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157 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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State v. Dube
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[Police as Caretakers, p. 2] Community policing allows entry to an apartment for that purpose
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Evidence discovered during community policing
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[Police as Caretakers, p. 2] May only be used if plain-sight causes officers to obtain warrant; cannot use evidence obtained during community policing role
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State v. Stowe
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[Police as Caretakers, p. 2] Police arrested man standing the public road refusing medical attention; arrest based on disturbing the peace; held valid; see also People v. Ray
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People v. Ray
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[Police as Caretakers, p. 2] Court cited "we're from the gov't & we're here to help"; is there const. rt. to refuse gov't help?
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State v. Janisczak
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[Enforcing Civility, p. 2] Ct. looks at arrest of man who cusses at police during police arresting 3d party; ct. requires balancing (1) societal interests v. (2) free speech/people's rt. to argue; but see City of St. Paul v. Morris
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City of St. Paul v. Morris
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[Enforcing Civility, p. 2] This ct. does not examine balancing test as ct. in Janisczak did; says police do /not/ have to take abuse as in that case
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City of Chicago v. Morales
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[Control of Gangs/Kids, p. 3] Chicago had ordiance making illegal to remain in one place w/o apparent purpose; held too vague, too much police discretion
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Spectrum of police encounters
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[Brief Searches/Stops, p. 3] (1) Voluntary encounter: no police scienter needed, no search under Const.; (2) "Seizure": reasonable suspicion required, brief search under Const.; (3) "Arrest": probable cause required, search under Const.
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Voluntary encounter with police
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[Brief Searches/Stops, p. 3] No police scienter needed, no search under Const.
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"Seizure"
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[Brief Searches/Stops, p. 3] Reasonable suspicion required; brief search under Const.; see also United States v. Mendenhall
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"Arrest"
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[Brief Searches/Stops, p. 3] Probable cause required, search under Const.
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United States v. Mendenhall
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[Consenual encounters/stops, p. 3] Woman in airport who is asked to accompany DEA agents to airport office is not "seized" under Const. because seizure only occurs when by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained
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"Seizure" under Mendenhall
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[Consenual encounters/stops, p. 3] Seizure only occurs when by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained
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Wilson v. State
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[Consenual encounters/stops, p. 3] Police ask man limping down street if he needs help; enter name into computer, finds out about fire, officer tells him to wait in specific place, eventually arrest man when warrant check returns positive; court holds seizure occurred when police tell man to wait: police used "show of authority" to restrain man's freedom of movement
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Florida v. Bostick
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[Consenual encounters/stops, p. 3] In case where police get on bus and ask for id, a reasonable person would not feel to decline giving id or terminate encounter
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Grounds for Const. "stop"
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[Grounds for "stop", p. 4] Suspicion must be (1) articulable, (2) individualized, and (3) reasonable
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Factors used to determine whether stop is const.
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[Grounds for "stop", p. 4] To determine whether suspicion is articulable, individualized, and reasonable, cts. look at (1) place and surroundings, (2) suspect's actions, (3) time of day/night, (4) appearance of suspect, (5) whether suspect flees
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Is "flight" a reasonable ground for a "stop"?
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[Grounds for "stop", p. 4] In Illinois v. Wardlow, U.S. S. Ct. says that flight may be one of many circumstances that an officer considers in coming to an articulable, individualized, and reasonable suspicion to allow for a stop
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Illinois v. Wardlow
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[Grounds for "stop", p. 4] U.S. S. Ct. says that flight may be one of many circumstances that an officer considers in coming to an articulable, individualized, and reasonable suspicion to allow for a stop
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Is pursuit after flight a seizure?
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[Grounds for "stop", p. 4] Under the Ct.'s reasoning in California v. Hodari D., no -- seizure only occurs when the police control the suspect (use a show of authority to restrain freedom of movement)
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California v. Hodari D.
