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89 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Requirement of a Voluntary Act: ROBINSON V. CALIFORNIA
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Robinson was convicted under a California statute that made it an offense for a person to “be addicted to the use of narcotics.” The Supreme Court struck down the statute on Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds.
Essentially, the Court held that, although a legislature may use criminal sanctions against specific acts associated with narcotics addiction, e.g., the unauthorized manufacture, sale, purchase, or possession of narcotics, it could not criminalize the status of being an addict, which the Court analogized to other illnesses. |
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Requirement of a Voluntary Act: POWELL V. TEXAS
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Powell was charged with violating a Texas statute that prohibited drunkenness in a public place. Powell argued that he was a chronic alcoholic and was thus unable to prevent appearing drunk in public and sought relief under the reasoning of Robinson. The Court upheld his conviction, distinguishing the case from Robinson on the ground that Powell was being punished for the act of public drunkenness and not for his status as a chronic alcoholic.
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Requirement of a Voluntary Act: TX view on unconsciousness / sleep activities
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Unknown, must look at TX case law to decide
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Requirement of a Voluntary Act: Automatism
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Automatism is the state of a person who, though capable of action, is not conscious of what he was doing.
A person who acts automatically does so without intent, exercise of free will, or knowledge of the act. In some situations, liability may be base don voluntary action taken before the accused became unconscious (i.e., deciding to drive when you know you are prone to seizures). |
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An omission may be a crime if...
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...a known legal duty is breached: contract, statute (filing taxes), relationship (parent/child), voluntary assumption of care, creation of danger, control conduct of others.
KUNTZ |
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Omissions: American Bystander Rule
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There is no duty to be a good Samaritan and help someone in need.
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Omissions: TPC and MPC
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Omissions ok unless a law makes it an offense or creates a duty.
Kuntz v. Montana |
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CL Larceny is a crime against...
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... possession, not title.
Welch v. Commonwealth (stealing TV from Lowe's) |
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CL Larceny by False Pretenses is different from CL Larceny...
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... because it relaxes the trespass element of larceny.
Similar to larceny, it only addresses possession. Commonwealth v. Reske: selling multiple cars to the retarded man. Croy v. State: promise to pay with a good check in the future; not LFP because misrepresentation cannot be of future facts. |
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CL Larceny by False Pretenses does not apply to future promises because...
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... potential chilling effect it might have on business transactions, would address civil wrongs, don't like debtor's prison.
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CL Embezzlement...
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... was not a crime because there was no trespassory taking.
Commonwealth v. Moreton: the auctioneer fails to pay on the tuna, but there was no evidence of fraudulent intent. Also, no trust relationship was formed in the consignment deal. |
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CL Robbery: Pick-pockets and Purse-snatchers
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They are not robbers unless the victim resists and force is used. But, if the item is attached to the victim's body and force is used, a robbery has been committed.
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Continuing Robbery
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A robbery is continuing until the person reaches a place of temporary safety because the risk that a robber will carry out his armed threat still exists until he is in a place of safety.
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CL Extortion Case
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State v. Harrington: A demand for settlement of a civil action along with a malicious threat to expose criminal conduct constitutes extortion.
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CL Extortion
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... could only be committed by a public official.
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CL Extortion and the 1st Amendment
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A statute can be unconstitutionally overbroad if it proscribes expression protected by the 1st Amendment.
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Burglary: Breaking and Entering
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Where a breaking is still required, it can be either actual or constructive... can be as simply as opening a door.
If an actor has access to house, but not to certain rooms, he can be found guilty of burglarizing those rooms. Entry can be obtained by any part of the actor's body or an instrument under his control if used to consummate a criminal objective. People v. Sparks: entry into the victim's bedroom with the specific intent to commit rape was a burglary even though he had been allowed to enter the house. |
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Assault Case
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United States v. McKinney: given the previous occasion where defendant drove her truck directly at the victim, it was reasonable for the victim to have an immediate fear of battery.
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Kidnapping Case
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State v. Dixon: A kidnapping is essentially incidental to another crime if...
(1) the removal or confinement did not substantially increase the risk of harm to the victim, (2) the victim's movement was slight, (3) the confinement was brief, AND (4) the victim was not harmed in any way. **A majority of courts now hold that kidnapping statutes do not apply to unlawful confinements or movements incidental to the commission of other felonies. |
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Mens Rea: Object Dimension v. Level Dimension
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Object Dimension: Which non-mental element is m/r directed towards?
