Crimpro I All The Cases

Front 1

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)

Back 1

Defendants are entitled to meaningful representation by counsel in a criminal proceeding, because the Sixth Amendment applies to states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The failure of a trial court to provide defendants with reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel for criminal proceedings is a denial of due process.

Front 2

Barron v. Mayor & City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833)

Back 2

The Bill of Rights does not apply to the states.

Front 3

Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)

Back 3

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from taking property without just compensation.

Front 4

Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908)

Back 4

[I]t is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against national action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law. If this is so, it is not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight Amendments, but because they are of such a nature that they are included in the conception of due process of law.

Front 5

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)

Back 5

The 4th Amendment protects communications that a person does not knowingly expose to the public.

Front 6

Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984)

Back 6

The special protection accorded by the 4th Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open fields. The ruling in Katz does not impair the open fields doctrine of Hester.

Front 7

United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987)

Back 7

A four-factor analysis contributes to the determination of whether an area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home's 'umbrella' of 4th Amendment protection.

Front 8

California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986)

Back 8

Aerial surveillance at 1,000 feet is not a search for 4th Amendment purposes , so therefore it does not violate a person's reasonable expectation of privacy.

Front 9

Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989)

Back 9

Surveillance of the interior of a partially covered greenhouse in a residential backyard from the vantage point of a helicopter located 400 feet above the greenhouse does not constitute a search for which a warrant is required.

Front 10

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)

Back 10

The use of a device not used by the general public to obtain evidence emanating from the interior of a residence that cannot otherwise be obtained without physical intrusion constitutes a search.

Front 11

California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988)

Back 11

Seizure of property requires a meaningful interference with a possessory interest. The warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for colelction outside the curtilage of a home is not prohibited by the 4th Amendment.

Front 12

United States v. Knotts, 486 U.S. 35 (1988)

Back 12

Installing and monitoring a beeper in transit over public areas is not a violation of 4th Amendment rights.

Front 13

United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)

Back 13

Knotts rule circumscribed: Monitoring a beeper in transit within a constitutionally protected area without a warrant is a violation of the 4th Amendment when the monitoring reveals information that could not have been obtained through visual surveillance.

Front 14

United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)

Back 14

False Friend Rule: A defendant bears the risk that communications with another will be transmitted, electronically or otherwise, to government agents.

Front 15

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1879)

Back 15

An individual assumes the risk of disclosure of information knowingly conveyed to a third party. (In this case, a pen register)

Front 16

United States v. Forrester, 495 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2010)

Back 16

Use of a mirror port, a pen register analogue, to monitor internet IP address traffic, is not a 4th Amendment search.

Front 17

Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)

Back 17

The use of a drug detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests.

Front 18

United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)

Back 18

Officers may temporarily detain a suspect and his luggage for exposure to a dog trained in detecting narcotics on the basis of reasonable suspicion that the luggage contains narcotics.

Front 19

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)

Back 19

Totality of the Circumstances test. So long as a substantial basis exists for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, a warrant is valid under the 4th Amendment.

Front 20

Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)

Back 20

To support a finding of probable cause for a warrant, the application for warrant must pass the two-pronged test of (1) relating enough of the underlying circumstances for the magistrate to independently validate the informant's conclusion and (2) supporting statements from the applicant substantiating either that the informant is credible informant or the information is reliable.

Front 21

Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969)

Back 21

In order for a search warrant based on an informant's tip to be valid, the informant must declare either that (1) he himself saw or perceived the fact or facts asserted; or (2) there is good reason for believing it, such as one of the usual grounds for crediting hearsay information.

Front 22

Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003)

Back 22

If a police officer knows that someone within a car is responsible for contraband, there is probable cause to arrest everyone in the car.

Front 23

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)

Back 23

The temporary detention of a motorist who the police have probable cause to believe has committed a civil traffic violation is consistent with the 4th Amendment.

Front 24

Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976)

Back 24

Search warrants are not rendered fatally general by a phrase "together with" so long as the referent for the phrase can be identified with enough particularity.

Front 25

Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979)

Back 25

A warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized, and items not specifically listed on the search warrant may not be seized.

Front 26

Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004)

Back 26

A completely facially invalid warrant cannot be the basis of a reasonable search.

