Crimpro Caselaw- Keyed To Dressler/thomas (Before Spring Break)

Front 1

Powell v Alabama (The Scottsboro Boys) | SCOTUS 1932 | 13

Back 1

(a) the right to the EFFECTIVE AID of counsel is guaranteed under due process
(b) apptmnt of "all members of the bar" is NOT a meaningful appt of counsel because there is no individual attorney responsible for the legal welfare of the client
(c) effective assistance of counsel requires the ability to discuss the case PRIOR to trial, so at-trial appts are also invalid
(d) in capital cases, the appt of counsel for an ignorant/indigent defendant is nec. even if not asked for

Front 2

Betts v Brady | SCOTUS 1942 | 25

Back 2

This defendant does not fall under the Powell ruling because he is "of ordinary intelligence," and abilities, etc.

Front 3

Is Grand Jury Indictment a part of due process?

Back 3

No! [Hurtado v California | SCOTUS 1884 | 29 ]

Front 4

Is a jury of TWELVE (as opposed to a jury of EIGHT) a part of due process?

Back 4

No! [Maxwell v Dow | SCOTUS 1900 | 29]

Front 5

Palko v Connecticut | SCOTUS 1937 | 29

Back 5

Justice Holmes: "is the hardship so acute that our polity will not allow it? is the right fundamental to all our institutions?" if so, then the 14th amendment's due process clause protects it. If not, then it doesn't.

Front 6

Duncan v Louisiana | SCOTUS 1968 | 31

Back 6

The right to jury by trial (even in MINOR criminal offenses) is part of 14th amendment due process!
[DISSENT: SCOTUS must either choose (a) to subscribe to total incorporation and incorporate the whole bill of rights or (b) find something fundamentally unfair in the denial of a jury trial; it does neither, so its conclusion that jury trial is part of 14th amendment due process is illogical]

Front 7

Stack v Boyle | SCOTUS 1951 | 769

Back 7

(a) bail that exceeds the amt necessary to ensure future presence at trial is excessive under the 8th am.
(b) bail must always be evaluated and set according to each D's individual circumstances

Front 8

US v Salerno | SCOTUS 197 | 774

Back 8

(a) the "excessive bail" clause is only applicable to cases where bail is APPROPRIATE
(b) NO BAIL is available in this case because the "future harm" D's are likely to cause to witnesses/society outweighs they're interest in being free before trial

Front 9

United States v Armstrong | SCOTUS 1996 | 800

Back 9

(a) re: the standard needed to gain discovery on a selective prosecution accusation (ie, the cops only arrest blacks)
(b) in order to PROVE, you need to prove "similarly situated individuals" were NOT prosecuted
(c) discovery causes the gov't almost as much trouble, so you need SOME EVIDENCE that "similarly sit... etc"

Front 10

Blackledge v Perry | SCOTUS 1974 | 808

Back 10

(a) prosecutors are in unique position to discourage appeals by bringing greater charge after D asserts his right to one
(b) Due Process does NOT preclude ALL increases of punishment on retrial, but prosecutors cannot bring a more serious charge after appeal and before de novo trial

Front 11

United States v Goodwin | SCOTUS 1982 | 810

Back 11

(a) prosecutors have discretion to change charges BEFORE trial, as new info comes in
(b) by the time trial comes around, evidence should be in and prosecutor no longer has this discretionary power

Front 12

Coleman v Alabama | SCOTUS 1970 | 812

Back 12

"plainly, the presence of counsel at the preliminary healing is essential" to defendant's due process

Front 13

California v Green | SCOTUS 1970 | 816

Back 13

evidence introduced in a prelim where judicial authority, judicial-grade recording, and defendants rights to cross-examination, etc are available is not subject to the nonconfrontation clause and therefore is admissible in the actual trial

Front 14

United States v Williams | SCOTUS 1992 | 824

Back 14

Prosecutor is NOT required to present all exculpatory evidence to the grand jury when seeking an indictment; it would be too heavy a burden for the prosecutor, and the grand jurie's only function has always been to evaluate the evidence the indictment is founded on, not the evidence that might clear the defendant. (WHAT?!?)