Level Dimension: P, K, R, or N **Note: Different elements might require different levels. |
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MPC Deliberate Ignorance
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One may not willfully choose to remain ignorant or a fact in order to escape liability.
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MPC view of "Negligence"
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Since negligence is an exceptional basis of liability, it should be excluded as a basis unless explicitly prescribed.
**Jurisdictions vary widely in applying these rules. |
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SCOTUS on Mens Rea
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Morissette v. US: the presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements which criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.
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Mens Rea as to the Punishment
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Courts are generally reluctant to hold that a statutory crime requires culpable mental state regarding a fact that determines only the degree or seriousness of the crime.
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Specific Intent Cases
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Lambert v. California: generally, ignorance of the law is no excuse, but in this case it was since the woman had no notice that it was a crime for a registered felon to not register (courts are more likely to read m/r into omission crimes).
Ratzlaff v. US: ignorance of the law is no excuse for something that anyone should know is wrong (here, structuring). FROM THE LEXIS OUTLINE: Generally speaking, a “specific intent” offense is one in which the definition of the crime: (1) includes an intent or purpose to do some future act, or to achieve some further consequence (i.e., a special motive for the conduct), beyond the conduct or result that constitutes the actus reus of the offense, e.g., “breaking and entering of the dwelling of another in the nighttime with intent to commit a felony”; or (2) provides that the defendant must be aware of a statutory attendant circumstance, e.g., “receiving stolen property with knowledge that it is stolen.” |
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Factors in Determining if a Crime is Strict Liability
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-public welfare regulation
-knowledge of dangerousness alerts defendant to possible regulation -small penalty -damage to defendant's reputation -clear statement from legislature |
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Strict Liability Case
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Staples v. US: carrying a gun is traditionally lawful conduct and the penalty for the crime of carrying an automatic weapon is severe, so the government should have to prove that he knew he was carrying a fully automatic weapon.
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The Winship Doctrine
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Prosecution's Burden of Persuasion
Pursuant to the due process clause, a person charged with a crime is presumed innocent and, to enforce this presumption, the Supreme Court held in In re Winship that the prosecution must persuade the fact-finder beyond a reasonable doubt of “every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged.” This rule has come to be known as “the Winship doctrine.” |
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Burden of Proof / Persuasion Cases
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Winship
Gaudin Mullaney Patterson Apprendi |
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Gaudin
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The JURY must determine whether the prosecution has proved all elements of a defense BRD.
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Mullaney
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The Court found that the murder instruction violated the Winship doctrine, as it essentially shifted to the defendant the burden of disproving an element of the offense – that the homicide was not “unlawful” as defined in the statute.
Presuming elements of a crime is not ok. |
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Patterson
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In contrast to Mullaney – where the absence of heat of passion (or any other justification or excuse) was an element of murder – absence of “extreme emotional disturbance” was not an element of the New York murder statute. Rather, existence of such a condition was an express affirmative defense to murder that mitigated the crime to manslaughter. As a non-element of murder, the state could properly place the burden of proving its existence on the defendant.
The significant facts here related only to punishment. |
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Apprendi
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Any fact that can increase the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum defined in statute must go to the jury and be proven BRD.
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Burdens on the State
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-burden of production and persuasion on every element.
-burden of pleading the facts to establish defendant's guilt. -affirmative defenses do not have to be pled or disproven unless the defendant has first raised the defense and met his burden of proof. -prosecutor would have the burden to move back to beyond a reasonable doubt after a defense has been presented. |
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Burdens on the Defense
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-burden of production on internal defenses - raise some evidence to negate one element.
-burden of production and persuasion for affirmative defenses (depends on jurisdiction). **At CL, the defendant bore the burden of proving all affirmative defenses. |
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Under the MPC, MOF can only negate...
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...a m/r of P, K, or R.
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MOF Burden
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Defendant has the burden of raising the issue, not proving it.
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MOF Cases
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Wilson v. Tard: Defendant only has to raise the defense but not prove it.
State v. Sexton: MOF must negate M/R and be in good faith to be a defense to specific intent crime. MOF must negate M/R and be reasonable to be a defense to a general intent crime. |
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MOL
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Generally not an excuse, but there are exceptions.
