Criminal Procedure

Front 1

The Criminal Process: Failure and Legitimacy - "Direct" Due Process: Powerll v. Alabama.

Facts. A group of African-American youths were on a freight train through Alabama. They got into a fight with some white youths, throwing the white boys from the train. A message was sent, requesting all blacks be removed from the train. Two white girls on the train testified that they had been raped by six different youths in turn. The youths were taken into custody. The community was very hostile, as a mob met the youths. The trial judge appointed “all members of the bar” for the purpose of the arraignment. The defendants themselves were illiterate and “ignorant”. They were all tried separately, each trial lasting a day, convicted, and sentenced to death.

Back 1

Synopsis of Rule of Law. “Where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable of making his own defense… it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law; and that duty is not discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case.”



-Fairness of process indep. of guilt/culpability
-No assignment of counsel when lacking time to consult, develop att. client relation., investigate, and prepare

Front 2

Brown v. Mississippi.

Facts: Brown (D) and others were indicted for the murder of Raymond Stewart. Ds plead not guilty. Trial was begun and concluded on the following day. Ds were found guilty and sentenced to death. Aside from confessions there was no evidence sufficient to warrant submission ofthe case to the jury. Ds testified that the confessions were false and had been procured by physical torture, as listed in the case book by hanging repeatedly (the rope bums were still visible on his neck while at trial) and then later while in the custody of police by a deputy whipping Ds until they confessed. The deputy even admitted to the whippings on the stand. The case went to the jury with instructions regarding the coercion of the confession. D appealed.

Back 2

Brown Standard: Violation of due process when state operates in a manner so shocking as to offend principles of justice that can be ranked as fundamental.

Front 3

Powell instructive, but not dispositive, when 2 criteria are met:

Back 3

1) Category of case where there could be due process viol:
.....1) Capital crime/case

2) Category of D where there could be due process trigger:
........1) Uneducated
........2) Far from home, family
........3) Pooer

Front 4

Katz v. United States.


Facts: FBI agents placed an electronic listening and recording devise to the outside of the public telephone booth from which Katz had placed calls. Based on the information obtained from his phone calls, Katz was charged with transmitting wagering information by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston, in violation of a federal statute. At trial he sought to have the conversations omitted, claiming it was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Despite his objections the conversations were admitted and Katz was convicted.

Issue(s): Whether the private conversations obtained by the government’s use of an electronic wiretap to a public enclosed telephone booth without a warrant, violated the Fourth Amendment? And whether a telephone booth is granted the protection of the Fourth Amendment

Back 4

Majority: Justice Powell, who wrote the majority opinion first stated that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, and that what a person knowingly exposes to the public, is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection. However, by going into the phone booth and shutting the door, Katz sought to preserve information. While he might have been visible to the public, his conversations were not intended to be heard by the public.

Front 5

United States v. White.

Facts: The government used an informant named Harvey Jackson in order to obtain information from the defendant James White in regard to illegal narcotics sales. Conversations took place in Jacksons home, his car and at a restaurant. During the course of these conversations, federal agents would monitor them through a transmitting devise that Jackson had hidden on his body and the agents were able to record these conversations. These conversations were admitted into evidence despite the fact that Jackson was unable to be located.

Issue(s): Whether the electronic transmission of the conversations violated the Fourth Amendment?

Back 5

Majority: The court first noted that the Court of Appeals had misinterpreted the Katz decision as well as the Fourth Amendment. Prior to Katz, electronic eavesdropping nor wiretapping violated a defendants Fourth Amendment right unless “there had been an official search and seizure of his person, or such as seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making a seizure”. The majority also recognized that a police officer, by concealing his identity, is able to write down his conversations with a defendant and testify concerning them, without a warrant authorizing his encounters and without violating the defendants Fourth Amendment rights. Furthermore, they held that no different result is required if the agent, rather than writing the conversations, records them. Moreover, they held that one who is contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting to the police. Lastly, they held that an electronic recording will many times produce a more reliable rendition of what a defendant has said than will the unaided memory of a police agent.

Front 6

Palko v. Connecticut

Back 6

Standard: Does it violate those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil & political institutions?"

Front 7

Duncan v. Louisiana.


-example of selective incorporation jurisprudence case

2. Facts: Duncan was convicted of simple battery, which in Louisiana was a misdemeanor punishable by 2 years imprisonment and a $300 fine.

3. Procedural Posture: Duncan sought trial by jury, but the Louisiana constitution grants jury trials only in capital punishment or hard labor cases, so the trial judge denied the request.

Back 7

Standard: Is it a fundemantel principle of libert & justice which liesat thebase of all our civil and political institutions whether it is basic in our system of jurisprudence and whether it is " a fundemantal right, essential to a fair trial."

If you are susceptible to a sentence over 6 months then you should be given the right to a jury trial to avoid the corruption, zeal, bias, over-compliance & eccentricities of prosecutors & judges.

Concurrence Reasoning: [Black] the “privileges and immunities” clause of the 14th amendment serves to totally incorporate the Bill of Rights because “what more precious privilege can there be that the privilege to claim the protections of our great Bill of Rights.”

Dissent Reasoning: [Harlan] Believes that people of LA are following its constitution & if they want to change it, they shoulduse the political process. HIs standard is whether the violation was so shocking as to affect our sense of polity. He is less concerned w/fundamental right violation and more concerned w/how egregious the violation was.

Front 8

What is a reasonable expectation of privacy analysis?

Back 8

First articulated in Katz v. US

1) Subjective expectation of privacy, and
2) Whether the individual has an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable

Front 9

Human Surveillance and reasonable expectation of privacy

Back 9

Information obtained by lip reading does not violate reasonable expectation of privacy. The lip reader would have to cover his mouth.

California v. Greenwood. D has no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage that was placed in opaque trash bags, left on the curb, and searched by police.

Front 10

United States v. White & Hoffa

Back 10

Katz does not apply when gov't agents have access to a conversation through a participant in the conversation. (consensual 3rd party bugging may be conducted w/o implication of 4th amendment)

When you expose convo to public, you have no protection of 4th amend. You cannot trust anyone your speaking to.

Front 11

Smith v. Maryland

Back 11

When D's convey information to third parties, you should have the subjective or objective expectation that your conversation can be reported to the police.

4 Factors Used by Smith Court:
1) "Invasion of Const. Protected Area?": no, minimal mode of intrusion,
2) limited nature of information revealed (Katz)
3) Subjective Exp. Rebuttal: all people understand phone co. retains records of calls
4) Objective Exp. Rebuttal: people's expectations of privacy regarding keeping ph #'s private are not reasonably legitimate with respect to first 3 factors, esp. exposing info to third party

Front 12

Kyllo v. United States

- Mode of Intrusion case

- a "thermal imaging device" was aimed at a private home from across the street, and the heat scan showed that the garage was hotter than the rest of the house and "substantially warmer than neighboring homes."

Back 12

Majority: Determined that the homeowner had a reasonable expectation of privacy from the use of the thermal imaging device: obtaining information about the interior of home by sense-enhancing technology by physical "intrusion into a constitutionally protected area" constitutes a search (requiring a finding of probable cause prior to using the imager), at least where the technology used is not available to the general public.

Front 13

US v. Knotts

Back 13

Court approved of beepers as a substitute for visual surveillance when the police attached a tracking beeper inside a container, and then followed the D's car in which the container was located.

Use of "tracking beepers" is ok as long as there is no indication that the beeper was used in any way to reveal information as to the movement of the container inside the D's premises."

Similar to having around the clock surveillance.

Front 14

US v. Karo

Back 14

Police cannot use "tracking beepers" to obtain information that could not have been obtained through visual surveillance.

Holding: A violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy occurred when police used a beeper in a container to discover "a critical fact about the interior of the premises," i.e., the container was moved inside the home.

Was there a seizure of Karo's can? No, a seizure of property occurs when "there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property." At most, there was a technical trespass on the space occupied by the beeper.

Majority: might have been a technical trespass, but there are some mitigating factors: 1) it's not really Karo's can, it's the DEA's can, 2) the seller gives his consent to what DEA is doing(this would have been enough to seize property), and 3) the question of seizure of property derives from this standard: has there been a meaninful intereference with the owner's possessory interest in the property? Karo still could use the ether that was in the can.

Dissent: he got a can of ether, although not exactly the one he bargained for. He got a can that contained more than be bargained for. DEA interfered with his exclusionary right to use his property exclusively as he sees fit.

Front 15

US v. Jones

Issue: whether the attachment of a
Global-Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device to an
individual's vehicle, and subsequent use of that device to
monitor the vehicle's movements on public streets,
constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.

Back 15

Holding: The Government physically occupied private
property for the purpose of obtaining information. We
have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have
been considered a "search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment when it was adopted

The issue of reasonableness of the search was not addressed. Since government's installation of a GPS device unto defendant's car was trespass, consideration of the reasonable expectation of privacy in all of his movements was not necessary.

Trespassory entry implicates the 4th Amendment.

This is different from Knotts b/c the beeper had been placed in the container before it came into Knotts' possession, with the consent of the then-owner.

Unlike Oliver, a trespass is problematic b/c a car is an effect.


If camera was installed on public road in car, then it's intruding onto zone that people enjoy a different degree of privacy.

Front 16

US v. Place

Back 16

Canine sniffs by narcotics detection dogs of luggage in a public place does not violate a reasonable exp of privacy.

The court relied on the sniff as:
1) minimally intrusive (contrasted with open luggage), and
2) disclosing "only the presence or absence of narcotics."

Front 17

Illinois v. Caballes.


Police used a "well-trained narcotics-detection dog" to sniff the exterior of the trunk of an automobile, which was lawfully stopped on the highway for a traffic ticket.

Back 17

Holding: Official conduct that does not "compromise any legitimate interest in privacy" is not a search. Any interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed "legitimate," and thus gov'tl conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband "compromises no legitimate privacy interest."

Front 18

Oliver v. US

Back 18

Police presence on a person's property that is an open field (i.e. beyond the curtilage) does not require compliance with the 4th Amend (even though it constitutes a trespass).

The special protection accorded by the 4th amend to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open fields.

Front 19

US v. Dunn.


Issue(s): Whether the area located between the barn and the house on the ranch was within the ‘curtilage’ of the home?

Back 19

Holding: “the barn in question was not within the cartilage of the residence and was not within protective ambit of the Fourth Amendment”.

The status of a potential "curtilage" area is evaluated with reference to four factors:
1) its proximity to the home,
2) whether it is enclosed,
3) the nature of its uses, and
4) the steps taken to protect it from observation.

Front 20

California v. Ciraolo.

Issue: Whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy when he puts up a fence around his yard, but police observe, with the naked eye, that he is committing illegal acts in his backyard from a low-flying airplane.

Back 20

Part 2 of the test is “whether the government’s intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the 4th Amendment.”

Area within the property of the ? is not automatically barred from police observation.
Even if he has taken some kind of measure to stop vision of the property, it is not off limits if it is freely visible.
In this case, any member of the public flying in the airspace, who glanced down, could have seen everything the officers observed BY THE NAKED EYE.
Therefore, his expectation of privacy is unreasonable.

Front 21

California v. Greenwood

Back 21

D had no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage that was placed in opaque trash bags, left on the curb, and searched by police who procured teh bags from the garbage collector.

What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of 4th amend protection. (Katz).

Front 22

Dow Chemical v. US.

Facts: agents of the EPA photographed Dow's 200-acre out-door industrial complex (an area described as "more comparable to an open field" than to an "industrial curtilage") from altitudes of 12,000, 3,000, and 1,200 feet with a "standard, floor-mounted, precision aerial mapping camera").

Back 22

Holding: aerial mapping camera is acceptable during "fly overs" of commercial property. The photos do not reveal intimate details, just buildings and equipment.

Factors the court looked at:
1) place (open field?),
2) mode of intrusion (outside of home, not inside)
3) specificity of information (like dog sniffing; content not revealed)

Front 23

US v. Kyllo

Facts: a thermal imaging device was aimed at a private home from across the street, and the heat scan showed that the garage was hotter than the rest of the house.

Back 23

Holding: the homeowner had a reasonable expectation of privacy from the use of the thermal imaging device; obtaining info about the interior of home by sense-enhancing technology by physical "intrusion into a constitutionally protected area" constitutes a search, at least where the technology used is not available to the general public.

In the home, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying gov't eyes.
-as gov't modes of intrusion become more readily accesssible to public, then it would not constitute a search

Front 24

Bond v. United States

Carry-on luggage place in an overhead bin by a bus passenger and was squeezed by a police officer.

Back 24

Holding: While "public access" and "conveyance to a third party" were present, given that other passengers and bus employees could handle or touch the luggage, the Court recognized that public customs do not extend beyond mere "handling" to encompass the "exploratory" feeling of a bag.

Physically invasive inspection is simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection.

Front 25

US v. Mendhenhall

Law Issue:
Whether a seizure occurs when a reasonable person believes they are not free to leave?

Factual Issue:
Whether a seizure had occurred where federal agents approached Ms. Mendenhall while walking through the airport and requested her identification?

Back 25

Rule:
A person has been “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.

Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be 1) the threatening presence of several officers(displayed by the wearing of uniforms), 2) the display of a weapon by an officer, 3) some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or 4) the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled.

Profiling Factors:
1) Flying from source city into recipient city. LA to Detroit.
2) last person to leave plane
3) appeared to be nervous and scanned the whole area
4) proceeded past baggage area and did not claim any luggage
5) changed airlines for her flight out of Detroit

If asking to come upstairs constitutes a seizure, then that consent would be tainted by preceding seizure. So anything subsequent would have been subject to exclusioanary rule and been suppressed.

If there was a seizure prior to consent, then everything after that is tainted.

Dissent says that no one would have been free to terminate that encounter, so therefore there was a seizure.

Court doesn't care what the reasonable guilty person do, they care about what the reasonable innocent person do? Would they say yes or no to a pat down or strip search?

Front 26

US v. Drayton

Facts: Drayton and Brown were on a bus when 3 officers boarded at a gas stop. Two officers went down the isle asking people to identify their bags and one stayed at the bus’ entrance. When they reached Ds, they asked to check their bags and Ds said yes, then the officer asked to check their person, which both Ds said yes. Both Ds were found to be carrying cocaine.

Issue: The fourth amendment permits police officers to approach bus passengers at random and ask questions and request consent to searches provided a reasonable person would understand that he or she is free to refuse, but MUST the officer advise the passengers of their right not to cooperate?

Back 26

Reasoning: First, the officers did not seize the Ds according to the Bostick rule( “if a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter, then he or she has not been seized.” A determination of when this is true “necessitates a consideration of “all the circumstances surrounding the encounter.”).
Second, the search was reasonable b/c the Ds consented to it and knew it was occurring. Third, the court rejects in specific terms the suggestion that police officers MUST always inform citizens of their right to refuse when seeking permission to conduct a warrantless search.

Any reasonable innocent person was simply asked a set of questions. No unreasonable search b/c citizen can comply or not.

Important: Every encounter b/t a citizen and officer does not implicate the 4th amendment. Posing a question is not a seizure, no 4th amendment implication.

Front 27

California v. Hodari D.

Facts: Officers were on patrol in a high crime area of Oakland, CA. They were dressed in street clothes but were wearing jackets that had “Police” emblazoned on both front and back and were driving and unmarked car. Officers saw suspicious youths around a car and when the youths saw the officers’ car approaching they ran away. The officers gave chase. Hodari D did not see Officer Pertoso until the officer was almost upon him. Hodari D threw what appeared to be a rock, and later turned out to be crack cocaine, to the ground. Pertoso tackled and handcuffed him, and called for assistance. In the juvenile proceeding against him, Hodari D moved to suppress the evidence relating to the crack cocaine. The court denied without opinion.

Cops do not have a warrant, no reasonable suspicion and no probable cause.


Officer may consider a high crime area as a factor for a seizure, even though seizures are supposed to be individualized.

Issue. Has a seizure occurred when a person, who is told to stop by police, runs from the police?

Back 27

Holding: assuming that officer's pursuit constituted a "show of authority" enjoining Hodari to halt, since Hondari did not comply with that injunction he was not seized until he was tackled. The cocaine abandoned while he was running was in this case not the fruit of a seizure, and his motion to exclude evidence of it was properly denied.

Front 28

When does a seizure occur?

Back 28

When police grasp or apply physical force with lawful authority, whether or not it succeeds in subduing the arrestee. (Hodari;Mendenhall).

Front 29

What are the consequences of a finding that a seizure by the police has occurred?

Back 29

When a suspect has consented to a subsequent search, the prior existence of a "seizure" is relevant to the question of whether consent was voluntary or coerced. If the seizure is illegal, that factor suggests involuntary consent. (Mendenhall).

Front 30

What is probable cause?

Back 30

It exists where "the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested." (Brinegar)

Front 31

Spinelli v. US


LEGAL ISSUE: Does an informant’s tip provide probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant if the tip does not state reasons why the informant is reliable and does not include specifics regarding the facts known by the informant?