Front 27

Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981)

Back 27

A search warrant comes with the implied authority to detain the occupant of the area searched during the search.

Front 28

Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005)

Back 28

Officers acted reasonably by detaining occupant in handcuffs for up to three hours during a search of a gang hangout.

Front 29

Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997)

Back 29

There is no "blanket exigency" bypassing the knock-and-announce rule for the whole category of searches "drug-related."

Front 30

Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995)

Back 30

Knock and announce is part of the analysis for a reasonable search under the 4th Amendment.

Front 31

Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006)

Back 31

Violations of knock and announce don't lead to evidence that must be excluded.

Front 32

Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987)

Back 32

A search with warrant remains permissible under the 4th Amendment despite a mistake in executing the warrant, so long as the police action is reasonable

Front 33

L. A. County, California v. Rettele, 127 S. Ct. 1989 (2007)

Back 33

Law enforcement officers acted reasonably under the 4th Amendment when executing a valid warrant to search residence when they ordered nude residents out of their bed and held them at gunpoint for one or two minutes, while they verified that no weapons were present and others were not close by.

Front 34

The Exceptions to the Warrant requirement (11 of them), ()

Back 34

The exceptions are (1) arrest (2) automobile, (3) border searches and checkpoints, (4) checkpoints, (5) consent, (6) exigent circumstances, (7) hot pursuit, (8) inventory, (9) parole and probation, (10) plain view, and (11) special needs

Front 35

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)

Back 35

Pursuant to a lawful arrest, the police may conduct a search of any area within the immediate reach of the accused criminal.

Front 36

U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)

Back 36

Pursuant to a lawful arrest, no matter how insignificant the arrest, the police may search the suspect's person for potential weapons or evidence.

Front 37

Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998)

Back 37

There is no "incident to a citation" exception to the warrant requirement

Front 38

Warden, MD Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S 294 (1967)

Back 38

Police may conduct a warrantless search of a dwelling the suspect has entered into if the police are in "hot pursuit" of the suspect

Front 39

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)

Back 39

An arrest warrant is required for a routine felony arrest of a person in his home.

Front 40

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)

Back 40

If officers are lawfully in a place, they may use all their senses. Under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant.

Front 41

Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987)

Back 41

The "plain view" doctrine may not be used to justify warrantless searches or seizures of a dwelling, which require probable cause.

Front 42

Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990)

Back 42

The warrantless seizure of evidence of a crime found in plain view should not be prohibited by the 4th Amendment, even if discovery of the evidence was not inadvertant.

Front 43

Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993)

Back 43

Plain-touch analogue. The warrantless seizure of nonthreatening contraband detected during a protective patdown search is permitted, so long as the search stays within the bounds marked by Terry.

Front 44

Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132 (1925)

Back 44

A warrantless search and seizure made upon probable cause known to the seizing officer of an automobile or other vehicle is valid.

Front 45

Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970)

Back 45

If government agents have probable cause to believe an automobile contains articles that they may be entitled to seize, they may search the vehicle pursuant to a lawful arrest, without a warrant, or impound the vehicle into police custody to be searched at a later time.

Front 46

California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985)

Back 46

The automobile exception to the warrant requirement includes protection for vehicles such as motor homes, vans, converted vans, minivans, and station wagons, which are capable of ready movement.

Front 47

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991)

Back 47

Police can search an automobile and all containers in it when they have probable cause to believe contraband is contained somewhere within the automobile.

Front 48

U.S. v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)

Back 48

A search warrant is required to search personal property of an arrestee at the point where the property to be searched comes under the exclusive dominion of police authority.

Front 49

Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979)

Back 49

Abrogated by Acevedo - warrantless search of an automobile does not include searching luggage from within the vehicle.

Front 50

U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)

Back 50

Automobile exception includes a "probing search" of compartments and containers within the automobile so long as the search is supported by probable cause.

Front 51

Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999)

Back 51

Automobile exception extends to containers within the vehicle capable of concealing the sought for contraband.

Front 52

New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)

Back 52

When a suspect is arrested in his vehicle, the interior of the car and any containers in it can be searched pursuant to the lawful arrest.