Type 1: Negates M/R; internal defense. Cheek v. United States: defendant must know that he is legally required to file income taxes; disagreement doesn't negate willfulness. Type 2: doesn't affect the elements of the crime but gives defendant an excuse; affirmative defense. Ostrosky v. State: MOL valid defense because he was relying on a court opinion saying he could go fish. **Entrapment by Estoppel. |
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Claim of Right
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Internal Defense negating the intent to steal or permanently deprive; does not apply to forcible takings.
Bartlett v. State: a man takes his truck back from another man he sold it to as payment for another debt which had yet to be repaid; the conviction for grand theft was reversed. |
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Voluntary Intoxication Cases
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Weaver v. State: Terry test for culpable M/R - was defendant able to devise a plan? operate equipment? instruct others? carry out acts requiring physical skill? Courts says no, so conviction overturned. SUPREME COURT LATER REVERSED UNDER FERGUSON REASONING BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT WAS ABLE TO DO PHYSICAL ACTS.
Montana v. Egelhoff: it is not unconstitutional to not allow a defendant the opportunity to present evidence of VI. |
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Involuntary Intoxication
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Defendant was unaware that the substance he was ingesting was intoxication or was compelled by quite direct action of another to ingest something he knew was intoxicating.
Could be involuntary if resulting from the ingestion of a prescription medication that the defendant didn't know was intoxicating. |
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Involuntary Intoxication: Settled Insanity Doctrine
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A defendant may assert an insanity defense based on mental impairment related to or arising from prior voluntary use of intoxicants as long as that condition is in some sense independent of the immediate intoxication from the defendant's use of substances.
The impairment must be permanent and the use of intoxicant must have been for an extended time. |
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Rape Reform Laws
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Under the old rules, it was very hard for victim's to prove rape, so the reform caused a shift from focusing on victim's response to emphasizing defendants behavior.
EX) eliminate marital exception, prevent past sexual history of victim from being used, allow more expert testimony. |
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Rape: When M/R attaches to consent, when is MOF instruction appropriate (4 tests)?
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-when defendant raises some evidence of GOOD FAITH BELIEF in consent
-when defendant raises evidence of REASONABLE AND GOOD FAITH BELIEF in consent; state must prove BRD that defendant's MOF was N -defendant raises substantial evidence of EQUIVOCAL CONDUCT that leads to reasonable and good faith mistaken belief in consent -defendant proves by POE that REASONABLE PERSON WOULD BELIEVE victim consented |
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Rape Cases
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Commonwealth v. Lopez: M/R doesn't attach to consent, so it doesn't matter what defendant believed, the only thing that matters is whether or not the victim actually consented; here, she did not.
Commonwealth v. Berkowitz: the statute is ambiguous, and the court determines that the girl must have resisted in order to find that the defendant used force. seems to be going back in time. MTS Case: the force required was only the force ordinarily necessary to have sex. |
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Rape: Fraud in Factum v. Fraud in the Inducement
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Fraud in Factum: if the deception causes a misunderstanding as the the act itself there is no legally recognized consent.
Fraud in the Inducement: consent induced by fraud is as effective as any other consent if the deception relates not to the thing done but merely to some collateral matter. |
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Statutory Rape: MOF
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No defense of MOF.
Some states have by statute modified the traditional position and accommodated some claims of mistake as to the victim's age. |
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Homicide: Status of a Fetus
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Traditional: A fetus is not a person; homicide is committed only if a fetus is born alive and expires as a result of injuries sustained either before or after birth.
Minority: A homicide prosecution can be based upon causing the death of a viable fetus. |
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Homicide: Traditional Definition of Death
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... Cessation of heartbeat and respiration. More modern definitions include the absence of brain activity.
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Depraved Heart Murder Case
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Jeffries v. State: Factors a jury must consider in determining whether a defendant has displayed extreme indifference to the value of human life - (1) social utility of actor's conduct, (2) magnitude of the risk his conduct creates, (3) actor's knowledge of the risk, AND (4) any precautions the actor takes to minimize the risk.