Back 31

REASONING: (Harlan, J.) An informant’s tip does not provide probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant if the tip does not state reasons why the informant is reliable and does not include specifics regarding the facts known by the informant IN SUFFICIENT DETAIL SO THAT THE MAGISTRATE MAY KNOW HE IS RELYING ON SOMETHING MORE SUBSTANTIAL THAN A CASUAL RUMOR. The Aguilar two part test is used: 1. Is the information reliable? 2. Is the informant reliable? In this case, there are no facts provided in the informant’s tip to explain why the informant thought D was involved in gambling. The FBI also did not provide any reasons why they thought this particular informant was reliable. Therefore, there was no probable cause to issue the warrant. The conviction should be overturned. Reversed, for D.

Front 32

Illinois v. Gates


LEGAL ISSUE: Is an anonymous letter alleging criminal activity with detailed modus operandi coupled with a policeman’s affidavits confirming activity conforming to aspects of the modus operandi sufficient to constitute probable cause under the 4th Amendment?

Back 32

HOLDING: An anonymous letter alleging criminal activity with detailed modus operandi coupled with a policeman’s affidavits confirming activity conforming to aspects of the modus operandi is sufficient to constitute probable cause under the 4th Amendment.

REASONING: (Rehnquist, J.) An anonymous letter alleging criminal activity with detailed modus operandi coupled with a policeman’s affidavits confirming activity conforming to aspects of the modus operandi is sufficient to constitute probable cause under the 4th Amendment. An informant’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are all highly relevant in determining the value of his tip. Those elements are intertwined issues that may illuminate the common sense, but there is still the practical question of whether there is probable cause. A “totality of circumstances” test should be used, rather than a rigid, excessively technical, two prong analysis. This is because probable cause is a fluid concept, and not readily reduced to a rigid set of rules. It allows a balanced assessment of the relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability attending an informant’s tip. The court held that very strong evidence as to one prong can make up for the weakness on th! e other prong, so they simply look at the totality and from all that info the magistrate can decide whether or not this informant has provided reasonably trustworthy information. The detail in the letter seemed to suggest first hand knowledge. Reversed, for P.

Front 33

Suppose that a police officer, properly inside a suspect's home, picks up a stereo turntable in order to record the serial number printed on the bottom. Is this a seizure of the turntable?

Back 33

Not a seizure according to Arizona v. Hicks.

The object has not been meaningful interefered with the owner's possesory interest in the property. THe officer can put the object down so there is no meaningful interference.

The officer when picking up the object to check serial number constitutes a search.

Front 34

Hypo: a package is shipped from outside the country to the US containing a photo album and cocaine. Aware of this, the gov't takes custody of the package when it arrives in the country. It holds it for ten days until an electronic beeper can be hidden in the cover of the photo album, after which the package is delivered to the intended recipient. Seizure?

Back 34

1) What is period of time that package has been delayed. The time delay is substantial and long enough to constitute a meaninguful deprivation of possessory interest. (The court focuses on this factor, rather than the second, in order to conclude a seizure.)

2) The insertion of tracking chip in cover of the photo.

Front 35

4th Amend

Back 35

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Front 36

Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York


FACTS
An investigator purchased two adult films which, after viewing them, he believed violated state obscenity laws. He showed the films to the town justice who issued a warrant authorizing the search of Lo-Ji Sales, Inc.’s (defendant) inventory and the seizure of the other copies of the two films. The investigator’s affidavit also stated that the store had other “similar” items he believed to also violate state obscenity law. The justice agreed to accompany the investigator to the store to determine whether there was in fact probable cause to believe other items violated state law. The warrant then contained a section authorizing the seizure of “the following items” but no specific items were listed. During the search of the store, when the justice found something he believed to violate state obscenity law, he ordered it seized as well as all “similar” items. In all, hundreds of films, reels, books and magazines were seized. After the search of the store, the warrant was amended to include all the items that were seized and the town justice signed the amended warrant.

Back 36

Holding: Except for the specification of copies of the two films previously purchased, the warrant did not purport to "particularly describe the things to be seized." 4th Amend prescribes open ended warrants.

Justice did not conduct himself as a "neutral and detached magistrate."

Front 37

Wilson v. Arkansas

Back 37

Holding: 4th amend prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures contains an implicit knock-and-announce rule. However, not every entry must be preceded by an announcement.

Knock-and-announce not necessary:
1) under threat of physical violence,
2) where a prisoner escapes and retreats to his dwelling,
3) where police have reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given.

Front 38

Richards v. Wisconsin


Issue: whether police officers are never required to knock and announce their presence when executing a search warrant in a felony drug investigation.

Back 38

Holding: No, the court rejects the blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for felony drug investigations. In order to justify a "no-knock" entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for ex., allowing the destruction of evidence.

Front 39

Knock-and-Announce Doctrine:

What must police do before entering:

Back 39

1) Audibly "knock" or otherwise make presence known at the outer door;
2) Announce the identity of the executing officer;
3) "Delay" for a period of time sufficient to permit occupants to reach and open door; a delay of 15-20 secs has been sufficient in cases of drugs(Banks);
4)

Front 40

Limits on the permissible intensity of a search

Back 40

The scope of the search is dictated and limited by the nature of the items being sough under the warrant

e.g., warrant that authorizes a search for illegal weapons provides authority to pen closets, chests, drawers, and containers in which the weapon might be found.

Front 41

Can anyone on the search premises be detained?

Back 41

Yes, they may be detained (but not searched) under the authority of a search warrant, to minimize violence and the potential destruction of evidence. (Michigan v. Summers).

Front 42

Searching persons during the execution of a warrant

Back 42

Police may search persons coincidentally at the scene during a warranted search but they must have independent probable cause to search the person as well as some justification for conducting the search without a warrant, i.e. they must be able to point to an exception to the "warrant requirement."

Front 43

Payton v. New York


STATEMENT OF THE FACTS: There were two different cases consolidated in one action. In the first case, six New York City police officers went to Payton’s (D) apartment at 7:30 A.M., without a warrant, to arrest him for murder. They knocked, but D wasn’t home. Since they could see light and hear music coming from the apartment, the police broke in and seized a shell casing that was out in plain view. The shell casing was later used as evidence against D at trial. D was convicted. In the second case, New York City policemen went to Riddick’s (D) apartment at noon without a warrant to arrest him for two robberies. When D’s three year old son opened the door, the police barged in and arrested D, who was in bed. The police also searched around the house, finding drugs, etc. in a bedroom drawer. D was later convicted on drug charges. Both Ds appealed their conviction, claiming that the arrests were unconstitutional for lack of warrant.

LEGAL ISSUE: Is an arrest warrant required for an in-house arrest under the 4th Amendment’s right to privacy?

Back 43

HOLDING: Absent exigent circumstances, the 4th Amendment bars warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a home to make a routine arrest.

Front 44

Gerstein hearing

Back 44

In order to satisfy the Gerstein timeliness requirement, a jurisdiction must provide a probable cause determination within 48 hours after a warrantless arrest, absent a bona find emergency or other "extraordinary circumstance."

Front 45

Executing an arrest: use of force

Back 45

An arrest, even one based on probable cause, constitutes an unreasonable seizure of the person if the method for making the arrest is unreasonable.

Front 46

Exigent Circumstances examples

Back 46

A warrantless intrusion may be justified by:
1) hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, or
2) imminent destruction of evidence, or
3) the need to prevent a suspect's escape, or
4) the risk of danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling

Front 47

How Probable Cause can Be Established?

Back 47

1) Through observation of officer
2) Through other sources(i.e. informants): use the Aguilar/Spinelli or Totality of Circumstances Tests

Front 48

Hypo: Year 1975 (Pre-Gates) (Post Aguilar/Spinelli); Affiant is a police officer w/25 years experience; has many arrests/warrants/convictions; says that drugs can be found in a certain D's location; tells in affidavit that he has sources who say that robberies have a pattern of being junkie like robberies and that D is the only known junkie in the neighborhood.

Back 48

Use the Aguilar/Spinelli test b/c he relies on tips.

There is no probable cause here b/c:

1)Officer has no basis in fact to support conclusion that he is asserting. No observation of target or D in possession. No actual or particular information. Info is well honed instinct & suspicion.
2) Officer has a great track record & may be highly reliable but information on which he is acting is not accurate, it's too broad.

Anyone may exhibit skittish behavior while conducting a robbery.

Front 49

Hypo: Year 1982 (Pre 1983 Gates Decision): no physical description or description of style of robbery; informant says he has information about evidence of robbery is in target's apt; informant is extremely reliable

Back 49

No PC.

Despite reliability of informant, there is still no accuracy of information.

Front 50

Draper


Facts. A federal narcotics agent was given information from a reliable informant that the Petitioner was dealing drugs from his apartment. The informant stated that the Petitioner had gone to Chicago to purchase heroin. The informant told the agent the date the Petitioner would return to Denver from Chicago, the clothes he would be wearing, and the color of the bag he would be carrying. Based on this information, the agent waited for the Petitioner at Denver’s Union Station on the Petitioner’s expected date of return. When the Petitioner disembarked the Chicago train, he was wearing clothes and carrying a bag fitting the informant’s description. Based on this information, the agent arrested the Petitioner without a warrant.

Back 50

There are some limited circumstances where even where we don't know basis of informant's knowledge there still might be probable cause.


Factors Court Uses to Assess PC:

1) Reliability of Informant
2) Accuracy of Information (Basis of Knowledge) - Can also be Satisfied by:
a) Detail (detail of prediction of future conduct)
b) Corroboration ( accuracy of prediction corroborated by police officer)

Held.
Yes. The informant’s past reliability, accurate description of the Petitioner’s clothing, bag, and date of arrival gave the agent probable cause to arrest the Petitioner without a warrant.

Discussion.
A tip from a reliable informant, which is corroborated by predicting facts unknowable to a stranger, gives rise to probable cause.
In determining what facts and circumstances will give rise to probable cause, one must view the facts and circumstances as a reasonable person would view them, and not how they would be viewed in a courtroom.

Front 51

Hypo: anonymous tip; heroine dealer in southern manhattan; he used his status as law student as a front; informant is a friend of his; he keeps his books of heroine deals and has moved drugs for him; here is his address. Informant is not signing his note. No other external sources of information. Not known by cops. Should a warrant be issued.

Back 51

Basis of Knowledge - Significant
Veracity of Info - Yes
Reliability of Informant - Unknown. Anyone could be saying this.

Prosecutor Arg:
1) very reliable informant b/c he's identified direct observation
2) Use a Totality of Circumstances test which recognizes the fluidity of probable cause.
3) The amount of detail provided supports a finding of probable cause. It points to overall reliability of tip.
4) Yes, there is little indicia of information of veracity of informant, but the degree of detail overwhelms the adequacy of probable cause. Wouldn't pass pre-Gates, but would pass post-Gates.

Def. Arg.:
1) No information about future activity - goes to basis of information
2) A lot of detail but doesn't establish veracity of informant( we don't know him)
3) no corroborating detail (Draper) and has no bearing of truthfulness of informant. May just be a good and creative liar
4) Wouldn't pass Aguilar/Spinelli

Front 52

Hypo: From pg. 163, Note 3
Social Worker; get an anonymous phone call reporting that 2 kids living with adult may have been battered; she has seen one kid limping and bruises on child; caller believes kids may need medical attention; caller knows adult who says he may have a nasty temper. Does cop have probable cause or an exigent circumstance to enter the home without an warrant?

Back 52

1) Need probable cause or
2) PC & Exigent Circumstance

-Source of Info Anonymous.
-Doesn't say how he knows the D
-Doesn't say how often he sees the children
-Conclusory information will not establish PC(need to state how he can verify that he's seen the bruised kids)
-Did he actually see the kids getting injured.
-What is the temporal relationship between the time of injury and the time the call is placed? Stale or fresh?
- Boggs' temper: this is conclusory information (Nathanson)
-B/c we cannot corrobrate the source, we know very little about the source and even less about the veracity of the information.

Front 53

Schmerber v. California &

Winston v. Lee


-Officers took a blood sample from motorist arrested for drunk driving.

Back 53

-PC may be a sliding-scale, in which pc barrier may be lower for some cases and higher for others

-Surgical procedures into your body might require probable cause "plus" i.e., a heightened degree of likelihood of discovering evidence when the police wish to conduct such a hyper-intrusive search.

Front 54

Indicia of Reliability of Tip & Informant to be considered Post-Gates (Totality of Circumstances Analysis)

Back 54

1) Conclusory Information (Nathanson)
2) Stale or fresh information
3) Relationship of Informant to Accused
4) Ability to be Corroborated

Front 55

Note 16, pg. 169; Pornographic material in a footlocker, which relates to info concerning the crime; identified citizens(presumptively reliable); they have 1st hand knowledge; relating information from 1st hand observation. What is the problem in account? It is the age of the allegations. Is there probable cause that the photos are still in a footlocker. Does priest still have photos in this footlocker 16 years later? Does it matter that at the time of the accusation, priest was living in a different city.

Back 55

Holding: passage of time was not dispositive of issue of PC. Is there PC that evidence is still in footlocker?

This is a fluid analysis and it depends on the totality of circumstances. Warrant was directed to just a particular footlocker. Warrant allowed to officers to look in the house but only allowed to open the footlocker. Allegations are 16 yrs old but warrant is very specific regarding certain item.

Front 56

States v. Watson


Facts:
-A reliable informant tells a Federal Post oFfice inspector that the D has provided him w/stolen credit cards
- Agent tells informant to provide info of future meet
-Officer arrests D but finds no stolen credit cards on his person but consents to search of his car
-Postal Inspector searches car and trunk and finds stolen cc's
-D challenges constitutionality of search of car arguing that consent was the effect of unlawful arrest saying inspector lacked an arrest warrant

Issue: may a gov't officla make a warrantless arrest in a public place where a crime has been committed or the official has PC to believe that a crime has been committed.

Back 56

Holding: there is a general consensus that recognizes that a police officer may arrest a person when a crime takes place in their presence or has PC.

Dissent:

-Warrantless arrest was valid b/c exigent circumstances existed here.

Concurrence:

-Law enforcement would be over-burdened if const. rule allowed felony arrests only in exigent circumstances or where officers had PC.

Take-away: in affirming that warrantless arrest in public do not violate the 4th, const. can be affirmed by virtue of consensus among the states. Widespread adoption of a particular rule can be treated as dispositive of constitutionality of rule.

PC to arrest in a public place doesn't require a warrant.

Front 57

People v. Harris

Back 57

the rule in payton is meant to protect the physical integrity of the home, it is not meant to protect the individual's confession if he is taken outside his home (i.e. precinct) even if evidence is suppressed at the home due to a warrantless arrest

Front 58

Hypo: i'm standing in my doorway and you come to me w/o a warrant to arrest; you arrest me; i say nothing; you handcuff me w/o entering the home;

Back 58

when you open your door it is reasonable that you are sacrificing are particular degree of privacy

Front 59

US v. Santana


Facts: Santana is in a private home; she has a front yard with a fence; her door is open and she is standing in her doorway; cops have probable cause to arrest her but no warrant; we approach her and yell police; she turns and runs into her house but she leaves her door open; cops follow her inside

Back 59

Holding: court held there is exigency here but the conduct is not permissible; if there were no exigency then cops would not be permitted inside the house; the exigency was that she might flush the drugs; what she exposed to the public was her person, therefore, she was legally open to be arrested

Front 60

US v. Berkowitz

Back 60

If warrantless arrest is communicated outside the home and then completed inside then it is constiutionally viable and there is no violation to the right of privacy.

If there is even tacit compliance with arrest then it does not matter if the arrest occurs inside the home.

Front 61

Hypo: you come to the door and cop asks you to come outside; eventually you come outside

Back 61

You have relinquished your right to privacy

Front 62

Hypo: Police approach D's home; D is peeking through the window; officers asks D to come out; no indication that D is threatened; Does Court apply Payton or Watson?

Back 62

This doesn't create exigency.

This is Watson b/c there was no kind of coercion that is inconsistent with voluntary consent.

Once home is surrounded there is a per se seizure but there was no arrest until D came outside.

Front 63

Hypo: identified civilian calls the police and says next door neighbor, who identifies by name, threatened her with a handgun a minute earlier; there is PC here; police is sent to address; dispatcher calls D and his three sons to come out of the house; they come out and are arrested; D moves to suppress statements b/c they submitted to comply and therefore Payton violation

Back 63

Holding: Watson controls here.

Officers never crossed threshold of D's home; the critical point is not whether they are arrested but where the arrest takes place; Payton focuses on the physical entry of the home, that is the chief evil; here, while being surrounded there was no physical intrusion/entry

Front 64

Officers at 3am repeatedly telephone D, but he fails to answer; officers come to home; they loudly knock on doors and windows for 30 mins, yelling loudly and identifiying themselves as police; D finally steps outside and submits to authority

Back 64

Court applies Payton saying he was essentially arrested inside his home and submitted to arrest; court points to repeated knocking, yelling, use of flash lights, etc... under these extreme circumstances Payton would apply

Front 65

Seigold

Back 65

If someone is in a 3rd party premise, if there is PC and arrest warrant, they don't get to treat that arrest warrant as permitting to enter 3rd party's home to arrest that home.