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[Grounds for "stop", p. 4] Police pursuit of suspect does not constitute seizure of that suspect; a eizure only occurs when the police control the suspect (use a show of authority to restrain freedom of movement)
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People v. Robinson
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[Pretexual stops, p. 5] Federal courts allow police to stop suspects for one reason as a pretext to search for another reason; the N.Y. App. Ct. looks at three different tests for pretextual stops: (1) "primary motivation" test, was police's primary motivation was for traffic or other reason, subjective; (2) "would-stop" test, would reasonable police officer have stopped suspect for traffic violation, quasi-objective; and (3) "probable cause" test, if traffic violation has occurred, then vehicle may be stopped
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"primary motivation" test for pretextual stop
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[Pretexual stops, p. 5] Was the officer's primary motivation for the traffic stop the traffic violation or some other reason? Subjective test; see People v. Robinson
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"would-stop" test for pretextual stop
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[Pretexual stops, p. 5] Would a reasonable police officer have stopped the suspect for the same traffic violation? Quasi-objective test; see People v. Robinson
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"probable cause" test for pretextual stop
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[Pretexual stops, p. 5] if traffic violation has occurred, then vehicle may be stopped; see People v. Robinson
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Quarles v. State
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[Criminal profiling/race, p. 5] Two police officers stop people for a consent search, the ct. asked whether they had reasonable suspicion because they fit a profile; ct. holds that in addition to location, no luggage, nighttime, pair are not enough -- adding leaving area where police were, looking at policemen, rapidity, about-face at sight of police car, etc.
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City of Indianapolis v. Edmond
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[Brief administrative stops, p. 6] Police used drug-sniffing dogs to search cars while they were stopped for alcohol traffic violations; held, that this was unconst. because it was a suspicionless search (at least reasonable suspicion is required)
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State v. Bobic
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[Plain view, p. 6] in this case, criminals were laundering money they made in a car-theft scheme; police saw the fruit of their scheme through a pinky-sized hole in a storage unit adjacent to the one they were using; held, that because materials were in "open view," a.k.a., plain view, where in a place one has the right to be, one sees or senses the items in question and one has a lawful right of access to seize the items, that the information gathering was not a "search" under const.
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"plain view"
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[Plain view, p. 6] (1) To be in a place where one has a right to be; (2) see or sense the items in question; and (3) have a lawful right of access to seize the items
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Bond v. United States
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[Plain view, p. 6] Border patrol agent does a lawful id check on a bus, on the way out he squeezes carry-on luggage and finds drugs; held that a "reasonable expectation of privacy" protects people from searches: (1) whether the individual, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy; (2) whether the individual's expectation of privacy is "one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable"
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"reasonable expectation of privacy" under Bond
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[Plain view, p. 6] a "reasonable expectation of privacy" protects people from searches: (1) whether the individual, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy; (2) whether the individual's expectation of privacy is "one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable"
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Terry v. Ohio
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[Frisks for weapons, p. 7] Officers frisk a suspect before arresting him, discovering two guns; are the guns admissible? Court held that where there was reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is being committed or is about to committed, and the officer believes the suspect is armed and dangerous, then the officer may stop someone and search them so that the search is confined to determining whether they have a weapon; the "stop-and-frisk" doctrine
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'Terry' search
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[Frisks for weapons, p. 7] where there was reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is being committed or is about to committed, and the officer believes the suspect is armed and dangerous, then the officer may stop someone and search them so that the search is confined to determining whether they have a weapon; the "stop-and-frisk" doctrine
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Stop-and-frisk doctrine
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[Frisks for weapons, p. 7] Same as a 'Terry' search: where there was reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is being committed or is about to committed, and the officer believes the suspect is armed and dangerous, then the officer may stop someone and search them so that the search is confined to determining whether they have a weapon
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Commonwealth v. Crowder
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[Scope of 'Terry' search, p. 8] Officer is conducting 'Terry' search when contraband is discovered; is contraband admissible? Court says that under a doctrine of "plain feel" an officer may seize such items that he can plainly feel during a properly conducted 'Terry' search
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"Plain feel" doctrine
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[Scope of 'Terry' search, p. 8] (1) when the requirements of 'Terry' are otherwise complied with and (2) the non-threatening contraband is immediately apparent from the sense of touch, then evidence may be admissible
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Brinegar v. United States
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[Defining probable cause, p. 10] Police stop a "known bootlegger" -- question is whether they had probable cause to do so; held, that probable cause exists "where the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed."
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"Probable cause" under Brinegar
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[Defining probable cause, p. 10] probable cause exists "where (1) the facts and circumstances (2) within the officers' knowledge and (3) of which they had reasonably trustworthy information (4) are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man (5) of reasonable caution (6) in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed."