**Some courts assume that only if an accused's conduct creates a high risk of death to many persons does it constitute this sort of murder. |
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Premeditation
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(1) Willful Conduct / Intent to Kill
(2) Deliberation: weighing process / considering the consequences (not HOP) State v. Thompson: The passage of time is not always sufficient to show premeditation. |
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Voluntary Manslaughter: 2 Tests
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Objective Test: Was there adequate provocation to cause HOP in a REASONABLE man?
Subjective Test: Did the defendant actually act as a result of HOP? **For both tests: cooling off period voids HOP, and provocation must come from the actual victim. |
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Voluntary Manslaughter: Adequate Provocation
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Mutual Combat
Illegal Arrest Observe Wife's Infidelity Violent Crime Against a Relative |
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Voluntary Manslaughter: Insufficient Provocation
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Words Alone
Civil Trespass Intoxication Mental Disease |
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Voluntary Manslaughter in TPC
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HOP can only be brought up at the punishment stage to decrease to felony of second degree.
Affirmative defense that must be proved by the defendant to POE. |
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Voluntary Manslaughter Case
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State v. Person
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Voluntary Manslaughter: Mutual Combat
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It is not necessary that actual blows have been struck for mutual combat to exist, but if any blows have been struck it is not material which participant struck the first blow or that the deceased may have struck no blows at all.
Where the evidence shows that one of the participants attacked the other and that other fought back in self-defense, the facts do not raise mutual combat. |
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Involuntary Manslaughter: Substantial Risk
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A risk does not have to be more likely than not to occur or probable in order to be substantial. A risk may be substantial even if the chance that the harm will occur is below 50 percent. Some risks may be substantial even if they carry a low degree of probability because the magnitude of harm is potentially great.
Whether a risk is justifiable is determined by weighing the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct against the risk created by that conduct. |
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FM: CL Merger Rule
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The conduct which constitutes the felony must be separate from the acts which cause the killing.
Without merger rule, prosecution could charge FM for manslaughter every time. |
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FM: Agency Rule
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CL and Majority of other Jurisdictions
A defendant is guilty of FM only for killing directly cause by him and his co-felons and only where the victim is not a co-felon. |
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FM: Proximate Cause Rule
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Used by a minority of jurisdictions...
A defendant is guilty of FM regardless of whether he, a co-felon, or a 3rd party is the direct cause of death, and regardless of whether victim is a co-felon or 3rd party. |
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FM: Felon as Victim Rule
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Minority.
A defendant is guilty of FM regardless of whether he, co-felon, or 3rd party causes the death, but only where victim is not a co-felon. |
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FM Cases
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Stouffer v. State: the court relied on the merger rule to say no felony murder here. REVIEW.
People v. Morgan: Court holds that the felony of FM must attach to a separate felony (other than the killing), otherwise all firearm murders would be FM too. Court adopt the Collateral Felony Rule. State v. Sophophone: Kansas is a proximate cause jurisdiction because death of the co-felon was brought about by a police man. |
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FM: Intent
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The intent to commit the underlying felony will be imputed to the homicide, and a defendant may thus be charged with murder on the basis of the intent to commit the underlying felony.
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FM: Limitations
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Some jurisdictions require the felony to be inherently dangerous.
Was felony dangerous in the abstract? Was felony dangerous as committed? |
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True Defense
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Admit commission of act but seek acquittal/reduction based in some defense.
Burden of proof may be on prosecution or defense. |
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Internal Defense
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Argue prosecution didn't prove some element of the offense.
Burden of proof never on the defendant (Winship). |
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Duress Case
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US v. Bailey: in order the receive the necessity/duress instruction, the defendants should have turned themselves in once they were out of the conditions creating the necessity/duress.
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Self-Defense: Deadly Force
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Modern Rule: non-deadly initial aggressor regains right to use deadly self-defense if victim escalates violence.
CL Rule: non-deadly initial aggressor must retreat/withdraw to be able to use deadly force; if not, the defense is imperfect and only serves to mitigate sentencing from murder to manslaughter. |
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Self Defense Case
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State v. Smullen: Case of the battered-child syndrome; boy didn't get instruction on self-defense because the evidence was insufficient to establish the record of abuse necessary to justify boy hiding in the closet and brutally murdering his father when his back was turned.
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Defense of Others Case
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State v. Beeley: the actor must believe his or her intervention is necessary for the protection of the 3rd party; MPC standard.
