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143 Cards in this Set
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Katz v. US |
Facts: Telephone booth electronic surveillance Rule: Police conduct is a search where it invades (1) a subjective expectation of privacy (2) that society regards as reasonable. |
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Oliver v. US |
Facts: Police trespassed around a gate saying "keep out" to find marijuana growing in an open field. Rule: There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in an open field. |
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US v. Bellina |
Facts: Police peered into Bellina's airplane through its window using a ladder. Rule: There is no subjective expectation of privacy where a suspect has not taken steps to manifest this expectation. |
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US v. Dunn |
Facts: Police crossed a couple fences on the edge of Dunn's 200 acre plot and looked inside a barn to see a drug lab. Rule: Curtilage is defined by (1) Proximity - to the home (2) Inclusion - in the same area/fence as home (3) Use - intimate activities? (4) Steps - taken to manifest/ensure privacy Rule: Police can observe the curtilage from the open fields. |
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US v. White |
Facts: Informant recorded co-conspirator. Rule: There is no reasonable expectation of privacy that co-conspirators won't turn you in. |
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US v. Miller |
Facts: Police subpoenaed suspect's bank records. Rule: No reasonable expectation of privacy in business records. |
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Smith v. Maryland |
Facts: Pen register cast Rule: There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in information you voluntarily turn over to a 3rd party. |
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California v. Greenwood |
Facts: Police collected/searched suspect's trash. Rule: No reasonable expectation of privacy in trash because of public/animal access to it. |
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California v. Ciraolo & Florida v. Riley |
Facts: The flyover cases Rule: If information/property can be seen from a place of public access (or that the public can legally access), it is not a search. |
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US v. Place |
Facts: Dog sniff Rule: Canine sniffs are not searches because (1) they're not intrusive, and (2) they can only reveal illegal activity. |
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US v. Jacobsen |
Facts: Warehouse tore package & police re-opened and chemical tested the powder. Rule: Field testing drugs is a seizure but always reasonable because (1) it is minimally intrusive, and (2) can only reveal illegal activity. Rule: Police can search to the same extent that private individual already did. |
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Kyllo v. US |
Facts: Police used thermal imaging to measure heat on wall of home. Rule: Police conduct is a search when they (1) use technology not in common public use, (2) to see intimate details of home that would be otherwise unknowable without physical intrusion. |
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US v. Knotts |
Facts: Police turned on beeper in contained purchased by suspect intermittently. Rule: Police can use technology to see what they could independently verify by visual inspection, but NOT to access information inside the home. |
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US v. Jones |
Facts: Police attached a GPS tracker to suspect's car. Rule: A physical trespass is still a search. |
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Illinois v. Gates |
Facts: Informant gave detailed information about suspects' future plans that police corroborated. Rule: Probable cause from informant's tip follows a totality of the circumstances test (1) Veracity (2) Reliability (3) Basis of Knowledge Substantial Basis Test: Magistrate makes a common sense evaluation as to whether there is probable cause, which is more likely where an informant predicts a suspect's future behavior. |
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Maryland v. Pringle |
Facts: Officer found cocaine in a car and arrested all of the passengers to the stationhouse when no one claimed it. Rule: Probable cause / particularity where there is a fair probability that any or all suspects could exercise dominion or control over the illegal substance. |
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Devenpeck v. Alford |
Facts: Officer arrested suspect impersonating a police officer for violating the Privacy Act. Rule: Officer's reason for arrest is immaterial if there is probable cause that the suspect actually committed an unrelated crime. |
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Warden v. Hayden |
Facts: Police pursued Hayden into his home and found incriminating clothing. Rule: It is reasonable under the 4th Amendment to seize "mere evidence" |
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Zurcher v. Stanford |
Facts: Search of newspaper for pictures of crime Rule: Warrants may issue to search 3rd parties on probable cause that they have evidence of crime |
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Hudson v. Palmer |
Facts: Search of prisoner's cell. Rule: Prisoners have no expectation of privacy in their cells, but do in their persons. |
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New Jersey v. TLO |
Facts: School administrator searched student's handbag for cigarettes. Rule: A school official is a gov't agent, thus the 4th amendment applies, but can search on reasonable suspicion pursuant to "special needs" to enforce school policies. |