Front 15

Hoffman v United States | SCOTUS 1951 | 838

Back 15

(a) 5th am. protects statements that would themselves support a conviction AND statemetns that would lead to evidence supporting conviction
(b)the court must decide whether silence is justified; it must "be perfectly clear" that witness is mistaken and that answers "cannot possibly" have tendency to incriminate in order to deny the 5th am. defense

Front 16

Strickler v Greene | SCOTUS 1936 | 872

Back 16

(a) In order to determine whether information witheld from discovery prejudiced the defendant, "the question is whether the evidence puts the case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict"
(b) here, the witholding of testimony showing the eyewitness to be less reliable than she appeared at trial did not prejudice BECAUSE the individual WOULD HAVE BEEN CONVICTED ANYWAY

Front 17

Banks v Dretke | SCOTUS 2004 | 872

Back 17

(a) police withheld testimony saying that the star witness only testified so he wouldn't be arrested, and that it was his idea to get a gun
(b) this DOES undermine our confidence in the verdict

Front 18

Arizona v Youngblood | SCOTUS 1988 | 874

Back 18

(a) police are NOT responsible for conserving ALL the evidence from a crime scene under the 5th am.
(b) Brady and Augurs govern the police responsibility to turn over the evidence they DO have, it doesn't govern their responsibility to keep evidence forever

Front 19

Williams v Florida | SCOTUS 1970 | 88

Back 19

Re: whether the alibi witness rule requiring D to turn over name/addy of alibi witness vioaltes 5th am.
(a) there are inherent safeguards in the rule
(b) while providing the info is mandatory, deciding to use the alibi is not; therefore its not "compelled" testimony subject to the 5th

Front 20

State v Reldan | S Ct NJ 1979 | 892

Back 20

In order to PROVE prejudice in joinder:
(a) confounded in presenting separate defenses: D has compelling reason to present evidence/testify on one count while remaining silent on another
(b) transfer of evidence by jury: D must prove evidence would not be allowed in via FRE 55 if the trials were separated; if it would, no cause to complain
(c) cumulation of evidence by jury (via confusion): D must prove inehrent complexity of evidence, such that adequate instruction would not solve the problem [and FRE 55 evidence doesnt count here]
(d) latent hostility to multiple charges: D cannot complain about unsavory evidence which, if evidence is believed, is authored by himself.

Front 21

Barker v Wingo | SCOTUS 1972 | 898

Back 21

THE BARKER FACTORS:
(a) length of delay [rule of thumb, 1 yr or more needs review]
(b) gov't reason for delay [unavailable witness = good reason; overloaded docket = poor reason; gov't ineptness or bad faith = AWFUL reason]
(c) whether, and how, defendant demands his right to speedy trial [not determinative, only factor]
(d) prejudice to defendant
(e) HERE, a and b are outweighed by c and d (no demand until late in process, and no real prejudice to D in the end); conviciton affirmed

Front 22

Strank v United States | SCOTUS 1973 | 909

Back 22

Dismissal WITH Prejudice is the ONLY adequate remedy for a valid speedy trial claim

Front 23

Zedner v US | SCOTUS 2006 | 910

Back 23

PROSPECTIVE waivers to speedy trial right are INVALID

Front 24

US v Marion | SCOTUS 1971 | 911

Back 24

If it were shown at trial that pre-indictment delay caused substantial prejudice to defendant's right to a air trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage, then due process rights would be implicated

Front 25

Dogget v US | SCOTUS 1992 | 911

Back 25

Barker Factors:,
(1) delay: (8 yrs) serious issue for the gov't,
(2) gov't reason: bad/eutral for gov't cuz they cant show good faith
(3) prejudice: no specific showing is necessary when (1) is so severe
(4) D's demand: dropped out cuz he didn't know of indictment
D WINS

Front 26

Nix v Whiteside | SCOTUS 1986 | 924

Back 26

(a) cousel is not bound to protect client's intent to commit crime (including perjury)
(b) counsel has ethical obligation to the Court as well as the client

Front 27

Gideon v Wainwright | SCOTUS 1963 | 931

Back 27

(a) WE OVERRULE BETTS
(b) right to counsel IS a "fundamental" 6th am. right

Front 28

Scott v Illinois | SCOTUS 1979 | 938

Back 28

Put corresponding gFlash+ Answer Choice here

Front 29

Douglass v California | SCOTUS 1963 | 946

Back 29

(a) in an initial appeal of right, defendant needs help to brief and research legal issues effectively
(b) right to counsel in initial appeal of right is constitutionally required

Front 30

Griffin v Illinois | SCOTUS ? | 947

Back 30

The State may not grant appellate review in such a way that would discriinate against defendants solely because of their poverty (although APPEAL is not necessarily "required")

