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142 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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In re Winship |
[Introduction] Proof beyond a reasonable doubt. |
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Owens v. State |
[Introduction] Presumption of innocence; circumstantial evidence. |
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State v. Ragland |
[Introduction] Jury nullification is a power, not a right. |
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People v. Du and People v. Superior Court (Du) |
[Punishment] Mixed utilitarian-retributive sentencing: (1) protection of society (2) retribution (3) individual deterrence (4) general deterrence (5) incapacitation (6) restitution (7) uniformity in sentencing. |
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Coker v. Georgia |
[Punishment] Death is an excessively severe and grossly disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping an adult. |
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Kennedy v. Louisiana |
[Punishment] Death is an excessively severe and grossly disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping a child. |
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Martin v. State |
[Actus Reus] D must voluntarily commit the unlawful act to be culpable. |
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State v. Utter |
[Actus Reus] D must consciously commit the unlawful act to be culpable. |
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People v. Beardsley |
[Actus Reus] Mere moral obligations are never the basis of a legal duty to act. |
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KISS AsS |
[Actus Reus] K(C)ontract Imperiling another Special status relationship Statute Assuming a duty and Secluding that person |
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Barber v. Superior Court |
[Actus Reus] Cessation of life supporting medical treatment is an omission. |
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Regina v. Cunningham |
[Mens Rea] "Malice" is not mere wickedness, but rather intent or gross recklessness. |
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People v. Conley |
[Mens Rea] Intent can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances, D's words, the weapon used, the force, etc. |
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(MPC) Purpose |
[Mens Rea] Conduct/Result: Conscious objective. Attendant Circumstances: Awareness of existence or belief/hope they exist. |
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(MPC) Knowledge |
[Mens Rea] Conduct/Attendant Circumstances: Awareness of existence. Result: Aware that it is practically certain conduct will cause result. |
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(MPC) Recklessness |
[Mens Rea] Conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. The disregarding must be a gross deviation from the standard that a law-abiding person would observe in D's situation. |
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(MPC) Negligence |
[Mens Rea] Should have been aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. The failure to perceive must be a gross deviation from the standard that a reasonable person would observe in D's situation. |
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State v. Nations |
[Mens Rea] Actual awareness != awareness of a high probability != high probability of awareness |
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Flores-Figueroa v. United States |
[Mens Rea] Unless stated otherwise, a mens rea requirement applies to each material element in the statute. |
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Staples v. United States |
[Mens Rea] Mens rea is implied unless (1) it is a public-welfare offense, (2) the punishment is mild, or (3) there is strong evidence of legislative intent. |
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Garnett v. State |
[Mens Rea][Mistake] Legislative intent clearly makes statutory rape a strict liability offense. MOF/MOL is not a defense to a strict liability offense. |
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People v. Navarro |
[Mens Rea][Mistake] MOF (reasonable or unreasonable) is a defense to a specific intent crime if it negates the requisite mens rea. |
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"Moral Wrong" Doctrine |
[Mens Rea][Mistake] If D acted immorally (under circumstances as D believed them to be), then D is liable even if he has a reasonable MOF. |
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"Legal Wrong" Doctrine |
[Mens Rea][Mistake] If D acted unlawfully (under circumstances as D believed them to be), then D is liable even if he has a reasonable MOF. |
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People v. Marrero |
[Mens Rea][Mistake] MOL (reasonable or unreasonable) is not a defense to a general intent crime. |
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Cheek v. United States |
[Mens Rea][Mistake] MOL (reasonable or unreasonable) is a defense to a specific intent crime, if it negates the requisite mens rea. |
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Oxendine v. State |
[Causation] D must be an actual cause to be liable. |
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Velazquez v. State |
[Causation] D must be a proximate cause to be liable. |
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Three Categories of Intervening Causes |
[Causation] (1) Acts of God (2) Acts by Independent 3rd Party (3) Acts/Omissions by Victim |
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People v. Rideout |
[Causation] Proximate causes can be overridden by superseding intervening causes. |
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AVOIDeR |