However, if they cohabit and you have an arrest warrant, then you can enter to arrest.

Front 66

Kentucky v. King.


Lexington, Kentucky police officials attempted to purchase illegal drugs and followed the suspect to an apartment complex where they pursued him inside. An officer radioed, to no avail, that he witnessed the suspect go into the apartment on the right. The policemen smelled marijuana emanating from the apartment on the left, therefore, they knocked, extremely hard ("as loud as they could"), on the door and announced their presence. After they "Heard noises consistent with the destruction of evidence", they kick in the door and found a gentleman on the sofa smoking marijuana and cocaine in plain sight. Upon further search of the apartment law enforcement located more illegal drugs and paraphernalia. At trial the defendant, King, filed a motion to suppress, but was denied at both the state circuit court and court of appeals levels, but upheld on appeal to the Supreme Court of Kentucky. This case proceeded via writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, where it reversed the Kentucky Supreme Court ruling, thereby upholding the validity of the search.

Issue: whether this exigency rule applies when police, by knocking on the door of a residence and announcing their presence, cause the occupants to attempt to destroy evidence.

Back 66

Holding: The conduct of the police prior to their entry into the apartment was entirely lawful. They did not violate the Fourth Amendment or threaten to do so. In such a situation, the exigent circumstances rule applies.

As long as prior conduct is not violative of 4th then anything they do is constitutionally permissible.

Front 67

HYPO: cops have PC; they go to 2bd apt to search for cocaine; they arrive at 2pm; they go to front door and back door; on front they knock loudly and say "police we have a warrant"; they knock loudly enough so that officers in back can hear them; officers in front wait for 15-20 seconds; they hear nothing from inside the apartment; then they bust open the door; D emerges from shower to confront the police; officers find drugs and weapons

Case: Banks

Back 67

D argues he didn't have enough notification. Also, he argues, there were no noises coming from inside warranting an exigency circumstance, and therefore no reasonable suspicion(Richards).

Outcome: Permissible, even though there is no reasonable suspicion to believe destruction of evidence, court defers to officers on ground to establish presence of exigency.

10 seconds reasonable; 15 - 20 seconds are reasonable.

Front 68

Facts: D and his wife had marital difficulties so much so that D has begun abusing his wife: wife leaves their mobile home and goes to police to report abuse; she enlists the assistance of 2 officers to escort her home so that she can enter home and retrieve her belongings and then leave; police knock on door, wife enters the home; pollice wait outside for her; she exists outside and approaches officer and says "you should check the trailer because D has some dope in there, under the couch."

Back 68

They have PC for ongoing crime.

He should obtain a warrant to arrest b/c there is no exigent circumstance.

If one co-occupant says you can come in, but another says you can't, then officer cannot come in.

D steps out and refuses entry to police.

Argument for D: before warrant was obtained, he was already seized b/c officer stepped inside threshold of mobile home.


Outcome: intrusion was minimal. restraint issued was tailored to meet the need of obtaining warrant. Reasonableness is a flexible standard.

4 Critical FIndings:
1) officers has PC to believe that home contains evidence of crime,
2) Police have reasonable suspicion to believe that unless D is restrained, D will destroy evidence,
3) they make reasonable efforts to reconcile their needs with those of the D( they allow him to call his lawyer) they impose less significant restraint then they could have,
4) they impose restraint for a limited time (i.e. 2 hours)

Front 69

Warden v. Hayden


Facts: police upon information that a person suspected of an armed robbery had entered a house a few minutes before, gained a warrantless entry into the dwelling; whereby, the search revealed the D and the evidence that was subsequently used in his conviction. This evidence included a shotgun found in the bathroom of the dwelling, a small caliber handgun and clip and clothing resembling the robbers in the washing machine. This was a taxi robbery that netted $363 dollars, not bad considering that he’ll do an 8-10 year stretch for it, hope it was worth it!

Issue: Is a search warrant necessary to enter a house to search for a suspect that may have just been involved in an armed robbery, and to conduct any subsequent search if incidental to the arrest?

Back 69

Reasoning: (Brennan) 1) Neither the entry without warrant to search for the robber, nor the search for him without warrant, was invalid, since under the circumstances of the case, the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative (they were in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect); (2) under the Fourth Amendment no distinction exists between merely evidentiary materials, which may not be seized, and those objects which may validly be seized, including the instrumentalities and fruits of crime, and contraband, and (3) the items of clothing were properly admitted in evidence. The fourth amendment allows intrusions upon privacy under these circumstances (exigent) and there is no viable reason to distinguished intrusions to secure mere evidence from intrusions to secure fruits, instrumentalities or contraband! (198)

Once the search has produced the guns and suspect, the search must cease.

Front 70

Mincey v. Arizona

Facts: Mincey was convicted of murder, assault and 3 counts of narcotics. In Oct Officer H had allegedly arranged to purchase a quanity of heroin from Mincey. When H returned to Mincey’s to pick up the drugs, 9 plain dressed officers accompanied him. When the officer’s arrived, H slipped inside the house and a friend of Mincey’s attempted to keep the other officers out. However the police got into the apartment and a shots were fired, H was hit. When the officers entered they found both Mincey and H hit, H died later on. After this incident, homicide crews searched and seized items from the apartment.

Back 70

A protective sweep is permissible but once objective of that sweep is met, if gov't wants to continue search it must obtain a warrant.

A four-day search that included opening dresser drawers and ripping up carpets can hardly be rationalized in terms of the legitimate concerns that justify an emergency search.

Holding: Not constitutionally permissible. The AZ Supreme Court has held that a “murder scene” is an exception to the warrant requirement of the 4th Amendment. The Supreme Court disagrees. A warrantless search must be “strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation,” (Terry v. Ohio) and it simply cannot be contended that this search was justified by an emergency threatening life or limb. Here, all the people in Mincey’s apartment were accounted for and the 4-day search did not commence until all the bodies/people were removed. Further, the extent of the search here was certainly not warranted, opening drawers and ripping up carpets can hardly be rationalized in terms of the legitimate concerns that justify an emergency search.

Front 71

Executing a warrant after entry: The Scope of the search of the premises.

Back 71

1) The police may search containers large enough to hold the criminal evidence for which they are searching.

2) While officers execute a search warrant, they may seize an object not described in the warrant, if they have probable cause to believe it is a seizable item (contraband, or a fruit, instrumentality or evidence of a crime).

3) Information that becomes available to officers immediately before or during the execution of a warrant may require them to cease or narrow their search, notwithstanding the dictates of the warrant. Maryland v. Garrison. Evidence ceased in wrongful application of warrant may still be used in obtained in good faith.

Front 72

Searching persons during the execution of a warrant.

Back 72

A warrant may authorize the search of a person, but it should be explicit.

Police must have independent PC to search the person (" a person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminial activity does not, without more, give rise to PC to search that person"), as well as some justification for conducting the search without a warrant, i.e., they must be able to point an exception to the "warrant requirement."

Front 73

Seizure of person during warranted searches.

Back 73

Michigan v. Summers: A warrant to search a residence for contraband founded on PC implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted."

Front 74

Warrantless entry of a home. Welsh v. Wisconsin:

The police received information that W had been driving his vehicle in a manner that suggested either that he was inebriated or very sick. THe police immediately proceeded to W's nearby home and entered without consent or an arrest warrant. They placed him under arrest for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant, a noncriminal offense.

Back 74

The Court found that there was no hot pursuit or continuing threat to "public safety," because Welsh had abandoned his car and returned home.

The only need for immediate action was that the police wanted to test Welsh's blood-alcohol level before the level dissipated.

The State's interest in the evidence was minimal given that the State had chosen to classify the offense as "noncriminal," i.e., a conviction carried no jail time.

The D has to know that they are being pursued for the "hot pursuit" exigency to exist.

Front 75

Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart

Back 75

One exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.

The officers had an objectively reasonable basis for believing both that the injured adult might need help and that the violence in the kitchen was just beginning.

Front 76

Chimel v. California

FACTS: A warrant for the arrest of the petitioner was made for the burglary of a coin shop. The officers identified themselves and were allowed entrance to the house by the petitioner’s wife where they waited for the accused man to come home. Upon arrival of the petitioner, the arresting officers showed the arrest warrant to the accused and asked permission to “look around”. The petitioner refused the request and the officers told the petitioner that a search could be conducted on “the basis of lawful arrest” and carried out the search. The officers searched the entire house including the attic, garage, and a small workshop, etc. and found various items which were admitted as evidence in court, over the defendants objection that they were admitted unconstitutionally.

ISSUE: Whether the warrantless search of an arrestees entire house can be constitutionally justified as incident to the arrest itself?

Back 76

RATIONALE: The decision of the Supreme Court, delivered by Justice Stewart, was based on the decision of United States v. Rabinowitz and that the search was unreasonable under the 4th and 14th Ammendments. Until this point in time, a “warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest may general extend to the area that is considered to be in the possession or under the control of the person arrested.” The Court held that a warrantless search was reasonable only of the defendant’s person i.e. whatever he/she has in pockets and etc. as well as anything that may be in reach such as a weapon in a nearby drawer. When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape . . . it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. The Court felt that there was “no comparable justification, for routinely searching rooms other than that in which an arrest occurs…” “Such searches, in the absence of well recognized exceptions, may be made only under the authority of a search warrant.” The court held the opinion that the 4th Amendment, at no point, allowed a search to go beyond that of the area where the person is arrested “from which the person might obtain weapons or evidentiary items.”

POLICY EFFECT: The outcome of Chimel v. California held that upon arrest, only a person’s body and immediate area is justified by a warrantless search. ** Searching beyond those points (i.e. after satisfying search principles, below)must be accompanied by a search warrant. **


2 Policy Reasons for Search Incident to an Arrest:
1) Officer Safety, and
2) Destruction of evidence

PC has nothing to do with Chimel rule. You don't need PC to do a search incident to a lawful arrest.

Front 77

United States v. Robinson

Facts: An officer spotted the respondent driving the car and officer had probable cause that respondent was driving the car after the revocation of his license. Officer stopped the respondent and lawfully arrested him. Officer patted down the person of the respondent and felt a cigarette packet and he further searched the packet and found heroin capsules.


Issue: Was the heroin obtained from locating the cigarette package, and subsequently opening the package to reveal the heroin, obtained in an unlawful way as to violate the defendant’s 4th rights?

Back 77

Rationale: According to the Court, it is well settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the 4th Amendment. In Chimel v. California, the Court held that it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Furthermore, the justification or reason for the authority to search incident to a lawful arrest rests quite as much on the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody as it does on the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use at trial. Also, a custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the 4th Amendment that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to arrest requires no additional justification. Based on these reasons, the Court held that a search of the arrestee incident to a lawful arrest is not only a valid exception to the warrant rule but it is also reasonable under the 4th Amendment.

Rule: When officers are effecting a lawful arrest they make automatically search immediate grabbable area and search that individual's person including interior content that that person may have on them, whether or not, that individual retains physical access of that object at time of search.

It doesn't matter that the search turned up evidence that was in support of the arrest because clarity in enforcement practices supports a bright-line rule that officers can easily follow in the heat of the moment.

Front 78

Arrests of Automobile Occupants.
New York v. Belton.

Facts: Trooper Douglas Nicot, a New York State Trooper, was driving an unmarked car on the thruway when he was passed by another automobile traveling at an excessive rate of speed. Nicot gave chase, overtook the speeding vehicle, and ordered its driver to pull it over to the side of the road and stop. There were four men in the car, one of whom was Roger Belton, the respondent in this case. The policeman asked to see the driver’s license and automobile registration, and discovered that none of the men owned the vehicle or was related to its owner. Meanwhile, the policeman had smelled burnt marijuana and had seen on the floor of the car an envelope marked “Supergold” that he associated with marijuana. He therefore directed the men to get out of the car, and placed them under arrest for the unlawful possession of marijuana. He patted down each of the men and “split them up into four separate areas of the Thruway at this time so they would not be in physical touching area of each other”. He then picked up the envelope marked “Supergold” and found that it contained marijuana. After giving arrestees their Miranda warnings, he searched each one of them. He then searched the passengers compartment of the car. On the back seat he found a black leather jacket belonging to Belton. He unzipped one of the pockets of the jacket and discovered cocaine.


ISSUE: The question before the court in this case deals with the custodial arrest of an individual as a result of a traffic stop, and incidental to the arrest his legal standing in regard to a subsequent search of the vehicle and the contents inside the car.

Back 78

HOLDING: The court held that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.

Rational: The majority used the standing set forth in Chimel, which states that after an arrest, the officer may search the area within the “immediate control” of the suspect. The majority also reasoned that a police may examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment, for if the passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in it be within his reach. Furthermore, it doesn’t matter if the containers were open or closed since the justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have. Moreover, in Chimel, the court held that the police could not search all the drawers in an arrestee’s house simply because of the arrest. However, they can search drawers within an arrestee’s reach due to the danger their contents might pose to the police.

Front 79

Search incident to a lawful citation: Knowles v. Iowa.

Knowles was stopped in Newton, Iowa, after having been clocked driving 43 miles per hour on a road where the speed limit was 25. The police officer issued a citation to Knowles, although under Iowa law he might have arrested him. The officer then conducted a full search of the car, and under the driver’ seat he found a bag of marijuana and a “pot pipe”. Knowles was then arrested and charged with a violation of a state law dealing with controlled substances. However, Iowa has a statute, which provided that issuance of a citation in lieu of an arrest “does not affect the officer’s authority to conduct an otherwise lawful search”.

Issue(s): Is the Iowa statute, which authorizes police to conduct a full-blown search of an occupant’s vehicle, even if they don’t arrest him/her, unconstitutional?

Back 79

Holding: Yes

Majority: The majority held that while the concern for officer safety in this context (traffic stop) may justify the “minimal” additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full field-type search. Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. There was no need for other evidence.

Front 80

Custodial Arrest incident to a minor violation:

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista.


Facts: Atwater was driving her pickup truck in Lago Vista, Texas, with her 3-year old son and 5-year-old daughter in the front seat. None of them was wearing a seatbelt. Respondent, a police officer, observed seatbelt violations and pulled P over. P told police officer she did not have driver’s license an insurance documentation because her purse had been stolen the day before.

P arrested and booked, charged with driving without her seatbelt fastened, failing to secure her children in seatbelts, driving without a license, and failing to provide proof of insurance. P pleaded no contest to the misdemeanor seatbelt offenses and paid $50 fine; the other charges were dismissed.

Issue: Whether the Fourth Amendment forbids a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine.

Back 80

Holding: The Fourth Amendment allows a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine, so long as there is probable cause that the violation has been committed.

Reasoning:

Rule: The standard of probable cause “applies to all arrests, without the need to ‘balance’ the interests and circumstances involved in particular situations.”
If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.

Front 81

Virginia v. Moore

Back 81

An arrest based on PC, although in violation of state law, is "lawful" for purposes of 4th Amend analysis. A search conducted as an incident of such an arrest, therefore, satisfies the 4th Amend rules discussed.

Front 82

Thornton v. US.

Facts: the police lawfully arrested T, who had just parked and exited his vehicle, for possession of illegal drugs.

The police handcuffed T and placed him in the back seat of a patrol car, after which they conducted a warrantless Belton search of the car, resulting in discovery of a handgun under the driver's seat.

T argued that Belton was limited to situation where the officer initiated contact with an arrestee while he was still an occupant of the car.

Back 82

The court disagreed, and ruled that the Belton rule applies "so long as an arrestee is the sort of recent occupant of a vehicle such as T was here."

Front 83

Arizona v. Gant.

When the officers returned to the house later that evening, they found a man near the back of the house and a woman in a car parked in front of it. After a third officer arrived, they arrested the man for providing a false name and the woman for possession. Both were handcuffed and placed in the back of a squad car when Gant arrived. The officers recognized him and his car as he entered the driveway. Gant parked at the end of the driveway, got out of his car, and shut the door. Officer Griffith, who was about 30 feet away, called to Gant, and they approached each other, meeting 10-12 feet from Gant’s car. Griffith immediately arrested Gant and handcuffed him. He then locked Gant in the backseat of a squad car. After Gant was secured, two officers searched his car and found a gun and a bag of cocaine.


Procedural Posture: Grant moved to suppress the evidence arguing that Belton did not authorize the search of his vehicle because he posed no threat to the officers after he was handcuffed. His motion was denied. Arizona Supreme Court found that the search was unreasonable.

Issue(s): Whether the officers are allowed the search the car of a person who just arrested, while the person is handcuffed and placed in the back of a squad car?

Back 83

Holding: the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.

Court also concludes that circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle( specifically in the passenger compartment).

