Crim Pro---Corbett

Front 1

TEST TO DETERMINE IF SOMEONE HAS BEEN SEIZED

Back 1

1. A reasonable person would not feel comfortable walking away or feel free to decline to cooperate.
--mendenhall test

2. Show of authority to which the suspect submits or physical force.

Front 2

An officer observed three guys doing what looked to be a "casing" of a jewelry store. He approached the men, asked them some questions, and frisked the men for weapons and found a gun on Terry.

The officer had reasonable suspicion that a crime was about to occur so he did not violate D’s 4th Amendment rights.

Back 2

TERRY V. OHIO

totality of circumstances.

Front 3

D fled upon seeing an approaching police car and was pursued on foot when he threw a rock of cocaine.

It is not a seizure if the officer shows his authority and the suspect does not submit.

Back 3

CALIFORNIA V. HODARI

Front 4

Some officers on a bus asked D to search his luggage and he agreed.

A reasonable person has to feel that they don't have the freedom to refuse to comply.

Back 4

FLORIDA V. BOSTICK

Front 5

Is everyone in a car seized when a car is pulled over by the cops?

--YES

Back 5

BRENDLIN V. CALIFORNIA

Front 6

All you need is reasonable suspicion that a crime is about to occur.

Back 6

(TERRY V. OHIO)

Front 7

TWO PRONG ANALYSIS FOR A SEIZURE

Back 7

Was it justified?
1. specific and articulable facts
2. with the officer's experiences
3. detect a crime that an ordinary person would not.

Did it stay within the scope?
1. Must last long enough to confirm or dispel suspicion.

Front 8

FOR NON-TERRY SEIZURES

Back 8

1. Government’s Interest v. Degree of Intrusion

2. When there is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the GI is always satisfied.

E.I special need exception = dont need individualized reasonable suspicion.

Front 9

WHAT KIND OF INFO SHOULD THE POLICE USE?

objective observations
info from police reports
consideration of MO's
inferences and deductions based on the officer's training and experience that would elude an ordinary person

Back 9

UNITED STATES V. CORTEZ

Front 10

D was in the back seat of a car that was pulled over for a traffic violation. He was wearing gang clothing, carrying a scanner, and admitted to serving time in prison for burglary. The officer asked him to get out of the car, frisked him, and found a gun.


The officer had a reasonable suspicion that he might be armed and dangerous, so D’s 4th Amendment rights were not violated.

Back 10

ARIZONA V. JOHNSON

Front 11

D was stopped at an airport by agents who knew he had purchased a ticket for $2100 with $20 bills, traveled under a name that did not match his telephone number listed, his destination was Miami, he stayed in Miami for only 48 hours even though a round trip to and from Miami takes 20 hours.


Fitting the profile is not automatic reasonable suspicion.


Seizure is not justified unless the officer can give specific articulable facts.

Back 11

UNITED STATES V. SOKOLOW

Front 12

D was seen talking to known narcotics addicts in a bad neighborhood and saw nor heard nothing else.


Simply being in the vicinity of known criminals does not, by itself, justify reasonable suspicion.

Back 12

SIBRON V. NEW YORK

Front 13

Officers relied on a reliable informant's tip that D seated in a nearby car had a gun and narcotics on him.

When a reliable informant (one that has given you reliable info in the past) gives an officer info which he relies on to perform a Terry search, he is justified.


Just because something is legal does not mean the officer can't have reasonable suspicion.

Back 13

ADAMS V. WILLIAMS

Front 14

The frisking officer felt a small lump in the D's pocket which after further tactile examination he determined to be crack cocaine.


You cannot manipulate something to determine that it is illegal.


As long as all you are doing is looking for a gun, and you don't go beyond that, and you find something else that you immediately believe to be drugs, this is okay.

Back 14

MINNESOTA V. DICKERSON

As long as they are still within the scope of a weapons frisk and they feel something that they immediately believe to be drugs, they can take it.

Front 15

D ran when he looked in the direction of the police.

You cannot run from the police, if you do, the police have the right to think you are guilty.

Unprovoked flight in a high-crime area is not automatically grounds for reasonable suspicion, but this will be used as a factor.

Back 15

ILLINOIS V. WARDLOW

Front 16

PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE

Back 16

If something is in your plain view, and you are allowed to be there, you can take it.

Front 17

Terry-stops apply to ongoing criminal activity as well.

Cop got flyer of df and recognized him when he was performing a robbery.

Back 17

UNITED STATES V. HENSLEY

Front 18

Two deputies saw a car swerve into a ditch and they stopped to investigate. The marijuana they found was not in plain view (under armrest) but the large hunting knife was.


Searches for weapons in a car are limited to the place where a weapon could be placed or hidden.

Back 18

MICHIGAN V. LONG

Front 19

Two deputies saw a car swerve into a ditch and they stopped to investigate. The marijuana they found was not in plain view (under armrest) but the large hunting knife was.


Searches for weapons in a car are limited to the place where a weapon could be placed or hidden.

Back 19

MICHIGAN V. LONG

Front 20

One of 2 D's suspected in an armed robbery was seized and his house was searched for the other guy or someone else that might be there that could harm the police.

An arrest warrant does not give the right to search someone's home.

The police need reasonable suspicion that someone else is there that might be dangerous.
This is limited to looking only where someone could be hiding.

Back 20

MARYLAND V. BUIE

Front 21

D was stopped for expired license plate tags, asked to get out of the car, a bulge was seen, a frisk was done, and a gun was found.


If the police lawfully stop your vehicle for any reason, they can make you get out of car or make you stay in the car, it is completely up to them.

Back 21

PENNSYLVANIA V. MIMMS

Front 22

D's partner in crime was pulled over and detained for 20 minutes while he was pursued and caught fleeing from the police. Drugs were found in his partner's car.

The court held that his partner in crime's detainment was not unreasonable and the drugs would not be excluded.

In determining whether a detention was excessive in length, the court may consider whether a less intrusive method was available and whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize it or to pursue it.

Back 22

UNITED STATES V. SHARPE

20 mins was ok ---not too long.

Front 23

D refused to present identification when requested from a police officer. There was a statute that said if a lawful Terry-stop is made, it is a misdemeanor to refuse to give identification.

This court did not say that every Terry stop requires identification.

--If there is a statute that says you have to give identification; this is not unconstitutional.

pleaded the 5th (right to incriminate self)
--did not want to give his name.

Back 23

HIIBEL V. SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

Front 24

D was pulled over for a speeding violation and a drug dog was brought over, the dog sniffed the car and alerted, and marijuana was found. D was convicted.

A search is anything that invades your reasonable expectation of privacy.

A dog sniffing your car is not a search according to the Supreme Court.

There is automatic probable cause if the dog alerts.

-They do not need a warrant.

Back 24

ILLINOIS V. CABALLES

Front 25

RULES FOR SEARCHES

Back 25

Timeliness
Public Place

Front 26

A warrant was executed for the search for deadly weapons and evidence of gang membership and D was handcuffed while this was done in her house.

The court held that this was okay because the GI outweighed the DI.

Back 26

MUEHLER V. MENA

Front 27

As officers were about to execute a search warrant at D's house, he was coming out of the house, and the officers made him stay for the entire execution of the warrant.

This is another example of a minor league seizure that is not a Terry stop.

For a minor league seizure that is not a Terry-stop, you have to balance the GI with DI.

Can detain while executing a warrant.

Can detain while waiting for the warrant.

Back 27

MICHIGAN V. SUMMERS

Front 28

D was pulled over a speeding violation, his ID was checked and no warrants were issued, his license was given back to him, and then the officer asked to search his car. He was not told he was free to go. He consented to the search. Drugs were found.