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State v. Barton
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[Sources of info supporting probable cause, p. 10] Formerly, Connecticut used 'Aguilar-Spinelli' test for informants; here, the adopt the Illinois v. Gates test recently adopted by the U.S. S. Ct., which provides for magistrate considering warrant to "view the totality of the circumstances" before authorizing the warrant
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Gates v. Illinois
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[Sources of info supporting probable cause, p. 10] Illinois v. Gates adopted by the U.S. S. Ct., a test which provides for magistrate considering warrant to "view the totality of the circumstances" before authorizing the warrant
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Nebraska v. Utterback
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[Sources of info supporting probable cause, p. 10] Here, the Court disallows information from a confidential informant because he does not meet any of the four indicia of reliability: (1) reliable in the past; (2) citizen informant; (3) statement against penal interest; and (4) officer investigation
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"indicia of reliability" for confidential informants
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[Sources of info supporting probable cause, p. 10] (1) reliable in the past; (2) citizen informant; (3) statement against penal interest; and (4) officer investigation
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Factors to consider in analyzing source of information supporting probable cause
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[Sources of info supporting probable cause, p. 10] Reliability of the source; the basis of the source's knowledge; and corroboration of the source's information performed by the police
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Hawkins v. State
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[Warrant requirement, p. 11] If there is no warrant, police must (1) have probable cause to enter; there must be (2) reasonable suspicion that (3) evidence will be lost or destroyed, or (4) the suspect will escape, or (5) the safety of police or citizens will be jeopardized; in this case, police created the circumstances that led to the "emergency" situation, thus they couldn't use that as a justification for a warrant-less search
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Exigent circumstances that allow warrantless search
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[Warrant requirement, p. 11] police must (1) have probable cause to enter; there must be (2) reasonable suspicion that (3) evidence will be lost or destroyed, or (4) the suspect will escape, or (5) the safety of police or citizens will be jeopardized
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Requirements for warrants to be const.
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[Warrant requirements, p. 11] there must be (1) a neutral and detached magistrate and (2) particularity in the warrants, i.e., general warrants are unconst. by the text of the const.
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State v. Dietrick
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[Warrant requirements, p. 11] does the identity of the magistrate violate detachment and neutrality when the magistrate is familially related to the chief of police; const. so long as husband does not personally investigate case
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Bell v. Clapp
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[Warrant requirements, p. 11] The constitution requires that warrants be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate and that the warrant is particular and not general
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"Four corners" doctrine
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[Warrant requirements, p. 11] Doctrine that magistrates may only consider the facts and averments present within the "four corners" of the document, usually an affidavit, requesting a warrant
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Franks v. Delaware
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[Warrant requirements, p. 11] If a Def. makes preliminary showing of false statements in warrant application or affidavit, trial courts must grant hearing on whether those statements materially affect the probable cause that led to the magistrate's issuance of the warrant; preliminary showing must (1) demonstrate that the gov't "knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth" (2) include a false statement (3) in the warrant affidavit. If warrant fails, the search is analyzed as though there were no warrant, and determines whether there is probable cause.
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Preliminary showing defendant must make to invalidate warrant
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[Warrant requirements, p. 11] preliminary showing must (1) demonstrate that the gov't "knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth" (2) include a false statement (3) in the warrant affidavit.
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If a warrant fails, then a search _____.
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[Warrant requirements, p. 11] ...is analyzed as though there were no warrant; a determination must be made as to whether there is probable cause for the search
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Richards v. Wisconsin
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[Warrant requirements, p. 11] S. Ct. case where knock and announce requirement is considered; held, that police do not have to knock and announce when they reasonably believe that there will be (1) loss/destruction of evidence, (2) escape of suspect, or (3) safety of the police/public (same as non-warrant entry)
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Police do not have to "knock and announce" a warrant search _____.
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[Warrant requirements, p. 11] ...when they reasonably believe that there will be (1) loss/destruction of evidence, (2) escape of suspect, or (3) safety of the police/public (same as non-warrant entry)
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Anticipatory warrants (are/are not) constitutional.
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[Types of warrants, p. 12] Are constitutional, if they are particularized; see State v. Parent
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For an administrative action, a warrant (is/is not) required.