Rational: The court relied in the decision set forth in Chimel by stating that a search incident to arrest may only include “the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’” If there is no possibility an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply. The court also re-examined their reasoning in Belton by looking to Justice Brennen’s dissent, which stated “ the result would presumably be the same even if [the officer] had handcuffed Belton and his companions in the patrol car before conducting the search”. The majority in this present case (Arizona v. Gant) rejected the Appeals Courts reading of Belton, which they felt was too broad. The Supreme Court held that the Chimel rationale authorizes policed to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.

Neither the possibility of access nor likelihood of discovering offense-related evidence authorized the search in this case. Because evidence of the offense (of driving with a suspended license) for which he was arrested might have been found therein, the search in this case was unreasonable.

Front 84

Pretextual Stops and Arrests (Particularly in Automobiles) Whren v. US.

Facts: Whren and his partner; the defendants were stopped at a stop sing in a high drug area. Vice squad officers, who were wearing plain clothes and driving unmarked car, noticed the defendants’ SUV stopped at the stop sign for about 20 seconds. After the officers made a u-turn, the defendants made a right turn without giving a signal and then they drove off at a fast speed. The officers caught up to the defendants and pulled them over. As one of the officer walked to the SUV, he spotted two large plastic bags full of drugs. The defendants were convicted for the possession of drugs. Now the defendants appeal and argue that the officers stopped them not for the traffice violation, but to conduct investigation for a crime the officers had no probable cause for, and that violates the defendants’ 4th Amendment rights. The defendants also argue that since they were black, the officers used the minor traffic violation to verify their stereotypical suspicions. The defendants further ask the court to apply the test of whether a reasonable officer would have stopped the defendants for the minor traffic violation they were pulled over for.


Issue. “[W]hether the temporary detention of a motorist who the police have probable cause to believe has committed a civil traffic violation is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures unless a reasonable officer would have been motivated to stop the car by a desire to enforce traffic law.”

Back 84

Synopsis of Rule of Law. In a conventional civil traffic stop, the Fourth Amendment is met by the traditional common-law rule that probable cause justifies a search and seizure.

Held. No. The petitioners’ argument was that a new standard should be imposed for such circumstances: “whether a police officer, acting reasonably, would have made the stop for the reason give.” The court cited extensive precedent that showed, regardless of the “pretext” of the officer’s action, an arrest “would not be rendered invalid” and that a “lawful postarrest search of the person would not be rendered invalid by the fact that it was not motivated by the officer-safety concern that justifies such searches.”


The court also stated that the defendants’ claims of being discriminated against due to their race should be considerd under the Equal Protection Clause and not the 4th Amendment. “Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” So the conviction was affirmed.

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Officer Safety: Maryland v. Buie.

Relevant Facts:
On February 3, 1986, two men committed an armed robbery of a Godfather's Pizza restaurant in Prince George's County, Maryland. One of the robbers was wearing a red running suit. That same day, Prince George's County police obtained arrest warrants for respondent Jerome Edward Buie and his suspected accomplice in the robbery, Lloyd Allen. Buie's house was placed under police surveillance. On February 5, the police executed the arrest warrant for Buie. They first had a police department secretary telephone Buie's house to verify that he was home. The secretary spoke to a female first, then to Buie himself. Six or seven officers proceeded to Buie's house. Once inside, the officers fanned out through the first and second floors. Corporal James Rozar announced that he would "freeze" the basement so that no one could come up and surprise the officers. With his service revolver drawn, Rozar twice shouted into the basement, ordering anyone down there to come out. When a voice asked who was calling, Rozar announced three times: "this is the police, show me your hands." Eventually, a pair of hands appeared around the bottom of the stairwell and Buie emerged from the basement. He was arrested, searched, and handcuffed by Rozar. Thereafter, Detective Joseph Frolich entered the basement "in case there was someone else" down there. He noticed a red running suit lying in plain view on a stack of clothing and seized it.

Issue: Whether this sweep done by the police detective after the defendant was in custody was reasonable and whether the jogging suit found as a result of the follow up sweep is admissible.

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The type of search authorized by Buie is more extensive than Chimel.

Holding:
1) Police can make a protective sweep of a dwelling during the course of an arrest if the police have a reasonable suspicion that there is some danger.
2) As an incident to arrest, the officers could, as a precautionary measure, and without probable cause or even reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be launched. Beyond that, there must be articulable facts which, if taken together with rational inferences would warrant a reasonable prudent officer in believing that the area scene. The Court noted that the intrusion on privacy is slight when weighted against the safety of the officers.

1)Standard: officer who went down in basement needed reasonable suspicion – specific + articulate facts which would lead officer to believe that there was an armed person down in the basement. (here D was wanted for a crime committed along w/ several accomplices)

2)Scope of Search: what was in plain view to the officers --- this allows police to search any place where a person could hide (including washing machine here!)

3)Evidence found during search: if above search is conducted lawfully, evidence seized as a fruit of the search (as it was here) will be lawfully admitted

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Arrest Investories: another warrant "exception": Illinois v. Lafayette

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An "arrest inventory" is constitutionality justified on various grounds:

1) to protect the arrestee from theft of her valuables within the jail;
2) to reduce the risk of false claims of theft by the arrestee; and
3) to ensure that contraband and dangerous instrumentalities that might have been missed by the police in the initial search incident to the arrest are not smuggled into the jail.

If you have PC to believe that there are drugs inside a cigarrette container, you still most likely have to get a warrant. There are no exceptions to the warrant clause to conduct a warrantless clause in this circumstance. Although the reason to protect the arrestee's valuables from conversion may be a good reason to look inside the cigarrette pack but possibly not if the arresting officer has reason to believe that there are drugs inside.

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Cars and Containers: Chambers v. Maroney.

Facts: service station was robbed by two men. Witnesses saw a blue compact station wagon circling the station during the day and saw the same car speed off after the robbery, and that four men were in the car with one wearing a green sweater. The service station attendant told the police that one of the men was wearing a green sweater and the other a trench coat. The car was stopped within the hour and the occupants were arrested. After the arrest the car was taken to the police station and searched without a warrant. Guns were found along with cards bearing the name of another service station attendant that was robbed two weeks ago. After a warrant search of Ds home, police found ammunition similar to that found in one of the guns taken from the station wagon that were hidden underneath a panel in the glove box!

Issue: Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, is a search made at another place without a warrant incident to that arrest?

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The court upheld the search even though the car had been immobilized and it would have been relatively easy to obtain a warrant.

There is no distinction here b/t seizure and search. Once the car was seized, it would not be a greater intrusion to search the car.

Given the existence of PC to search the car for guns and stolen money and the fact that it was a fleeting target(car's contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained) for a search, the police may choose to search later at the police station or elsewhere.

If the automobile could be searched on the street, the search later could occur at the police station.

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Coolidge v. New Hampshire.

Facts: Police arrested Coolidge at his home. At the time of the arrest, two Coolidge cars were parked in the driveway. More than 2 hours after Coolidge was taken into custody, the cars were seized without a warrant. One of the cars was searched and vacuumed for microscopic evidence two days later, again a year later, and a third time five months after the latter search. Police had PC for these searches.

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HOlding: Warrantless car searches were unconstitutional, notwithstanding PC, where opportunity for search is not "fleeting."

There was no indication that Cooldige would "flee" b/c he had ample opportunity to destroy any evidence. No alerted criminal ben on flight, no fleeting opportunity on an open highway after a hazardous chase, no contraband or stolen goods or weapons, no confederates waiting to move the evidence, not even the inconvenience of a special police detail to guard the immobilized automobile. So under Carroll, police could not conduct a warrantless search at the scene.

Also under Chambers, if doesn't survive Carroll, then cannot seize the card and search it later at the police station.

It is of no constitutional consequence that someone could still have driven the car away. This car was not actively mobile, as opposed to Chambers where it was actively mobile.

Once you strip car of its mobility, you need a warrant.

"Immediately Apparent": THe Court held that the seizure of the car was invalid, b/c the incriminating character of the car (containing the fibers) was not immediately apparent.

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California v. Carney.

The court treated a mobile home like an automobile.

Brief Fact Summary. The defendant, Charles Carney (the “defendant”), was arrested for possession of marijuana for sale, after police surveyed the defendant’s parked motor home. The police did not obtain a warrant for the arrest and subsequent search.

Facts. The arresting officer noticed the defendant escorting a youth into the defendant’s parked motor home and drawing the shades. The officer stopped the youth after he left the vehicle, and the youth admitted that he received marijuana in exchange for sexual contact. The youth, per the officer’s request, knocked on the motor home, wherein one officer entered the vehicle without a warrant and found marijuana and related paraphernalia.

Issue. Whether the police needed a search warrant to search the parked mobile home?

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Rule: The pervasive schemes of regulation, which necessarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy, and the exigencies attendant to ready mobility justify searches without prior recourse to the authority of a magistrate so long as the overriding standard of probable cause is met.

Also, the Court noted that the mobile home was not in an area of a mobile home park where a case could have been made for its immobility.

There's a second reason to permit this mobile home as a vehicle: there's a reduced expectation of privacy b/c cars are regulated by administrative procedures.

Side Note: the kid could have been detained, under Summers, outside the mobile home for his safety.

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"Automobile Inventory" Warrant Exception: South Dakota v. Opperman.

Facts:

Defendant had parked his car illegally and the car was impounded. Upon impounding, the police officer noticed some valuables in the car in plain view, so he did the regular inventory search of the car and found marijuana in the unlocked glove compartment. When the defendant came to police station to claim his car, he was give back his valuables less the weed and was arrested.

Issue:

Whether a routine inventory search of a car, by a police officer, violates the 4th Amendment when the car is being impounded.

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Analysis: The Court reasoned that the PC and warrant requirements of the 4th Amend do not apply to routine inventory searches.

The standard of PC is peculiarly related to criminal investigations, not routine, non-criminal procedures.

With no PC necessary, there is no need, thus, for the a search warrant seeing as how the two are linked.

Reasonableness Balancing of Competing Interests.
1) The court reasoned that when it comes to automobiles, people have less of a reasonable expectation of privacy than that relating to their home or office.
2) Also, automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and controls, including periodic inspection and licensing requirements.
3) Moreover, the expectation of privacy as to automobiles is further diminished by the obviously public nature of automobile travel.

Government Interests:

(1) The protection of the owner’s property while it remains in police custody
(2) the protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property, and (3) the protection of the police from potential danger, such as incidents of theft or vandalism.

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United States v. Chadwick.


Facts:

Chadwick and accomplice, Defendants, were carrying a heavy footlocker which was leaking talcum powder, material that is used to hide the odor of marijuana. The officers at Boston train station brought a dog and the dog signaled that there were narcotics in the footlocker.

As the defendants were loading the footlocker into the vehicle, the officers arrested them. Later at the police station, the officer broke the two locks which protected the footlocker and they discovered large quantity of marijuana.

Issue:

Whether officers violated the 4th Amendment when they opened a locked footlocker back at the station, without a warrant or consent.

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Reasoning:

The court ruled that the defendants had reasonable expectation of privacy in a closed container which was not part of a vehicle search, ie. the footlocker.
The court further ruled that since the officers had no exigent circumstances.
Closed containers, like the locked footlocker, deserve more protection than an open automobile, thus, the officers should have gained a warrant before opening the footlocker.
A person’s expectations of privacy in a container are higher than a vehicle.
The court ruled that 4th Amendment protects ‘people and not places’ and the search of the footlocker was unlawful.
List of Reasons Expectations are lower in a vehicle than a container:
Function is transit and seldom serves as the repository of one’s personal effects.
Travels public areas and people can see inside.
States require that they are registered and details codes for its use.
Undergo official inspections.

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Containers "coincidentally" in cars: Arkansas v. Sanders.

Facts of the Case
Local police in Little Rock, Arkansas received a tip that an individual would be arriving at the airport with a suitcase containing a significant quantity of marijuana. Upon arriving, the suspect retrieved his suitcase and left in a taxi. The police officers pursued and stopped the taxi, and ordered the driver to open the trunk which revealed the suitcase in question. The police opened the suitcase without obtaining permission from its owner and found nearly ten pounds of marijuana.

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Yes. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement applies to personal luggage taken from an automobile. In this case, Justice Powell applied the principle which the Court had identified in United States v. Chadwick (1977), namely, that a locked footlocker which had been loaded into a vehicle could not be opened without a warrant. Since the Little Rock police officers had exclusive control of the luggage at the time of their search, there was no danger that its contents could have been tampered with or removed before a valid warrant could have been obtained. Powell concluded that since "luggage is a common repository of one's personal effects" it is "associated with the expectation of privacy."

Overruled by California v. Acevedo.

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The relative 4th Amend worthiness of different containers

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Not all containers and packages found by police during the course of a search will deserve the full protection of the 4th Amend.

THus, some containers(i.e. a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy b/c their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance.

Similarly, in some cases the contents of a package will be open to "plain view," thereby obviating the need for a warrant.

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Cars with "coincidental" containers: United States v. Ross.

Facts: An informant, who proved to be reliable, telephoned Detective Marcum and advised him that an individual known as “Bandit” was selling illegal drugs out of the trunk of his car. The informant gave the detective a detailed description of “Bandit” and the vehicle. Detective Marcum immediately drove to the area with Detective Cassidy and Sergeant Gonzales, and they spotted a vehicle matching the description parked in front of 439 Ridge Street. A license check disclosed that the car was registered to Albert Ross. A computer check on Ross revealed that he fit the informant’s description and used the alias “Bandit”. In two passes through the neighborhood the officers did not observe anyone matching the informant’s description. TO avoid altering persons on the street, they left the area. The officers returned give minutes later and observed the maroon Malibu turning off Ridge Street onto Fourth Street. They pulled alongside the Malibu, noticed the driver matched the informant’s description, and stopped the car. Marcum and Cassidy told the driver, Albert Ross, to get out of the vehicle. While they searched Ross, Sergeant Gonzales discovered a bullet on the car’s front seat. He searched the interior of the car and found a pistol in the glove compartment. Ross then was arrested and handcuffed. Detective Cassidy took Ross’s keys and opened the trunk, where he found a closed brown paper bag. He opened the bag and discovered a number of glassine bags containing a white powdered. Cassidy replaced the bag, closed the trunk, and drove the car to headquarters. At the police station Cassidy thoroughly searched the car. In addition to the “lunch-type” brown paper bag, Cassidy found in the trunk a zippered red leather pouch. He unzipped the pouch and discovered 3,200 in cash. The police laboratory later determined that the powder in the bag was heroin. No warrant was obtained.

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Holding: They may conduct a search of the vehicle that is as thorough as a magistrate could authorize in a warrant “particularly describing the place to be searched”.

Reasoning: The majority went back to their reasoning in Chadwick, in which they held that absent exigent circumstances, the warrantless search of a double-locked luggage just placed in the trunk of a parked vehicle is a violation of the Fourth Amendment and not justified under the “automobile exception”. The court also made reference to Sanders, which was factually similar to Chadwick and the ruling was the same. The majority said that this present case did not compare to the others, because there was no ‘target’ container that had been observed being placed in the car, but rather probable cause to believe that contraband was somewhere in the car. The majority held that the permissible scope of the warrantless search “is defined by the object of the search and the place in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found” This situation justified that the automobile exception took precedent.”If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle [under the ‘automobile exception’], it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search. The court has clarified that the Ross rule applies to all containers found in a car, even if the container belongs to a person not linked to the vehicle, such as a passenger of the suspect-driver or a person not in the vehicle at all. The court also compared the scope of a search of an automobile to that of a home. For a home, a warrant, supported by probable cause and which meets the particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment, ordinarily is required. However, once the warrant is authorized, the police may search “the entire area in which the object of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search”. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that if the police had probable cause to search a container, which was then placed in an automobile, Chadwick-Sanders applied, and the police needed a warrant to search the container. In contrast, if the police had probable cause to search a car, and a container happened to be found during the lawful search, the automobile exception applied, and the container could be opened as part of the car search.

But, if the police had PC to search a specific container, coincidentally found in a car, they could search the car on the highway (or tow it) without a warrant to find and seize the container, but they needed a warrant to open the container.

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California v. Acevedo.

Facts. The Defendant entered the apartment of Jamie Daza (”Mr. Daza”) and left with a package. Earlier, police were informed that Mr. Daza picked up a Federal Express package known to contain marijuana. The package that the defendant held looked similar to the Federal Express marijuana package. Police, concerned that the package would be compromised, followed the defendant, stopped him and searched the package to find marijuana.

Issue. Whether the police are required to obtain a warrant to search a container in a car – a car that they otherwise lack probable cause to search?

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Analysis: As long as the police have PC to search the automobile, they can search anywhere in the automobile, including a search of containers found within the automobile.

However, PC to believe that a container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify a search of the entire cab.

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Containers belonging to Passengers: Wyoming v. Houghton

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HOlding: Police officers with PC to search a car may inspect any passengers' "belongings" found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search.