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Florida v. Jardines |
Facts: Canine sniff on suspect's doorstep. Rule: A canine sniff of a house is a search. |
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US v. Grubbs |
Facts: Controlled delivery of child porn. Rule: Anticipatory warrants proper where (1) Probable cause that trigger will occur (2) Probable cause that trigger will result in probable cause of crime |
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Franks v. Delaware |
Franks Hearing: (1) Prove falsity of facts in affidavit for warrant (2) False statements must be reckless/deliberate (3) Must be no probable cause without falsities |
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Maryland v. Garrison |
Facts: Warrant for 3rd floor apartment Rule: Reasonability & particularity are determined based on the information the officers had at the time the warrant issued |
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Andresen v. Maryland |
Facts: Lawyer fraud. Warrant allowed "other fruits, etc." Rule: General language in a warrant is modified by specific language preceding it. Rule: Specificity is difficult in cases of complex crimes. |
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Richards v. Wisconsin |
Facts: Cops knocked, pretending to be maintenance men, then broke down door when the jig was up. Rule: Can no-knock when reasonable suspicion evidence will be destroyed. |
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US v. Banks |
Facts: Knocked and waited, then busted in and found drugs. Rule: A failure to answer becomes a refusal to submit after 15-20 seconds or whatever is a reasonable period of time for the suspect to answer the door. |
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Hudson v. Michigan |
Rule: No exclusion for violating the knock-and-announce rule. |
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US v. Ross |
Facts: Police had probable cause to search suspect's car for drugs. Rule: If probable cause, the police can search any container that could possibly contain the object of the search. |
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Michigan v. Summers
(detention incident to search) |
Facts: Summer was just leaving as police searched his house under a warrant & detained him on site while they did so. The Summers Rule: Police can detain occupants during and arrest. |
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Muehler v. Mena
(detention incident to search) |
Facts: Detained suspect in handcuffs during search of house for deadly weapons and asked her immigration status. Rule: The police can detain occupants while executing a search warrant. |
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Bailey v. US
(detention incident to search) |
Facts: Police apprehended suspect a mile from the place of a search he had just left. Rule: Can't detain suspects who left the scene of a search. |
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Brigham City v. Stuart
(emergency aid) |
Facts: Loud underage drinking party. Rule: Police can enter without a warrant if there is a danger to public safety, even if they have an ulterior motive. |
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Michigan v. Fisher
(emergency aid) |
Facts: Arrived to broken window, blood, and smashed pickup truck. Rule: If reasonable belief someone is in danger or has been injured, the police do not need a warrant to enter. Rule: Danger/injury need not be fatal. |
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Kentucky v. King
(destruction of evidence) |
Facts: Police setup controlled drug buy and followed informant to apartment. They entered after smelling burnt marijuana and hearing scuffling. Rule: Police can search without a warrant pursuant to exigent circumstances with probable cause. Rule: Police do not impermissibly create an exigency so long as they engage in conduct that is lawful. |
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Maryland v. Buie |
Facts: Police arrested suspect for armed robbery in his home, then conducted a "protective sweep" for confederates. Rule: Protective sweeps are supportable by reasonable suspicion that the area swept may contain confederates posing a danger to officers. Rule: Only sweep until suspicion is dispelled. |
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US v. Robinson |
Facts: Officer searched person of arrested suspect, opening cigarette pack. Rule: Police can fully search containers on a person incident to arrest. |
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US v. Chadwick |
Facts: Police arrested Chadwick and searched his footlocker. Rule: A person's expectation of privacy in luggage is greater than in an automobile. |
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Warden v. Hayden |
Facts: Police pursued suspect into house. His wife answered the door and the police searched for the suspect, weapons, and confederates. Rule: Police in "hot pursuit" may enter a premises in search of a suspect. |
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US v. Edwards
(search incident to arrest) |
Facts: Arrested suspect for break-in. Searched him in jail for wood chips. Rule: Police can search a suspect's person later in time if they could do it at the time of the arrest. |
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Atwater v. City of Lago Vista
(warrantless arrest) |
Facts: Arrested suspect for not wearing a seatbelt. Rule: Can arrest without a warrant for misdemeanors or felonies. |
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US v. Watson
(consent) |
Facts: Arrested suspect on the street and gained his consent to search his car. Rule: Arrested suspects can consent to a search. |
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Bumper v. North Carolina
(consent) |