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[Types of warrants, p. 12] For State action in entering a home, a warrant is required if there is a search and if there is not probable cause for a search; the ct. decided Camara v. Municipal Ct. of San Francisco based upon a balancing test of intrusion into private home v. public interest
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Administrative search balancing test
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[Types of warrants, p. 12] Intrusion into private property v. public interest; see Camara v. Municpial Ct. of San Francisco
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Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
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[Consenual searches, p. 13] This case, where someone who had ID gives police permission to search car, even though he may not be in control of the vehicle, is known establishing "valid consent" doctrine: search has valid consent if (1) totality of the circumstances show (2) the consent was voluntary, i.e., there was no coercion
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"Valid consent" under Schneckloth
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[Consenual searches, p. 13] search has valid consent if (1) totality of the circumstances show (2) the consent was voluntary, i.e., there was no coercion
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State v. Maristany
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[Consenual searches, p. 13] Is third-party consent const.? Here, ct. says that apparent authority of driver, who does not own bag in which drugs are found, is valid consent if otherwise voluntary
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Search incident to arrest
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[Search incident to arrest, p. 13] When police are arresting someone, they may search (1) the Defendant's person or (2) in an area within the "immediate control" of the defendant
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Scope of search incident to arrest
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[Search incident to arrest, p. 13] Two standards: (1) for areas immediately adjacent to place of arrest, no suspicion required for anything large enough for a person, must leave when arrest is complete; (2) Other spaces, there must be reasonable suspicion, space large enough for a person, must leave when arrest is complete
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When is a body cavity search const.?
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[Intrusive body searches, p. 14] Only allowable incident to arrest when (1) there exists a clear indication that desired evidence will be found; (2) absent an emergency, a warrant is required; and (3) might reasonably have believed that emergency existed where officers are endangered or evidence might be destroyed
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In searching a home, what distinctions are made concerning property?
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[Searching houses, etc., p. 15] Homes exist on their property, their curtilage, and their outer fields
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What is curtilage, and what is its significance for search jurisprudence?
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[Searching houses, etc., p. 15] Curtilage is land appurtenant to a home and in which a person may have a legitimate privacy interest
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What is the standard for searching curtilage?
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[Searching houses, etc., p. 15] The same as searching a home, i.e., probable cause and search warrant
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What are open fields, and what is their significance for search jurisprudence?
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[Searching houses, etc., p. 15] Open fields are unimproved, open areas where there is no "search" under the Const.
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What criteria are there to determine the difference between curtilage and open fields?
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[Searching houses, etc., p. 15] Four criteria: (1) what is the proximity of the land to the house; (2) is there an enclosure; (3) for what is the property used; and (4) what steps have been taken to protect the area from observation?
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What questions must be answered before searching in a workplace?
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[Searching houses, etc., p. 15] (1) Is the employer private or governmental? (2) If governmental, is there a search, i.e., is there a reasonable expectation of privacy? (3) If there was a reasonable expectation, is there a warrant or probable cause?
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At a school, does the Fourth Amendment's protection against searches apply?
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[Searches in schools, prisons, p. 15] Student had a reasonable expectation of privacy, but the State may balance that expectation interest with its interest in the maintenance of public order; the search, touching the student's bookbag to find the contours of a gun, was a minimally intrusive search, but it was a search
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What is the scope of the student's expectation of privacy at school?
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[Searches in schools, prisons, p. 15] The interest is limited in scope, and if students receive proper notice of the State's further intrusion into that interest, such intrusion may also be constitutional.
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When is an inventory search const.?
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[Searching cars and containers, p. 16] (1) Original impoundment of vehicle must be lawful; (2) purpose of inventory search must be legitimate; and (3) must be conducted in good faith under reasonable procedure.
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A consent search is const. when _____.
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[Searching cars and containers, p. 16] (1) the totality of the circumstances tend to show (2) that the consent was voluntary, i.e., without coercion
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A search incident to arrest in a traffic stop is const. when _____.
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[Searching cars and containers, p. 16] (1) the stop is lawful; (2) there is a custodial arrest: allowing (a) person of arrestee and (b) entire passenger compartment
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State v. Pierce
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[Searching cars and containers, p. 16] The N.J. Ct. ruled that the U.S. S. Ct. standard for searches of vehicles in traffic stops, that if (1) the stop is lawful; and if (2) there is a custodial arrest: then allowing search of the (a) person of arrestee and (b) entire passenger compartment, was not const. under the N.J. Const.; N.B., the U.S. S. Ct. is still good law
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California v. Acevedo
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[Searching cars and containers, p. 16] Here, the Ct. held that separate probable cause or a separate warrant was not required to search containers within an automobile; the search of the automobile included containers within it
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In re M.E.B.