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Hypo: Officers have PC to arrest Donal for murder. THey come to Donald's home to arrest him, but nobody is home. They return to their cars across the street, and await Donald's arrival. Ninety minutes later, Donald arrives and enters his house. Fifteen minutes later, the officers come to the door, knock, and arrest Donald at the doorway when he opens the door. Donald is now shoeless but otherwise fully dressed. THe police handcuff Donald at the door and move him into the living room, four feet from an open closet. THe police search Donald, but they find nothing. Officer, hoping to find the murder weapon, goes to the closet, pats down trousers on closet hangers, and shakes pair of shoes. In one pair, the officer discovers a gun, later determined to be the murder weapon. Prior to trial, Donald moves to suppress the gun from evidence. Should the motion be granted. Assume lawful and then not lawful arrest.

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1) Is there PC? Yes
2) Do they have a warrant or exigency? Not in hot pursuit, no exigency, so cannot enter home without warrant.
2) Constitutionality after arrest? Since he's shoeless, they can bring him inside to get his shoes as a medical exception.
3) SITLA, as per Chimel? Arrested at doorway. Even if permissible intrusion it wasn't a lawful arrest. Even if gun was in immediate grabbable area, the arrest was not lawful.
4) If it is lawful arrest ask if there is evidence that can be destroyed or affect safety of officer in the immediate grabbable area? The question is whether Donald is handcuffed.

You have an automatic right to search anything on his person.

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US v. Turner.

Before the search, police handcuffed Turner and took him to another room. We have not previously determined whether searches incident to arrest may ever encompass a room from which the arrestee has been removed.

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To reach this result, the court used a two-level inquiry. First, it put itself in the officers' position and determined whether the searched bag was within the arrestee's immediate control when he was arrested. The answer was yes. Next, it considered whether events occurring after the arrest but before the search made the search unreasonable. It determined that the officers acted reasonably and out of a concern for *888 their safety when they delayed the search five minutes and first handcuffed the arrestee. The court reasoned that “it does not make sense to prescribe a constitutional test that is entirely at odds with safe and sensible police procedures.” Id.

We adopt the Seventh Circuit's approach. First, we consider whether the baggies of cocaine base were within Turner's immediate control when he was arrested. They were. He was on the bed with the baggies when he was arrested.

Next we consider whether subsequent events made the search unreasonable. The officers handcuffed Turner and took him into the next room out of a concern for safety. We cannot say that these concerns were unfounded, for they had already discovered a concealed weapon beneath the bedding. They did not take him far away or delay for long before conducting the search. Under the circumstances, we cannot find the search that revealed the baggies of cocaine inconsistent with Chimel or Andersson.2 The baggies were validly seized during a search incident to arrest.

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Plain View (And Touch) Doctrines: Horton v. California.

Statement of the case: The D Argued that the officer’s discovery of the seized items not listed in the search warrant was not inadvertent, and that the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire required their suppression under the Fourth Amendment.

Statement of facts police officer investigating an armed robbery determined that there was probable cause to search the accused’s home for the property stolen in the robbery and for the weapons used by the robbers. The warrant authorizing the search of the accused’s home, however, authorized a search for only the stolen property. The officer searched the accused’s home pursuant to the warrant but found no stolen property. In the course of the search, the officer discovered the robbery weapons in plain view and seized the weapons and several other items. The officer testified that while he was searching for the stolen property, he also was interested in finding other evidence connecting the accused to the crime.

Legal issues: If the discovery of an item in Plain view not named in the warrant is not inadvertent, may these items be seized where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them.

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Holding: There is no requirement that the officer discover evidence in plain view inadvertently. The plain view doctrine could apply even if an officer expected in advance to find the object in plain view.

Reasoning: Yes. The inadvertence requirement is unsound on two grounds. First, the standard is impermissibly subjective, based solely on the state of mind of the officer. The officer’s state of mind is irrelevant , b/c the question under the 4th is whether the search or the seizure is objectively reasonable. Second, rejecting the inadvertence requirement would not allow the officer to look in any more places or with any more intensity than he would otherwise be able to look. In fact, the officer would want to include all seizable materials to expand his search area. Plain view doctrine is justified when there is a (1) lawful arrival at the place from which the object can be plainly seen, (2) lawful access to the object seized, and (3) an object whose incriminating nature is immediately apparent.

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Arizona v. Hicks.


Facts: A bullet was fired through the floor of the defendant’s apartment into the apartment below and struck an individual who then called the police. Police responded to the incident and went first to the apartment of the origin of the bullet. The defendant, Hicks, was not in the apartment at the time, but officers found and seized three firearms and a stocking-cap mask, which were in plain sight. One of the officers then noticed two sets of stereo equipment that look displaced in the otherwise shabby apartment. After moving two turntables from on top of the equipment, the officer recorded their serial numbers and found them to be property stolen in a recent armed robbery. Mr. Hicks was found and charged with various crimes.

Issue: Was their probable cause to search the stereo equipment based on its appearance alone?

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Holding: The stereo equipment seized in the search was suppressed.

Rationale: The Supreme Court first ruled that the warrantless entry by the officers, under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, was valid. The court then ruled that the recording of the equipment’s serial numbers did not constitute a search or seizure. However, when the officer moved the turntable it was held to be a separate search, apart from the search for the defendant and his firearms. It was the court’s ruling that the officer did not have probable cause, only reasonable suspicion to search the stereo equipment. The evidence seized after the discovery of the turntables was subsequently deemed inadmissible.


Rule: For the plain view exception to apply, the contraband's incriminating character must be "immediately apparent."

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Plain Touch: Minnesota v. Dickerson

Officer w/ reasonable suspicion pats down someone coming out of a crack house. Terry permits brief detention upon reasonable suspicion and a pat down upon reasonable suspicion that the person is armed. Officer is allowed to pat the down the outer clothing for search a weapon.

Here, officer pats down suspect and finds no weapon. He finds some object in shirt pocket of individual. He moves the object within the shirt and determines that it is crack wrapped within selophane. With PC now to search and arrest, he moves the object out of shirt and arrests.

Issue: Did the officers go beyond the constitutional limits when they took the cocaine out of defendant’s pocket?

Is there analagous doctrine called "plain search". Can officer, upon plain touch of an object due to a pat down, seize the object and arrest suspect.

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HOlding: Officer conducted more than just a pat down to get PC.

Legal Reasoning: The court ruled that when an officer stops a person for reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, he can give him/her Terry frisk to see if the person is armed. The court further ruled that if during the search, the officer finds someting in plain view of in plain feel which gives him probable cause to believe that it is a contraband, then he has the power to obtain this contraband. But, the court stated, in the current case, the officer did not have the probable cause to believe that the object was cocaine and he had to do further search to come to this conclusion. So the court ruled that since the officer conducted further search to make sure that the object was cocaine, he clearly went beyond his limits and the decsion of the lower court was affirmed.

The contraband was not in plain view and that the seizure therefore was invalid, b/c the officer was unaware that the "lump" was contraband until he manipulated it.

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Commonwealth v. Hatcher.

A police officer, w/consent, entered H's residence to investigate an allegation of an abandoned minor at a residence. Inside, the officer observed a pipe sitting on a table that, based on his experience and training was "predominantly used to smoke marijuana." The officer picked it up and smelled the odor of marijuana. The officer seized the pipe and arrested H for possession of drug paraphernalia.

Did the officer's actions violate Hicks?

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Search is not good and smelling it in that way, officer was searching the object in the way like in Hicks officer lifted up the turntable.

If officer hadn't picked it up and just smelled marijuana emanating from the bowl, then the search would have been valid. However, if you need to move the object to smell it then it's not a valid search/seizure.

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Consent: Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.

Facts: An officer on a routine patrol at 2:30 in the morning observed an automobile with a broken headlight. He stopped the car, and the driver was unable to produce a driver's license. There were five other passengers, and only one could produce a license. The officer asked that person (who said that the car was his brother's) if he could search the car. The person allowed him to search, and the officer found three stolen checks. Bustamonte (D) was convicted after these checks were admitted into evidence at his trial. The California Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction. D sought a writ of habeas corpus in a federal district court. He was denied, but the Court of Appeals set aside the district court's order. Schneckloth (P) appealed.

Issue: Must the State always bear the burden of proof that consent to a search was voluntarily given?

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Rule: To determine whether a search was voluntary does not require that a person knew of his rights, but whether the totality of circumstances indicated that the person was voluntarily allowing the search.

Reasoning: Based on the totality of the circumstances (namely: Characteristics of the accused, and Details of the interrogation), when the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent the state must demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied. The Due Process Clause does not require the state to prove that the defendant knew he had a right to refuse to answer questions. His state of mind and the police's failure to advise him of his rights are certainly factors, but are not in themselves determinative. In this case, there is no evidence of any inherently coercive tactics.

Factors Considered under the Totality of Circumstances:
1) If suspect is particularly vulnerable b/c of lack of schooling(factors of suspect);
2) whether suspect knew that he has the right to refuse consent;

and Factors that suggest Coercion:
3) Police guns were drawn,
4) police demanded the right to search

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Bumper v. North Carolina.

Facts. The petitioner lived with his grandmother, a 66-year-old negro widow, in a rural area. Two days after an alleged rape, four white police officers went to the widow’s house and her that they had a search warrant to search her house. She told them they could conduct their search and they found a .22 caliber rifle gun eventually introduced into evidence.
During a suppression hearing, the four officers testified that they relied not on the search warrant, but on the widow’s consent to conduct their search. The widow testified that she believed the officers had a valid search and that she did not know her grandson was being accused of anything when the search was conducted. The trial court found that the widow consented to the search.

Issue. “[W]hether a search can be justified as lawful on the basis of consent when that ‘consent’ has been given only after the official conducting the search has asserted that he possesses a warrant?

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Held. No, “there can be no consent under such circumstances.”

“When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given. This burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority. A search conducted in reliance upon a warrant cannot later be justified on the basis of consent if it turns out that the warrant was invalid. The result can be no different when it turns out that the State does not even attempt to rely upon the validity of the warrant, or fails to show that there was, in fact, any warrant at all.”
“When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search. The situation is instinct with coercion – albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where there is coercion there cannot be consent.”

Factors of Analysis: Age, Sex, Race, Number of Officers, Whether Guns were flashed, Context of Situation.

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Hypo: Officers don't have PC, but have a hunch that drugs are being dealt by one law school kid. One or two kids are in the apt when the officers show up and ask for consent to enter the house and look around. Officers find nothign in their initial perusal. THey then ask whether one of the kids shares bd with the suspected dealer. THe on kid says yes. Officers ask whether they can search the bd. THe roommate agrees and lets them look around. THe officers find MJ and prescription drugs in the closet. When the suspect returns he is arrested in the hallway of the apt.

Issue: Was the search of the apt consitutional? Was the search of bd and closet const?

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1) There is no const. violation when the officers enter the house with consent.

2) If there was a dissenting voice in consent then the offices would not be allowed to search.

3) Illinois v. Rodriguez controls the outcome: An officer's reasonable reliance on the apparent authority of a co-occupant to consent to search is legitamite even where co-occupant does not have actual authority to consent to the search.

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Ohio v. Robinette.

Facts:

Robinette was stopped for speeding in a construction zone, ticketed, technically freed to leave, but consented to a police search of his car, claiming that he would not have if he knew he could have declined. The officer asked, “Before you go, can I search the car.”

Ticketed motorist, Robinette, is seeking to suppress marijuana and a methamphetamine found in his car when he was pulled over, technically freed to leave, but consented to a police search of his car, claiming that he would not have if he knew he could have declined.

Issue:

Whether the 4th Amendment requires that a lawfully seized D be advised that he is “free to go” before his consent to search will be recognized as voluntary.

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Holding:

The 4th Amendment does not require that a lawfully seized D be advised that he is “free to go” before his consent to search will be recognized as voluntary, as the voluntariness should be based on the totality of the circumstances.

Reasoning:

Whren stated that an officer’s state of mind is not important in searching, just that he objectively does not violate the 4th Amendment. Subjective intentions are not important.
There was probable cause to make the stop.
Reasonable searches do not violate the 4th Amendment, and reasonableness is based on the totality of the circumstances.
Knowledge of the right o refuse consent is only one factor in showing voluntariness, and the government does not necessarily need to show this knowledge.
4th Amendment Test that Consent be Voluntary: “Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances.”

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Third Party Consent: US v. Matlock

Facts: a woman consented to the search of a house that she shared with Matlock, including their bedroom where police found evidence that they used agains Matlock.

Issue: Whether the evidence presented by the United States with respect to the voluntary consent of a third party to search the living quarters of the respondent was legally sufficient to render the seized materials admissible in evidence at the respondent’s criminal trial?

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Holding: The court held that the woman could consent to a search of the room b/c she had "common authority" over the area.

"Common authority" rests on "mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection of his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched."

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Third party consent when one party consents but another objects: Georgia v. Randolph.

Scott Randolph was arrested for drug possession after police found cocaine in his home. The police did not have a warrant to search the home, but Randolph's wife consented to the search. Randolph was also present at the time of the search, however, and objected to the police request. At trial, his attorney argued that the search was unconstitutional because of Randolph's objection, while the prosecution argued that the consent of his wife was sufficient. The trial court ruled for the prosecution, but the appellate court and Georgia Supreme Court both sided with Randolph, finding that a search is unconstitutional if one resident objects, even if another resident consents.

Question
Can police search a home when one physically present resident consents and the other physically present resident objects?

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Holding: a wife's consent to search did not validate the search in the face of the husband's objections.

Unless there is some "recognized hierarchy" within a household (e.g., parent and child or barracks housing military personnel of different grades), "there is no societal understanding of superior or inferior" and "a physically present inhabitant's express refusal of consent to a police search is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant."

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Consent by someone who lacks "Common Authority": Illinois v. Rodriguez.

Facts:

Fischer appeared to have been severely beaten by D. She took police officers to D’s apartment (which Fischer referred to as “our” apartment), unlocked the door with her key, and gave the officers permission to enter. They had neither an arrest nor a search warrant. Upon entry, the officers observed cocaine and drug paraphernalia in plain view. They arrested D, charging him with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.

D moved to suppress all evidence, claiming that Fischer had no authority to consent to the entry. Trial court granted the motion, concluding that Fischer was an “infrequent visitor” and not a “usual resident.” This was based upon the findings that Fischer’s name was not on the lease, that she did not pay rent, she was not allowed to invite other to the apartment on her own, she did not have access to the apartment when D was away, and that she had moved some of her possessions from the apartment.

Issue:

Whether the 4th Amendment’s reasonable search requirement is satisfied when police conduct a warrantless search of a person’s home based upon the apparently authorized consent of another, and the person is later shown to not have authority to grant such a search.

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Holding: The 4th Amendment’s reasonable search requirement is satisfied when police conduct a warrantless search of a person’s home based upon the apparently authorized consent of another and the person is later shown to not have authority to grant such a search, SO LONG AS it is reasonable for the officers to believe that the person had authority to grant the search, based on the totality of the circumstances.

Rule: A warrantless search of a home is valid if police at that moment reasonably believe that the consenting party has authority over the premises.

Reasonableness Test: The determination of consent to enter must be judged against an objective standard:
Whether the facts available to the officer at the moment lead a man of reasonable caution to believe that the consenting party had authority over the premises.
If not, then absent actual authority, the search is invalid.
If so, the search is valid.

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Scope of Consent: Florida v. Jimeno.

Facts: Believing that respondent was carrying narcotics, a police officers asked for permission to search his car. Respondent consented stating that he had nothing hide. After two pas- sengers stepped out of respondent's car, Officer Trujillo went to the passenger side, opened the door, and saw a folded, brown paper bag on the floorboard. The officer picked up the bag, opened it, and found a kilogram of cocaine inside.

Issue: Does a suspect's consent to a search of his vehicle extend to closed containers found inside?

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Holding: the consent extended to the paper bag b/c Jimenez "did not place any explicit limitation on the scope of the search."

Standard: Whether it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search respondent's car included consent to search containers within that car which might bear drugs.

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Scope of Consent: State v. Wells.

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Holding: the consent to search the trunk of a car did not include authorization to pry open a locked briefcase found inside the trunk.

It is very likely unreasonable to think that a suspect, by consenting to the search of his trunk, has agreed to the breaking open of a locked briefcase within the trunk, but it is otherwise with respect to a closed paper bag.

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Stop and Frisk: Terry v. Ohio.

Statement of the facts: An officer observed two men standing on a street corner. One would walk up to a store window, look inside, and return to confer with his companion. This process was repeated about a dozen times. The suspects talked with a third man, then followed him up the street. Thinking the suspects were “casing” the store, the officer confronted the three men and asked their names. The men mumbled a response, at which time the officer spun one of the men, Terry (D), around and patted his breast. He found and removed a pistol. D was charged with carrying a concealed weapon. D moved to suppress this weapon from evidence. The trial judge denied his motion. The Ohio court of appeals affirmed, and the state supreme court dismissed D’s appeal.

Legal issue: Is it always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons when there is no probable cause for arrest?