[Causation] Apparent-Safety Doctrine Voluntary Human Intervention Omissions Factor Intended-Consequences Doctrine De Minimis Contributions to Social Harm Reasonable Foreseeability Doctrine |
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(CL) Expressed Malice |
[Homicide] (1) Intent to kill (2) Intent to cause serious bodily injury |
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(CL) Implied Malice |
[Homicide] Acting with "wanton and willful disregard of an unreasonable risk" (i.e. recklessly) and with an "depraved heart". |
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(CL) "Abandoned and Malignant Heart" or "Depraved Heart" |
[Homicide] D, with conduct reckless to life, deliberately commits an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life. |
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People v. Knoller |
[Homicide]["DH" Murder] Lays out definitions of implied malice, "depraved heart", and the standards of "depraved heart" murder. |
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(CL) 1st Degree Murder |
[Homicide] Unlawful, deliberate, premeditated killing with malice aforethought. |
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(CL) 2nd Degree Murder |
[Homicide] Unlawful killing with malice aforethought which is not 1st Degree Murder. |
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(CL) "Depraved Heart" Murder |
[Homicide] Unlawful killing with implied malice under circumstances evidencing a "depraved heart". |
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(CL) Felony-Murder |
[Homicide] Unlawful killing during the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from committing a felony. |
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(CL) Voluntary Manslaughter |
[Homicide] Unlawful killing resulting from a reasonable loss of control, caused by an adequate provocation. |
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(CL) Involuntary Manslaughter |
[Homicide] Unlawful killing with either: (1) recklessness/gross recklessness (2) negligence/gross negligence |
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State v. Williams |
[Homicide][Manslaughter] Usual standard for manslaughter is gross negligence. |
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State v. Schrader |
[Homicide][Premeditation] Can be formed in a "twinkling of an eye". |
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State v. Dodds |
[Homicide][Premeditation] Time required varies from person to person, but it is any interval of time between forming intent and execution of intent for D to be fully conscious of what they intend. |
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People v. Morrin |
[Homicide][Premeditation] Time required is unquantifiable, interval should be long enough to afford a reasonable man a "second look". |
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State v. Forrest |
[Homicide][Premeditation] Can prove deliberation and premeditation through circumstantial evidence. See Lethal CLIENT. |
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Lethal CLIENT |
[Homicide][Premeditation] Lethal blows after V is felled and helpless. Conduct/statements from D before + after killing. Lack of provocation from V. Ill-will between parties. Evidence of brutality. Number + nature of wounds. Threats/declarations from D before + during the incident giving rise to the killing. |
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Midgett v. State |
[Homicide][Premeditation] Deliberation and premeditation must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; anything less fails to meet burden. |
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Girouard v. State |
[Homicide][Provocation] Lays out standards for provocation and voluntary manslaughter. |
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Rule of Provocation |
[Homicide][Provocation] (1) Adequate provocation (2) Killing in heat of passion (3) No cooling off (4) Causal connection between provocation, passion, and killing |
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Adequacy of Provocation |
[Homicide][Provocation] A provocation is adequate if it is "calculated to inflame the passion of a reasonable man and tend to cause him to act for the moment from passion rather than reason." |
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MAIID and Words+ |
[Homicide][Provocation] Mutual Combat Assault + Battery Illegal Arrest Injury to D's relatives or 3rd Party Discovering a Spouse Cheating Words+: Words plus conduct indicating a present intention and ability to cause D harm. |
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Director of Public Prosecutions v. Camplin |
[Homicide][Provocation] Both the loss of control itself and the reaction must be reasonable. "Reasonable person" referring to a person with the power of control expected of an ordinary person of the sex and age as D. |
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People v. Fuller |
[Homicide][Felony-Murder] Example of Felony-Murder upheld. Unarmed carjackers committing felony burglary accidentally kill an innocent person while fleeing from police. |
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People v. Howard |
[Homicide][Felony-Murder] In considering the inherent dangerousness of an act, the court looks at the act in the abstract. |
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People v. Smith |
[Homicide][Felony-Murder] A felony merges into the homicide when it is an integral part of the homicide and is included in fact. |
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BARRK |
[Homicide][Felony-Murder] Burglary Arson Roberry Rape Kidnapping |
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(MPC) Murder |