An officer does not have to tell someone they are free to go before they can ask for consent to search their car.

Back 28

OHIO V. ROBINETTE

Front 29

A warrant was issued for the search of a bartender, and other patrons at the bar were searched and drugs were found on D who was one of those patrons.

Merely associating near criminal activity does not give rise to probable cause without more.

If a minor-league seizure goes on too long, it becomes a major league seizure.

Back 29

YBARRA V. ILLINOIS

Front 30

Police suspected D but did not have PC for an arrest so they asked D to come with them for questioning. They read him his Miranda rights and later on he gave incriminating statements.

he was not arrested but if he tried to leave he would be physically restrained.

The police must have PC for any arrest whether it is technically called one or not.

Back 30

DUNAWAY V. NEW YORK

Front 31

D was questioned on an airport concourse and then asked to go to a small room for questioning about 40ft away. His luggage was retrieved from the airline and brought to the room where he was asked to and did consent to a search of his luggage.

Once he gave the key to his luggage, the detention became more of a serious intrusion on his personal liberty than is allowable on mere suspicion of criminal activity.

Seizing a traveler's luggage is equivalent to seizing the person.

Detention must be reasonable at the start and must continue to be reasonable upon completion.

Back 31

FLORIDA V. ROYER

Front 32

D was one of 24 other black youths who were detained at the police station for questioning and fingerprinting in connection with a rape for which the only leads were a general description given by the victim and a set of fingerprints around the window through which the assailant entered. His prints were found to match those at the scene of the crime.

It is arguable, however, that because of the unique nature of the fingerprinting process, such detentions might, under narrowly defined circumstances, be found to comply with the Fourth Amendment even though there is no probable cause in the traditional sense.

Back 32

DAVIS V. MISSISSIPPI

Front 33

QUESTIONS TO ASK FOR EXAM/TRIGGERS

Back 33

1. Is it a seizure?
2. What kind is it?
3. Was there justification?
4. Did it last too long?
5 Did they stumble upon something they shouldn't have?

Front 34

POLICE MUST HAVE

Back 34

1. probable cause + warrant
or
2. probable cause + warrant exception
or
3. consent

Front 35

WHAT IS PROBABLE CAUSE?

Back 35

1. The level of suspicion the police need to justify an arrest.

2. '' '' conduct a full and thorough search.

3. PC for a crime--crime was committed and PC that this person did it.

4. PC for search= pc that evidence will be located where you intend to search.

Front 36

D was told that they were waiting on a warrant for his luggage, and they took it from one airport to another where it was sniffed by a drug dog, and the dog alerted. They had to wait from Friday to Monday to get the warrant, and cocaine was found in the bag during execution of the warrant.

“When the police seize luggage from the suspect's custody, we think the limitations applicable to investigative detentions of the person should define the permissible scope of an investigative detention of the person's luggage on less than probable cause.”

“Under this standard, it is clear that the police conduct here exceeded the permissible limits of a Terry-type investigative stop.”

Back 36

UNITED STATES V. PLACE

90 mins too long

Front 37

TWO PROBABLE CAUSE ISSUES

Back 37

Did the affidavit reflect probable cause?

Was the probable cause based on a tip from an informant?

Front 38

D was convicted of gambling in violation of federal statutes. His arrest was based on PC that came from an affidavit with information obtained through an informant.

The court held that the affidavit was not specific enough about how the informant knew what they claimed to have known.

veracity--

Back 38

SPINELLI V. UNITED STATES

Front 39

An anonymous tip was given to the police about a couple that was making trips to Florida for the purpose of drug-trafficking. The tip gave very specific details about the couple's activities.

The Court overturned Spinelli in that the determination for probable cause based on a tip from an informant would depend on the totality of the circumstances.

Back 39

ILLINOIS V. GATES
--totality of circumstances
--predictive details

Front 40

FACTORS TO DETERMINE PROBABLE CAUSE FROM AN INFORMANT

Back 40

Credibility
Reliability
Basis of Knowledge
Predictive Detail
Corroboration

Front 41

What if something in the affidavit was a lie/wrong, but everything else correct?

Back 41

4th Amendment "exclusionary rule" simply keeps the police from profiting from the evidence.

Just b/c they lied, does not make the affidavit bad, have to go back and put the police where they would have been without the evidence.

Front 42

An anonymous caller reported to police that a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun; officers went there and saw such a person but did not see a firearm or any unusual movements, and had no reason to suspect him apart from the tip.

“The reasonableness of official suspicion must be measured by what the officers knew before they conducted their search.”

“The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.”

Back 42

FLORIDA V. J.L.

Front 43

D's ex-girlfriend ratted her boyfriend out when she tried to make an anonymous tip but the officer recognized her voice.

Supreme Court upheld the warrant.
--She had very specific details as well as a reason for trying to turn in him anonymously; because she was afraid of retaliation.

Back 43

MASSACHUSETTS V. UPTON

Front 44

During a lawful traffic stop, the police looked inside the car, closed an armrest that was open to the back seat, and found drugs underneath. D as well as the other guys in the car, each denied that the drugs were theirs.

Did the police have PC to believe that one of them committed the crime?
--YES

Any or all of them could have exercised dominion or control over the drugs, so it was reasonable to believe that the D possessed them.

There is PC for any individual in a car that is lawfully seized and found to have drugs.

Back 44

MARYLAND V. PRINGLE

Front 45

A D can challenge an affidavit that is valid on its face.

---the warrant must be KIR
knowingly, intelligently and reckless advised with disregard to the truth.

Back 45

FRANKS V. DELAWARE

Front 46

what are the 3 ways needed for arrest.

Back 46

Need probable cause with a warrant or a warrant exception for an arrest.

Always have to have PC for an arrest, but you do not always have to have a warrant for an arrest.

You don't need a warrant if something is happening right in front of you (exigent circumstances), or if arresting someone outside their home (Inside/Outside Dichotomy).

Front 47

A postal inspector was given information from a reliable informant that D was going to be in a restaurant with stolen credit cards at a specified time. D was there, and he was arrested without a warrant.

A police officer can make an arrest without a warrant when he has probable cause.

Back 47

UNITED STATES V. WATSON

Front 48

D was arrested when she was pulled over for not having her children in a seat belt which was a misdemeanor.

You can be arrested for for misdeamenor event if cop have probable cause.

Back 48

ATWATER V. CITY OF LAGO VISTA

Front 49

D was arrested for seat belt violation and there was a statute that said a summons was supposed to be issued instead. Therefore, the evidence that was obtained, he tried to argue, could not be admitted.

The SC can only exclude evidence that violates the 4th Amendment, and the 4th Amendment only requires PC that a crime has been committed for an arrest.

Back 49

VIRGINIA V. MOORE

Front 50

D was a suspect for a murder when the police went to his home to arrest him without a warrant. They knocked on the door with no response. They broke in and found a 30-caliber shell casing in plain view and seized it.

Generally, a warrant is needed to go inside your home to arrest you.

A warrant gives you PC that someone is a criminal, but you must also have PC that the person is at home.

cant use evid. against him-- w/o pc cant use = violation of 4th.

Back 50

PAYTON V. NEW YORK

Front 51

The court went in the D's house looking for someone else, but they did not find that person. Instead, they found drugs in plain view which got D prosecuted and convicted.

They were illegally in his house.

arrest warrant is not sufficient to search the home of a third person absent exigent circumstances.

They need either the 3rd party's consent or a search warrant based on PC that the arrestee is going to be there.

Back 51

STEAGALD V. UNITED STATES

Front 52

WHAT ELSE CAN GET YOU INTO THE HOUSE?

