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39 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
- 3rd side (hint)
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U.S. V. Drayton
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Consensual encounter; when armed police boards bus and asks questions eventually finding evidence to convict ∆, you are free to leave so no search and no seizure so no 4th. Used Bostick.
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Florida v. Bostick
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Officers boarded bus and intergoated ∆ which led to evidence and conviction. Court says police do not need a Terry predicate. No search and no seizure = no fourth= NO PREDICATE.
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Officers board Florida bus
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California v. Hodari (p. 409)
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Officers chased suspect and he threw away something that ended up being cocaine. Police needed no predicate to chase him. DO need a predicate to arrest him and search him, but not the case here. He was not searched. He was not seized. He is not protected by the 4th.
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Police chase
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Brendlin v. CA
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Traffic stop. Gov't found evidence against passenger. During a traffic stop there is no "free(dom) to decline." This is a seizure under the 4th and protected. MUST NEED A PREDICATE.
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Traffic Stop, post-Terry
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U.S. v. Wilson
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∆ refused search of coat after cooperating. DEA agent harassed him until he let him search his coat. This was a seizure under Terry and agent need Terry predicate which he did not have. EVIDENCE thrown out.
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Terry seizure or not?
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Terry predicate
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reasonable suspicion; must be particularized (U.S. v. Cortez)
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US v. Cortez
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Terry predicate requires particularized suspicion as to the person. A particular person is engaged in wrong doing
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For a terry stop, do you look at all the factors indivually to see if the officer had reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop, or do you add them up.
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A totality of the circumstances
See US v. Cortez |
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Can one of the factors for a Terry stop be, the fact that it is a "high crime area".
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Yes. See Illonois v. Wardlow
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Is "unprovoked flight" enough to reach reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop?
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Yes, see Il. v. Wardlow
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Do police have to use the least intrusive means, when making a Terry stop?
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Yes, according to FL v. Royer and minority in US v. Sharpe
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Camara v. Municipal court
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Admin search
Building inspector must obtain warrant to inspect building if owner does not consent to it. |
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Ohio v. Robinette
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No bright lines for Terry stops. robinette agrues he was illegal searched after legit traffic stop. When traffic stop ended he should have been notified that he could leave. SCOTUS: No, police don't have to.
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What two standards justify seizure of a person?
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Reasonable suspicion and probable cause.
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What constitutes reasonable suspicion under a Terry stop?
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Seizure: that a crime was about to be committed (later expanded to a crime will be committed in Hensley).
Search: that suspect is armed w/ dangerous weapon |
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What is the legal scope of a Terry stop?
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Must be presumptively brief and only long enough to confirm or dispel the suspicion
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Is a hunch enough for a terry stop?
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No. must be based on specific and articulable facts... particularized suspicion
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Can police ever search without particularized suspicion?
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YES! admin search.
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Michigan v. Long
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See a car swerve into a ditch and cops go over and ask for ID and search after seeing a hunting knife. Extreme application of Terry.
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Do you have a right of privacy in what your voice sounds like?
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Dionisio. No
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"In A Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interrogation"
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Yale Law Review article claiming that minorities and females are less likely to assert their right to a lawyer and be more deferential.
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Davis v. U.S.
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Have to say the magic words.
If suspect makes ambiguous or equivocal reference to attorney, cessation of questioning is not required but, rather, suspect must unambiguously request counsel, and (2) accused's remark, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer,” was not request for counsel and Naval Investigative Service (NIS) agents therefore were not required to stop questioning him. |
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Edwards v. AZ
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When right to counsel is invoked, no police questioning until counsel is made available or suspect initiates.
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Michigan v. Mosley
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When right to Silence Invoked. Police can wait a few hours and attempt questing again, but must re-Mirandize
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Roberson case
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Applies to all crimes, not just the crime you are being held/indicted for
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McNeil v. Wisconsin
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Accused's invocation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during judicial proceeding did not constitute invocation of right to counsel derived by Miranda v. Arizona, from Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compelled self-incrimination. The sixth is crime specific, so police can question about a different crime b/c when you invoke the sixth you do it for the crime you were charged with. (p. 641)
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Messiah v. U.S.
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held that defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated by use in evidence against him of incriminating statements which he made to co-defendant after their indictment and their release on bail and in absence of defendant's retained counsel and which were overheard on radio by government agent without defendant's knowledge that co-defendant had decided to cooperate with government and had permitted agent to install radio transmitter under front seat of co-defendant's automobile.
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Moran v. Burbine
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Failure of police to inform defendant of efforts of attorney, who had been retained by defendant's sister without his knowledge, to reach him did not deprive defendant of his right to counsel or vitiate waiver of his Miranda rights.
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RI v. Innis
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Officers conversation about kids finding shotgun did not constitute interogation.
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N.Y. v. Quarles
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Recognizes "pub safety" exception. The language is very strong against Miranda. (see p. 615)
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Oregon v. Elstad
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Statement not inadmissible when the first time, confession violated Miranda, but the second confession was made after waiving Miranda rights.
Court held that while Miranda required that unwarned admissions must be suppressed, subsequent statements, if made knowingly and voluntarily, need not be. The Court held that ". . .the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion." This is not what Miranda says. Indeed there is a presumption of compulsion!!! |
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Moran. Burbine
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o failure of police to inform defendant of efforts of attorney, who had been retained by defendant's sister without his knowledge, to reach him did not deprive defendant of his right to counsel or vitiate waiver of his Miranda rights
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Withrow v. Williams
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(1) Stone restrictions on exercise of federal habeas jurisdiction in Fourth Amendment cases did not extend to state prisoner's claim that his conviction rested on statements obtained in violation of Miranda safeguards, but (2) where state prisoner's federal habeas claim raised only one claim going to admissibility of his statements to police, on ground that police had elicited those statements without satisfying Miranda requirements, it was error for district court, without evidentiary hearing or argument, to go beyond habeas petition and find statements petitioner made after receiving Miranda warnings to be involuntary under due process criteria.
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Oregon v. Hass
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∆ invoked his rights. Po ignored him and got a confession. Confession cannot but admitted, but SC held it can be used to impeach.
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Harris v. New York
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Defective warning. ∆ did not invoke his rights. Confession can be used to impeach.
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Michigan v. Tucker
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Fruit of the poisonous tree. Can use W, whose identity was revealed during uncons. interrogoation
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Dickerson v. U.S.
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§3501 challenged and ruled unconstitutional.
"Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture," wrote Rehnquist. "Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively. We decline to overrule Miranda ourselves." (p.657) |
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Massiah rule
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When charged. Grants ∆ the right to not have incriminating statements taken from him by the police unless he has counsel with him or he waives his right to a lawyer.
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Brewer v. Williams
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Respondent was deprived of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel when ∆ att. said police could drive ∆ to somewhere else as long as po did not interrogate ∆. Christain burial speech. ∆ directed po. to body. Relied on Massiah.
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