[Homicide] Criminal homicide: (1) purposely (2) knowingly (3) recklessly under circumstances of E.I.H.L. (4) recklessness and E.I.H.L. are presumed for Felony-Murder of BARRK |
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(MPC) Manslaughter |
[Homicide]
Criminal homicide: (1) recklessly (2) murder when D is under the influence of E.M.E.D. for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse. |
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(MPC) Negligent Homicide |
[Homicide] Negligent criminal homicide. |
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(MPC) People v. Casassa |
[Homicide][Manslaughter] Two-prong test for E.M.E.D.: (1) Subjective: D acted under the influence of an E.M.E.D. (2) Objective: Reasonable explanation or excuse for the E.M.E.D. |
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(RCW) 1st Degree Murder |
[Homicide] Criminal homicide: (1) Premeditated, intentional (2) Conduct with a grave risk of death under circumstances of E.I.H.L. (3) Felony-Murder of BARRK |
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(RCW) 2nd Degree Murder |
[Homicide] Criminal homicide: (1) Intent without premeditation (2) Felony-Murder not BARRK |
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(RCW) 1st Degree Manslaughter |
[Homicide] Reckless criminal homicide. |
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(RCW) 2nd Degree Manslaughter |
[Homicide] Grossly negligent criminal homicide. |
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Five Categories of Defenses |
[Defenses] (1) Failure of Proof "Defenses" (2) Offense-Modification Defenses (3) Justifications (4) Excuses (5) Nonexculpatory/Extrinsic Defenses |
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Justification Structure |
[Defenses][Justifications] (1) Triggering conditions permit a (2) necessary and (3) proportional response. |
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(CL) Self-Defense |
[Defenses][Justifications][Self-Defense] (1) Actual or perceived threat of death/serious bodily injury (2) Threat is unlawful and immediate (3) D must believe peril is imminent (4) D must believe their response is necessary (5) D's beliefs must be subjectively + objectively reasonable |
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State v. Norman |
[Defenses][Justifications][Self-Defense] Although cases of battered-spouses are tragic, self-defense requires imminent peril. |
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United-States v. Peterson |
[Defenses][Justifications][Self-Defense] Lays out limitations on self-defense. D was not entitled to a self-defense claim because he was the initial aggressor. |
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(CL) Three Limitations on Self-Defense |
[Defenses][Justifications][Self-Defense] (1) "Initial Aggressor" Limitation (2) "Provoking Presence" Limitation (3) "Retreat to the Wall" Rule |
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(CL) Exceptions to the "Retreat to the Wall" Rule |
[Defenses][Justifications][Self-Defense] (1) Perilous Exception (2) "Castle" Doctrine (3) Coinhabitant/Coworker Exception to "Castle" Doctrine |
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People v. Goetz |
[Defenses][Justifications][Self-Defense] The reasonable person standard for self-defense cannot be entirely subjective, but it can take D's circumstances and situation in to consideration. Subjective: It must appear to D and D must believe it necessary to act in order to save themselves from death or serious bodily injury. Objective: D's beliefs must be reasonable, considering all the circumstances facing D in their situation. |
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State v. Wanrow |
[Defenses][Justifications][Self-Defense] (1) Reasonableness is evaluated in light of all the facts + circumstances known to D, not just those immediately prior to the incident. (2) Reasonableness is evaluated in light of D's own perceptions of the situation, incorporating characteristics such as D's age and sex. |
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(MPC) Self-Defense |
[Defenses][Justifications][Self-Defense] (1) D must believe reactive force immediately necessary (2) D must be protecting themselves (3) Force is unlawful (4) Must be on the present occasion. |
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(MPC) Limitations on Self-Defense |
[Defenses][Justifications][Self-Defense] Force is not justified to resist arrest by a known peace office (even if arrest is unlawful). Deadly force is not justified: (1) If D is the provocateur (2) If D can avoid the necessity by safely-retreating (except for "Castle" Doctrine (except for Coworker Exception)) |
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(CL) Necessity |
[Defenses][Justifications][Necessity] (1) D's act must have been to prevent a significant evil (2) No adequate alternative (3) Harm caused not disproportionate to harm avoided (4) D must have acted on a subjectively and objectively reasonable belief that the harm caused would be less than the harm avoided |
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Nelson v. State |
[Defenses][Justifications][Necessity] Lays out the elements of necessity. D's belief must be both subjectively and objectively reasonable, given the facts as D reasonably perceived them. D failed all four elements of (CL) necessity. |
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(MPC) Necessity |
[Defenses][Justifications][Necessity] (1) D must believe their conduct is necessary to avoid a harm (2) Harm avoided is greater than the harm caused |
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The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens |
[Defenses][Justifications][Necessity]
Necessity is not a defense to murder. |
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United States v. Contento-Pachon |