Back 52

Exigent Circumstances [these are exceptions to the warrant]:

--Hot Pursuit

--Prevent Destruction of Evidence

--Prevent Danger or Injury to the Police or Innocent Bystanders

--Prevent Flight by Suspect

Front 53

Police officer was reliably informed that an armed robbery had taken place and that the perpetrator had entered a certain house five minutes earlier.

The Court concluded they "acted reasonably when they entered the house and began to search for a man of the description they had been given and for weapons which he had used in the robbery or might use against them.”

This is a hot pursuit case.

Back 53

WARDEN V. HAYDEN

Front 54

This case permitted the police to attempt a warrantless arrest of the defendant when she was found "standing directly in the doorway--one step forward would have put her outside, one step backward would have put her in the vestibule of her residence."

The court reasoned that she was in a public place.

Back 54

UNITED STATES V. SANTANA

Front 55

Police can lock up and stay inside a house while waiting for a warrant as long as everyone is
You can prevent someone from leaving the house while waiting on a warrant.

A neighbor can go into someone's house to obtain evidence, and that evidence would be admissible.
4th Amendment only applies to the government.

Back 55

WELSH V. WISCONSIN

Front 56

An officer observed a juvenile, inside a home, hit someone very badly, and entered the home.

Community Caretaking Exception:
--Going in someone's house because you think you are stopping a crime from occurring.

Back 56

BRIGHAM CITY V. STUART

Front 57

D was arrested outside his home, and the police went inside his home to search for weapons.

The court held that an arrest on the street cannot provide its own "exigent circumstance" so as to justify a warrantless search of the arrestee's house.

Back 57

VALE V. LOUISIANA

Front 58

D was arrested in the lobby of his apartment building, went to his apt and arrested his partner in crime.

The court held that “where officers, having probable cause, enter premises, and with probable cause, arrest the occupants who have legitimate possessory interests in its contents and take them into custody and, for no more than the period here involved, secure the premises from within to preserve the status quo while others, in good faith, are in the process of obtaining a warrant, they do not violate the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable seizures."

Back 58

SEGURA V. UNITED STATES

Front 59

Wife was removing her things from her trailer when she told the police that her husband had marijuana under the couch. D refused to consent to a search, so the police made him wait outside while waiting on a warrant and he was only allowed in the house with supervision for 2 hours.

(i) "the police had probable cause to believe that trailer home contained evidence of a crime and contraband, namely, unlawful drugs";

(ii) "the police had good reason to fear that, unless restrained, McArthur would destroy the drugs before they could return with a warrant";

(iii) "the police made reasonable efforts to reconcile their law enforcement needs with the demands of personal privacy"; and

(iv) "the police imposed a restraint for limited period of time."

Back 59

ILLINOIS V. MCARTHUR

Front 60

The criminal nature of the homicide and the perpetrator were already known to the police. The search lasted four days. No occupant of the premises had summoned the police.

The Court, "decline[d] to hold that the seriousness of the offense under investigation itself creates exigent circumstances of the kind that under the Fourth Amendment justify a warrantless search."

---even for a murder scene still need a search warrant--------
---not exigent circumstance.

Back 60

MINCEY V. ARIZONA

Front 61

df was convicted of transmitting wagering information by telephone in violation of a federal statute. His conversations, which got him convicted, were overheard by FBI agents that had wired the public telephone booth that he used to make these calls. This wiring was done without a warrant.
The Fourth Amendment protects persons, houses, papers, and effects.
Phone conversations are private if you conduct them in a manner indicating that you want them to be private.
By closing the door he was signaling that he wanted privacy.

Back 61

KATZ V. UNITED STATES

gen. question.

Front 62

The government has to invade your reasonable expectation of privacy.
(SUBECTIVE)

That expectation has to be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
(OBJECTIVE)

Back 62

TWO PART TEST FOR PRIVACY?

judge harlan test
--specific.

Front 63

Police found marijuana in D's crop fields.

Anything in an "open field" can be searched without a warrant.

Back 63

OLIVER V. UNITED STATES

Front 64

Police helicopter flying at an altitude of 400ft observed D's greenhouse. The greenhouse was within the curtilage.

Was this a search under the 4th Amendment requiring a warrant?

NO

A fly-over is not a search.

Back 64

FLORIDA V. RILEY

Front 65

Police found evidence of narcotics in D's garbage and used this to get a warrant.

What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of 4th Amendment protection.

Back 65

CALIFORNIA V. GREENWOOD

Front 66

During a lawful stop of a Greyhound bus, federal agents squeezed the soft luggage passengers had placed in the overhead compartment and felt something like a brick in D's luggage. They asked to search the bag and D said yes. They found drugs.

A passenger does not expect for anyone to do an exploratory search of his luggage.

The agent's physical manipulation of the bag violated the 4th Amendment.

Back 66

BOND V. UNITED STATES

Front 67

If all you are doing is detecting something by enhancing a natural sense, that is not a search, even though it is more refined than what a human can do.

What can drug dogs sniff?

lawfully seized luggage
lawfully seized car

Back 67

UNITED STATES V. PLACE

Front 68

This case reaffirmed United States v. Place holding that a drug dog sniff is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

Back 68

ILLINOIS V. CABALLES

Front 69

With the consent of a chemical company, police installed a "beeper," a battery operated radio transmitter, into a container of chloroform, a chemical used to manufacture illicit drugs, prior to its purchase. By a combination of visual surveillance and monitoring of the beeper signal, the police tracked the container as it was carried in Petschen's automobile to D's cabin in a rural area. On that evidence and other information, a search warrant for the cabin was issued, and an illicit drug lab was discovered within.

The use of the beeper did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.

Visual surveillance could have revealed the same details to the police.

Back 69

UNITED STATES V. KNOTTS

Front 70

Same type of facts as previous case except that the police got information that they could not have observed themselves.

---not violation to install the beeper but was when it was inside the house-----

Back 70

UNITED STATES V. KARO

Front 71

Aerial photographs were taken of a chemical company's industrial complex.


This case is dealing with something that cannot be seen with a natural eye, but here there were no intimate details revealed as to raise constitutional concerns.

Back 71

DOW CHEMICAL V. UNITED STATES

not search b/c this was open field.

Front 72

This is the case where they used a thermal imaging device to find marijuana in D’s home.

Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of a private home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a Fourth Amendment “search,” and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.

Back 72

KYLLO V. UNITED STATES

Front 73

When is the use of an enhancement device (dogs, beepers, cameras) a search within the meaning of the 4th Amendment?

Back 73

It is a search only if the information obtained could not have been obtained by the use of natural senses from a public vantage point AND the device reveals sufficient intimate detail so as to raise constitutional concerns.

Front 74

EXAM TIPS FOR SEARCHES WITH A WARRANT

Back 74

1. Look for PC and whether or not the search stayed within the scope of the warrant.

2. Plain View doctrine tells you whether or not you are within the scope of the warrant.

3.WHAT TO KNOW FOR EACH WARRANT EXCEPTION:
trigger
scope
time limit
rationale

Front 75

SPECIFICITY REQUIREMENT
search warrant.

Back 75

1. The language must be precise on its face specifying the place to be searched and what is being searched for.

2. Must limit the officer’s discretion.

3. Does not have to have perfect minute detail, just enough to let the officer know what he is looking for.

Front 76

--already arrested--D was patted down and the officer felt a cigarette package in his shirt pocket. He knew the packet did not have cigarettes in it, so he looked further and found heroin.

Back 76

UNITED STATES V. ROBINSON

This is an example of the SEARCH INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREST EXCEPTION.

This is a probable cause arrest, and that is all that is needed for the search.

To protect the police officer from possible weapons, and to prevent the destruction of evidence.

Front 77

D was arrested in his home and the officers searched his home without a warrant even though he objected.