1)Was the seizure constitutionally justified at its inception?
2) Was the nature and quality of the search for weapons, where PC is lacking, constitutionally justified?

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Holding: An officer is justified in conducting a carefully limited search of persons whom he reasonably suspects to be dangerous in order to discover any weapons which might be used to assault him or other nearby, even in the absence of probable cause for arrest. Officer must identify himself as a policeman and make reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter dispels his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled to conduct a carefully limited search of outer clothing for weapons.

Standard for an "investigative stop": Reasonable suspicion (less than PC) that D is involved in criminal activity.

"Reasonable Suspicion": determined using a totality of circumstances standard, i.e., a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person of criminal activity. You can also assess the experience of the officer in analyzing the reasonableness of the suspicion. Involves less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.

Frisk: a protective search for weapons of the suspect's outer clothing.

Standard for conducting a frisk: In addition to suspecting criminal activity, the officer must also have reason to believe that suspect is "armed and dangerous" with weapons that might be used to harm the officer and others nearby.

Probable cause= reasonable belief. Stop and Frisk = reasonable suspicion backed by articulable facts.


Analysis: Court goes through a competing interest analysis with privacy vs. crime prevention/safety and adopts a reasonableness approach tailored to limited circumstances.

Terry stop doctrine, as it is shown by future jurisprudence, applies to misdemeanor shoplifting and traffic stops.

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Administrative Inspection: Frank v. Maryland

Frank refused to allow the health inspectors into his home citing the Fourth Amendment. Inspectors were trying to perform an administrative search for code violations, specifically a rat infestation, not a criminal investigation, so they did not believe they were violating the Fourth Amendment.

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The Court, in an opinion written by Felix Frankfurter, decided in favor of the inspectors claiming that the search would benefit the public more than Frank's interests in privacy.

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Administrative Inspection: Camara v. Municipal Court.


Facts: Local statute concerned inspection of houses for civil reasons. Guy refused to let inspector in and multiple occasions, because he lacked a search warrant. He was arrested for city violation of the local statute.

Statement of the case: The D contended that the weapon seized from his person and introduced into evidence was obtained through an illegal search, under the Fourth Amendment, and that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress.

Issues: Does the 4th amendment allow individuals to prevent government agents from conducting civil inspections in their homes without a warrant?

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Rule: The controlling standard of reasonableness.

Should judge whether house needs to be inspected on case by case basis. Reasonable expectation of privacy. $503 is a violation of the 4th and 14th b/c it authorizes municipal officials to enter a private dwelling w/o a search warrant and w/o PC to believe that a violation of the Housing Code exists therein.

Plaintiff’s Argument: Legitimate government interests to protect all. Search not intrusive; only for good of all.

Conclusion: Judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Holding: Appellant had a constitutional right to insist that inspectors obtain a warrant to search and that appellant may not constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection.

Analysis: In determining whether the search was "reasonable" the Court balanced the governmental interest against the private interest.

After balancing these interests, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment imposed a warrant requirement on administrative inspections based on "administrative" probable cause.

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Terry Doctrine after a Crime has been Committed: US v. Hensley

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Holding: Terry doctrine also applies when an officer seeks to investigate a completed felony.

Stops are allowed if the "police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony."

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Reasonable Suspicion based on anonymous tip: Alabama v. White

Facts: Cops received a tip from an anonymous caller that White ("Defendant") was leaving 235-C Lynwood Terrace Apartments in a brown car with the right taillight broken and that she was was going to Dobey's Motel and that she had cocaine inside a brown bag. Cops obsved a brown car with broken taillight in front of the apartment and saw Defendant drive off towards Dobey's Motel. Cops pulled over the Defendant and received the consent to search the car. Cops discovered cocaine in the brown bag.

Issue: Whether the anonymous tip corroborated by the cops' independent investigation can provide reasonable suspicion.

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Alabama: Police can rely on an anonymous tip in developing "reasonable suspicion." Reasonable suspicion depends on both the "quantity and quality" of the evidence. Must believe that that person must commit a crime. Court focused on 1) police corroboration of facts and 2) ability of tip to accurately predict future events.

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Reasonable Suspicion based on reliable tip: Adams v. Williams


Facts: While on duty, a police officer was approached by a reliable informant who told the officer that a person sitting in a nearby car, i.e., the defendant, was carrying drugs and a gun. The officer went to defendant’s car and grabbed a gun from exactly the same place where the informant said the gun would be. Then the officer searched the car and found additional weapons and drugs.

Issue: Can the officer rely on information obtained from a reliable informant for reasonable suspicion for a search?

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Adams: An officer may skip the frisk of outer clothing and reach into the car to remove a fully loaded revolver from the driver's waistband, which was the place indicated by the informant.

Reasoning: The Court held that the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct the search. Here, the Court noted that the officer had reasonable suspicion because the officer knew the informant to be reliable. Thus, the officer had reason to believe that the suspect was armed and dangerous and he could constitutionally frisk the suspect for weapons.

Main Point: A reliable informant’s tip may give officer reasonable suspicion to frisk the suspect for weapons.

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Traffic Stops that become something more: Arizona v. Johnson.

Tucson, Arizona, police officers were patrolling a neighborhood associated with the Crips street gang when they stopped a vehicle because its registration had been suspended. Officers noticed that Johnson looked back and kept his eyes on the officers, that he was wearing a blue bandana (consistent with Crips membership), and that he had a police scanner in his pocket. While in the car, Johnson stated that he was from a town the officer knew to be associated with the Crips gang, and also admitted that had served a prison sentence for burglary and had been out for about a year. The police asked Johnson to exit and step away from the car because they wanted to question him and gather gang intelligence; after he complied, the police patted him down because they believed that he was armed and dangerous, based on their observations and Johnson’s statements. The pat down search revealed a gun, and Johnson was arrested.

Question presented
Whether a police officer may search a vehicle stopped for a minor traffic offense, when the officer has no reason to believe the passenger is committing, or has committed a crime, but reasonably suspects the driver is armed and dangerous?

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Holding: The police may lawfully stop and detain an automobile and its occupants pending an inquiry into a minor traffic violation, and may conduct a pat down search of an occupant if the police reasonably suspect that the individual is armed and dangerous
During a traffic stop, the police may order occupants to exit the vehicle pending completion of the stop. A police officer may pat down a driver once he exits a vehicle if the officer reasonably believes that the driver is armed and dangerous.

The Court observed that a seizure occurs when the police stop a car for a traffic violation, and the seizure continues and is usually reasonable until the police inform the car’s occupants that they’re free to leave. In addition, questioning by the police about a matter unrelated to the traffic stop does not make the stop unlawful, as long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.

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Traffic Stops that become something more(dog sniffing): Illinois v. Caballes.

Facts: Illinois State Trooper Daniel Gillette stopped respondent for speeding on an interstate highway. When Gillette radioed the police dispatcher to report the stop, a second trooper, Craig Graham, a member of the Illinois State Police Drug Interdiction Team, overheard the transmission and immediately headed for the scene with his narcotics-detection dog. When they arrived, respondent's car was on the shoulder of the road and respondent was in Gillette's vehicle. While Gillette was in the process of writing a warning ticket, Graham walked his dog around respondent's car. The dog alerted at the trunk. Based on that alert, the officers searched the trunk, found marijuana, and arrested respondent. The entire incident lasted less than 10 minutes.

ssue: Whether the 4th requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop

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Holding: No.

Reasoning: the initial seizure of respondent when he was stopped on the highway was based on probable cause and was concededly lawful. A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if its prolonged beyond the time reasonable required to complete that mission. The duration of the case was entirely justified by the traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries incident to such a stop. Conducting a dog sniff wouldn’t change the character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner, unless the dog sniff itself infringed respondent’s constitutionally protected interest in privacy. We hold that it did not. Any interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed legitimate and thus governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband compromises no legitimate privacy interest.

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Hypo: The police in Acevedo open the trunk, immediately spot the paper bag, open it, and find marijuana. The police proceed to search the remainder of the trunk. They find and seize transparent bags of cocaine hidden under a blanket. They search the passenger compartment. Under the front seat, they find a small quantity of marijuana.

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[A] Of course, the seizure and search of the bag is permitted under Acevedo, but are the subsequent searches - lifting the blanket and searching under the front seat - valid?

Probably not, as the police had very limited / specific probable cause here: to search the car trunk to find the paper bag, which they found.

In search warrant cases, once the police find all of the items described in the warrant, the search must cease.

Of course, they may seize criminal evidence in plain view while the original search is underway.

BUT as the cocaine was not in plain view but was hidden under a blanket, the subsequent searches
should be forbidden.

The police might argue that finding the marijuana in the paper bag, gave the officers probable cause to believe that they would find more drugs in the trunk (and, perhaps, elsewhere).

Thus, they would use the first search to bootstrap themselves into new probable cause to conduct a broader search.

But, there are no additional facts here to support the claim that PC exists to believe that Acevedo had additional drugs in the car. Acevedo was suspected of being a user, not a pusher, of drugs. The police saw one paper bag go in the trunk, so the search should stop.

NOTE: CLOSER QUSETION: once MJ is found in paper bag in trunk and Acevedo is arrested, the question becomes whether there is a reasonable belief to search the car interior for evidence relating to the arrest offense? Gant.


If the police are permitted to search the remainder of the trunk, the transparent bags of cocaine do not constitute a container protected by the Fourth Amendment.

And, if the search was lawful, finding those bags might give the police reason to believe that Acevedo had other drugs in the car, which might have strengthened the claim that they could search the passenger compartment.

BUT when you apply Horton and Hicks – it should be clear that the transparent bags were not in plain view because the cops only saw them AFTER LIFTING up the blanket. Hicks

THE better answer here is the search must stop once the paper bag with drugs was found and searched.

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Hypo: The police in Acevedo open the trunk, immediately spot the paper bag, open it, and find non-contraband lawful items. The police proceed to search the remainder of the trunk. They find and seize transparent bags of cocaine hidden under a blanket. They search the passenger compartment. Under the front seat, they find a small quantity of marijuana.

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[B] Same as [A] but search of paper bag is negative. LEO may do what? Lift the blanket?

Presumably, if there was no marijuana in the paper bag, that strongly suggests that Acevedo did NOT buy drugs from Daza. The police should search no further.

BUT the prosecutor argues what?

The paper bag on top of the blanket is NOT the paper bag they saw Acevedo put in the trunk.

After all, paper bags are not distinctive.

Therefore, the police should be permitted to search the rest of the trunk for another paper bag and should they find it, search it to see if it contains the marijuana.

If this argument is persuasive, and it might be, the police could continue the search, which would justify the finding of the cocaine hidden under the blanket in as much as the blanket could be hiding the paper bag. Ross.

That leaves the question of whether finding the cocaine justifies a search of the rest of the car.

Notice: The irony of the government's argument, if it is accepted, is that not finding contraband in the first paper bag strengthens their argument for continuing the search.

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Drawing Lines: "Terry Stops" vs. De Facto Arrests.

Dunaway v. New York.

Facts. The owner of a pizza parlor was killed during an attempted robbery. A few months later, the police received a tip from an informant implicating the Petitioner, Dunaway (the “Petitioner”). A detective questioned the informant and did not learn enough to get an arrest warrant, but nonetheless that Petitioner be brought in. The Petitioner was taken into custody and told he was not under arrest, but he would have been restrained physically if he tried to leave. He was driven to a police station, put in an interrogation room and then mirandized. The Petitioner waived his right to counsel and incriminated himself via statements and drawings.
The Petitioner filed motions to suppress the drawings and statements at trial and the motions were denied.

Issue:
-Is it legal under the 4th amendment to detain someone for questioning on less then probable cause for a full fledged arrest?

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Rule:
-4th amendment; general rule to custodial interrogations as seizures

Analysis:

-Plaintiff’s Argument:
-Probable cause didn’t exist for this interrogation; improper search and seizure. Evidence should be suppressed.

-Defendant’s Argument:
-Seizure is justified based on reasonable suspicion. Does not amount to a technical arrest!  Apply a balancing test!

Holding: If the police want to pick up a suspect and take him to the station for questioning, they must have probable cause. The court regarded this type of seizure as tantamount to an arrest.

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Moving the Suspect: Florida v. Royer.

Brief Fact Summary. Detectives stopped and questioned respondent Mark Royer after figuring out he fit the profile of a person transporting illegal drugs, and then asked him to accompany them to a small room about 40 feet away. Fifteen minutes later, he consented to search of his bags.

Issue: – Whether consent to a search invalid if tainted by unlawful confinement without probable cause?

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Holding. A police officer asking a suspect to accompany them to a small police room, taking their ticket and driver’s license and not mentioning that they are free to leave, has exceeded the scope of a valid stop based on reasonable suspicion under Terry.

Rule: Investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time; removal to an office was too intrusive.

This detention was a more serious intrusion on his personal liberty than that that is allowable based on mere reasonable suspicion as the least intrusive investigatory means should be used in such stops.
Since the detective’s actions are held to exceed the permissible bounds of an investigative stop, the respondent’s consent to the search of his suitcase is invalid, and the evidence found as a result is the “fruit of the poisonous tree” and must be excluded.

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Moving the Suspect: Pennsylvania v. Mimms.


Facts: Two Philly cops were on a routine patrol when they observed Mimms the defendant driving a car, which had an expired license plate on it. The officer’s stopped the vehicle so they could ticket the driver for the moving violation. The officer pursuant to safety concerns asked the driver (Mimms) to exit the vehicle; he saw a bulge in a sport jacket he was wearing (An Eagle fan no doubt). A frisk of Mimms uncovered a loaded 38-caliber handgun in his waistband and his passenger had a loaded 32 caliber on him as well, so both were arrested for carry concealed firearms without a license and carry a firearm in general on their person without a permit.

Issue: Whether the order to get out of the car, issued after the driver was lawfully detained, was reasonable and thus permissible under the 4th Amendment?

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Rule/Holding: This was a common practice for police to ask motorists who were being cited for motor vehicle violations to step out of their car. Establishing the face-to-face contact between the police and the driver being detained on violation diminishes the possibility that a person will do movements unobserved in their car and assault the officer. Also if the stop is executed in a high traffic area, having the driver step around to the back of his vehicle gets the officer out of the danger of standing in the road near traffic. This amounts to a mere inconvenience for a driver, but is reasonable given a police officer’s concern for his or her safety. By stepping out of the car he only revealed little more than was already visible when he was seated in the vehicle. The bulge in the jacket permitted the officer to conclude that Mimm’s was armed and thus posed a serious and present danger to the safety of the officer. In these circumstances, any man of “reasonable caution” would likely have conducted the “pat down.”

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Moving the Suspect: Maryland v. Wilson.

The driver, stopped for a ticket, has a passenger in his car. Is the officer justified in ordering her out of the car too?

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Holding: Yes, on the public interest side of the balance, the same weighty interest in officer safety is present regardless of whether the occupant of the stopped car is a driver or passenger.

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Length of the detention: US v. Sharpe.

Sharpe and Savage; one of the defendant was driving in a pickup truck and other was following in a car. The officer got reasonable suspicion that the defendants were carrying drugs. While one of the officer pulled over the car, the defendant driving the pickup sped away and the other officer went after him. So to end the story, the defendant was held by police officers for about 20 minutes while the officers conducted investigation. The jury convicted the defendants for possession of marijuana. The court of appeals reversed the conviction stating that since the defendants were detained for about 20 minutes, their detention was an actual arrest and not a Terry investigative stop.

Issue: Were the defendants actually arrested, making thier arrest unlawful since the officers had no probable cause?

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Rule: In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.

Legal Reasoning: The court ruled that the officers acted diligently and reasonably and the defendants were detained for a long period because of the fact that one of the defendant tried to flee from the police. The court ruled that this stop was a Terry investigative stop and not an official arrest because the officers acted diligently and reasonably to conduct the investigation as quickly as possible and any delay was due to the actions of the defendants.

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Protective Sweep

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Is a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of pollice officers or others.

It is narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding.

The sweep lasts no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises.

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Brief Seizure of Property: US v. Place.

Facts. The respondent Raymond Place was met on a Friday by drug enforcement agents on arrival at the airport and he refused to consent to a search of his bags, leading an agent to tell him that they were going to take the bags to a judge to get a search warrant. The agents took the bags to another airport to have the drug detection dogs sniff them, and the dogs reacted positively ninety minutes after seizure of the bags. The agents kept the bags over the weekend, and on Monday they were able to get a search warrant for the bags which yielded cocaine. The trial court convicted the respondent of drug possession, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, claiming that such a prolonged seizure of the respondent’s baggage amounted to a seizure without probable cause counter to the Fourth Amendment. The government was granted certiorari.

Issue. Does the seizure of a person’s luggage for, first, 90 minutes and then an entire weekend until a warrant may be procured violate the Fourth Amendment as exceeding the limits of a Terry stop?

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Standard: When the police seize luggage from the suspect's custody, we think the limitations applicable to investigative detentions of the person should define the permissiible scope of an investigative detention of the person's luggage on less than PC. Under this standard, it is clear that the police conduct here exceeded the permissible limits of a "Terry-type" investigative stop.