[Defenses][Excuses][Duress] Lays out the elements of duress. |
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(CL) Duress |
[Defenses][Excuses][Duress] (1) Immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury (2) Well-grounded fear that the threat will be carried out (3) No reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened harm |
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(MPC) Duress |
[Defenses][Excuses][Duress] (1) D is coerced by force or threat of force (2) Force is unlawful and against D's person or another person (3) A person of reasonable firmness in D's situation would have been unable to resist |
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People v. Anderson |
[Defenses][Excuses][Duress]
Duress is not a defense to murder. |
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State v. Johnson |
[Defenses][Excuses][Insanity] Lays out the history insanity defense, the objectives for any insanity defense, and gives four of the Five Insanity Tests: (1) The M'Naghten Test (2) The "Irresistible Impulse" or "Control" Test (3) The "Product" or Durham Test (4) The MPC Test [... and included later... (5) The "Justly Responsible" or Brawner Test] |
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The M'Naghten Test |
[Defenses][Excuses][Insanity] D is not liable if, at the time of their unlawful act, D was under a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, such that they either: (1) ["Cognitive Incapacity" Prong] did not know the nature + quality of the act they were doing; or (2) ["Moral Incapacity" Prong] if they did know the nature + quality of the act they were doing, they did not know that what they were doing was wrong. |
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Clark v. Arizona |
[Defenses][Excuses][Insanity] Constitutional to remove the "cognitive incapacity" prong of the M'Naghten test. |
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The "Irresistible Impulse" or "Control" Test |
[Defenses][Excuses][Insanity] D is not liable if they suffer from an unsound/diseased condition of the mind, such that they may know abstractly that a given act is wrong, but are yet irresistibly driven by an insane impulse to commit such act. |
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Durham v. United States |
[Defenses][Excuses][Insanity] Established the "Product" Test of insanity. |
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Brawner v. United States |
[Defenses][Excuses][Insanity] Federally abolished the "Product" Test and established the "Justly Responsible" Test of insanity. |
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The "Product" or Durham Test |
[Defenses][Excuses][Insanity] D is not liable if their unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect. |
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The "Justly Responsible" or Brawner Test |
[Defenses][Excuses][Insanity] D is not liable if, at the time of their unlawful conduct, their mental/emotional processes or behavior controls were impaired to such an extent that they cannot be held justly responsible for their act. |
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The MPC Test |
[Defenses][Excuses][Insanity] D is not liable if, at the time of their unlawful conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, D lacks substantial capacity either: (1) to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of their conduct; or (2) to conform their conduct to the requirements of law. |
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(MPC) State v. Wilson |
[Defenses][Excuses][Insanity] D does not appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct if a mental disease/defect causes D to have a belief that, under the circumstances as D honestly perceives them, that their actions do not offend societal morality. |
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Perez v. Cain |
[Defenses][Excuses][Insanity] Expert testimony may not be arbitrarily ignored, but must be objectively dismissed for an acceptable reason. |
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People v. Gentry |
[Inchoate Crimes][Attempt] D must have both of the specific intents required for attempt. |
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Bruce v. State |
[Inchoate Crimes][Attempt] Because it requires two-prongs of intent, attempt is a specific intent crime. It is impossible to have an attempt "version" of a non-specific intent substantive crime. |
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United States v. Mandujano |
[Inchoate Crimes][Attempt] Lays out the five "Preparation-Attempt" Demarcation Tests: (1) The Physical Proximity Doctrine (2) The Dangerous Proximity Doctrine (3) The Indispensable Element Test (4) The Probable Desistance Test (5) The Res Ipsa Loquitur or Unequivocality Test |
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Commonwealth v. Peaslee |
[Inchoate Crimes][Attempt] D's act did not constitute attempt because he never came "very near" to accomplishment (Physical Proximity Doctrine). |
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People v. Rizzo |
[Inchoate Crimes][Attempt] D's act did not constitute attempt because they never found their intended V, and therefore the act was not "dangerously proximate" to succeeding (Dangerous Proximity Doctrine) or "very near" to success (Physical Proximity Doctrine). |
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People v. Miller |
[Inchoate Crimes][Attempt] D's act did not constitute attempt because it was indistinguishable (i.e. equivocal) from acts which may be purely innocent (Unequivocality Test). |
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Three Main Cases of (CL) Attempt |
[Inchoate Crimes][Attempt] (1) Commonwealth v. Peaslee (2) People v. Rizzo (3) People v. Miller |