Rule: Gov't must prove consent is more than mere acquiescence with authority. |
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US v. Drayton
(consent) |
Facts: Bus sweep searched suspects with consent, the second after first was arrested. Rule: Verbal consent is effective, and a compatriot being arrested will not render consent ineffective. |
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Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
(consent) |
Facts: Police gained consent of suspect to search his brother's car that he was driving ("sure, go ahead"). Rule: Consent is determined by totality of the circumstances. |
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Ohio v. Robinette
(consent) |
Facts: "One more thing" during traffic stop. Rule: Officer doesn't have to tell a suspect that he or she is free to go, or when the stop is over. |
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US v. Matlock
(3rd party consent) |
Facts: Co-inhabitant consented to search of suspect's home. Rule: Joint access, use, or control allows consent by anyone. |
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Illinois v. Rodriguez
(3rd party consent) |
Facts: Ex-girlfriend with key admitted police to suspect's apartment. Rule: If reasonable to believe consenting party had authority, then the search is proper pursuant to consent. |
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Georgia v. Randolph
(3rd party consent) |
Facts: Objecting party was arrested and co-tenant admitted police pursuant to consent. Rule: Objecting parties must be present in fact, and removal of them must be in good-faith. |
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Hoffa v. US
(3rd party consent) |
Facts: Informant was admitted to Hoffa's camp and spied on him. Rule: Consensual presence of undercover informants violates no privacy interest. |
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California v. Carney
(auto exception) |
Facts: Entered mobile home after youth emerged with drugs. Rule: Auto exception supported by (1) mobility of vehicle, & (2) low privacy interest (pervasive regulation). Rule: No distinction between mobile home and car. |
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California v. Acevedo
(auto exception) |
Facts: Had probable cause to search car for a container. Rule: If prob cause only to search container but not car, then can search car until container found. |
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Arizona v. Hicks
(plain view) |
Facts: Cops responding to shots fired lifted a turnstile to see the serial # on a stereo. Rule: Plain view must not require a further search. |
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Elements of Plain View |
(1) Lawful Presence (2) Readily Apparent (3) Criminal on its Face |
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Minnesota v. Dickerson
(plain view) |
Facts: Cop frisked suspect during Terry stop, finding cocaine after manipulation. Rule: "Plain touch" doctrine requires that the criminality of an item be immediately apparent without further manipulation. |
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Horton v. California
(plain view) |
Facts: Warrant to search for jewelry, but officers wanted to find guns, and did. Rule: If an article is in plain view, and is criminal on its face, neither its observation nor its seizure violates a privacy interest. Rule: Intent under a warranted search is irrelevant. |
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Colorado v. Bertine
(inventory searches) |
Facts: Officers searched van and containers under inventory scheme. Rule: Inventory searches are proper where they reasonably limit the discretion of searching officers. (1) protect owner's property (2) protect police from property disputes (3) protect police from danger Requirements: (1) Pursuant to policy (2) Motive cannot be solely investigative |
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Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n
("special needs") |
Facts: Railway mandated drug testing for operators involved in accidents. Rule: If privacy interest minimal & particularized suspicion would place gov't interest in jeopardy, suspicionless searches are reasonable. |
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Chandler v. Miller
("special needs") |
Facts: Drug testing for political candidates. Rule: A special need must be "substantial" and address an actual need/harm. |
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Ferguson v. City of Charleston
("special needs") |
Facts: Drug testing pregnant women for cocaine to coerce them into a treatment program. Rule: "Special needs" searches cannot have a predominate interest in law enforcement. |
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New Jersey v. TLO
("special needs") |
Facts: Searched student's handbag for cigarettes on reasonable suspicion, finding marijuana. Rule: Can search students on reasonable suspicion to enforce school policies. |
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New York v. Burger
(administrative searches) |
Facts: Police searched junkyard under administrative scheme. Rule: Administrative searches are proper without suspicion where (1) Compelling gov't interest (2) Necessary to further gov't interest (3) Adequate warrant substitute --> advises of search's lawfulness --> limits discretion of officers
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Florida v. Royer
(Terry stop) |
Facts: Officers took Royer's license and ticket at the airport, escorted him to a separate room, and obtained his consent to search his luggage, finding drugs. Rule: If reasonable person would not feel free to leave, he has been seized within the Fourth Amendment. Rule: An officer identifying himself as such does not effect a seizure. |