Front 53

Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004)

Back 53

Chimel rule extends to a person who just left a car. If the police officer doesn't arrive in time to catch the person in the vehicle, but sees him exit the vehicle, the automobile exception for "grab area" searches in the vehicle still applies.

Front 54

Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009)

Back 54

Once the person is handcuffed in the back of the squad car, the premises for protection of the officer or of the evidence animating the application of the Chimel rule in the vehicular context no longer applies.

Front 55

South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)

Back 55

Inventory exception to the warrant requirement

Front 56

Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983)

Back 56

Inventory exception of personal effects during booking

Front 57

United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004)

Back 57

No need for reasonable suspicion or probable cause for a warrantless search at the border.

Front 58

United States v. Montoya-Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985)

Back 58

Reasonable suspicion supports balloon swallower search.

Front 59

United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977)

Back 59

Postal regulations allows customs officials to inspect incoming mail on "reasonable cause to suspect."

Front 60

Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990)

Back 60

Police may set-up temporary sobriety checkpoints and stop each car coming through to look for signs of intoxication.

Front 61

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000)

Back 61

Need a warrant for a drug checkpoint, distinguished from an alcohol checkpoint.

Front 62

Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004)

Back 62

Don't need a warrant to snag a DUI guy when the purpose of the checkpoint was distributing and soliciting information for a hit-and-run.

Front 63

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)

Back 63

An individual need not be informed that he has the right to refuse consent to a search before his consent to the search will be considered voluntary.

Front 64

Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006)

Back 64

Consent from a person with apparent authority to consent does not override refusal from a person who is there and does refuse the search.

Front 65

United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001)

Back 65

A warrantless search supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a probation condition, is not unreasonable.

Front 66

Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006)

Back 66

A warrantless search of a parolee, unsupported by probable cause or even suspicion is not unreasonable.

Front 67

Camara v. Muni Ct of Cty & Cty of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)

Back 67

When requested, city inspectors must go get a warrant.

Front 68

New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987)

Back 68

Highly regulated businesses, such as junkyards, may be searched without a warrant, if the statutory inspection program is a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant by advising owner of search and scope, and limiting searching officer's discretion.

Front 69

Skinner v. Railway Executive’s Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)

Back 69

Even without particularized suspicion, drug tests for railway workers involved in an accident are reasonable.

Front 70

National Treasury Employees Union v. Van Rabb, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)

Back 70

Drug interdiction and firearms - reasonable. Classified information - not reasonable.

Front 71

Vernonia School Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)

Back 71

Student Athlete Drug Policy deemed reasonable.

Front 72

Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002)

Back 72

Student Activities Drug Testing Policy deemed reasonable.

Front 73

Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001)

Back 73

Cannot get the hospitals to do the law enforcement work for you.

Front 74

Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, 129 S.Ct. 2633 (2009)

Back 74

Reasonable suspicion supports search, but not strip search.

Front 75

Ontario v. Quon, No. 08-1332 (2010)

Back 75

Given acknowledged policies and plenty of warning, municipal authority can inspect text transcripts to determine administrative need for the service - if evidence shows up - oh well.

Front 76

Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984)

Back 76

Privacy in the home should not be violated via warrantless searches relative to minor offenses, even if evidence may be lost or destroyed.

Front 77

Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 126 S. Ct. 1943 (2006)

Back 77

Exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.

Front 78

Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546 (2009)

Back 78

Exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.

Front 79

United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976)

Back 79

Warrantless arrests in strict compliance with applicable statute deemed reasonable.

Front 80

U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980)

Back 80

A person is seized when, in light of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that he was no longer free to leave.

Front 81

Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991)

Back 81

A police practice of searching buses and their passengers randomly is not per se unconstitutional as an unreasonable restraint on an individual's freedom to leave.

Front 82

California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991)

Back 82

An arrest requires either physical force or submission to the assertion of authority.

Front 83

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001)

Back 83

Police may arrest a person on probable cause of a crime, even if it is a misdemeanor punishable only by a fine.

Front 84

Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008)

Back 84

Search incident to the arrest is valid even if the crime actually calls for the issuance of a summons.

Front 85

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)

Back 85

If the police have reasonable suspicion that a suspect has committed a crime or is about to commit a crime, they may stop the person, detain him briefly for questioning, and then frisk the suspect if they reasonably believe the suspect is carrying a dangerous weapon.

