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103 Cards in this Set
- Front
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Wayte v. United States, 470 US 598 (1985)
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Selective prosecution claims may appropriately be judged according to ordinary equal protection standards.
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United States v. Armstrong, 517 US 456 (1996)
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For a defendant to be entitled to discovery on a claim that he was singled out for prosecution on the basis of his race, he must make a threshold showing that the Government declined to prosecute similarly situated suspects of other races.
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Blackledge v. Perry, 417 US 21 (1974)
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Vindictive prosecution is a denial of due process, conviction of a misdemeanor followed by an appeal as of right to a trial de novo does not justify indictment on a felony charge in retaliation.
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Costello v. United States, 350 US 359 (1956)
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Hearsay evidence is admissible in grand jury proceedings
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United States v. Williams, 504 US 36 (1992)
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Exculpatory evidence does not have to be presented to or considered by a grand jury.
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Zafiro v. United States, 506 US 534 (1993)
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Defendants are not entitled to separate trials merely because a separate trial might give them a better chance of acquittal; there must be a “serious risk” that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right, or prevent the jury from individually assessing the guilt of each defendant separately.
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Bruton v. United States, 391 US 123 (1968)
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When a defendant in a multi-defendant case makes a confession implicating codefendants, a limiting instruction is no substitute for the right to confrontation under the 6th Amendment. Either redact or try separately.
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Richardson v. Marsh, 481 US 200 (1987)
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A redacted confession by a codefendant combined with properly admitted evidence falls outside the Bruton rule.
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Gray v. Maryland, 523 US 185 (1998)
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Confessions redacted to resolve a Bruton problem must provide the protection contemplated in Bruton.
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United States v. Salerno, 481 US 739 (1987)
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Given the Bail Reform Act's legitimate and compelling regulatory purpose and the procedural protections it offers, § 3142(e) is not facially invalid under the Due Process Clause
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United States v. Osama Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2nd Cir. 2003)
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Material witness statute authorizes detention of grand jury witnesses when their appearance may be impracticable to secure by subpoena.
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Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 US 346 (1996)
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Kansas’ Sexually Violent Predator Act passes constitutional muster.
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Williams v. Florida, 399 US 78 (1970)
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Notice-of-alibi rule does not (1) deprive a defendant of due process; or (2) deprive a defendant of a fair trial; or (3) compel a defendant to be a witness against himself.
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Brady v. Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963)
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The suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.
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Giglio v. United States, 405 US 150 (1972)
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Nondisclosure to the jury of a promise by the Government not to prosecute in exchange for cooperation is a violation of due process requiring a new trial.
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United States v. Bagley, 473 US 667 (1985)
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Non-disclosed evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different
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Kyles v. Whitley, 514 US 419 (1995)
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The state's disclosure obligation under Brady turns on the cumulative effect of all suppressed evidence favorable to the defense, not on the evidence considered item by item
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Banks v. Dretke, 540 US 668 (2004)
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Texas Two-Step Does Not Dance in D.C.
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Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 US 51 (1988)
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The government’s failure to preserve potentially useful evidence is not a denial of due process absent a showing of bad faith
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Brady v. United States, 397 US 742 (1970)
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A guilty plea, voluntarily and intelligently made, is not rendered invalid merely because it was made to avoid the possibility of a death penalty.
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Boykin v. Alabama, 395 US 238 (1969)
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It is reversible error to accept a plea of guilty without an affirmative showing that the plea was intelligent and voluntary
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Henderson v. Morgan, 426 US 637 (1976)
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A plea is not knowing and intelligent when the defendant is not aware of all the elements of the crime and the nature of the charges. The plea cannot be voluntary unless the defendant understands the relationship of the law to the facts of his case.
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Hill v. Lockheart, 474 US 52 (1985)
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An attorney’s erroneous advice about corollary issues in a plea bargaining process does not constitute ineffective counsel
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Santobello v. New York, 404 US 257 (1971)
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Prosecutors must keep their promises when the defendant's guilty plea is induced by the promise
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Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 US 1 (1987)
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Breach of a plea agreement by the defendant can remove the bar to double jeopardy and get you an appointment with Ole Sparky.
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North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)
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A defendant can enter a valid guilty plea while maintaining his innocence.