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Commonwealth v. McCloskey |
[Inchoate Crimes][Attempt] D's voluntary abandonment of his "preparation" exonerated him of attempt. |
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People v. Kimball |
[Inchoate Crimes][Attempt] Voluntary abandonment is not a defense where the elements of attempt have already been met. |
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(MPC) Attempt {Completed Attempt, Conduct-Based Crime} |
[Inchoate Crimes][Attempt] Attempt = Purposely engages in the criminal conduct, if the attendant circumstances were as D believes them to be. |
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(MPC) Attempt {Completed Attempt, Result-Based Crime} |
[Inchoate Crimes][Attempt] Attempt = Purposely acts to cause (or believing it will cause) the result without further conduct on D's part. |
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(MPC) Attempt {Incomplete Attempt} |
[Inchoate Crimes][Attempt] Attempt = Purposely commits anything which, under the circumstances as D believes them to be, constitutes a substantial step in D's course of conduct planned to culminate in the crime. |
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(MPC) Attempt {Substantial Step} |
[Inchoate Crimes][Attempt] Conduct is not a substantial step unless it is strongly corroborative of of D's criminal intent. |
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State v. Reeves |
[Inchoate Crimes][Attempt] D's conduct was strongly corroborative of D's criminal intent. Fact-finder entitled (but not required) to find such conduct constituted a substantial step in D's course of conduct planned to culminate in the crime's commission. |
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(MPC) Attempt {Renunciation} |
[Inchoate Crimes][Attempt] Affirmative defense to attempt if D: (1A) abandons their effort to commit the crime or (1B) otherwise prevents the commission of the crime; and (2) under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of D's criminal purpose. |
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State v. Cotton |
[Inchoate Crimes][Solicitation] Uncommunicated solicitation does not constitute solicitation. |
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(MPC) Solicitation |
[Inchoate Crimes][Solicitation] (1) D acts with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the crime's commission (2) D commands, encourages, or requests another person to engage in specific conduct (3) Such conduct would constitute a crime, or an attempted crime, or would establish the solicitee's complicity. |
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(MPC) Solicitation {Renunciation} |
[Inchoate Crimes][Solicitation] Affirmative defense to solicitation if D, after soliciting another person to commit a crime: (1A) persuades them not to commit the crime or (1B) otherwise prevents the crime's commission; and (2) under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of D's criminal purpose. |
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Pinkerton v. United States |
[Inchoate Crimes][Conspiracy] Established the Pinkerton Doctrine: So long as the conspiracy continues, the partners act for each other in carrying it forward. An overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act. |
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People v. Swain |
[Inchoate Crimes][Conspiracy] Because it requires two-prongs of intent, conspiracy is a specific intent crime. It is impossible to have an conspiracy to commit a non-specific intent substantive crime. |
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People v. Lauria |
[Inchoate Crimes][Conspiracy] When a supplier (D) knows their supplies are being criminally used, D's intent to participate in the criminal activity may be established by: (2) an inference D intends to participate based on D's special interest in the activity or the aggravated nature of the crime itself. |
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Corrupt Motive Doctrine |
[Inchoate Crimes][Conspiracy] Parties to an alleged conspiracy are not guilty unless they had a corrupt or wrongful motive for their planned actions. |
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Commonwealth v. Azim |
[Inchoate Crimes][Conspiracy] A conspiracy may be inferred by the following circumstantial evidence: (1) the relationship of the parties (2) the conduct or circumstances of the parties (3) uniform overt acts Circumstances relevant to proving conspiracy: (1) Association with the alleged conspiracy (2) Knowledge of the commission of the substantive crime (3) Presence at the scene of the crime (4) [Sometimes] Participation in the object of the conspiracy |
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Commonwealth v. Cook |
[Inchoate Crimes][Conspiracy] A conspiracy must be formed before the commission of the substantive crime, not during it. Furthermore, there must be an overt act before the commission of the objective substantive crime in order to prove conspiracy. |
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People v. Foster |
[Inchoate Crimes][Conspiracy] Bilateral conspiracy is the traditional approach in common law because unilateral conspiracy is covered by solicitation. |
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(MPC) Conspiracy |
[Inchoate Crimes][Conspiracy] (1) D acts with purpose of promoting or facilitating the crime's commission (2) D agrees with one or more persons (3) Either (b) D agrees to aid such person(s) in the planning or commission of the crime, or attempt, or solicitation. |
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(MPC) Conspiracy {Multiple Crimes} |
[Inchoate Crimes][Conspiracy] D is guilty of one conspiracy as long as such multiple crimes are the object of the same agreement or continuous conspiratorial relationship. |