Front 86

Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979)

Back 86

Police may not subject a suspect to custodial interrogation unless they have probable cause to believe a crime has been committed. Mere reasonable suspicion does not meet the required standard.

Front 87

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)

Back 87

The drug courier profile supports a Terry stop but not a search, and not a de facto arrest.

Front 88

US. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985)

Back 88

The law enforcement's diligence in making a Terry stop no longer than needed to meet investigative requirements is a factor to consider in assessing the reasonableness of a Terry stop.

Front 89

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)

Back 89

A search of the passenger compartment of an automobile is permissible if the police officer has reasonable belief, based on specific and articulable facts and the rational inferences from those facts, that the suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of weapons.

Front 90

Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990)

Back 90

The police can make a protective sweep of a dwelling during the course of an arrest if they have reasonable suspicion that there is some danger.

Front 91

Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004)

Back 91

A state law requiring a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a valid Terry stop is consistent with 4th Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Front 92

United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002)

Back 92

Considering the totality of the circumstances and giving due weight to the factual inferences drawn by an experienced law enforcement officer can meet the level of reasonable suspicion required of a Terry stop.

Front 93

Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)

Back 93

An anonymous tip received by police and not completely corroborated can be used as the basis for a Terry stop as long as a significant portion of the tip is verified.

Front 94

Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000)

Back 94

Suspicion based entirely on information provided by an anonymous informant does not by itself, satisfy the requirement of a reasonable suspicion required for a Terry stop.

Front 95

Illinois v. Wardlow, 538 U.S. 119 (2000)

Back 95

Flight from police is not indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.

Front 96

United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989)

Back 96

A drug courier profile supported by empirical evidence can be used to support the reasonable suspicion required for a Terry stop.

Front 97

Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S.Ct. 781 (2009)

Back 97

Once you have reasonable suspicion to stop for a traffic violation, you do not need additional reasonable suspicion for a Terry frisk of one of the passengers.

Front 98

U.S. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Eastern Dist. of Michigan, 407 U.S. 297 (1972)

Back 98

18 U.S.C. 2511 is not a grant of Presidential authority to conduct warrantless national security surveillance.

Front 99

U.S. v Calandra, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)

Back 99

A witness summoned to appear and testify before a grand jury may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that they are based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure.

Front 100

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)

Back 100

The Exclusionary Rule. The 4th Amendment forbids federal officers from obtaining evidence through unreasonable searches and seizures, such as a warrantless search of the home. (Warrantless searches prohibited)

Front 101

Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)

Back 101

4th Amendment, but not the exclusionary rule, applies to the states via the 14th Amendment. The 14th Amendment incorporates the 4th Amendment, restraining states from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures, but does not exclude the evidence at a state trial. (Incorporation of 4th Amendment) (Overruled by Mapp v. Ohio on at least one point)

Front 102

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)

Back 102

Evidence obtained by unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the 4th Amendment is inadmissible in state court. (4th Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule are Applied to States via 14th)

Front 103

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)

Back 103

To sustain a 4th Amendment challenge, a defendant must establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the areas to be searched or in the items seized.

Front 104

Jones v. U.S., 362 U.S. 257 (1960)

Back 104

Bevederian logic disavowed: you do not have to claim the drugs are yours in order to have the standing required to claim the drugs are not yours.

Front 105

Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980)

Back 105

You do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy for your drugs in someone else's purse at another person's house.

Front 106

Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998)

Back 106

Residential visitors, who are on the premises for only a short time and who claim no connection to the host other than to transact business, have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises under the 4th Amendment.

Front 107

Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990)

Back 107

An overnight guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus can make a Constitutional challenge to his search and seizure.

Front 108

Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400 (2007)

Back 108

Any passenger in a car during a traffic stop is seized under the 4th Amendment and may challenge Constitutionality.

Front 109

Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988)

Back 109

The independent source doctrine applies to both evidence obtained for the first time during an independent lawful search, and also to evidence initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search, and also to evidence initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but later discovered independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality.

Front 110

Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984)

Back 110

Inevitable discovery. Illegally obtained evidence is admissible in the case-in-chief if the government can demonstrate its inevitable legal discovery.