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United States v. Marion, 404 US 307 (1971)
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The 6th Amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial is applicable only after a person has been ‘accused’ of a crime, which in this case did not occur until indictment.
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United States v. Lovasco, 431 US 783 (1977)
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Prosecution of a defendant following a good-faith investigative delay does not deprive him of due process even if his defense might have been somewhat prejudiced by the lapse of time.
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Barker v. Wingo, 407 US 514 (1972)
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A defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial cannot be established by any inflexible rule but can be determined only on an ad hoc balancing basis, in which the conduct of the prosecution and that of the defendant are weighed
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Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S.Ct. 1283 (2009)
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An assigned counsel's failure to move the case forward does not warrant attribution of delay to the State.
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Doggett v. United States, 505 US 647 (1992)
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A delay between indictment and trial that spans years, and is attributable to government negligence, violates the 6th Amendment guaranty of a speedy trial.
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Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 US 25 (1972)
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The right of an indigent defendant in a criminal trial to the assistance of counsel, is not governed by the classification of the offense or by whether or not a jury trial is required
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Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S.Ct. 2578 (2008)
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Attachment of the 6th Amendment right to counsel does not also require that a prosecutor (as distinct from a police officer) be aware of that initial proceeding or involved in its conduct
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Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335 (1963)
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6th Amendment right to counsel at trial is a fundamental right which is thus applied to the states via the 14th Amendment.
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Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668 (1984)
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Ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing follows a 2-part test (1) counsel fell short of an objective standard, and (2) the defendant suffered prejudice – the outcome would have likely been different but for the ineffective attorney.
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Florida v. Nixon, 543 US 175 (2004)
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Defense counsel's failure to obtain defendant's express consent to a strategy of conceding guilt at the guilt phase of a capital trial does not automatically render counsel's performance deficient
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Faretta v. California, 422 US 806 (1975)
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A defendant in a state criminal trial has an independent constitutional right of self-representation and that he may proceed to defend himself without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so
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Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S.Ct. 2379 (2008)
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The Constitution permits states to insist upon representation by counsel for those who are competent enough to stand trial but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.
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Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S.Ct. 13 (2009)
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Effectiveness of counsel determinations must apply the objective test using standards in place at the time of representation (not those put in place 18 years later).
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Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010)
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Effective counsel demands accurate legal advice about the impact of a guilty plea on the risk of deportation.
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Porter v. McCollum, 130 S.Ct. 447 (2009)
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The utter failure to uncover and present any mitigating evidence regarding mental health, family background, or military service, when it exists, falls below the objective standard for effective counsel
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Wong v. Belomentes, 130 S.Ct. 383 (2009)
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The failure to produce additional mitigation evidence during the penalty phase of a trial is not per se grounds for ineffective counsel
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Presley v. Georgia, 130 S.Ct. 721 (2010)
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A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial is violated when the trial court excludes the public from the voir dire of prospective jurors.
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Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 US 145 (1968)
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A crime punishable by two years in prison is “serious crime” and not “petty offense”, so that Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require state to grant jury trial. U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 6, 14.
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Williams v. Florida, 399 US 78 (1970)
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The 12-man panel is not a necessary ingredient of ‘trial by jury,’ and that s State’s refusal to impanel more than the six members provided for by State law does not violate Sixth Amendment rights as applied to the States through the Fourteenth.
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Ballew v. Georgia, 435 US 223 (1978)
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A five-member jury violates 6th and 14th Amendment trial by jury guarantees.
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Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 US 404 (1972)
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State juries do not have to deliver unanimous verdicts.
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Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 US 522 (1975)
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Systematic exclusion of women from the jury pool violates 6th Amendment rights to a jury trial.
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Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979)
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Conviction by a nonunanimous six-person jury in a state criminal trial for a nonpetty offense violates the right of a defendant to trial by jury
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Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986)
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A defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial
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Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S.Ct. 1203 (2008)
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The prosecution cannot offer pretextual explanations to defeat a Batson challenge.
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Skilling v. U.S, No. 08–1394 (2010)
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A showing of adequate protective procedures in jury selection can defeat a challenge to pre-trial publicity prejudice to a defendant’s right to a fair trial.