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US v. Mendenhall
(Terry stop) |
Facts: DEA approached Mendenhall in airport and asked her questions. Rule: Asking questions is not a seizure. |
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Adams v. Williams
(Terry stop) |
Facts: Informant tip said suspect had gun in car. Rule: Can frisk in car upon anonymous tip. |
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Pennsylvania v. Mimms
(Terry stop) |
Facts: Asked passengers out of car. Rule: Cops have automatic right to ask passengers to step out of a car. |
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Rakas v. Illinois
(standing) |
Facts: Officers stopped car matching description and searched it, finding passenger's gun. Rule: Suspect cannot challenge the seizure of his item from another's car. Rule: Standing is determined by whether a fourth amendment right was "actually violated" |
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Rawlings v. Kentucky
(standing) |
Facts: Search of girlfriend's purse for dealer's drugs. Rule: Standing to challenge a seizure requires a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area from which the object was seized. |
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Minnesota v. Carter
(standing) |
Facts: Dealers were only present in 3rd party's premises to bag cocaine. Rule: No standing to challenge search of location where only nexus is commercial illegal activity. |
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US v. Payner
(standing) |
Facts: Police searched suitcase of agent of bank for evidence of another's guilt. Rule: The "Target Theory" is immaterial |
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US v. Leon
(exclusionary rule) |
Facts: Warrant was facially valid, but issued without probable cause. Rule: If officers reasonably rely on a deficient warrant, and would not be deterred by exclusion, the fruits of a search pursuant to that warrant will not be excluded. |
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US v. Sheppard
(exclusionary rule) |
Rule: Officers can reasonably rely on a facially deficient warrant. |
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Arizona v. Evans
(exclusionary rule) |
Facts: Clerical error failed to quash arrest warrant. Rule: If the operation of the exclusionary rule would not deter a police officer or the official who made the error, then it does not apply. |
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Herring v. US
(exclusionary rule) |
Facts: Police clerical error resulted in failure to remove arrest warrant from database, and the arrest of a suspect under that warrant. Rule: Exclusion only applies where an officer's mistake was flagrant or deliberate. |
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Davis v. US
(exclusionary rule) |
Facts: Whether exclusion applies retroactively to a Gant violation that occurred before Gant. Rule: No exclusion if officers were acting according to the law as it existed when a violation occurred. |
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Nix v. Williams
(exclusionary rule) |
Facts: Gov't would have discovered girl's body if search was not called off because of 6th amendment violation. Rule: If gov't would have inevitably discovered evidence obtained illegally in a legal manner, then it is not excluded. |
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Murray v. US
(exclusionary rule) |
Facts: Officers entered warehouse illegally, then obtained a warrant based upon evidence not obtained from the illegal entry, and searched again. Rule: Illegal police activity will not exclude evidence if a warrant later issues upon an independent source. |
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US v. Havens
(exclusionary rule) |
Facts: Found torn-out pocket in shirt that contained cocaine. Defendant lied about the shirt on the stand. Rule: Physical evidence, even that illegally obtained, may be used to impeach a defendant at trial. |
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Lefkowitz v. Turley
(compulsion) |
Facts: Gov't contractors were forced to testify or else forfeit right to contract with gov't in future. Rule: Economic sanctions are compulsion. |
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McKune v. Lile
(compulsion) |
Facts: Prisoner had to fill out "admission of responsibility" form to move into cushy prison. Rule: A benefit is not compulsion. |
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Griffin v. California
(compulsion) |
Facts: Adverse comment on D's silence. Rule: Adverse comment on silence by judge or prosecutor is compulsion. |
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Mitchell v. US
(compulsion) |
Facts: Adverse comment on silence at sentencing. Rule: Privilege applies at sentencing. Rule: The scope of waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination. |
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Fisher v. US
(person) |
Facts: Taxpayers sent documents prepared by their accountants to their lawyers. IRS subpoenaed documents. Rule: The privilege only protects the "person" |
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Braswell v. US |
Rule: A corporation cannot claim the privilege. |
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US v. Doe |
Rule: Privilege applies to sole proprietorships. |
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Kastigar v. US |
Rule: Use-fruits immunity is the proper standard for self-incriminating testimony & must be coextensive with the privilege. |
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Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy |
Facts: Asked to repeat immunized testimony in a civil proceeding. Rule: Can invoke privilege not to repeat immunized testimony. |