WINGSPAN/GRABBING DISTANCE RULE:
The police can only search within reaching distance of the arrestee.
 
In order to do a search incident to arrest in the home, you need search warrant

Back 77

CHIMEL V. CALIFORNIA

Front 78

D was arrested for not having her children in seat belts.
Can arrest for minor offense that usually has a fine attached to it.

Back 78

ATWATER V. CITY OF LAGO VISTA

Front 79

WAYS FOR OFFICER TO GET INTO THE HOME

Back 79

WARRANT

EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES(4)
hot pursuit
prevent destruction of evidence
prevent flight
prevent injury

CONSENT

Front 80

You can’t arrest someone outside and then go search inside their home.

Back 80

VALE V. LOUISIANA

Front 81

D went back in the house to get his ID when the police arrested him outside and they saw marijuana inside.

The entry was lawful because the suspect asked to go back inside and the marijuana was in plain view and therefore not could not be excluded.

Back 81

WASHINGTON V. CHRISMAN

Front 82

was arrested for not appearing in crt. he was driving with friends and cops pull him over. cuffed and put him in the back of the police car. did a search on his car.

was this legal--yes--search incident to an arrest.

but if not arrested and in handcuff--
cop can only do a visual search of car and not thorough-because i cant reach for weapons in the car.

Back 82

ARIZONA V. GANT

Front 83

Iowa had a statute that says you can, but do not have to, be arrested for a crime, and the D was issued a citation, and the officer did a search without arresting him.

You have to arrest someone to actually make a search incident to arrest.

If you catch someone in the middle of a violent crime and they are probably going to be arrested, a search would be allowed.

Back 83

KNOWLES V. IOWA

Front 84

D was pulled over for stolen tags, he got out of the car and was accosted by the officer when the officer asked him if he had any illegal drugs when he produced bags of drugs.

Whenever the police arrest an occupant or recent occupant of a car then they have the search incident to arrest powers of the car.

Back 84

THORNTON V. UNITED STATES

Front 85

D was arrested for drunk driving and refused to blow into the blood alcohol machine. They used a needle blood test to get his blood.

They had PC that he was drunk, and there were exigent circumstances that evidence would be destroyed, so the Court upheld this blood test.

For blood tests, you need PC + W or WE

Back 85

SCHMERBER V. CALIFORNIA

Front 86

Just says narcotics officers can follow you for days until you forget to change lanes and then arrest you and search your car.

Back 86

WHREN V. UNITED STATES

Front 87

D was arrested outside his motor home, and they had PC that there were drugs in his motor home, and they went inside and found drugs in plain view.

You have to have PC that evidence is in the vehicle to search a car without a warrant.

You never need a warrant to search a car, all you need is probable cause.

You can search anywhere you want in that car as long as your search is continually supported by PC.

Back 87

CALIFORNIA V. CARNEY

Front 88

once arrested the cops can choose to search the car at any time that they want.

Back 88

CHAMBERS V. MARONEY

Front 89

Search of a securely impounded vehicle days after it has been impounded is okay as long as PC still exists.

Back 89

UNITED STATES V. JOHNS

Front 90

Police saw a guy pick up a package which they knew contained marijuana, guy went into apt, D came out with brown bag the size of one of the marijuana packages and police arrested him and searched the bag finding the marijuana.

Police may search containers in an automobile as long as search is supported by PC.

Back 90

CALIFORNIA V. ACEVEDO

Front 91

RULES FOR CONSENT

Authority (Who can give consent?)

(actual v. apparent)

Back 91

Consent must be voluntarily given.

Involuntary consent is to falsely threaten someone.
--Can't trick people.

Doesn't have to be warned that you are free to refuse.


You have to be an occupant.
For roommates, can't consent to search to a room other than yours.
(actual v. apparent)
Whether or not someone has authority to someone else's room it is based on mutual use.
Scope

Where they can search is defined by what a reasonable 3rd person would have assumed the officer can search.

Front 92

D had a syringe in his pocket--PC to search for drugs—and the police searched a female passenger's purse.

If you have PC that there is evidence in the car, you can't search the person unless you have reasonable suspicion of the person, but you can search containers which in this case was her purse.

Back 92

WYOMING V. HOUGHTON

Front 93

Passenger consented to a search of his brother's car and the search produced evidence which got D convicted.

A person’s consent will be valid even if they were not told they had a right to refuse (if not arrested dont have to prove voluntary).

Back 93

SCHNECKLOTH V. BUSTAMONTE

Front 94

“The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent, the Court concluded is neither the suspect’s intent nor the officer’s perception thereof, but rather ‘that of objective reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?”

Back 94

FLORIDA V. JIMENO

Front 95

D’s girlfriend claimed to share an apartment with her boyfriend and gave them consent to search the apartment. She did not actually live there (she lied) or have a right to consent.
All that matters is that police had a reasonable belief that the person consenting had a right to.

This is an example of apparent authority.

Back 95

ILLINOIS V. RODRIGUEZ

Front 96

Police asked wife to search house and she said yes. Police asked husband to search the house and he said no.
When one person says no to a search and the other person says yes, the no wins.

Back 96

GEORGIA V. RANDOLPH

Front 97

PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE

Back 97

1. Court says you can search anything you lawfully stumble upon.

2. Officer must be lawfully present.

3. Can only seize what is immediately apparent to him without unlawful manipulation.

4. Immediate PC without manipulation.
(Buie)

Front 98

One of 2 D's suspected in an armed robbery was seized and his house was searched for the other guy or someone else that might be there that could harm the police. The police found the red jumpsuit that was described by a witness because it was in plain view. This jumpsuit was used to convict the D.

Because they were lawfully in the house, they were able to seize the jumpsuit that was in plain view.

Back 98

MARYLAND V. BUIE

Front 99

Police lawfully entered premises when officer saw what looked like stolen electronics which he slightly moved to find the serial #s which once called in determined the turntable was stolen.

Court held this search to be unreasonable because the officer had to move the items.
You cannot manipulate an item at all in order to use the plain view doctrine.

Back 99

ARIZONA V. HICKS

Front 100

If there is a fire in someone’s home, and they come to investigate the next day, must have a warrant.

Back 100

CAMARA V. MUNICIPAL COURT

Front 101

D was arrested while DUI, taken into custody, and his van was lawfully impounded when they inventoried it and drugs were found.

Police can do an inventory search

1. if procedure

2. limit cop discretion.

3. container policy, this is good enough.

4.D has to make the argument that search is outside the scope.

Back 101

COLORADO V. BERTINE

Front 102

The inventory of a locked suitcase found in an impounded vehicle was unlawful because there was no policy whatsoever.

Back 102

FLORIDA V. WELLS

Front 103

Court upheld a customs inspection of mail entering the United States.

Govt. can search your car, trunk, and your person at an international border.

They cannot do a strip search unless they have RS.

For a body cavity search, they must have PC.

They can do an X-Ray with RS.

Back 103

UNITED STATES V. RAMSEY

Front 104

“removal and disassembling of a vehicle’s gas tank does not require reasonable suspicion”

Back 104

UNITED STATES V. FLORES-MONTANOs

Front 105

A student can be searched without a warrant by school official or teacher as long as there is reasonable suspicion that they have something that is prohibited by the school.

Ordinarily will be considered reasonable when there is reasonable suspicion that the search will turn up evidence.

The measures adopted must be reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.

Back 105

NEW JERSEY V. TLO

Front 106

The court upheld a school policy applicable to middle-school and high-school students requiring random drug testing for those in extracurricular activities.

Drug testing is a search.