Front 111

Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975)

Back 111

Miranda warnings alone do not attenuate the taint of an unlawful search and seizure. The confession is presumed to be out.

Front 112

U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)

Back 112

Good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule does not bar use by the prosecution in its case-in-chief of evidence seized by law enforcement acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, subsequently found to be unsupported by probable cause.

Front 113

Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006)

Back 113

Police have to knock-and-announce before entering a building, but violation of knock-and-announce does not lead to exclusion of the evidence.

Front 114

Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995)

Back 114

The exclusionary rule does not apply to a search pursuant to a warrant rendered invalid due to clerical errors by a court employee.

Front 115

Herring v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 695 (2009)

Back 115

The exclusionary rule does not apply to a search pursuant to a warrant rendered invalid due to clerical errors by administrative law enforcement employees

Front 116

Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)

Back 116

Confessions supporting a conviction must be obtained through interrogation not violating the defendant's due process rights under the 14th Amendment.

Front 117

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991)

Back 117

Under the totality of the circumstances, a confession motivated by a fear of physical violence absent protection from a supposed friend inside the prison who is actually a government agent, is a coerced confession.

Front 118

Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959)

Back 118

A confession provided by a defendant suffering from fatigue and emotional distress brought on by police pressure is not voluntary.

Front 119

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986)

Back 119

A confession obtained from a person suffering from undetected mental illness is not a deprivation of due process in the absence of police misconduct.

Front 120

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)

Back 120

No statements obtained during a custodial interrogation, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, may be used against the defendant at trial unless the prosecution proves that the accused was advised (1) of the right to remain silent, (2) that any statements made can and will be used against the accused at trial, and (3) that the accused has the right to an attorney prior to and during questioning.

Front 121

Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000)

Back 121

Congress may not legislatively supersede Court decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.

Front 122

Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (1977)

Back 122

An individual who appears voluntarily at the police station for questioning, and who is not placed under arrest, is not in a custodial setting such that Miranda warnings must be given.

Front 123

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004)

Back 123

Youth and inexperience do not enter into the consideration of circumstances surrounding an interrogation to determine whether a reasonable person would have felt at liberty to leave to assess whether Miranda warnings are applicable. The youth was not in a custodial interrogation and the lack of Miranda warnings was not unreasonable on these facts.

Front 124

Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010)

Back 124

Miranda warnings have a two week shelf life

Front 125

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984)

Back 125

All suspects in custody must be given Miranda warnings prior to questioning, regardless of the nature or severity of the crime, but an ordinary traffic stop does not render the detainee(s) "in custody" for purposes of Miranda.

Front 126

Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980)

Back 126

For purposes of Miranda, an "interrogation" occurs when police either expressly question a suspect in custody or engage in any actions or dialogue that the police should know is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.

Front 127

Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990)

Back 127

False friend in jail (Miranda context) An undercover informant in jail with a suspect does not have to give Miranda warnings before asking questions that may elicit an incriminating response.

Front 128

California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981)

Back 128

Miranda warnings need not be a "virtual incantation" of the precise language from the opinion.

Front 129

Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989)

Back 129

Informing a suspect that an attorney would be appointed for him "if and when you go to court" does not render Miranda warnings inadequate.

Front 130

Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S.Ct. 2250 (2010)

Back 130

Silence during interrogation is not an invocation of the right to remain silent.

Front 131

Florida v. Powell, 130 S.Ct. 1195 (2010)

Back 131

Miranda warnings need only reasonably convey to a suspect his rights.

Front 132

Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974)

Back 132

Fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to Miranda warnings without police misconduct

Front 133

Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985)

Back 133

The self-incrimination clause of the 5th Amendment does not require suppression of a confession, made after proper Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of rights, solely because the police had obtained an earlier but unwarned admission from the suspect.

Front 134

Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004)

Back 134

An unwarned confession followed by a warned confession in an interrogation featuring deliberately failing to provide Miranda warnings must be excluded, distinguished from Elstad by the deliberate initial omission of Miranda warnings.

Front 135

United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004)

Back 135

A post-Dickerson Miranda failure does not lead to exclusion of tangible evidence.