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US v. Apfelbaum |
Rule: Perjury applies even under immunity. |
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Kansas v. Cheever |
Facts: Defendant charged with shooting sheriff who came to arrest him for methamphetamine. Defendant brought expert who testified as to D's altered state from drugs. Rule: Prosecution can rebut evidence presented by D with their own. |
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Schmerber v. California |
Facts: D challenged blood drawing as violating 5th amendment privilege. Rule: Blood evidence is not testimonial or communicative, and thus the 5th Amendment does not apply. |
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US v. Wade |
Facts: D asked to speak a line for a witness. Rule: Voice is an identifying physical characteristic, and thus, is not testimonial. |
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Pennsylvania v. Muniz |
Facts: Police asked D to say the date of his 6th birthday and he stumbled over the words. Rule: When speech is non-testimonial when its relevance is divorced from its content. Rule: Booking exception - biographical questions are not interrogation. |
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Curcio v. US |
Facts: Agents of business would not testify to location of documents. Rule: Collective entity rule does not require agents to testify orally about business' documents. |
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Marchetti v. US |
Facts: D convicted for willfully failing to register for occupational tax for illegal gambling. Rule: Required records exception does not apply if it is aimed at a group inherently suspect of illegal conduct. |
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California v. Bryers |
Facts: Hit and run drivers info-leaving requirements. Rule: Giving ID is non-testimonial. |
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Watts v. Indiana |
Ruling: Sustained pressure = coercion |
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Brown v. Mississippi |
Ruling: "Shocks the conscience" = coercion |
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Arizona v. Fulminante |
Facts: "I can protect you from other prisoners" Rule: Threat of violence from others is coercion. |
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Spano v. New York |
Facts: Uneducated immigrant questioned all night long. Had his friend question him. Rule: Psychological pressure is coercion |
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Green v. Scully (2d. Cir) |
Facts: Threatened with electric chair. Defendant confessed to get help/treatment for problem. Ruling: Not coercion if suspect has own reason to confess. |
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Colorado v. Connelly |
Facts: D confessed under command hallucinations. Rule: Coercion must come from police. |
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Harris v. New York |
Rule: Can use Miranda-defective testimony for impeachment at trial. |
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Mincey v. Arizona |
Rule: Involuntary statements are inadmissible, even for impeachment. |
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Doyle v. Ohio |
Rule: Cannot use post-Miranda silence at trial. |
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Jenkins v. Anderson |
Facts: Why didn't you claim self-defense when the police arrived on the scene? Rule: Pre-Miranda silence is admissible for impeachment. |
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Fletcher v. Weir |
Rule: Post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence can be used for impeachment. |
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Michigan v. Tucker |
Facts: Police used D's Miranda-defective testimony to find his friend who incriminated D. Rule: The fruits of a Miranda-defective statement may be used in the prosecution's case-in-chief. |
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Oregon v. Elstad |
Facts: Young suspect incriminated himself, was taken to station, Mirandized, and repeated incriminating testimony. Rule: Police need no tell a suspect their previous testimony can't be used against them. |
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Missouri v. Seibert |
Facts: Midstream Mirandizement. Rule: Admissibility of testimony following midstream Mirandizement is determined by whether the warning could have been effective to accomplish its goals. |
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US v. Patante |
Facts: Failure to Mirandize, but testimony led to police finding shotgun. Rule: Miranda violation does not exclude physical evidence from the prosecution's case-in-chief. |
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New York v. Quarles |
Facts: "Where's the gun?!" Ruling: A Miranda-defective statement is admissible if pursuant to exigent circumstances. |
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Indicia of Custody |
(1) Told free to leave? (2) Physically restrained? (3) Suspect-initiated or acquiesced to authority? (4) Intimidation or deceptive strategies? (5) Police-dominated atmosphere? (6) Arrested afterwards? |
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Howes v. Fields |
Facts: Incarcerated individual questioned Rule: Incarceration is not custody per se. |
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Stansbury v. California |
Facts: Police interviewed suspect thinking he was a witness and then realized he was the killer. Rule: Custody determined by totality of the circumstances. Rule: Officer's uncommunicated intent/views do not affect custody determination. |
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JDB v. North Carolina |
Facts: Interrogation of 13-y/o schoolboy. Rule: Age counts in determining custody.