Back 106

BOARD OF EDUCATION V. EARLS

Front 107

upheld blood and urine testing of railroad--major train accidents or railroad employees who violated certain rules


allow
the suspicionless testing of to carry a firearm is reasonable

Back 107

SKINNER/

VON RAAB

Front 108

Court struck down a statute requiring each candidate for public office to submit to drug testing.
LINE-DRAWER CASE

Back 108

CHANDLER V. MILLER

Front 109

1. Can have a check point but has to check everyone and not be discretionary.

2.Brief questioning of vehicle occupants at such checkpoints is permissible without any individualized suspicion whatsoever.

3.Sobriety checkpoint program upheld.

Back 109

MARTINEZ-FUERTE/PROUSE/SITZ

Front 110

Cops going in to inspect a junkyard are acting as both administrative and criminal law enforcement and this is okay.

Back 110

NEW YORK V. BURGER

Front 111

Parolees have no privacy and can be searched whenever and wherever.

Probationers have less privacy, are like students in school, and can only be searched upon reasonable suspicion.

Back 111

SAMSON V. CALIFORNIA

Front 112

drunk search

Primary Purpose Cases.
Here, they were looking directly for the bad guys in violation of Criminal Laws.

—drug interdiction checkpoint for unlawful drugs.

—there was a South Carolina statute which required drug testing of pregnant women who were poor and looked like they were drug users. If they failed the drug test, they were referred for prosecuting. If all the women had not been prosecuted, this might have worked.
Because all the women were prosecuted, it was obvious that the primary purpose was criminal justice.

Back 112

INDIANAPOLIS V. EDMOND

FERGUSON V. CHARLESTON

Front 113

There was a hit and run one week, and the next week at the same time as the incident, officers set up a checkpoint for investigation.

Here, the court upheld the checkpoint because they were doing questioning and not looking directly for the bad guys.

Always do the primary purpose test, and/or balancing of GI v. DI.

Back 113

Illinois v. Lidster

Front 114

The police suspected D for a crime, tried to get consent to enter her home, she refused, eventually they moved her out of the way and forced their way into her home. Once inside, they found her nephew’s dirty magazines which was illegal back then.

Exclusionary rule is a judicially created rule to deter police conduct and to preserve judicial integrity.

This rule says that any evidence obtained during an unlawful search or seizure is inadmissible in court for substantive reasons.

Back 114

MAPP V. OHIO

Front 115

The court will not allow 4th Amendment exclusionary rule issues to be heard in federal habeas corpus proceedings as long as the D was given a full and fair chance to litigate them in state court.

Back 115

STONE V. POWELL

Front 116

Fourth Amendment rights are personal, not derivative. Thus, evidence seized in violation of one defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights may be admissible against a co-defendant unless the co-defendant has independent grounds to assert such claim.

Back 116

ALDERMAN V. UNITED STATES

Front 117

D was a passenger in a car that was seized, a shotgun was found, and he was convicted. He wants to challenge the illegal search.
The court said that he does not have standing.

Back 117

RAKAS V. ILLINOIS

Mere passengers have no REP in another’s car.

Standing is when a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the thing or place searched.
[Courthouse Door Rule

Front 118

D’s were packaging cocaine in someone else’s home when the police illegally searched the home.

You have to be an over-night guest to have standing in someone else’s house.

The more business-related the visit, the less likely you will have standing in someone else’s home.

Back 118

MINNESOTA V. CARTER

Front 119

If the seizure of a car is illegal and you have been seized in this car, the exclusionary rule will apply.
There is no automatic standing.

Back 119

BRENDLIN V. CALIFORNIA

Front 120

Illegal search of a man’s briefcase coming from Bahamas into the U.S. that they suspected of tax fraud.

The documents found incriminated someone else that was convicted.

The SC did not exclude the evidence because the D had no standing. He was not the one that was illegally searched.

The standing limitation gives the police the right to violate others rights to obtain evidence

Back 120

UNITED STATES V. PAYNER

Front 121

D put drugs in a female friend’s purse. He had only known the female for 3 days.

Standing Determination Factors:

How long you have known the person?

Does the person have access to the thing searched?

Does the person have a right to exclude others from the thing searched?

Do others have access?
What is the nature of the transaction?

Back 121

RAWLINGS V. KENTUCKY

Front 122

OTHER EXCEPTIONS to search warrant

Back 122

1.good faith

2. inevitable discovery

3.impeachment

Front 123

cop---- reliance on a search warrant found invalid may be admissible.

It is necessary that a reasonably well-trained officer would have believed that the warrant was valid. This has come to be known as the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule.

Back 123

UNITED STATES V. LEON

Front 124

what are problems to valid search warrant.

Back 124

1.magistrate not neutral and detached

2.warrant lacking PC

3. judge in issuing was lied to

4. groush case _-Warrant facially deficient

Front 125

Cops wanted to search for evidence of a homicide and the warrant was put on a drug warrant form and the judge told the officer that he would fix it.

The judge did not.

This was okay.

Evidence admissible

Back 125

MASSACHUSETTS V. SHEPPARD

Front 126

Police officer who was also the affiant mistakenly put, in the place to list the items to be seized, a description of the place to be searched.

The court held that such a mistake should have been so obvious even at a quick glance so as to not allow the “good faith” exception to apply.

Back 126

GROH V. RAMIREZ

Front 127

police have right to rely on statute even if the statute is wrong on its face.

Back 127

ILLINOIS V. KRULL

Front 128

Court clerk forgets to remove a paid parking ticket warrant for the D who was arrested.

The cop in good faith relied on the warrant.

Back 128

ARIZONA V. EVANS

Front 129

D was arrested after an officer called to find out if there was a warrant for someone which he was told there was. This info was incorrect.

The officer was allowed to rely on the misrepresentation of the other officer if reasonable.

Back 129

HERRING V. UNITED STATES

Front 130

The evidence had been seized in a search conducted pursuant a warrant that specified a location of "the premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment." The police reasonably believed that there was only one apartment on the premises described in the warrant. However, there were two apartments on the third floor. Before the officers executing the warrant became aware that they were in a separate apartment occupied by defendant, they had discovered the contraband that provided the basis for defendant's conviction.

The Court held that the warrant was valid when it was issued and the manner in which it was executed was reasonable. The validity of the warrant was assessed on the basis of the information that the officers disclosed, or had a duty to discover and to disclose, to the issuing magistrate. The officers' execution of the warrant reasonably included the entire third floor, and their conduct was consistent with a reasonable effort to ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched wi

Back 130

MARYLAND V. GARRISON

Front 131

INEVITABLE DISCOVERY

Back 131

Police would have found it anyway by legal means.

Knock and Announce is the classic example.

Front 132

The confession was suppressed.


inevitable discovery rule
The body was not excluded because they presented evidence that they were so close to finding the body anyway that they were right on top of it.

Back 132

NIX V. WILLIAMS

Front 133

IMPEACHMENT EXCEPTION

Back 133

The exclusionary rule does not give the D a license to commit perjury.

If the D opens the door by offering contradictory testimony, evidence is admissible to impeach him.

Types of Impeachment:

---ability to remember
---ability to tell the truth
---(anything that attacks credibility)

Front 134

D opened the door by testifying under oath that he had never possessed any narcotics.

He opened the door to be impeached because he had an earlier case of heroin being seized in his house legally.

Back 134

WALDER V. UNITED STATES

Front 135

The Court held that illegally seized evidence was properly admitted to impeach any aspect of defendant's testimony, and that such impeachment was not limited to a direct contradiction of a particular statement made during direct testimony.

Back 135

UNITED STATES V. HAVENS

Front 136

Limitation on impeachment.

This case is the line drawer which says only the D can open the door, not his witnesses.