Front 31

Ross v Moffit | SCOTUS 1974 | 951

Back 31

(a) on discretionary, second appeal, appted counsel is a sword and not a shield
(b) because counsel is appted on first appeal of right, it is NOT constitutionally required on second appeal

Front 32

Halbert v Michigan | SCOTUS 2005 | 955

Back 32

(a) in a discretionary FIRST appeal from guilty/nolo contendere pleas, appted counsel IS REQUIRED
(b) here, Douglass (not Ross) governs because it is a first appeal, even though discretionary

Front 33

Faretta v California | SCOTUS 1975 | 957

Back 33

(a) many states and the federal gov't suggest that right ot represent oneself is guaranteed by 6th am
(b) 6th am does imply the right by constructing the defense as primary the DEFENDANT's, not counsels; counsel is only an assistant
(c) allowing an "intelligent and knowing" pro se defense preserves defendants autonomy

Front 34

McKaskle v Wiggins | SCOTUS 1984 | 967

Back 34

(a) appted standby counsel for pro se defendant was extremely disruptive
(b) pro se defendant must APPEAR pro se as well as BEING TECHNICALLY pro se; this preserves jury's view of defendants autonomy

Front 35

Martinez v Ct App CA | SCOTUS 2000 | 966

Back 35

the status of a defendant changes drastically when a jury returns a "guilty" verdict; he is no longer presumed innocent on appeal. Autonomy interests of a convict are not nearly as important to the State as autonomy interests of a presumed innocent individual. On the other hand ,the State's interest in a fair and reliable justice system continues to go strong; therefore, the State is within its discretion to force an attorney on an appellate defendant.

Front 36

Godinez v Moran | SCOTUS 1993 | 968

Back 36

The test for competence to stand trial includes whether the defendant is competent to plead not guilty; if it is good enough for them, it is clearly good enough for a defendant who pleads guilty and wishes to appear pro se. We do not think that a defendant who waives his right to counsel must be any "more" competent than one who does not. The question is whether he has the competence to WAIVE, not whether he has the requisite competence to REPRESENT HIMSELF.

Front 37

Indiana v Edwards | SCOTUS 2008 | 11 Supp

Back 37

Three levels of defendant competence seem to exist: incompetence to stand trial; competent to stand trial and waive counsel/plead guilty but NOT competent to waive represent himself (so if he pleads not guilty he will be appted counsel); competent to stand trail/waive counsel AND competent to represent himself.

Front 38

Strickland v Washington | SCOTUS 1984 | 973

Back 38

1) the "reasonably effective counsel" standard is what is constitutionally required
2) if an attorney is reasonably professionally capable to make the decision, it is effective counsel
3) there is a very weighty presumption in favor of counsel
4) even if counsel was not reasonablly professionally capable, defendant must also prove PREJUDICE in order to gain reversal

Front 39

Holloway v Arkansas | SCOTUS 1978 | 991

Back 39

When counsel tells court he is operating under conflict of interest and no action is taken, there is a presumption of prejudice to defendant.

Front 40

Cuyler v Sullivan | SCOTUS 1980 | 991

Back 40

Where court does not/should not be aware of conflict of interest, there is no presumption of prejudice to defendant

Front 41

Mickens v Taylor | SCOTUS 2002 | 992

Back 41

When the court knows of possible conflict of interest but the defense does not object or request a hearing, no hearing is required.

Front 42

Wheat v United States | SCOTUS 1988 | 992

Back 42

Court has discretion to accept or reject defendant's waiver of conflict of interest hearing

Front 43

United States v Gonzales-Lopez | SCOTUS 2006 | 993

Back 43

If defendant is denied 6th am. right to choose retained counsel, the only remedy is reversal

Front 44

Brady v US | SCOTUS 1970 | 1017

Back 44

Valid guilty must be:
(1) VOLUNTARY: choice based on possibility of higher penalties at jury trial is STILL voluntary, even if the higher penalty is posisble capital punishment
(2) INTELLIGENT: plea intelligently made in accordance w/ current law are not undermined by later changes that make the law inapplicable

Front 45

United States v Pollard | DC Cir 1992 | 1022

Back 45

Requiring a joint plea deal so that healthy husband will relent to get sick wife out of jail is acceptable (cert denied)