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Irvin v. Dowd, 366 US 717 (1961)
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With his life at stake, it is not requiring too much that petitioner be tried in an atmosphere undisturbed by so huge a wave of public passion and by a jury other than one in which two-thirds of the members admit, before hearing any testimony, to possessing a belief in his guilt.
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Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 US 333 (1966)
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The fact is that bedlam reigned at the courthouse during the trial and newsmen took over practically the entire courtroom, hounding most of the participants in the trial, especially Sheppard.
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Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 US 1030 (1991)
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The restraint on speech [imposed by the “substantial likelihood of material prejudice” standard ] is narrowly tailored to achieve valid objectives, since it applies only to speech that is substantially likely to have a materially prejudicial effect, is neutral to points of view, and merely postpones the lawyer's comments until after the trial.
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United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825 (1995)
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The advocate is still entitled-indeed encouraged-to strike hard blows, but not unfair blows. Trial practice, whether criminal or civil, is not a contact sport. And, its tactics do not include eye-gouging or shin-kicking
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Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 US 539 (1976)
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Prior restraint requires a finding that measures short of prior restraint on the press and speech would not have protected the accused’s rights.
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Chandler v. Florida, 449 US 560 (1981)
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An absolute constitutional ban on broadcast coverage of trials cannot be justified simply because there is a danger that, in some cases, [the broadcast coverage] may impair the ability of jurors to decide the issue of guilt or innocence uninfluenced by extraneous matter.
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Illinois v. Allen, 397 US 337 (1970)
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An accused, by persisting in disruptive conduct can lose his constitutional right to be present throughout his trial, so that his removal from a courtroom and proceeding with trial in his absence until he promises to conduct himself properly is not unconstitutional
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Deck v. Missouri, 544 US 622 (2005)
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The Constitution forbids the use of visible shackles during a capital trial's penalty phase, as it does during the guilt phase, unless that use is “justified by an essential state interest”-such as courtroom security-specific to the defendant on trial.
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Maryland v. Craig, 497 US 836 (1990)
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Thus, the use of the one-way closed circuit television procedure, where it is necessary to further an important state interest, does not impinge upon the Confrontation Clause's truth-seeking or symbolic purposes.
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Crawford v. Washington, 541 US 36 (2004)
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The Confrontation Clause commands that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.
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Griffin v. California, 380 US 609 (1965)
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The Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the Federal Government and in its bearing on the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.
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In re Winship, 397 US 358 (1970)
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The Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
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Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 US 466 (2000)
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The Constitution requires that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (The “hate” in a “hate crime” is an element to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.)
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Blakely v. Washington, 542 US 296 (2004)
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A sentence not supported by facts neither admitted by a defendant nor found by a jury violates the 6th Amendment right to trial by jury.
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United States v. Booker, 543 US 220 (2005)
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Blakely applies to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
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Oregon v. Ice, 129 S.Ct.711 (2009)
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The Sixth Amendment does not inhibit States from assigning to judges, rather than to juries, the finding of facts necessary to the imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences for multiple offenses because historical practice and the States' authority over administration of their criminal justice systems can be distinguished from findings of fact about the elements of a crime.
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Solem v. Helm, 463 US 277 (1983)
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The Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishments prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed.
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Ewing v. California, 538 US 11 (2003)
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Nothing in the Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from choosing to incapacitate criminals who have already been convicted of at least one serious or violent crime.
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Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010)
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A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile recidivist, but must impose a sentence that provides some meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.
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United States v. Bajakajian, 524 US 321 (1998)
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A punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish. Solem v. Helm applies to punitive fines.
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Furman v. Georgia, 408 US 238 (1972)
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The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.
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Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 US 407 (2008)
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The 8th Amendment limits the power of the State to impose the death penalty against an individual when the crime does not result in the death of the victim, to crimes against the State (such as espionage or treason).
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Atkins v. Virginia, 536 US 304 (2002)
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Executions of mentally retarded criminals are “cruel and unusual punishments” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
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Roper v. Simmons, 543 US 551 (2005)
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The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.
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Harbison v. Little, 571 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2009)
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Lethal Injection is not cruel and unusual.