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(MPC) Conspiracy {Termination} |
[Inchoate Crimes][Conspiracy] Conspiracy terminates: (1) when its objectives are committed or the agreement is abandoned by all parties; or (2) if none of the conspirators commits an overt act within an applicable period of time, the agreement is presumed abandoned. |
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(MPC) Conspiracy {Renunciation} |
[Inchoate Crimes][Conspiracy] Affirmative defense to conspiracy if D, after conspiring to commit a crime: (1) thwarts the success of the conspiracy; and (2) under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of D's criminal purpose. |
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(MPC) Conspiracy {Abandonment} |
[Inchoate Crimes][Conspiracy] D can abandon the conspiracy (and terminate its effect on him) only if and when they: (1) advise their fellow conspirators of their abandonment; or (2) inform law enforcement of the conspiracy's existence and of the extent of their participation. |
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List and describe "principles" |
[Complicity] Principle in the 1st Degree ("Perpetrator"): The one who actually commits a crime, either themselves, through an inanimate agent, or through an innocent human agent. Principle in the 2nd Degree/Accessory at the Fact ("Aider and Abettor"): One who aides, counsels, commands, or encourages the crime's commission, which they are present at. |
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List and describe "accessories" |
[Complicity] Accessory Before the Fact ("Inciter"): One who aided, counseled, commanded, or encouraged the commission of a crime, prior to the actual commission. Accessory After the Fact ("Criminal Protector") |
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Define "accomplice" |
[Complicity] (1) Principles in the 2nd Degree/Accessories at the Fact (2) Accessories Before the Fact |
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State v. Hoselton |
[Complicity] In general, D is liable as an accomplice if they: (2) with the intent to promote or facilitate the crime's commission. |
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Riley v. State |
[Complicity] To be liable as an accomplice: (1) D must intend to promote or facilitate the conduct which constitutes the actus reus of the crime; and (2) regarding the results of that conduct, D must meet whatever mens rea is required by the underlying crime. |
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"Natural and Probable Consequences" or "Foreseeable Consequences" Doctrine |
[Complicity] An accomplice is liable for any criminal act which, in the ordinary course of things, was [the natural and probable consequence/a reasonably foreseeable consequence] of the crime that he encouraged, even if such consequence was not intended by him. |
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State v. Linscott |
[Complicity] D intended to promote the primary crime and was therefore liable as an accomplice for the unintended second crime, because it was a "foreseeable consequence". |
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State v. V.T. |
[Complicity] Passive behavior (like mere presence) does not make D an accomplice absent evidence that D affirmatively did something to encourage the crime. |
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Wilcox v. Jeffrey |
[Complicity] Complicity can be established by encouraging or promoting known illegal activity, even if D does not request or facilitate the crime. |
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State v. Helmenstein |
[Complicity] Independent evidence must establish an actor as primary. |
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People v. Genoa |
[Complicity] D cannot be convicted under accomplice liability if the target offense in question was never actually committed. |
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Bailey v. Commonwealth |
[Complicity] One who implements a crime through an innocent or unwitting agent is a principal. |
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United States v. Lopez |
[Complicity] Accomplices may be tried before the principal (even if the principal is never identified or convicted) but an accomplice may not be held liable without proof that the principal actually committed a crime. If the principal actor succeeds on a justification defense, any accomplices are likewise justified. |
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People v. McCoy |
[Complicity] An accomplice may be charged/convicted of a crime greater than the crime the principal committed or is charged/convicted of. |
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In re Meagan R. |
[Complicity] One may not be an accomplice/solicitor/conspirator in one's own victimization. |
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State v. Formella |
[Complicity] D is no longer an accomplice if he: (1) terminates his complicity prior to the commission of the offense; and (2A) wholly deprives his complicity of its effectiveness in the crime's commission, or (2B) gives timely warning to law enforcement, or (2C) otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense. |
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(MPC) Complicity |
[Complicity] D is guilty of the substantive crime committed by the principal if: (1) (with the requisite mens rea) D causes an innocent or irresponsible agent to commit the crime (2) (with purpose to promote or facilitate the crime) D: (a) solicits; or (b) agrees to, aids, or attempts to aid the planning or commission of the crime (3) (with the requisite mens rea) the particular result of the crime was reached by D |