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[Stop or arrest, p. 17] Ct. held that confession obtained was admissible because it was during a stop, not an arrest, despite restraints placed on suspect
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Matrix for determining legality of detention
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[Stop or arrest, p. 17] (1) Public or private place? If public, then (2) Arrest? Consider location, restraints used, police intent. (3) If no, then seizure; if yes, did police have probable cause? (4) If seizure, was there reasonable suspicion? If private, then (2) valid arrest warrant? (3) If no, invalid arrest; if yes, arrest valid
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If the police detain someone in public, what must be considered to determine if it is an arrest?
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[Stop or arrest, p. 17] Location of the detainment, restraint techniques used, and the police intent
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If the police detain someone, but it is not an arrest, what is the legal status of the suspect?
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[Stop or arrest, p. 17] He is seized; seizure is const. if police had reasonable suspicion
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If police detain someone, and it is an arrest, what will make the arrest const.?
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[Stop or arrest, p. 17] The police must have had probable cause
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If police detain someone in private, what must be considered to determine if it is const.?
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[Stop or arrest, p. 17] The police must have a valid search warrant; if they do not, the arrest is invalid
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State v. Kiper
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[Arrest warrants, p. 18] Because police had not altered warrant to reflect location they actually went to, and because person arrested wasn't on the warrant in the first place, arrest was held invalid
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Knowles v. Iowa
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[Police discretion in arrests, p. 18] There is no search incident to citation; only incident to arrest -- here, the S. Ct. holds invalid a search conducted incident to a traffic citation
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Under what circumstances is a search incident to citation const.?
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[Police discretion in arrests, p. 18] Searches incident to citation are unconst. under all circumstances
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Atwater v. Lago Vista
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[Police discretion in arrests, p. 18] The Ct. held that an arrest was const. for even minor offenses; common law "breach of the peace" theories are not applicable under U.S. Const.
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When may a police officer arrest someone for a crime?
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[Police discretion in arrests, p. 18] Any time there is probable cause to believe a crime is being or has been committed, regardless of whether such crime is a felony or misdemeanor
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Tennessee v. Garner
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[Use of force in arrests, p. 19] Ct. said that apprehension of a suspect is a seizure; in addition, deadly force is only const. when there is probable cause to believe fleeing person is dangerous to the police or the public
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When is it const. to use deadly force on fleeing persons?
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[Use of force in arrests, p. 19] When there is probable cause to believe a fleeing person is dangerous to police or the public
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Weeks v. United States
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[Exclusionary rule, p. 20] Evidence improperly or unconst. obtained is excluded from trial
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People v. Cahan
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[Exclusionary rule, p. 20] Evidence obtained in violation of constitutional guarantees is inadmissible
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Commonwealth v. Edmunds
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[Evidence obtained in good faith, p. 20] Even though evidence was obtained in good faith, under a faulty warrant, the failed warrant made the fruits of the illegal search inadmissible, despite the police's good faith -- at least in Pennsylvania
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United States v. Leon
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[Evidence obtained in good faith, p. 20] The U.S. S. Ct. held that the exclusionary rule was modified so that (1) evidence seized (2) in reasonable (3) good-faith reliance on (4) a search warrant that was subsequently held to be defective COULD be admissible despite the defective warrant
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When is evidence obtained in good faith under a defective warrant admissible?