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Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008)
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Lethal injection does not violate 8th Amendment
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United States v. Scott, 437 US 82 (1978)
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Where a defendant himself seeks to have his trial terminated without any submission to either judge or jury as to his guilt or innocence, an appeal by the Government from his successful effort to do so does not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause, and hence is not barred by 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976 ed.). United States v. Jenkins, supra, overruled.
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Hudson v. United States, 522 US 93 (1997)
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The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar criminal prosecution that follows a civil prosecution for the same conduct.
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Blockburger v. United States, 284 US 299 (1932)
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Where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.
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Burks v. United States, 437 US 1 (1978)
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The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict of guilty, and the only “just” remedy available for that court under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 is the entry of a judgment of acquittal.
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United States v. Sanford, 429 US 14 (1976)
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Even when double jeopardy attaches and empanelling a jury, double jeopardy does not bar retrial after a mistrial on a hung jury.
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United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976)
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Absent bad-faith conduct by judge or prosecutor, a mistrial granted on defendant’s motion does not bar retrial.
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Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 US 667 (1982)
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Absent intentional misconduct by the prosecutor, a mistrial granted on defendant’s motion does not bar retrial.
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Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 US 121 (1959)
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Prosecution by dual sovereigns does not violate due process.
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Rutledge v. United States, 517 US 292 (1996)
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Concurrent punishments do not satisfy the one crime one punishment rule.
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Ashe v. Swenson, 397 US 436 (1970)
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Established rule of federal law regarding collateral estoppel in criminal cases is embodied in Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy. *** Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause protects a man who has been acquitted from having to run the gauntlet a second time.
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Yeager v. U.S., No. 08-67 (2009)
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A jury verdict which decides an issue in favor of a defendant protects that defendant from prosecution for any charge for which that issue is an essential element.
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Tyler v. Cain, 533 US 656 (2001)
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A second habeas petition lies “on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable,” meaning that the Supreme Court held the new rule to be retroactive.
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Rose v. Lundy, 455 US 509 (1982)
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All state habeas claims, not just some, must be exhausted before filing for federal habeas relief.
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Teague v. Lane, 489 US 288 (1989)
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Federal habeas relief does not lie where a Supreme Court holding interprets a new constitutional rule as not retroactive.
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Stone v. Powell, 428 US 465 (1976)
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Where the State, has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search and seizure was introduced at his trial. In this context the contribution of the exclusionary rule to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment outweighed by the substantial societal costs of applying the rule.
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Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 US 72 (1977)
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Failure to make timely objection under a State’scontemporaneous objection rule to the admission of his inculpatory statements, absent a showing of cause for the noncompliance and some showing of actual prejudice, bars federal habeas corpus review of a Miranda claim
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Herrera v. Collins, 506 US 390 (1993)
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Claiming your dead brother did it doesn’t get you out of your appointment with Sparky. A claim of actual innocence does not entitle him to federal habeas relief
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House v. Bell, 126 S.Ct. 2064 (2006)
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Under the exception for actual innocence to the procedural bar rule, a habeas petitioner asserting innocence as a gateway to defaulted claims must establish that, in light of new evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The standard is high, but (1) does not rise to the level of conclusive exoneration and (2) is an objective test for a “reasonable juror viewing the record as a whole.”
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Williams v. Taylor, 529 US 362 (2000)
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After the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the AEDPA), when a state habeas corpus proceeding has been adjudicated on the merits, federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) may issue only if the state-court adjudication either (1) “was contrary to,” or (2) “involved an unreasonable application of” *** clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Rassul v. Bush, 542 US 466 (2004)
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United States courts have jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay.
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Holland v. Florida, No 09-5327 (2010)
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Section 2244(d), the AEDPA statute of limitations, is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.
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Magwood v. Patterson, No 09-158 (2010)
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A habeas application that challenges a new judgment for the first time, is not a “second or successive” application under §2244(b).
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Boumediene v. Bush, 553 US 723 (2008)
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Habeas Corpus applies to Club Gitmo detainees
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lineup
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A police identification procedure in which a criminal suspect and other physically similar persons are shown to the victim or a witness to determine whether the suspect can be identified as the perpetrator of the crime
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show up
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A pretrial identification procedure in which a suspect is confronted with a witness to or the victim of a crime. Unlike a lineup, a showup is a one-to-one confrontation
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