Front 46

US v Ruiz | SCOTUS 2002 | 1027

Back 46

In order to satisfy "intelligent plea" requirement, D must understand only the general effect a plea might have and not the specific effect the plea would have in all the circumstances of the present case

Front 47

North Carolina v Alford | SCOTUS 1970 | 1029

Back 47

Usually pleas include (1) waiver of trial and (2) admission of guilt; however, a nolo contendere plea accepting jail time w/o admitting guilt is still acceptable; there is nothing wrong w/ defendant concluding that he has nothing to gain by jury trial

Front 48

Bordenkircher v Hayes | SCOTUS 1978 | 1034

Back 48

Distinguish from Blackledge!
1) failure of plea deal resulted in higher indictiment
2) this is NOT punishment for a constitutional right to appeal, as in Blackledge
3) there is no practical difference between charging high and pleading down or pleading low and charging up

Front 49

Santobello v New York | SCOTUS 1971 | 1043

Back 49

It is unconstitutional for a prosecutor's office to break a plea deal, even in good faith. Reversal.

Front 50

United States v Brechner | 2nd Cir 1996 | 1049

Back 50

Despite the substantial performance of defendant's plea deal, his minor breach is enough to allow prosecutor's to use their broad discretion in deciding not to pursue lower sentencing.

Front 51

Ricketts v Adamson | SCOTUS 1987 | 1052

Back 51

Defendant's good faith misinterpretation of his plea deal ending in subsequent breach does not allow him the benefit of the deal after appellate courts have corrected his interepretation; he made a contract and breached it, so he will not get the benefit any more.

Front 52

McMann v Richardson | SCOTUS 1970 | 1055

Back 52

If a defendant pleads guilty on the mistaken assumption that the court will allow a coerced confession in trial against him, he cannot later impeach his plea on the grounds that the decision was "coerced" by the confession; he made a decision within the acceptable range and must now live with it.

Front 53

Hill v Lockhart | SCOTUS 1985 | 1057

Back 53

A clarification of the Strickland effective counsel test: The ineffective counsel portion of the test is a restatement of McMann's lawyer competency test. The prejudice portion turns on the likelihood that the alleged error changed the outcome of the trial.

Front 54

Duncan v Lousiana | SCOTUS 1968 | 1062

Back 54

Any offense punishable by two years in prison cannot be considered petty and requires a jury trial

Front 55

Baldwin v New york | SCOTUS 1970 | 1067

Back 55

Only crimes punishable by 6 mos or less in prison can possibly be termed "petty" and w/o need for jury trial

Front 56

Taylor v Louisiana | SCOTUS 1975 | 1075 -

Back 56

Systematically excluding women from the jury venire destroys the constitutionally required "fair cross-section" characteristic of the jury and is not appropriate

Front 57

Duren v MO | SCOTUS 1979 | 1081

Back 57

Prima Facie Case for systematic exclusion from jury (after which the State bears the burden of justification):
(1) group alleged to be excluded is 'disstinctive'
(2) representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to number of such persons in thee community and
(3) underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of grou in jury-selection process.

Front 58

Ham v South Carolina | SCOTUS 1973 | 1083

Back 58

A civil rights activist in volatile South Carolina has the right to have his jurors questioned about possible racial/activist bias (but NOT about beards)

Front 59

Ristiano v Ross | SCOTUS 1976 | 1085

Back 59

White victim + black defendant is NOT ENOUGH to require racial bias jury questions

Front 60

Rosales-Lopez v US | SCOTUS 1981 | 1086

Back 60

Mexican defednant + illegal immigration is NOT ENOUGH to require racial bias questions

Front 61

Turner v Murray | SCOTUS 1986 | 1087

Back 61

Capital cases DO require bias questions of any kind defense asks for; death is different.

Front 62

US v Padilla-Valenzuela | D. AZ 1995 | 1088

Back 62

Venire questions that go too far in invading juror privacy are not appropriate

Front 63

US v Smalamone | 3rd Cir 1986 | 1094

Back 63

It is improper to exclude someone from petit jury for cause solely on basis of affiliation w/ a ideological group; the question is whether they can be impartial, and mere affiliation can not immediately answer this question

Front 64

US v Thomas | 2d Cir 1997 | 1127

Back 64

It is NOT appropriate to dismiss a juror for nullification if there is ANY indication that his obstinance is due to his doubts about the sufficiency of evidence (even if other factors appear to be present!)