Back 136

JAMES V. ILLINOIS

Front 137

when is the case in chief over?

what is the prosecutors tool?

Back 137

Case in chief is over when the prosecution rests.

The exceptions are the prosecutor’s tools.

Front 138

FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE CONT.

Back 138

Start with the initial illegality and follow the chain.

Chain Breakers for fruit of poisoness tree
1. Independent Source—evidence was obtained legally.

2..Inevitable Discovery—police would have found it anyway

3.. Attenuation—so much time can pass that the taint wears off in the end.

Front 139

Lee was arrested and snitched on Toy who snitched on Yee; who gave up drugs and snitched on D claiming that was who he got the drugs from. After being released on bond, D confessed.

His confession came after a break in custody, so it was not suppressed.

Back 139

WONG SUN V. UNITED STATES

Front 140

D was arrested in the lobby of his apartment building and the police searched his apartment. The arrest was illegal, and so was the search of his apartment. They saw drug paraphernalia in plain view and went to get a warrant. Execution of the warrant turned up drugs.

The drugs found were admissible because they were found independently of the initial illegality.

2 groups of cops

independent source rule

Back 140

SEGURA V. UNITED STATES

Front 141

Police broke into a warehouse--after have info--didnt touch anything and got warrant but did not tell magistrate they broke in the first time--but when applying they did not rely on what they saw.

crt= applied independent source rule.

---crt said this was ok--as long as police had probable cause to apply for search in the first place

This was okay.

Back 141

MURRAY V. UNITED STATES

Front 142

D was suspected of murdering someone, illegally arrested, Mirandized, and then gave incriminating statements.

Confession was inadmissible.

FACTORS TO DETERMINE BREAK IN CHAIN:
1. temporal proximity

2. intervening circumstances

3. the level of the illegal conduct (kinda like TOT)

Back 142

BROWN V. ILLINOIS

Front 143

Police suspected D but did not have PC for an arrest, so they asked D to come with them for questioning. They read him his Miranda rights and later on he gave incriminating statements.

Mirandizing someone does not attenuate the taint of an unconstitutional arrest.

Back 143

DUNAWAY V. NEW YORK

Front 144

illegal arrest
“six hours had elapsed between the illegal arrest and the time petitioner confessed; petitioner was advised of his rights three times; and he was allowed to visit briefly with his girlfriend and his neighbor shortly before he confessed.”

Confession was the fruit of an illegal arrest.

----attenuation---
mere passage of time is not enough for attenuation----------

Back 144

TAYLOR V. ALABAMA

Front 145

D was illegally arrested without a warrant in his home. He waived his Miranda rights. He then confessed to the murder.

Where the police have PC to arrest a suspect but no warrant, the exclusionary rule does not bar the use of a statement made by the suspect outside his home even though the statement is obtained after an in-house arrest

Back 145

NEW YORK V. HARRIS

Front 146

what is the payton rule.

Back 146

NY had statute that allowed cops to go in people houses w/o warrants and arrest

S.C crt over ruled = violation of
4th

must have warrant and pc to go into the house.

Front 147

Victim gave a description of her assailant, police found guy that looked like him, illegally arrested him and let him go after taking his photo, showed a photo array to victim and she identified D.

The photo was an illegal fruit of an out of court ID. But the victim’s in court ID was not suppressed.

The victim’s ID has to be independent of the illegally obtained photo.

Back 147

UNITED STATES V. CREWS

Front 148

Officer illegally picked up an envelope and gave the info to federal agents which was used to get an employee of the store to testify against the D. They would not have known about these people “but for” the illegal evidence.

The more willing the witness is to testify, then the prosecutor can argue that they would inevitably have been discovered

Back 148

UNITED STATES V. CECCOLINI

Front 149

There will be no more wiretapping in this country unless there is a legislative standard that limits it. (Minimization Requirement)

States have to authorize wiretapping through legislation.

MI absolutely does not allow wiretapping.

Back 149

BERGER V. NEW YORK

Front 150

TITLE III STATUTE
--When is a Title III warrant required?

Back 150

must get crt order for

1. non-consensual interceptions

2. of the contents

3. of any wire, oral, or electronic communication

4. through the use of electronic, mechanical, or other device

5. that invades a reasonable expectation of privacy

Front 151

1. To use a bugging device, agents may first need to enter homes in secret in order to install the devices.

Does Title III permit this covert entry and if so does this covert entry satisfy the 4th Amendment?

Back 151

DALIA V. UNITED STATES

1. YES

Front 152

An informant snitched on Hoffa about his plans to bribe jurors.

You run the risk that your words that you knowingly speak to another person will be repeated to law enforcement officers and used against you.

It is not a violation of the 4th Amendment for your words to be repeated to someone else as long as someone consents to this.

Back 152

HOFFA V. UNITED STATES

Front 153

The Fourth Amendment protects private conversations where no party consents to the surveillance and/or recording but does not protect conversations where one party consents to such activity. Thus, under the doctrine of “false friends,” no search occurs if a police informant or undercover agent masquerading as the defendant’s friend, business associate, or colleague in crime, reports to the government the defendant’s statements made in the informant’s or agent’s presence.

A person is not deemed to have a reasonable expectation of confidentiality from a person with whom he is conversing.
The doctrine also applies where the “false friend” wears a “wire” to record the conversation with the defendant.

Back 153

UNITED STATES V. WHITE

Front 154

VOLUNTARINESS CASES

Back 154

Looking at two types of facts:
--the characteristics of the accused (how old, how intelligent, emotional or mental stability, physical condition, gender, race) “boo hoo facts”

--the circumstances of the interrogation

Front 155

In the evening of the same day as the raid, one of the detectives went to the hospital where petitioner was confined in the intensive-care unit, and, after giving him Miranda warnings, persisted in interrogating him while he was lying in bed barely conscious, encumbered by tubes, needles, and a breathing apparatus, and despite the fact that he repeatedly asked that the interrogation stop until he could get a lawyer.

D is almost in a coma when the police get him to write down a confession.

Court said no good.

Back 155

mincey v. arizona

Front 156

After an individual's 11-year-old stepdaughter had been murdered in Arizona, the individual, who was a suspect in the killing, was incarcerated in a federal prison for an unrelated federal crime. Eventually, the individual confessed to the murder to a fellow inmate who was a paid informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, after the informant had (1) become friends with the individual; (2) said that he--the informant--knew that the individual was starting to get some "tough treatment" from other inmates because of a rumor that the individual was suspected of the murder; and (3) offered to protect the individual from his fellow inmates.

A confession is not necessarily a product of coercion where the police expressly or implicitly promise leniency in exchange for the suspect’s cooperation.

Back 156

ARIZONA V. FULMINANTE

Front 157

Officer told D that his partner in crime had already confessed and that he was already in a lot of trouble, in order to get the D to confess which he did.

Despite the lies they told to get the guy to confess, the confession was still voluntary.

Back 157

FRAZIER V. CUPP

Front 158

Officer repeatedly told D craziness, like he was his brother, and he was on his side.

This case was put in here to show how hard it is to get a confession to be deemed involuntary.

Back 158

MILLER V. FENTON

Front 159

Defendant approached a police officer and, without any prompting, confessed to a murder. The officer immediately advised him of his Miranda rights and defendant said that he understood the rights. After another police officer arrived, defendant was again advised of his rights. Defendant was then held in custody and proceeded to confess to a child's murder. The next day, defendant stated for the first time that voices had told him to confess.

The Court held that absent police coercion, defendant's confession was not barred by either Miranda or the Due Process Clause.

Involuntary—actually coerced by the police or government.

Back 159

COLORADO V. CONNELLY

Front 160

The purpose for creating these rules was to protect Defendant’s 5th Amendment rights.