Front 136

Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)

Back 136

Evidence excluded under Miranda may be used to impeach

Front 137

New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984)

Back 137

Public safety exception to Miranda. Miranda warnings are not required before police question a suspect in custody about imminent matters related to public safety.

Front 138

North Carolina v. Butler, 441 US 369 (1979)

Back 138

Waiver doesn't have to be express, or in writing. An express statement is not indispensible to a finding of waiver of the right to counsel; waiver may also be inferred by the words or conduct of the suspect.

Front 139

Moran v. Burbine, 475 US 412 (1986)

Back 139

Miranda's reach will not be extended so as to require the reversal of a conviction if the police are less than forthright with an attorney or if they fail to tell a suspect of an attorney's unilateral efforts to contact him.

Front 140

Spring v. Colorado, 479 US 564 (1987)

Back 140

A suspect's awareness of all the crimes about which he may be questioned is not relevant to determining the validity of his decision to waive the 5th Amendment privilege.

Front 141

Michigan v. Mosley, 423 US 96 (1975)

Back 141

The admission in evidence of respondent's incriminating statement did not violate Miranda principles. Respondent's right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored, the police having immediately ceased the robbery interrogation after respondent's refusal to answer and having commenced questioning about the murder only after a significant time lapse and after a fresh set of warnings had been administered.

Front 142

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 US 477 (1981)

Back 142

An accused who expresses a desire to deal with police only through counsel does not waive that right merely be responding to further police-initiated questioning, even though he has been re-advised of his rights, and may not be subjected to further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.

Front 143

Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 US 146 (1990)

Back 143

Once an attorney is requested, the state cannot reinitiate interrogation without the attorney present.

Front 144

Davis v. United States, 512 US 452 (1994)

Back 144

The demand for an attorney must be clear and unambiguous

Front 145

Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010)

Back 145

A 6th Amendment waiver has a 14-day shelf life

Front 146

Corley v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 1558 (2009)

Back 146

18 U.S.C. 3501 modified McNabb-Mallory but did not supplant it. Confessions made absent a prompt presentment under FRCP 5(a) are generally rendered inadmissible, with prompt presentment defined as within 6 hours of arrest plus reasonable delay.

Front 147

Massiah v. United States, 377 US 201 (1964)

Back 147

The 6th Amendment prohibits government interrogation of a defendant after indictment outside the presence of counsel.

Front 148

Brewer v. Williams, 430 US 387 (1977)

Back 148

The right to assistance of counsel can be waived only by the knowing relinquishment of that right.

Front 149

Texas v. Cobb, 532 US 162 (2001)

Back 149

Because the 6th Amendment right to counsel is "offense specific," it does not necessarily extend to offenses that are "factually related" to those that have actually been charged.

Front 150

Patterson v. Illinois, 487 US 285 (1988)

Back 150

Massiah does not apply to a defendant who is not represented by counsel and has never requested counsel.

Front 151

Michigan v. Jackson (overruled), 475 US 625 (1986)

Back 151

An accused who requests the appointment of counsel at arraignment is permitted under the 6th Amendment to consult with that counsel during any custodial interrogation by the police, absent waiver by the accused.

Front 152

Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S.Ct. 1667 (2009)

Back 152

Michigan v. Jackson overruled. Defendant must actually invoke the 6th Amendment right to counsel. Standing mute does not invoke. Montejo's post-arraignment inclupatory letter is admitted

Front 153

United States v. Henry, 447 US 264 (1980)

Back 153

Deliberately elicited inculpatory statements by a false friend government agent in jail after arraignment are excluded.

Front 154

Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 US 436 (1986)

Back 154

6th Amendment rights do not extend to cover “spontaneous” or “unsolicited” statements to a government informant in jail.

Front 155

Kansas v. Ventris, 07-1356 (2009)

Back 155

Evidence obtained in violation of the 6th Amendment may be used for impeachment.

Front 156

Yeager v. U. S., 129 S.Ct. 2360 (2009)

Back 156

An apparent inconsistency between a jury's acquittal on some counts and its failure to return a verdict on other counts does not affect the acquittals' preclusive force under the Double Jeopardy Clause

Front 157

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009)

Back 157

Confrontation Clause demands that lab analysts cannot simply certify an affidavit - they must come in and testify.