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[Evidence obtained in good faith, p. 20] Under Leon, when the (1) evidence seized (2) in reasonable (3) good-faith reliance on (4) a search warrant that was subsequently held to be defective
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Nix v. Williams
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[Causation limits on exclusionary rule, p. 21] The Ct. held that was an "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule; the exception posits that if evidence, such as a body in a field, would have inevitably been discovered without the unconst. search/seizure, then such evidence is admissible
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"inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule
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[Causation limits on exclusionary rule, p. 21] if evidence, such as a body in a field, would have inevitably been discovered without the unconst. search/seizure, then such evidence is admissible
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"independent source" doctrine
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[Causation limits on the exclusionary rule, p. 21] If evidence is the result of two sources, and one of those sources is found to be unconst., then the evidence may still be admitted under the const. source
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State v. Wood
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[Standing to challenge illegal searches/seizures, p. 22] A person may still have standing to challenge a search, even if they are not the owners of the property searched, so long as the person challenging the search has a legitimate possessory interest in the property searched
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Rakas v. Illinois
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[Standing to challenge illegal searches/seizure, p. 22] The court changed their standing jurisprudence to hold that only those persons who had a reasonable expectation of privacy; i.e., if you have no legitimate property or possessory interest, you have no legitimate expectation of privacy
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Katz v. United States
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[Enhacement of senses, p. 24] In this case, a man using a telephone booth has a U.S. Const. Amd. IV reasonable expectation of privacy
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What level of protection is provided to a man using a telephone booth from wiretapping?
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[Enhancement of senses, p. 24] He has a reasonable expectation of privacy under U.S. Const. amd. IV
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Kyllo v. United States
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[Enhancement of senses, p. 24] The Ct. held that obtaining information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area constituted a search, at least where the technology was not in general public use
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Commonwealth v. Martin
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[Enhancement of senses, p. 24] Because police had no probable cause to use a sniffing dog on a satchel, evidence recovered through that search is inadmissible
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Olmstead v. United States
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[Judicial limits on wiretaps, p. 25] Ct. said that the Const. protects people, not places from intrusion, as in 'Katz'
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"super probable cause"
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[Judicial limits on wiretaps, p. 25] What professor Cochrane says is necessary in order for a wiretap application to be granted; information to be obtained can only be obtained by wiretap; other investigative methods have been tried or would fail and compromise the investigation; information to be obtained is likely to lead to evidence of a crime
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State v. Worthy
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[Judicial limits on wiretaps, p. 25] Evidence obtained from improper wiretap is excluded and not subject to inevitable discovery exception
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State v. Reeves
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[Bugs on agents, p. 26] Because declarant was speaking to someone from whom there was no reasonable expectation of privacy, it did not matter that the disclosure was electronic or state-authorized in nature
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When is in unconst. to use recording device?
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[Bugs on agents, p. 26] It is a const. practice
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What is FISA?
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[Wiretaps against terrorism, p. 27] The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which authorizes special courts to hear wiretap applications on terrorists and foreign agents
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Describe the search/seizure law of wiretaps.
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[p. 27] U.S. Const. amd. IV; Tit. 3, U.S. Code; super probable cause
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Describe the search/seizure law of secret agents.
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[p. 27] U.S. Const. amd. IV; amds. V & VI?; Not a search.
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Describe the search/seizure law of 3d party records that do not reveal content.
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[p. 27] U.S. Const. amd. IV; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1321, 1323; Not a search
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Describe the search/seizure law of 3d party records that reveal contents.
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[p. 27] ECPA '86 (less than 180 days, greater than 180 days); probable cause relevant and material to an on-going investgiation
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Richardson v. State
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[3d party records, p. 27] There is a legitimate and reasonable expectation of privacy that the number one dials will not be disclosed; thus, probable cause is necessary, in Texas, for a pen register search
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Brown v. Mississippi
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[Confessions, physical abuse, etc., p. 28] In this case, using violence to obtain confessions was a denial of U.S. Const. amd. XIV Due Process rts.
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State v. Strain
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[Confessions, promises/threats, p. 29] Voluntariness of confession must be viewed in the "totality of the circumstances," and linking rt. to counsel to future point was unconst.
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When does confession violate Due Process?
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[Confessions, promises/threats, p. 29] confession violates due process if not voluntary
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When is a confession wrong 'per se'?
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[Confessions, promises/threats, p. 29] physical abuse, threat of greater punishment, promise of lesser sentence, refusal to protect from co-defendants or mob, extrinsic lies by police to suspect
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When must totality of the circumstances be considered in context of a confession?
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[Confessions, promises/threats p. 29] intrinsic police lies, characteristics of Defendant, e.g., age, experience with legal system, mental capacity, etc.; length of interrogation
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State v. Carroll
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[Confessions, promises/threats, p. 29] Defendant was not in custody, and so his mother, a police officer, could not make promises or threats in her capacity as a police officer
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State v. Kelekolio
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[Confessions, police lies, p. 29] Police officer's lies to defendant were, considering the totality of the circumstances, intrinsic to the crime, not of the type to exhort a false confession
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Escobedo v. Illinois
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[Miranda warnings, p. 30] Ct. held that denial of counsel by police upon request by suspect was violative of suspect's const. rts.
