political system, authority, life or lives of those he values in a nuclear exchange. |
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Nuclear weapons have prevented the outbreak of major wars but have not prevented conventional regional wars: FALSE-Nukes & US/USSR |
Nuclear weapons remain a significant danger to the existence of humanity, the sheer number of NW that exist increase the statistical probability that one day a nuclear weapon[s] will be used. the conflict between US/USSR was not cultural, they did not hate or wish to destroy each other, there was no territorial issue due to geofraphical distance. |
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Nuclear weapons have prevented the outbreak of major wars but have not prevented conventional regional wars: FALSE continued-USSR in europe & China |
USSR never intended to invade & overrun West Europe but rather extend its influence to create a buffer against the West. USSR leadership was very rational & only wanted to challenge the US on geographical margins like Vietnam or the ME. Their ideology was an economic one of maximizing gains & minimizing costs. Especially trust after cuban missile crisis. [zero option- should all be destroyed, no benefit, dangerous] |
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Nuclear weapons have prevented the outbreak of major wars but have not prevented conventional regional wars: nuclear deterrence with anti-status quo ideologies |
WMD terrorism is a wild card, can they be deterred? Payne criticized that assumptions & rational actor model are less reliable due to the human nature to be ignorant, misperceive, misunderstand, miscalculate, etc. Especially true with ideologies with mystical and mythical elements. |
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Nuclear weapons have prevented the outbreak of major wars but have not prevented conventional regional wars: conventional deterrence |
less effective because a challenger is inherently less cautious when expected retaliation & costs are in conventional terms rather than nuclear. They are more willing to take risks, accept a greater margin of error regarding costs, punishment, and outcome that can be tolerated in conventional conflict but not nuclear. Especially true for states/ideologies that emphasize non-material values [sacrifice is a positive value]. conventional deterrence is more fragile, even at the theoretical level. |
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Nuclear weapons have prevented the outbreak of major wars but have not prevented conventional regional wars: examples of conventional deterrence |
German invasion of Poland starting WWII, 6 day war in June 1967: Egypt was willing to sacrafice military defeat in order to advance other agenda goals that are of greater importance to them. |
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Nuclear weapons have prevented the outbreak of major wars but have not prevented conventional regional wars: minimum deterrence states |
UK & France- curious contradiction in current trend to de-emphasize the role/important of nuclear weapons/deterrents and upgrade conventional aspects of D&S strategy. However conventional forces are being reduced somewhat. UK is renewing nuclear submarine fleet. France combo of subs for strategic deterrent & retaining aircraft launch capability. Afghanistan campaign relied on conventional capabilities involving heavy political costs. |
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3. Deterrence theory origins |
today's beliefs regarding the effectiveness of deterrence are the result of the experience with CW nuclear deterrence & how it was evolved & practiced. Although deterrence was practiced before the nuclear age, it was the advent of nuclear weapons that changed the crucial poignancy of the need to ensure the success of deterrence. If deterrence failed, nuclear war. Nuclear war would be qualitatively different from even the most catastrophic conventional wars. |
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First wave implications on deterrence |
Realized the qualitative differences that nuclear weapons imposed on deterrence issues. Not just bigger or more powerful, but victory in NW would be meaningless, therefore they should be used to prevent war, not win it. As the USSR's arsenal diminished the US's strategic advantage, they realized any NW would be disastrous and futile. Nuclear deterrence issues were the central D&S strategy issue during the CW. |
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Shift from 1st to 2nd nuclear age & implications for deterrence: |
In the 2nd nuclear age the context of nuclear deterrence changed fundamentally however the majority opinion is that the assumptions of the theory are applicable to the new situation even when applied to eccentric adversaries. Rational actor model: max gains, min loss; no gain in nuclear war, all sides would lose. |
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Shift from 1st to 2nd nuclear age & implications for deterrence: Obama administration |
Still believe the fundamental truth of deterrence theory, while others are highly skeptical because of the flaws inherent in deterrence theory assumptions. Its insufficient attention to cultural intricacies impacting decision making can lead to a multitude of serious potential miscalculation, especially due to mythical or mystical ideologies. |
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Shift from 1st to 2nd nuclear age & implications for deterrence: status-quo |
USSR after stalin was fundamentally a rational leadership that had a vested interest in the statu-quo & military involvement in sensitive arenas like the ME or W Europe was avoided. Today's adversaries are driven to undermine or overthrow the status-quo and may be willing to incur unprecedented high costs to attain the victory that they believe is inevitable. |
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Shift from 1st to 2nd nuclear age & implications for deterrence: Payne's beliefs- desperate political imperatives can limit rational decision-making & encourage leadership towards a high-risk brinkmanship |
A leader's nationality, passion, idealism, pragmatism, stupidity, intelligence, imagination, flexibility, stubbornness, depression, anxiety, and paranoia shape reactions and decisions during a crisis. Even very lethal threats cannot end the capacity of leaders to base their reactions on severely distorted perceptions of reality, pursue unreasonable goals, etc. |
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2nd wave implications on deterrence |
relied on game-theory model and thus gained great acceptability & credibility as a reliable explanation for the evolution of deterrence/deterrence stability which was viewed as the central core of security. A way for 2 sides to co-exist without giving up ideals or ideological long-term goals. |
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Shift from 1st to 2nd nuclear age & implications for deterrence: weapon development |
The Triad of air-launched bombs & cruise missiles, ICBM's in protected silos, & the submarine launched ballistic missile capability resulted in a survivable assured 2nd strike retalitory capability. |
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2nd wave implications: conservative viewpoint |
War-fighting school: capability to win assures deterrence in the first place |
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2010 QDR Report & 2010 BMDR ballistic missile defense review |
BMDR- heavy fiscal commitment is evidence of the recognized need to bolster deterrence by the threat of punishment - added element of denial as well. Defense is mandated in case deterrence fails after all.