For this limited purpose, the court created this remedy.

Court extended the 5th Amendment privilege to the interrogation room.

Court said that all police interrogation is coerced All confessions will be suppressed

Back 160

MIRANDA V. ARIZONA

Front 161

remain silent

if you don’t, what you say can be used against you

right to have an attorney during police questioning/right to have one present

if you can’t afford one, court will appoint one

Back 161

MIRANDA RIGHTS

Front 162

When does Miranda apply?
--During police-custody interrogations.
--Taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning.

Miranda warnings have to be given to everybody if you want to ask questions.

Oral testimony that the cop gave them is good enough if the trier of fact believes him.

Back 162

MIRANDA RULES

Front 163

During a custodial interrogation, respondent gave police the name of an alibi witness. The witness actually gave incriminating evidence to police. Holding that the police's failure to fully give respondent his Miranda warnings only implicated the prophylactic standards of the warnings, and not the 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination they were designed to protect.

The only defect was the failure to inform him that counsel would be provided free if he could not afford one.

The Court held that this failure did not require the exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of the statement, particularly where the statement itself was excluded

Back 163

MICHIGAN V. TUCKER

Front 164

Violation of Miranda is not a violation of the 5th Amendment.

Back 164

NEW YORK V. QUARLES

Front 165

An earlier and unwarned confession does not render a later confession that is warned inadmissible if the first confession was not the result of police coercion.

Back 165

OREGON V. ELSTAD

Front 166

Congress tried to pass a law that said if a statement was made voluntarily, there was no requirement for Miranda rights.

Chief Justice Rehnquist said, okay, it is not a constitutional doctrine, but a constitutional rule. It is constitutional enough that it can be commanded to be followed by the states and the federal courts.

Back 166

UNITED STATES V. DICKERSON

Front 167

D let the police in his house. The police were investigating him for tax fraud.

The court rejected the “focus” test.

You have to be taken into custody.

Even if they have made a subjective decision to arrest you, until they do, you are not arrested and do not have any right to Miranda warnings.

Back 167

BECKWITH V. UNITED STATES

Front 168

D was questioned in his bedroom by four police officers at 4:00am.

If they arrest you in your house, Miranda kicks in immediately.

General rule is that there is no requirement for Miranda for questioning in your home.

If there are extreme facts as the ones in this case, there is coercion, and Miranda kicks in.

Back 168

OROZCO V. TEXAS

Front 169

If suspects are at the police department, do officers have to Mirandize? Look for intimidation.

To what sorts of police seizures does Miranda not apply?—Terry-Seizures

Factors to Determine if Suspect is in Custody:
--How you got there.
----If the police say “you’re coming with us”—you are in custody.
----If the police ask you to come, you make an appointment, and come on your own—not in custody.
---Where they put you.
---How long you are there.
---What were you told or not told.
------Did they tell you that you were free to go and not under arrest?

Back 169

MATHIASON—BEHELER—BERKEMER

Front 170

D gave incriminating statements at his probation appointment.

Probation meeting is not as coercive as a custodial arrest.

Back 170

MINNESOTA V. MURPHY

Front 171

Cops asked parents to bring their son in for questioning.

Son was not in custody. Parents did not have to bring him in. Therefore, no Miranda warnings were required at the station.

Back 171

YARBOROUGH V. ALVARADO

Front 172

In Innis, a murder suspect was being transported to the police station when the police commented that they hoped that the murder weapon, which had not yet been located, would not be found by any children from a nearby school for the handicapped. In response, the suspect, who had previously requested a lawyer, revealed the location of the gun. The Court held that the comments were not the functional equivalent of interrogation because it found:

(1) the comments were brief;

(2) the comments were not particularly evocative;

(3) the suspect was not disoriented or upset when the comments were made;

(4) there was no evidence that the police should have known that the suspect would be susceptible to an appeal to his conscience.

Back 172

RHODE ISLAND V. INNIS

Front 173

For purposes of Miranda “interrogation” refers to express questioning or its “functional equivalent,” i.e., “any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”


For example, if the police know the person in custody may be susceptible to certain forms of persuasion, any statements or actions designed to play upon such susceptibilities may be deemed the functional equivalent of interrogation.

Back 173

RHODE ISLAND V. INNIS

Front 174

How long does the waiver last?

Back 174

There is no rule.

Most courts would say that a waiver is not effective the next day after 24 hours have passed from the signing of the waiver

Front 175

D’s wife insisted on talking to her husband who was in the interrogation room and had invoked his right to counsel.

It held that although the officers knew that incriminating statements might be made if defendant spoke with his wife, their decision to allow the conversation involved no coercion or psychological ploy designed to elicit an incriminating response. It thus held that the officers' actions in allowing defendant to speak with his wife and taping the conversation were not the functional equivalent of an interrogation under Miranda that violated defendant's previously expressed wish to not be questioned further without a lawyer present.

Back 175

ARIZONA V. MAURO

Front 176

You have to know your interrogator is a police officer for Miranda to apply.

--Suspect has to believe he is talking to a police officer.

If a snitch applies illegal and inappropriate pressure to the situation, D can make an argument that the confession was involuntary, not a Miranda argument.

Back 176

ILLINOIS V. PERKINS

Front 177

Once he lost 4th Amendment argument (blood test was unreasonable search), he made 5th Amendment argument that blood test meant that he was forced to incriminate himself.

5th Amendment applies to testimonial evidence (asking you to recall things that happened from memory).
---Voice lineup is not testimonial (content of his words)

Back 177

SCHMERBER V. CALIFORNIA

Front 178

The employees of a robbed bank identified respondent in a lineup that had been conducted without counsel being present. At trial, the employees pointed to respondent when asked to identify the robber.

The Court remanded to enter a new judgment vacating respondent's conviction, until a hearing could determine whether the in-court identifications had independent origins.

Back 178

WADE V. UNITED STATES

Front 179

Miranda warnings need not be issued prior to asking a suspect in custody routine booking questions, such as name, address, date of birth, and other biographical data necessary to complete the booking process.

Booking Question:
Any question that is reasonably necessary for booking someone in their jail.

Back 179

PENNSYLVANIA V. MUNIZ

Front 180

A police officer responded to a call reporting that a man assaulted a woman. The officer found defendant standing outside a parked truck with a woman inside the truck. The officer asked for defendant's identification 11 times and was refused each time. The officer arrested defendant.

The Court also determined that defendant's conviction did not violate the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on compelled self-incrimination, because disclosure of his name presented no reasonable danger of incrimination.

Back 180

HIIBEL V. SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

Front 181

What is required of Miranda warnings?

The Miranda warnings were not given exactly the way they were supposed to, but the court said they have to “touch all four corners.”

Ambiguity cuts in favor of the police.

**Look for whether or not all four corners are covered.

**If the Miranda warnings are quoted, keep looking, this is a trigger.

Back 181

CALIFORNIA V. PRYSOCK

Front 182

Before confessing, the prisoner was given warnings by the police, which included the advice that a lawyer would be appointed "if and when" the prisoner went to court.

On appeal, the Court held that the initial warnings given to the prisoner touched all of the bases required by Miranda.

The "if and when you go to court" advice simply anticipated that question.

Miranda did not require that attorneys be producible on call, but only that the suspect be informed, as here, that he had the right to an attorney before and during questioning, and that an attorney would be appointed for him if he could not afford one.

Back 182

DUCKWORTH V. EAGAN

Front 183

You can change topics in the middle of the interrogation.

Officers do not have to warn you about what they are investigating, unless they affirmatively mislead you.

SC said they are not adding anything to the Miranda warnings– because they did not want to disrupt the bright line rule.