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Miranda v. Arizona
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[Miranda warnings, p. 30] Before any questioning, suspect must be informed of const. rts., including right to remain silent, words said will be used against suspect; right to counsel, if cannot afford, one will be provided; designed to protect people from interrogation in custody without adequate procedural safeguards
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'Miranda' warning
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[Miranda warnings, p. 30] (1) Right to remain silent; (2) anything you say can be used against you; (3) right to counsel during questioning; (4) if you cannot afford attorney, one will be provided for free; however, there is no absolute right to an attorney
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When must a 'Miranda' warning be given?
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[Miranda warnings, Bobo 3] custody, interrogation, adequate procedural safeguards
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State v. Smith
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[Miranda "custody", Bobo 4] After 4 juveniles brought in and questioned with their parents, then brought back in, boys confess to murder; Iowa law gives "super Miranda" to juveniles says parents have right to be present during custodial questioning; ct. says seizure is not necessarily custody; must consider totality of the circumstances: (1) purpose, place, manner; (2) whether free to leave; (3) age of suspects; (4) coercive; (5) environment used for questioning
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What is considered to determine Miranda custody?
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[Miranda "custody", Bobo 4] The totality of the circumstances: (1) purpose, place, manner; (2) whether free to leave; (3) age of suspects; (4) coercive; (5) environment used for questioning
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Rhode Island v. Innis
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[Miranda "interrogation", Bobo 5] Here, police officers talking to one another while suspect is in the car; suspect admits where gun is located, was this interrogation? Ct. held no, there was no direct questioning or non-direct questioning (i.e., the functional equivalent of direct questioning)
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What is the test for Miranda interrogation?
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[Miranda "interrogation", Bobo 5] Is there direct questioning, or its functional equivalent (i.e., actions/words by police that police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response)? Or, if non-direct questioning (i.e., the functional equivalent of direct questioning), does the suspect have special susceptibility?
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What are the exceptions to Miranda interrogations?
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[Miranda "interrogation", Bobo 5] Reflexive response of the officer; fear for public safety; Booking question; blue/gray rule, i.e., officer is undercover and suspect does not believe that he is talking to an officer (because there is no coercion)
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State v. Reed
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[Miranda "adequate procedures", Bobo 7] If a suspect has knowingly waived his Miranda rights, it is not unconst. for the police to refuse to allow a lawyer access to the suspect unless the suspect asks for a lawyer; see Moran v. Burbine (U.S.); N.J. ct. holds that it is unconst. under State Const. because it interrupts the attorney-client relationship
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Has adequate procedure been provided for a suspect who has waived Miranda rights when the police refuse to admit a lawyer he does not ask for?
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[Miranda "adequate procedures, Bobo 7] Yes, under Moran v. Burbine, U.S. S. Ct. case
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State v. Williams
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[Miranda "right to remain silent", Bobo 8] In this case, a teenager walks out of an interrogation; the Q is whether he invoked rt. to remain silent; Ct. examines three views of invocation of right: (1) must stop if possibility of invocation; (2) interrogation may continue, but only to determine whether right has been invoked; or (3) Davis approach, no stopping or clarification unless invocation is unambiguous
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Ambiguous assertions of right to counsel
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[Miranda right to counsel, Bobo 9] If someone makes an ambiguous statement that could be an invocation of counsel rights, it should be clarified, though you do not have to stop
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When is silence a waiver of Miranda rights?
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[Miranda invocation, Bobo 10]
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What test determine's a suspect's capacity to waive rights?
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[Miranda invocation, Bobo 10] Totality of the circumstances, fact-specific
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Minnick v. Minnesota
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[Effect of asserting Miranda rts., Bobo 10] A man asserts rt. to counsel; is questioned. Is then re-questioned, without attorney. U.S. S. Ct. held: once attorney rt. is invoked, questioning may not occur without attorney physically present
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Once suspect invokes rt. to counsel, when may police question suspect?