Investigative detentions of the person: Terry standard - officer can detain briefly to investigate the circumstances that aroused his suspicion, provided that the investigative detention is properly limited in scope.

Holding: the detention of respondent's luggage in this case went beyond the narrow authority possessed by police to detain briefly luggage reasonably suspected to contain narcotics.

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"Car Frisks": Michigan v. Long.

Facts:
David Long was questioned by police after driving his car off a road and into a shallow ditch in Barry County, Michigan. Officers said he acted erratically and that he, "appeared to be under the influence of something." Noticing a hunting knife on the floor of the car, they conducted a "Terry" protective patdown (named after Terry v. Ohio), but they turned up no weapons. They then conducted a "protective search" of the car with the same justification: searching for weapons. Inside the car, police found an exposed bag of marijuana. In the trunk they found approximately 75 pounds more, and Long was arrested for drug possession.


Issue: May the police, short of PC, search the car to protect themselves from possible weapons that might be hidden inside the passenger compartment.

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Rule: the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonable warrant" the officer in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.

Also, the Supreme Court holds that the principles outlined in Terry also apply to the passenger compartment and trunk of a vehicle if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that a person may be armed and dangerous.

Standard: whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.

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Length of Detention(Terry or de facto arrest): US v. Montoya de Hernandez.

Facts: Montoya de Hernandez entered the United States at Los Angeles International Airport from Bogotá, Colombia. Customs inspectors detained Montoya de Hernandez upon her arrival based upon a suspicion that she was smuggling drugs. After 16 hours and a rectal examination by a physician that produced a balloon containing a foreign substance, she passed balloons filled with cocaine from her alimentary canal. The defendant had claimed that she was pregnant, and she was given the opportunity to undergo an X-ray, but she refused after being informed that she would have to be handcuffed en route to the hospital. Over the next three days, the defendant passed 88 balloons filled with over one pound of cocaine. Overall, the detention lasted nearly 24 hours.

Montoya de Hernandez alleged that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated by an unreasonable detention.


Issue: is this Dunaway custodial, de facto test or a Terry seizure?

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Rule: Using Sharpe, In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.


Holding: The Supreme Court held that the detention of a traveler at the border, beyond the scope of a routine customs search and inspection, is justified at its inception if customs agents, considering all the facts surrounding the traveler and her trip, reasonably suspect that the traveler is smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal; here, the facts, and their rational inferences, known to the customs officials clearly supported a reasonable suspicion that respondent was an alimentary canal smuggler.

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Reasonable Suspicion based on an Anonymous Tip: Florida v. J.L.

Facts. Miami-Dade police were told by an anonymous caller that an armed black male in a plaid shirt was standing at bus stop. There was no audio record of the call, no any other specific information. Two officers were instructed to respond. Upon arriving at the bus stop, the officers saw three black males, one of whom, respondent J.L., was wearing plaid. There was nothing else about the situation that suggested to the police that illegal activity was afoot. The officers could see no firearm, and the respondent did nothing threatening. The officers approached all three men, and frisked them. They found a gun on J.L.’s person.

Issue. “[W]hether an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is, without more, sufficient to justify a police officer’s stop and frisk of that person.”

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Holding: No. “An anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability . . . does not justify a stop and frisk whenever and however it alleges the illegal possession of a firearm.”

Analysis: All the police had to go on in this case was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about J.L.

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Converting Reasonable Suspicion into an Arrest: Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada

Facts. The police received a phone call reporting an assault. The caller reported seeing a man assault a woman in a red and silver GMC truck. An officer was sent to the site to investigate and he saw a truck matching the description parked on the side of the road. There were skid marks near the car leading the office to believe that the truck had come to a sudden stop. A man was standing near the truck and a woman was inside. The officer asked the man for his identification eleven times, but the man refused to provide any. The man began to taunt the officer by telling him to arrest him and take him into jail. The officer eventually arrested the man for his failure to comply.

Question
Did Hiibel's arrest and conviction for not telling a police officer his name violate his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself and his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search?

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Held: the police could demand ID from a suspect, and upheld an officer's decision to arrest for a statutory refusal to comply with the demand.

The court relied on the Terry balancing test, concluding that an "officer's reasonable suspicion that a person may be involved in criminal activity permits the officer to stop the person for a brief time and take additional steps to investigate further."

Questioning a suspect "may help clear a suspect and allow the police to concentrate their efforts elsewhere."

Standard: a Terry stop must be justified at its inception and "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified" the initial stop.

After a legitimate Terry Stop, refusal to provide identity, provides PC to make an arrest if State passes legislation on "stop and identify." This serves important governmental interests.

Context is everything. Court applies "totality of circumstances" will decide the outcome. Failure to respond does not constitute PC.

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Reasonable Suspicion based on Evasion: Illinois v. Wardlow

Facts: Officers Nolan and Harvey were working as uniformed officers in the special operations section of the Chicago Police Department. The officers were driving the last car of a four car caravan converging on an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking in order to investigate drug transactions. The officers were traveling together because they expected to find a crowd of people in the area, including lookouts and customers. Nolan observed Wardlow standing next to the building holding an opaque bag. Respondent looked in the direction of the officers and fled. Nolan and Harvey turned their car around, watched him as he ran through the gangway and an alley, and eventually cornered him on the street. Nolan then exited his car and stopped respondent. He immediately conducted a protective pat-down search for weapons because his experience it was common for there to be weapons in the near vicinity of narcotics transactions. During the frisk, Officer Nolan squeezed the bag respondent was carrying and felt a heavy, hard object similar to the shape of a gun. The officer than opened the bag and found a .38 caliber handgun with five live rounds of ammunition. Wardlow was arrested.

Issue(s): Whether the stop and frisk of the individual violated the Fourth Amendment?

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Holding: No. Headlong flight is the consummate act of evasion: it is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.

Rule: It was not his presence in the area that aroused the officer’s suspicion, but rather his unprovoked flight upon noticing the police. Court uses a "totality of circumstances" test in balancing whether officer's conduct was reasonable.

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Standing: Rakas v. Illinois.

Facts: A police officer on a routine patrol received a radio call notifying him of a robbery of a clothing store in Bourbonnais, and describing the getaway car. Shortly thereafter, the officer spotted an automobile which he thought might be the getaway car. After following the car for some time and after the arrival of assistance, he and several other officers stopped the vehicle. The occupants of the automobile, petitioners and two female companions, were ordered out of the car and, after the occupants had left the car, two officers searched the interior of the vehicle. They discovered a box of rifle shells in the glove compartment, which had been locked, and a sawed-off rifle under the front passenger seat. The petitioners were placed under arrest. At trial, the prosecution offered into evidence a sawed-off rifle and rifle shells that had been seized by police during a search of an automobile in which the petitioners had been passengers. Neither one was the owner of the automobile and both denied owning the rifle or shells seized. Their motion to suppress was denied and they were convicted of armed robbery.

Issue(s): Whether or not the search and seizure of the riffle and shells from the vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment? Whether the petitioners lacked standing to challenge the admissibility of the evidence seized?

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Rule: Personal constitutional rights are violated where the constitutional harm is done to that individually personally, at a place (i.e. her home), or to some thing (e.g. her car or backpack) where and when she possessed a "reasonable expectation of privacy."

Holding: The search and seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the petitioners did not have any possessory interest in the automobile or items seized and therefore, lacked standing to challenge the admissibility.

Person is not a victim even though evidence seized may be introduced against them at trial.

Here, D's can challenge the stop of the car but can't challenge the search of the car without more connection to the car or owner of the car.

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Standing( Over-night Guests): Minnesota v. Olson.

Respondent/Defendant: Olson; the defendant was involved in robbery and murder. The police found out that he was staying with his friends. The police surrounded the house and then made a forced entry and arrested the defendant. The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed the conviction by ruling that since there there were no exigent circumstances, the officers should have obtained a warrant before arresting the defendant. Now the state appeals and argues that they did not need a warrant because the defendant was staying in his friend’s house and also the state asserts that there were exigent circumstances.


Issue:
-If there’s probable cause to arrest someone, can you search someone else’s house where the arrestee is a guest?

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Legal Reasoning: The court ruled that since the defendant was an over night guest, he had reasonable expectation of privacy under Jones v. United States. The court further ruled that since the police had already surrounded the apartment, there were no exigent circumstances and the police should have waited for the defendant to come out of the house. The court ruled that under Payton v. New York, the police officers need a warrant when arresting someone in his house and since the police officers in the current case did not have such warrant, the ruling of the lower court was affirmed.

Long standing social customs confers a reasonable belief that an overnight guest maintains a reasonably interest in privacy. Even when that person has no key.

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Standing: Commercial Guests - Minnesota v. Carter.

Respondent/Defendant: Carter and Johns; the defendants were bagging cocaine in the apartment of a person whom they did not know before and they were in the apartment purely for business purposes. An officer observed the defendants bagging cocaine through a gap in the closed blind. The defendants were later arrested. Upon appeal, the defendants argued that their arrest was the result of the original unlawful search (officer seeing through the gap) and it was the fruit of a ‘poisonous tree’. The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed the conviction and now the state appeals.

Issue: 1. Did the defendants have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment?

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Legal Reasoning: The court ruled that unlike Minnesota v. Olson, the defendants in the current case were in the apartment only for commercial purposes and they were there only for about 2 and a half hours. The court stated that the defendants had no prior relations with the owner of the apartment before the day of the arrest and their sole purpose for being in the apartment was to conduct business. So the court ruled that the defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment. The decision of the lower court was reversed.

Factors court looks at:
1) Commercial transaction and
2) Illegality of transaction

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Standing: (search of another person's container) Rawlings v. Kentucky

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An individual does not have standing to complain about the constitutionality of the search of another person's container (containing his drugs).

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How does a defendant sustain the burden of proving that her 4th Amend rights have been violated?

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Factors to be considered:
1) property ownership;
2) whether the defendant has a possessory interest in the thing seized;
3) whether the D has a possessory interest in the place searched;
4) whether the D has the right to exclude others from that place;
5) whether the D has exhibited a subjective expectation that the place would remain free from governmental invasion; and
6) whether the D took normal precautions to maintain privacy.

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Faulty Search Warrants Obtained in "Good Faith": US v. Leon.

Statement of the facts: Police officers initiated surveillance of Leon’s (D) activities. A search warrant was issued pursuant to that surveillance. A large quantity of drugs were seized. D was charged with violations of federal drug-trafficking laws. At trial, the court granted D’s suppression motion because the warrant was not issued on probable cause. Specifically, the court found that the warrant contained allegations of an untested informant and limited corroboration by the police. The court of appeals affirmed; they refused to accept a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Issue(s): Whether the Fourth amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant that is subsequently held to be defective?

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Holding: The 4th Amendment’s exclusionary rule should be modified to permit the introduction of evidence obtained in the reasonable good-faith belief that a search or seizure was in accord with the 4th Amendment.

Rule: the "good-faith exception" to the exclusionary rule is an objective test, i.e., the police officer's reliance on the otherwise invalid search warrant must be reasonable: "whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization."

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Faulty Search Warrants Obtained in "Good Faith": Massachussetts v. Sheppard.


FACTS:
A body was found, and police questioned V’s boyfriend, D
D said that he was at a gaming place that night, but it turns out that he was gone for a 2-hour period when he borrowed someone’s car
The car was searched and blood stains and wire similar to that found near the body were found
A search warrant was prepared on a controlled substances search warrant application, and some changes were made
A judge then made changes of his own and issued the warrant without changing the reference to controlled substances and w/o incorporating the affidavit

ISSUE: Did officers reasonably rely on a search warrant issued by a judge that was defective because it included a authorization to search for materials for which the officers had no PC and it didn’t incorporate the supporting affidavit?

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Holding: Yes

REASONING:
Reasonable belief: No dispute that the officers believed that the warrant was valid, and there was an objectively reasonable basis for the officers’ mistaken belief
Reasonable police officer could conclude that the warrant authorized a search for those items contained in the warrant
Officers are not required to disbelieve a judge how had advised an officer and assured him that it authorized the search
Police conduct was reasonable and largely error-free

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Faulty Search Warrants Obtained in "Good Faith": Groh v. Ramirez.

Facts: Issue(s): Joseph Ramirez and members of his family, live on a large ranch in Butte-Silver Bow County, Montana. Groth is a special agent for ATF. In 1997 a concerned citizen informed petitioner that a number of visits to respondent’s ranch the visitor had seen a large stock of weaponry, including an automatic rifle, grenades, a grenade launcher, and rocket launcher. The agent prepared a search warrant, which was for “any automatic firearms or parts to automatic weapons, destructive devices to include but not limited to grenades, grenade launchers, rocket launchers, and any and all receipts pertaining to the purchase or manufacture of automatic weapons or explosive devices or launchers”. Although the application particularly described the place to be searched and the contraband petitioner expected to find, the warrant itself was less specific; it failed to identify any of the items that petitioner intended to seize, petitioner typed a description of respondent’s two-story blue house rather than the alleged stockpile of firearms. The warrant did not incorporate by reference the itemized list contained in the application. It did, however, recite that the Magistrate was satisfied the affidavit established probable cause to believe that contraband was concealed on the premises, and that sufficient grounds existed for the warrants issuance. When they executed the warrant, Joseph Ramirez was not home, but his wife and children were. Groth states that he orally described the objects of the search to Mrs. Ramirez in person and to Mr. Ramirez by telephone. Mrs. Ramirez said that he only stated that he was searching for an “explosive device in a box”. The officers did not find any illegal weapons.

Issue(s): Whether the search violated the Fourth Amendment, and if so, whether petitioner nevertheless is entitled to qualified immunity, given that a Magistrate Judge, relying on an affidavit that particularly described the items in question, found probable cause to conduct the search?

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Majority: The majority held that the warrant did not completely comply within the textual meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This is because it did not “particularly describe the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized”. Moreover, in the space set aside for a description of the items to be seized, the warrant stated that the items consisted of a “single dwelling residence… blue in color” and did not describe the items to be seized.

But in this case the warrant did not incorporate other documents by reference, nor did either the affidavit or the application (which had been placed under seal) accompany the warrant. Hence, we need not further explore the matter of incorporation

Rather, in the space set aside for a description of the items to be seized, the warrant stated that the items consisted of a "single dwelling residence ... blue in color." In other words, the warrant did not describe the items to be seized at all. In this respect the warrant was so obviously deficient that we must regard the search as "warrantless" within the meaning of our case law.

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"Knock and Announce" Violations & Abolition of Exclusionary Rule: Hudson v. Michigan.

Facts: Police obtained a warrant authorizing a search for drugs and firearms at the home of petitioner Booker Hudson. They discovered both. Large quantities of drugs were found, including cocaine rocks in Hudson’s pocket. A loaned gun was lodged between the cushion and armrest of the chair in which he was sitting. Hudson was charged under Michigan law with unlawful drug and firearm possession. When police arrived to execute the warrant, they announced their presence, but waited only a short time – perhaps “three to five seconds” ---before turning the knob of the unlocked front door and entering Hudson’s home. Hudson moved to suppress all the inculpatory evidence, arguing that the premature entry violated his Fourth Amendment rights. He was convicted of drug possession.


Issue(s): Whether the exclusionary rule is appropriate for violation of the knock-and-announce requirement?

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Holding: A violation of the “knock and announce” rule by police does not require the suppression of evidence found during the search.

Analysis: the Court applied the cost-benefit test and noted that the exclusionary ruled should not be indiscriminately applied, but rather reserved for situations "where its remedial objectives are though most efficaciously served," i.e., "where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs."

Our cases show that but-for causality is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for suppression. In this case, of course, the constitutional violation of an illegal manner of entry was not a but-for cause of obtaining the evidence. Scalia also states that the knock-and-announce-rule protects police officers from people inside the home who might want to retaliate against them.

Only where the deterrence effect outweighs the social cost shall exclusionary rule be applied.

Deterrence = what do you want to incentivize.

By increasing more waiting time on the part of offices, you're putting them more at risk to danger and evidence suppression. You would be over-deterring here.

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Abolition of Exclusionary Rule & Negligent Recordkeeping: Herring v. US.


Facts: Investigator Mark Anderson learned that Bennie Herring had driven to the Coffee Country Sheriffs Department to retrieve something from his impounded truck. Herring was no stranger to law enforcement and Anderson asked the warrant clerk Sandy Pope to check for any outstanding warrants for Herrings arrest. When she found none, he contacted Sharon Morgan, a warrant clerk on the neighboring country. She was able to come up with an active warrant for Herrings arrest for failure to appear for Felony charges. Anderson and a deputy followed Herring out of the impound lot, pulled him over and a search incident to arrest found drugs and a gun. Herring was arrested. However, there had been a mistake about the warrant. The Dale County sheriffs computer records are suppose to correspond to actual arrest warrants, which the office maintains. But when Morgan went to the files to retrieve the actual warrant to fax to Pope, Morgan was unable to find it. She called a court clerk and learned that the warrant had been recalled five months earlier. For whatever reason this information about the recall did not appear in the computer database. After Morgan contacted Pope who contacted Anderson over a secure radio, Herring had already been placed under arrest.