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2010 NPR nuclear posture review |
Obama favors boosting conventional capabilities to offset a reduction in reliance on nuclear weapons for defense & deterrence becaue they're believed to become less relevant. True in Kennedy's admin too. Obama favors zero option. |
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Ideological Paradox - nuclear weapon use |
The ideology stating that deterrence is highly reliable because it means that use of nuclear weapons will never occur - believes that nuclear weapons should be abolished because otherwise someday they might be used. |
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Can a nuclear Iran be deterred? Liberal view |
No danger Iran would use NW due to severe nuclear retaliation. MAD is relevant as it was to USSR which was more powerful than Iran ever will be. However, a nuclear Iran poses other risks such as pursuing its anti-status quo agenda more aggressively, destabilizing regional allies of the US. Still doesn't warrant confrontation to prevent them becoming nuclear. Only the threat of actual use of NW, however Iran is a RA & will be deterred. A nuclear Iran > to a war of preemption. |
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Can a nuclear Iran be deterred? Conservative view |
Skeptical that deterrence theory alone explains why USSR didn't launch a nuclear war against US. Can we project the behavior of USSR onto Iran? USSR was cautious & calculating, guided by a materialistic economically-based ideology. Iran is a theocracy with God as the predominant consideration. USSR-status quo power; Iran- overthrow status quo. Deterrence can't be guaranteed, low probability - high consequence that they would use NW against an adversary. |
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Bracken on nuclear Iran |
deterrence is static, while escalation is dynamic. Most of the focus is on deterrence and almost none at all on escalation which is more relevant in this case. |
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4. Will Obama's strategy of engagement work? |
He favors soft/smart power. De-emphasizes the use of force and the threat of the use of force in favor of diplomacy, multilateralism, engagement, & cooptation, through diplomatic & economic incentives. |
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Obama's exact strategy: do all that is necessary to guarantee and improve the security, safety, & prosperity of the US citizens, interests, & allies. |
Radical departure from prior administrations, especially Bush. Rejects almost entirely the use of force as a dominant element and operates under a well defined understanding of how the world works with an elaborate strategy for addressing challenges. Fundamentally differs from neo-conservative concepts. Never initiate the use of force except in unusually extreme circumstances. Diplomacy, negotiation, engagement, multilateralism, economic incentives. |
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Obama's criticism of Bush |
Believes that Bush's strategy degraded America's standing in the world and produced less ecurity instead of more by driing adversaries to more extreme positions while alienating allies. He must work to fix all of this. |
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2010 National security strategy published by the WH |
threatens adversaries with isolation as the most exteme form of punishment rather than the use of force, pre-emption, or regime change much discussed during the Bush times. |
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Isolation as the ultimate punishment |
Adversaries offered to adhere to international norms or bear consequences of isolation which can motivate adversaries to further engage, therefore enhancing defense & security. Even when bad things are happening US still won't go to war. The perceived decline of American power: fuels Islamic surge & possible second CW. Power vacuums [real or not] invite forces to occupy them, creating potentially volatile situations. |
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Will it work? YES |
Because the adversary is rational and deterrable [except al Qaeda], in time, radical regimes will become rational & pragmatic [except al Qaeda] & in time, radical regimes will go away so pre=emption is unnecessary & dangerous. Common interests, cooperation, commonalities, are all forgeable & achievable. |
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Will it work? NO |
The adversary doesn't think in those terms, they are more determined, resolute, & act with divine authority. View the West as declining & defeatable, no interest in accommodation. Culturally based misperceptions are paramount factors in shaping strategy. Radical Islam believes they are on the march, has dominated in ME for centuries. Globally these regimes are working to undermine the status quo. US only strength is military which is currently unobservable. |
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If it works |
It will be slow to develop & requires patience, the world will become more secure & prosperous. Allies of the moderates to isolate extremists will marginalize them. Maybe even roll them back, reversing worrisome trends. Diplomatic & political resolution of crises in Iran, NK, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc will reduce dangers of war, nuclear terrorism, & economic repercussions of escalation. |
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If it fails |
It will encourage the radical tide & the status quo will deteriorate. Radical ideologies will demonstrate that they are on the rise while Western society is in retreat, they will gain more support and violence will spread. "Clash of Civilization" Crises in Iran, NK, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc could escalate. Increased danger from nuclear proliferation/terrorism to points of deep concern. |
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Rogue States |
NK & Iran which some believe will be deterred from ever using NW but others are skeptical or doubtful to the degree that use of force may be warranted to prevent them from acquiring WMD capabilities, especially NW. |
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Terroist Networks |
al Qaeda, Hezbollah, which is assumed that they cannot be deterred |
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Peer adversaries |
for the US this means Russia, increasingly China, for the UK & France this means Russia |