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Berkemer v. McCarty |
Rule: Terry stops are non-custodial |
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Rhode Island v. Innis |
Facts: Officer said it would be unfortunate if a child found the gun suspect allegedly committed a crime with. Rule: If a suspect is not questioned, he is not interrogated. Test for Interrogation: (1) Questioned (2) Reasonably likely to elicit incriminating testimony. |
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US v. Tyler |
Facts: Timeline in interrogation room. Rule: Conduct can constitute an interrogation. |
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Michigan v. Mosley |
Facts: Suspect remained silent, then was questioned 2 hours later. Rule: Miranda only requires that officers scrupulously honor a suspect's right to cut off questioning. Rule: A suspect's invocation of right to silence does not perpetually bar interrogation. |
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Illinois v. Perkins |
Facts: Undercover cop elicited incriminating statements from cell-mate in prison. Rule: Miranda doesn't apply if a suspect doesn't know they're speaking to the police. |
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Moran v. Burbine |
Facts: Burbine arrested. He signed waivers and confessed to murder. Rule: Waiver of Miranda must be knowing & voluntary. Rule: No need to inform suspect his lawyer is trying to reach him. |
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US v. Garibay |
Facts: Suspect didn't speak English and was uneducated. Rule: Age, education, etc. enter determination of waiver |
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Connecticut v. Barrett |
Facts: D thought his oral testimony could not be used against him when he waived Miranda. Rule: A defendant need not be cognizant of full consequences of waiver. |
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US v. Soliz (9th Cir.) |
Facts: Suspect agreed to waive Miranda regarding immigration status, but not the smuggling charge. Rule: Police must respect conditions placed on waiver. |
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US v. Berghuis |
Facts: D was Mirandized & then responded to officers' questions. He was silent for 3 hours beforehand. Rule: A suspect must invoke his rights unambiguously. Rule: Answering a question after Mirandizement is a course of conduct waiver. |
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Edwards v. Arizona |
Rule: All questioning must cease after a suspect invokes the right to counsel & only the suspect may re-initiate contact. |
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Arizona v. Roberson |
Rule: Edwards is not offense-specific. Rule: After invoking the right to counsel, a suspect may not be interrogated until counsel is appointed. |
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Davis v. US |
Rule: Must clearly and unequivocally invoke right to counsel in order to trigger Edwards. |
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Minnick v. Mississippi |
Facts: Police initiation requires a lawyer present. |
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Maryland v. Shatzer |
Rule: 14 days cures Edwards. |
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Montejo v. Louisiana |
Rule: Edwards can only be invoked in a custodial setting. Rule: 6th Amendment is offense-specific. |
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Gideon v. Wainwright |
Rule: Must appoint counsel for indigents, otherwise it is an unfair trial. |
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Argersinger v. Hamlin |
Rule: Misdemeanors get appointed counsel, too. |
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Scott v. Illinois |
Rule: A defendant only gets appointed counsel where he is actually imprisoned. |
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Nichols v. US |
Rule: A post-conviction sentence enhancement based on a previous unrepresented conviction is valid. |
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Massiah v. US |
Facts: D was indicted and police sent wired informant to discuss another crime with him, but the conversation spilled over into the crime with which he was charged. Rule: Police violate 6th Amendment when they deliberately elicit statements about the crime a defendant is charged with (after adversary proceedings have begun) |
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Brewer v. Williams |
Facts: Christian Burial Speech. Rule: Deliberately elicited confession regarding the whereabouts of his victim's body. |
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US v. Henry |
Facts: Jailhouse snitch conversed with defendant. Rule: Gov't violates 6th Amendment when it creates an environment likely to elicit incriminating statements from a defendant without counsel. |
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Kuhlmann v. Wilson |
Facts: Jailhouse snitch was told to "listen only" Rule: Informant/gov't agent must go beyond mere listening to violate the 6th Amendment. |
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Bey v. Morton |
Facts: Prison guard spoke with prisoner on death row and testified at his re-trial. Rule: A passive conversation, not at the direction of the police, is not deliberate elicitation. |
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Kansas v. Ventris |
Rule: Can use Massiah-defective statements for impeachment, but not in the case-in-chief. |
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Powell v. Alabama |
Facts: Racist community/judge did not give defendants a chance to meet with counsel before trial. Rule: Defendants must have meaningful chance to meet with counsel under the |