Issue(s): Whether the exclusionary rule should be applied to evidence found as a result of an unlawful arrest, when in-fact, the officers were acting out of “good-faith”?

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Holding: The court held that as long as the officers are acting in good-faith and that their conduct was not deliberate, reckless or grossly negligent, than the exclusionary rule does not apply.

Here the officers only acted negligently.

You can't cure negligence but you can cure systematic and reckless misconduct.

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Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: Silverthorne Lumber Company v. US.


Facts: An indictment upon a single specific charge having been brought against the two Silverthorne’s mentioned, they both were arrested at their homes early in the morning of February 25th and were detained in custody a number of hours. While they were thus detained representatives of the Department of Justice and the United States marshal without a shadow of authority went to the office of their company and made a clean sweep of all the books, papers and documents found there. The evidence was turned over to the District Attorney who planned to use it against the defendants.

Issue(s): Whether the evidence seized through an unlawful search can be used against the defendants during trial?

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Holding: The essence of the exclusionary rule is not merely that illegally seized evidence not be used in court, but that the prosecution should not be permitted to use such evidence at all.

However, when the police obtain knowledge of the same facts through an independent source, the prosecution is not barred from attempting to prove such facts.

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Attenuation (or "Dissipation of Taint") Doctrine: Wong Sun v. US.

Facts: Hom Way was arrested iwht heroin, bought ounce from Blackie Toy, owner of laundry mat James Wah Toy. Cops went to his place, he closed door, they broke open and arrest him, no dope there. He ratted out this guy Johnny Yee. Yee took from bureau heroin and surrendered them. Said he got it from Toy and a guy named Sea Dog known as Wong Sun. They searched Wong Sun’s apartment, no dope. Toy, Wong Sun, and Yee (petitioners) were interrogated separately. Toy and Wong Sun refused to sign their statement, although both refused to sign statements but admitted their accuracy.

“The Government’s evidence tending to prove the petitioners’ possession (the petitioners offered no exculpatory testimony) consisted of four items which the trial court admitted over timely objections that they were inadmissible as ‘fruits’ of unlawful arrests or of attendant searches: (1) the statements made orally by petitioner Toy in his bedroom at the time of his arrest; (2) the heroin surrendered to the agents by [ ] Yee; (3) petitioner Toy’s pretrial unsigned statement; and (4) petitioner Wong Sun’s similar statement.”

Issues: Can testimony and free will statement fall under the exclusionary rule following and unlawful search and seizures?

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Holding: although the D was initially arrested w/o probable cause, where he had been released for several days after the arrest and then returned voluntarily to make a statement, the statement was admissible despite the initial illegal arrest b/c "the connection b/t the arrest and the statement had become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint."

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Attenuation: Brown v. Illinois.

Facts: Brown was arrested at his apartment without probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. While in custody, he made incriminating statements after being read the Miranda warnings and voluntarily waiving his constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda. The statement came less than two hours after the illegal arrest, and there was no intervening event of significance whatsoever.

ISSUE: Did Miranda warnings sufficiently attenuate the taint of an illegal arrest in order from them to be admissible into evidence?

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Held: No.


Rule: Courts have applied four factors in determining when the connection b/t a Fourth Amendment violation and a fruit has become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint:
1) the length of time that has elapsed b/t the initial illegality and the seizure of the fruit in question;
2) the flagrancy of the initial misconduct (dissipation of bad-faith violations takes longer than with good-faith violations);
3) the existence or absence of intervening causes of the seizure of the fruit; and
4) the presence or absence of an act of free will by the defendant resulting in the seizure of the fruit.

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Independent Source: Murray v. US.

Facts: Based on information received from informants, federal law enforcement agents had been surveilling petitioner Murray and several of his co-conspirators. At about 1:45 p.m. on April 6th, 1983, they observed Murray drive a truck and Carter drive a green camper, into a warehouse in South Boston. When the petitioners drove the vehicles out about 20 minutes later, the surveilling agents saw within the warehouse two individuals and a tractor-trailer rig bearing a long, dark container. Murray and Carter later turned over the truck and camper to other drivers who were in turn followed and ultimately arrested, and the vehicles lawfully seized. Both vehicles were found to contain marijuana. After receiving this information, several of the agents converged on the South Boston warehouse and forced entry. They found the warehouse unoccupied, but observed in plain view numerous burlap-wrapped bales that were later found to contain marijuana. They left without disturbing the bales, kept the warehouse under surveillance, and did not reenter it until they had a search warrant. In applying for the warrant, the agents did not mention the prior entry, and did not rely on any observations made during that entry. When the warrant was issued at 10:40p.m., approximately eight hours after the initial entry, the agents immediately reentered the warehouse and seized 270 bales of marijuana and notebooks listing customers for whom the bales were destined.

Issue(s): Whether the independent source doctrine applies if evidence is initially discovered unlawfully, but is later obtained lawfully in a manner independent of the original discovery?

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Holding: The court held that the independent doctrine does apply if the evidence was seen during an unlawful search but is later obtained during a lawful search, as long as the evidence in question was not the basis for probable cause to issue the warrant.

RUle: the search pursuant to the warrant must in fact be a genuinely independent source of the information and tangible evidence at issue here.

Here the detectives based their warrant on all the information obtained prior to the illegal entry.

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Independent Discovery: Nix v. Williams.

Brief Fact Summary. Williams was arrested for the murder of a 10 year old girl whose body he disposed of along a gravel road. State law enforcement officials engaged in a search for the child’s body. During the search, in response to an officer’s appeal for assistance, Williams made statements to the police (without an attorney present) which helped lead them to the body. Williams was only read his Miranda rights after he was arrested.


Issue. Whether evidence, which ultimately results in arrest, should be excluded from trial because it was improperly obtained.

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Rule: If the prosecution can establish that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means - here the volunteers' search - then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be received.

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Police Interrogation Without Torture: Lisenba v. California

Robert James (defendant) was indicted for the murder of his wife. During interrogation, James confessed to the murder and the trial court allowed the confession to be admitted, holding that it was made voluntarily. The confession was made after James had been held in police custody for nearly two days, prior to being arraigned and without counsel. While James claims the police beat him, it is corroborated only that James had been slapped once. Also, James did not mention any mistreatment, save the slap, until trial, even when the district attorney asked how the police were treating him. A few days after this initial interrogation, another man, Hope, was arrested for the murder as well. Hope made statements incriminating James. At this time, James was removed from jail and again questioned, this time for over 12 hours, without his attorney being present, when he finally told his side of the story, placing Hope as the mastermind of the murder scheme. James claims that he confessed after being threatened by an officer. The state argued that James confessed after an officer agreed to take him to a restaurant to get something to eat.

Issue: whether D was coerced into a confession.

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Held: upheld the death penalty where the defendant was held for over 24 hours, slapped and deprived of sleep and food, after which a confession was made.

Court looks at all the surrounding circumstances including individual characteristics of D in concluding whether D's due process was violated b/c it wasn't voluntary: length of interrogation, physical conditions(food, water, isolated, sleep), deception.

Standard: whether individual's will was overborne by official pressure which makes his confession not voluntary.

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Police Interrogation Without Torture: Spano v. New York.


Petitioner/Defendant: Spano; the defendant was an Italian American. One night, while the defendant was at a bar, an ex-boxer took his money and when the defendant followed the ex-boxer, he was severely beaten by the boxer. Spano went to his house and got a gun and went to a candy store where the ex-boxer was and the defendant shot and killed the ex-boxer. The store employee saw this shooting. The defendant disappeared for one week and the grand jury charged the defendant for 1st degree murder. Then defendant called his friend, who was about to become a police officer, and the defendant told him that he is going to turn himself in. Defendant, with the help of an attorney, turned himself in and the attorney instructed the defendat not to say anything to the police officers. The officers interrogated the defendant for about 8-10 hours and they even used defendant’s friend to get a conviction out of him. Finally the defendant gave in and confessed. The confession was used by trial court and defendant was sentenced to death.

Issue: Was the confession of the defendant voluntary?

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Holding: No

Legal Reasoning: The court stated that the police had a witness to the crime and they had the defendant charged with 1st degree, so the only intent the officers had was to get a confession out of the defendant. The court further observed that the defendant was put through long hours of interrogation and his friend was used by the officers to get the confession out of him and they ignored his reasonable requests not to answer and to speak with an attorney. So the court ruled that the defendant “was overborne by official pressure, fatigue and sympathy falsely aroused” which makes his confession not voluntary. The conviction was reversed.

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Miranda v. Arizona


Statement of the facts: Miranda (D) was arrested and taken to the police station where officers questioned him for two hours. D signed a confession. The confession stated that it was made voluntarily and that D had full knowledge of his legal rights. D’s confession was used against him at trial and over D’s objection. D was convicted of rape and kidnapping. The state supreme court affirmed the conviction. D appealed.

Legal issue: Must law enforcement officials inform an accused of his constitutional rights? Are statements obtained from an individual subjected to custodial police interrogation admissible if he has not been notified of his privilege under the 5th Amendment not to be compelled to incriminate himself?

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Holding: Incriminating statements made by an individual are only admissible if the following safeguards have been taken; and/or, when a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom, the following warnings must be given: he has the right to remain silent; that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law; that he has the right to have an attorney present; and if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him.

Once these warnings have been given, a person may knowingly and intelligently waive his rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement.

If a person indicates a desire to remain silent or have an attorney present at any time during questioning, the interrogation must cease or cease until an attorney is p! resent. The admissibility of volunteered confessions or statements is not affected by this decision.

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Miranda Custody: Oregon v. Mathiason

Facts. The Respondent, Carl Mathiason (the “Respondent”), was convicted of first-degree burglary. His confession was critical to the case. A police officer left the Respondent his card after being told by a burglary victim that the Respondent was the only person she could think that would rob her home. The Respondent came to the police station and was told he was not under arrest. The officer told the Respondent that he thought he was involved in the burglary and lied to him that his fingerprints were found on the scene. The defendant then confessed to taking the property. After the confession, the officer read the Respondent his Miranda rights. Thereafter, he taped a confession. The Respondent was then again informed that he was not under arrest at the time and released to go home and to his job. During trial, the Respondent moved to suppress the confession because it was not preceded by Miranda warnings.

Issues: If a defendant comes in voluntarily to speak about a crime, and gives a confession when questioned about the crime, is it a violation of the 5th and 6th?

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Rule: Miranda – “By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”

Court relied on 3 factors to hold that a defendant could be interviewed at the station house w/o Miranda warnings:
1) the D was a parolee who was "invited" by police to come to the station house and so his presence there was "voluntary;"
2) he was told during his interview that he as "not under arrest;" and
3) after making incriminating statements, he was released as promised, although he was arrest later.

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Miranda Custody: Berkemer v. McCarty

Statement of the facts: Petitioner’s officer stopped respondent’s vehicle and asked if respondent had been using intoxicants. Respondent replied yes. Respondent was arrested, asked again about the use of intoxicants, and again answered in the affirmative. Respondent was never advised of respondent’s constitutional rights.

Issues: Does the Fifth Amendment require that Miranda warnings be given in misdemeanor cases? Does the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop constitute custodial interrogation?

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Rule: A person who is subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to Miranda warnings regardless of the severity of the crime. However, one is not entitled to the warnings until custody occurs. Questioning before arrest does not trigger the right to Miranda warnings.

Holding: The Supreme Court, Justice Marshall, held that: (1) motorist's statements made at station house were inadmissible since, at least as of moment he was formally arrested following traffic stop and instructed to get into police car, he was “in custody” and since he had not been informed of his constitutional rights; (2) roadside questioning of motorist detained pursuant to routine traffic stop did not constitute “custodial interrogation” for purposes of Miranda rule, so that prearrest statements motorist made in answer to such questioning were admissible against motorist;

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Miranda Interrogation: Rhode Island v. Innis

Respondent/Defendant: Innis, the defendant was arrested for murder of a taxi driver and robbery of another taxi driver. At the time of the arrest the defendant was unarmed and the officers read the Miranda warnings to the defendant on two different occassions and the defendant asked for a lawyer. The officers did not find the weapon and the defendant was placed in a caged wagon to be transported to the police station. On their way to the police station, two of the transporting officers started a conversation. The conversation was about the little handicap children finding the defendant’s gun and then possibly shooting themselves. The defendant could not take it any longer and he intervened and told the officers to return to the arresting spot so he can show them where the weapon was. The weapon was used as evidence to convice the defendant.

Issue: Did the conversation between the two officers mount up to the level of custodial interrogation?

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Rule: Custodial interrogation includes express questioning or its functional equivalent ( “any words or actions on the part of the police) (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”

Factors court focused on:
1) the police conversation was "brief" not "evocative;"
2) it was not directed to Innis but merely overheard by him;
3) the police had no knowledge of any "peculiar" susceptibility of Innis to an appeal for the safety of handicapped children, and they knew of no disorientation or upset suffered by Innis as the time of arrest; and
4) the incriminating response of the D was "unforseeable."

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Waiver and Invocation of Miranda Rights: North Carolina v. Butler

Facts: Butler (defendant) was arrested and convicted of kidnapping, armed robbery, and felonious assault. After his arrest, Butler was given his Miranda warnings. He was also given a form to read outlining his rights. When asked, Butler said that he understood his rights. He refused to sign the form indicating that he waived his rights, but agreed to talk to the agents and made self-incriminating statements. Butler never requested an attorney or tried to stop the agent’s questions. Butler sought to have his statements excluded from evidence, arguing that he had not waived his right to counsel at the time the statements were made.

ISSUE: Must officers obtain an express waiver from a D of his Miranda rights as a necessary condition for the admissibility of subsequent statements?

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HOLDING: No.

REASONING:
Not about form: The question is not one of form, but rather whether the D in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in Miranda
Mere silence is not enough, however
But in some cases, waiver can be inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated
D gave waiver: No doubt that D was adequately and effectively apprised of his rights
No reason why an express waiver need be a precondition to admissibility

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Invocation & Waiver: Edwards v. Arizona

Facts: D was arrested, and received Miranda warnings. He invoked his right to counsel by saying that he wanted to talk to an attorney before making a “deal.” The next day, D was required to meet with the police again; the police gave D new warnings, obtained a waiver, interrogated D, and obtained incriminating statements about the crime for which he had been arrested.

Issue: Once a D invokes the right to counsel, and police cut off questioning, may police approach D to seek a waiver so that interrogation may occur?

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Rule: When an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that D responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation, even if D has been advised of his rights again. Furthermore, a D whose invocation has implicitly expressed the desire to deal with police only through counsel is not subject to further questioning until counsel has been made available to D, unless the D initiates further “communication, exchanges, or conversations” with the police.

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Invocation & Waiver: Berghuis v. Thompkins

Overview: Petitioner inmate did not say that he wanted to remain silent or that he did not want to talk with the police. Had he made either of those simple, unambiguous statements, he would have invoked his right to cut off questioning. He did neither, so he did not invoke his right to remain silent. There was no basis to conclude that he did not understand his rights; and it fol- lowed that he chose not to invoke or rely on those rights when he did speak. His answer to a detective's question about whether the inmate prayed to God for forgiveness for shooting the victim was a course of conduct indicat- ing waiver of the right to remain silent. If the inmate wanted to remain silent, he could have said nothing in response to the detective's questions, or he could have unambiguously invoked his Miranda rights and ended the interrogation. The fact that the inmate made the state- ment about three hours after receiving a Miranda warn- ing did not overcome the fact that he engaged in a course of [**1099] conduct indicating waiver. There was no evidence that the statement was coerced.

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Rule: A suspect who has re- ceived and understood the Miranda warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right to re- main silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police.

Holding: Thompkins did not invoke his right to remain silent and stop the questioning. Understanding his rights in full, he waived his right to remain silent by making a voluntary statement to the police. The police, moreover, were not required to obtain a waiver of Thompkins's right to remain silent before interrogating him.

Rule: invocation of right to silence has to be clear and unambiguous.

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Invocation & Waiver: Florida v. Powell

Kevin D. Powell was convicted in a Florida state court of being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced to 10 years in prison. Mr. Powell appealed arguing that his Miranda warning was invalid because the written form used by the Tampa police at his arrest did not explicitly indicate that he had a right to an attorney at his questioning. The court of appeals agreed and reversed the conviction. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that informing a defendant that he has the right to “talk with an attorney” is not sufficient to inform him of his right to have counsel present.

Issue: whether advice that a suspect has "the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of [the law enforcement officers'] questions," and that he can invoke this right "at any time . . . during th[e] interview," satisfies Miranda.

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Rule: whether the warnings reasonably 'conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda.

Holding: In combination, the two warnings reasonably conveyed Powell's right to have an attorney present, not only at [**1020] the outset of interrogation, but at all times.