Front 158

Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S.Ct. 1316 (2010)

Back 158

Confrontation Clause demands that lab analysts cannot simply certify an affidavit - they must come in and testify.

Front 159

Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757 (1966)

Back 159

Withdrawal of blood, even with counsel's advice to object, is not a violation of the 5th Amendment

Front 160

Fisher v. United States, 425 US 391 (1976)

Back 160

A person may be required to produce specific documents containing incriminating assertions of fact or belief because the creation of those documents was not "compelled" within the meaning of the privilege.

Front 161

McKune v. Lile, 536 US 24 (2002)

Back 161

If you want to get into the sexual abuse treatment program, it is not a violation of rights to make you answer the questions.

Front 162

Kastigar v. United States, 406 US 441 (1972)

Back 162

A grant of immunity must afford protection commensurate with that afforded by the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, it need not be broader, and immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the privilege and is sufficient to compel testimony over claim of privilege

Front 163

United States v. Hubbell, 530 US 27 (2000)

Back 163

Derivative use immunity covers the act of producing the documents.

Front 164

Burghius v. Thompkins (part 2), 08-1470 (2010)

Back 164

Silence during interrogation is not an invocation of the right to remain silent.

Front 165

Maryland v. Shatzer (part 2), 130 S.Ct. 1213 (2010)

Back 165

A 6th Amendment waiver has a 14-day shelf life

Front 166

McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 US 171 (1981)

Back 166

A defendant's statements regarding offenses for which he has not been charged are admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel on other charged offenses

Front 167

Fellers v. U.S., 540 US 519 (2004)

Back 167

Statements taken after indictment, without a waiver of 6th Amendment rights, and without the presence of counsel must be excluded.

Front 168

Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 US 249 (1988)

Back 168

Where ex parte orders for psychiatric examinations did not come with adequate notice to defense counsel, the psychiatrist’s testimony as to future dangerousness in a sentencing proceeding violated the defendant’s 6th Amendment rights

Front 169

Maine v. Moulton, 474 US 159 (1985)

Back 169

Government violated defendant’s rights by wiring a co-defendant and then sending the co-defendant to a meeting about defense strategy with the defendant.

Front 170

Estelle v. Smith, 451 US 454 (1981)

Back 170

After indictment and appointment of counsel, and a psychiatrist was sent to determine the defendant’s competency to stand trial without notice to counsel, defendant’s 6th Amendment right to counsel was violated when the psychiatrist’s adverse diagnosis testimony was admitted in the penalty phase

Front 171

Hiibel v. 6th Judicial District Court of NV, 542 US 177 (2004)

Back 171

A state law requiring a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a valid Terry stop is consistent with 4th Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Front 172

United States v. Wade, 388 US 218 (1967)

Back 172

An in-court identification of a defendant by a witness must be excluded from evidence unless it is offered independent of a pretrial identification obtained without notice to and participation of defense counsel

Front 173

Illinois v. Kirby, 406 US 682 (1972)

Back 173

There is no 6th Amendment right to counsel for a pre-indictment lineup identification.

Front 174

United States v. Ash, 413 US 300 (1973)

Back 174

There is no 6th Amendment right to counsel for a post-indictment photographic display identification procedure

Front 175

Stovall v. Denno, 388 US 293 (1967)

Back 175

A showup, rather than a traditional lineup, used for identification of an accused violates the accused's due process rights when it is unnecessarily suggestive under the totality of the circumstances

Front 176

Foster v. California, 394 US 440 (1969)

Back 176

The state only gets so many bites at the identification apple before it violates due process

Front 177

Simmons v. United States, 390 US 377 (1968)

Back 177

Supreme Court declines to declare photographic identifications unconstitutional

Front 178

Neil v. Biggers, 409 US 188 (1972)

Back 178

While the station-house identification may have been suggestive, under the totality of the circumstances the victim's identification of respondent was reliable and was properly allowed to go to the jury

Front 179

Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 US 98 (1977)

Back 179

An unnecessarily suggestive pretrial identification of the defendant need not be excluded if, under the totality of the circumstances, it is sufficiently reliable