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Defense of Others: Policy Consideration
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There is more of a risk that a 3rd party will use force to assist another who is not in fact entitled to defend himself.
A person is less likely to know which party to a fight between two others is at fault and is therefore barred from using protective force. |
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Threat of deadly force to protect property?
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CL and modern majority - NO.
Modern minority - YES. |
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Defense of Habitation
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-deadly force only to prevent forcible entry
-deadly force only if reasonably believe trespasser intends felony/sbi -once intruder enters, no deadly force unless it could be used in self-defense or to prevent a felony -minority view: MAKE MY DAY. **Substantial disagreement about the scope of this doctrine. |
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Defense of Property Case
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State v. Nelson: the taking has already been complete so Nelson cannot use force (since he is not in hot pursuit of the property).
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Inchoate Crimes: Two Kinds
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Complete but imperfect attempts: the crime just didn't work out (i.e., point pistol and pull trigger but the it jams).
Incomplete Attempts: final attempt at completion of the crime has not been made (i.e., the police intervened before the final act could be done). |
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Attempt Case
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State v. Reeves: the girls bring rat poison to school to try and poison their teacher; statute relied on was very similar to MPC - when an individual possesses materials to be used in the commission of a crime, at or near the scene of the crime, and where the possession serves no lawful purpose of the actor, the jury is entitled, but not required, to find a substantial step if action is corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose. After the Dupuy case, the court wants to be able to convict for attempt earlier.
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Attempt: Requirements (2)
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Culpable mental state.
An act or conduct going far enough beyond the commission of the substantive crime or at least going far enough beyond forming the intent. |
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Attempts: Impossibility
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Factual: defendant picks an empty pocket.
Legal: professor klein attempts to swim illegally in town lake, but it is not a crime. Hybrid: defendant's goals are illegal, but commission of the offense is impossible because of a matter of fact (defendant shoots a stuffed deer out of season). Inherent: attempted murder by voodoo doll. People v. Thousand: because defendant is charged with an attempt it is irrelevant whether it was impossible to commit the crime. |
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Solicitation Case
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State v. Anderson: Lawyer convicted of solicitation for taking drugs as payment, but the appellate court reversed because he didn't solicit the criminal activity - he was the solicitee.
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Conspiracy: Bilateral v. Unilateral Approach
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Federal Bilateral: there need to be at least 2 people who have a meeting of the minds to form a conspiracy.
MPC Unilateral: one person with the intent to make an agreement is enough. |
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Why have a conspiracy statute?
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-greater danger in group activity (increased chance of success, less chance of backing down, more complex crimes, additional crimes)
-crime prevention |
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Wharton's Rule
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An agreement between two persons is not a conspiracy if the target offense requires participation by two people (i.e., adultery).
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Rule of Consistency
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In bilateral jurisdictions, one co-conspirator cannot be guilty if all others are acquitted or immune to prosecution. This is a disfavored rule because acquittal can come from circumstances not having to do with the crime (better lawyer, witness doesn't show up, etc.).
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Questions to ask to see if defendant was the proximate cause of a felony murder...
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1) Was D the direct cause, or was there an intervening act? This doesn't necessarily cut off liability but it could. See next question.
2) If there was an intervening act was it superseding? (this would cut off liability) Foreseeable? (this would allow for liability, like if a cop shot someone while trying to stop cofelons. this was foreseeable). Was the intervening act responsive to the felon's actions? (like was the victim/policeman/bystander responding to what the felons did? if so it will not cut off liability. if the 3rd party's actions were not responsive to the felons, this could cut off liability) These are all questions for the jury. Could decide to cut off liability if the connection/proximate cause seems too attenuated. |
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How to prove a conspiracy agreement...
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Direct ev. - Co-conspirator flips; Co-conspirator HS exception.
Circumstantial ev. - Financial stake in venture, Repeat business with/sales to venture, Communication among co-conspirators, that conspirators know each other, any act by conspirators toward accomplishment of crime; Crime/attempt appears choreographed |
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Malice Quarter
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-intent to kill
-intent to cause sbi -depraved heart -felony murder |
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How to Determine if Something is a LIO...
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CCP 37.09
-established by same or less than all the facts of offense charged OR -differs from offense charged only bc less serious risk to same person or property OR -differs only bc less culpable mental state OR -attempt to commit the offense charged |