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[Effect of asserting Miranda rts., Bobo 10] Only when attorney is physically present
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State v. Stanley
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[Effect of asserting Miranda rts., Bobo 10] Man asserts rt. to silence, is picked out of line-up, and is asked if he wants to talk; he signs waiver and admits to shooting; Q is whether he properly waived his rts. Held, under 'Mosley' rule: if D invokes rt. to silence, police may question again so long as they scrupulously honor rt. to remain silent, i.e., (1) immediately stop at invocation? (2) wait significant period? (3) different crime? (4) Fresh Miranda rts. and waiver? (5) second interview different officer?
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What does the ct. examine to determine whether police scrupulously observed suspect's rt. to silence?
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[Effects of asserting Miranda rts., Bobo 10] (1) immediately stop at invocation? (2) wait significant period? (3) different crime? (4) Fresh Miranda rts. and waiver? (5) second interview different officer?
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If a suspect is in custody and invokes Miranda what may police question about?
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[Miranda rts. v. U.S. Const. amd. VI rt.] Neither the present crime nor any other crime; police must respect rt. to silence or wait for attorney; under U.S. Const. amd. V
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If a suspect, while in custody, invokes Miranda and is then released, may police question him?
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[Miranda rts. v. U.S. Const. amd. VI rt.] Yes, about either the crime previously in custody or another
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If a suspect is formally charged, may police question him?
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[Miranda rts. v. U.S. Const. amd. VI rt.] Not about the crime charged, but about a different crime under U.S. Const. amd. VI
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If a suspect is formally charged and is no longer in custody, may police question him?
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[Miranda rts. v. U.S. Const. amd. VI rt.] Not about the crime charged, but about a different crime under U.S. Const. amd. VI
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When does the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attach?
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[Sixth Amendment rt. to counsel, Bobo 11] After the initiation of formal proceedings, usually a criminal indictment or presentment
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Massiah v. United States
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[Sixth Amd. rt. to counsel, Bobo 12] Interrogation after formal charge is unconst. if (1) right has attached; (2) there is a "deliberate elicitation"; (3) by government agent
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When is interrogation after charge unconst.?
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[Sixth Amd. rt. to counsel, Bobo 12] if (1) right has attached; (2) there is a "deliberate elicitation"; (3) by government agent
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How may Miranda-tainted statements be used at trial?
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[Bobo 13] For impeachment purposes only
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If a D confesses in a Miranda-tainted statement, and then is Mirandized and confesses again, is that statement admissible?
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[Bobo 13] Yes, under Oregon v. Elstad (U.S.); Ct. holds that D, after being informed of rts., doesn't have to talk again
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May the police intentionally obtain a confession only to then Mirandize a suspect and have them confess again to get an admissible statement?
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[Bobo 13] No, under Missouri v. Seibert, such a statement, when there is not a good-faith mistake by the police, is inadmissible either pre- or post-Miranda warnings; it violates the spirit of the Miranda warning of a D's Due Process rights
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When is the Sixth Amd. rt. to counsel violated in suspect identifications?
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[Identifications, Bobo 16] When (1) pretrial identification procedure (2) after initiation of adversarial proceedings (3) is carried on without an attorney
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Does a suspect have a right to have counsel present at police line-up?
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[Identifications, Bobo 16] No, under People v. Hawkins (attorney would play only a passive role, is limited in what he can do)
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Would a policeman handcuffed to a suspect in a line-up be a const. exercise of that power? Why or why not?
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[Identifications, Bobo 16] No, because it is unduly suggestive; but see State v. Ramirez, where reliability is also taken into consideration
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State v. Ramirez
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[Identifications, Bobo 16] Court says that unduly suggestive does not make identification inadmissible per se; instead, reliability factors should be considered: (1) opportunity to witness; (2) witness' degree of attention; (3) accuracy of prior description; (4) level of certainty; (5) length of time between crime/identification
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What factors do cts. consider to determine reliability of suspect identification?
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[Identifications, Bobo 16] (1) opportunity to witness; (2) witness' degree of attention; (3) accuracy of prior description; (4) level of certainty; (5) length of time between crime/identification
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Must a court give a jury instruction on cross-racial identifications?
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[Identifications, Bobo 16] Some cts., see State v. Cromedy, require that the judge be allowed to give such an instruction; other jurisdictions do not allow such instructions
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When is counsel required for a criminal case?
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[Rt. to counsel, p. 33] It is required in both felonies and misdemeanors
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