Back 183

COLORADO V. SPRING

Front 184

Respondent confessed to and was convicted of the murder of a young woman. Respondent later challenged his conviction, claiming his confessions should have been suppressed because the police deceived him by failing to inform him that a public defender had called to speak with him while he was in custody, but prior to arraignment.

The Court found that respondent at no time requested an attorney, and events occurring outside the presence of respondent and entirely unknown to him had no bearing on his capacity to comprehend and knowingly waive his rights. The Court held that once a person knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights, the waiver was valid as a matter of law.

Back 184

MORAN V. BURBINE

Front 185

Is silence enough to constitute waiver?

Back 185

The court can never find a waiver based on a silent record.

Front 186

Although mere silence is not enough, that does not mean that the defendant’s silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver, may never support a conclusion that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution’s burden is great; but in at least some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated.”

Nodding and shrugging in a manner that says yes, can be okay.

Back 186

NORTH CAROLINA V. BUTLER

Front 187

D asked for his probation officer when he was told he had a right to an attorney.

Court said asking for a probation officer is not the same as asking for a lawyer.

Back 187

FARE V. MICHAEL C.

Front 188

Defendant, suspect in murder, was interviewed by the Naval Investigative Service, and was given the military equivalent of Miranda warnings, which he voluntarily waived. After the interview was under way, defendant made comments, indicating at first he might want a lawyer, but then saying he did not want a lawyer. Questioning continued.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that equivocal requests or comments regarding an attorney did not require questioning officers to stop interrogation so that counsel could be present and that questioning could continue unless a suspect actually requested an attorney.

Unless they unambiguously ask for a lawyer, you do not have to stop or ask anything.

Back 188

DAVIS V. UNITED STATES

Front 189

D refused to give a written statement, but nonetheless gave oral incriminating statements.

He waived his rights as to oral statements only.

Back 189

CONNECTICUT V. BARRETT

Front 190

After being advised of his rights, defendant stated that he did not want to talk about the robberies. Defendant was thereafter re-Mirandized and questioned at another police station about a different homicide and confessed to the murder.

The Supreme Court held that the right to remain silent encompassed within the Miranda rights was not a right to permanently remain silent, but was a right that had to be scrupulously honored by the police.

--The Court concluded that when the questioning was for different crimes, by a different police officer, in a different station, after an extended period without questioning, the request to remain silent had been scrupulously honored

Back 190

MICHIGAN V. MOSLEY

Front 191

After he was arrested and read his Miranda rights, petitioner requested an attorney. The police officers ceased questioning, but detectives from the same police department returned the next day and again interrogated petitioner. Petitioner confessed to the crimes during the second interrogation.

They can come back if suspect re-initiates the conversation or counsel is present.

The court assumes that the suspect does not want to be questioned.

Back 191

EDWARDS V. ARIZONA

Front 192

D said that he wanted a lawyer while he was being questioned and then asked what was going to happen to him. Officer then told him he did not have to talk to him and then suggested that he do a polygraph test which indicated that he had been lying. Before the polygraph test he was Mirandized.

This is called the “polygraph trick.”

The SC held that he did re-initiate because he asked what would happen to him and indicated that he wanted to discuss the facts of the case.

Back 192

OREGON V. BRADSHAW

Front 193

This case provides the bright-line rule that you cannot question a suspect about a different crime when they have invoked their Miranda rights as to one crime.

Back 193

ARIZONA V. ROBERSON

Front 194

Counsel must be present during all interrogations.

Back 194

MINNICK V. MISSISSIPPI

Front 195

Police chase a rape suspect into a supermarket, find him, grab him, and the officer sees an empty holster and asked him where the gun is. He tells them, they find the gun, then they Mirandize them.

Overriding considerations of public safety justify the officer’s failure to provide Miranda warnings before he asked questions devoted to locating the abandoned weapon.

Back 195

NEW YORK V. QUARLES

Front 196

There was a police protocol that officers would not give Miranda warnings until they got a confession and would then get the person to confess again. They could use the invalid confession for impeachment and could then use the valid confession.

If they do a two-step interrogation on purpose to get you to confess, no good.

If good faith mistake, the second statement, as long as everything else is okay, will be admissible.

Back 196

MISSOURI V. SEIBERT

Front 197

Respondent apparently violated a restraining order and officers going to his home to investigate the matter were told that respondent, a convicted felon, illegally possessed a pistol. They arrested respondent but were interrupted by respondent when they attempted to advise him of his Miranda rights. An officer then asked about the gun and respondent eventually revealed where it was.

A 5th Amendment Miranda violation does not lead to the suppression of physical evidence.

Back 197

UNITED STATES V. PATANE

Front 198

The accused, who was indicted for selling heroin, had been questioned by the police when taken into custody, but had not been warned of his right to appointed counsel. After the accused testified at the trial, prior inconsistent statements which he had made to the police were admitted in evidence for the purpose of impeaching his credibility, and the jury was instructed that such statements could be considered only in passing on the accused's credibility, and not as evidence of guilt.

Back 198

HARRIS V. NEW YORK

Front 199

D was given immunity. They cannot use what you said to impeach you.

Impeachment is only permitted if there was a Miranda violation.

Actually involuntary, or immunity, testimony cannot be used to impeach

Back 199

NEW JERSEY V. PORTASH

Front 200

After being arrested for selling marijuana to an informant, defendants were given the Miranda warnings and chose to remain silent.

--Prosecutor tried to tell the jury that the defendant must be guilty because he exercised his right to remain silent.

-This cannot be done.

Back 200

DOYLE V. OHIO

Front 201

Here, the D’s silence was before he was arrested so he was not exercising his Miranda rights and the prosecutor could make a statement to the jury that this might indicate guilt.

Back 201

JENKINS V. ANDERSON

Front 202

Prosecutor tried to argue that because the D waited two weeks to confess, he must be guilty.

This was okay.

Silence must be a direct response to Miranda warnings; otherwise, we are not sure if he is exercising his right to silence.

--All this stems from the idea that an ordinary person would speak up and say that they did not do it.

Adoptive Admission—remaining silent indicates that you did something.

Back 202

FLETCHER V. WEIR

Front 203

D gets indicted, out on bond, gets in car w/ co-defendant who was helping the police, and gave incriminating statements.

Has the 6th Amendment attached?

--Once indicted, already have the right to counsel.

--Here, they used “deliberate elicitation.”

--On exam, professor will use the words “arraigned” or “indicted” to trigger a 6th Amendment issue.

--DE + AJP – Counsel or Waiver = 6th Amend. Violat.

Back 203

MASSIAH V. UNITED STATES

Front 204

D was arraigned in Davenport, had an attorney waiting for him in Des Moines, attorney in Davenport was not allowed to join the ride to Des Moines, his 6th Amendment right had definitely attached, they “deliberately elicited” incriminating statements from his when trying to find out where the body of the young girl was.

The court acknowledged that this right could be waived, but it was not done so in this case.

Back 204

BREWER V. WILLIAMS

Front 205

D had been indicted, FBI had an informant, told him to not ask any questions, they concluded that there was general conversation between the two, and they said the informant was not a passive listener.

DE means that the informant somehow prompted D to incriminate himself.

Here, the court found that there was “deliberate elicitation.”
--Statement was inadmissible.

Back 205

UNITED STATES V. HENRY

Front 206

An informant was in a cell with D and was a passive listener. D on one occasion told the informant that he had not done anything, and the informant told him his story didn’t sound too good. The D met with his brother later, and then eventually told the informant that he committed the crime.

Here, the statement was admissible because of the break in time when the D spoke with his brother.

Back 206

KUHLMAN V. WILSON

Front 207

Respondent and co-defendant were charged in a multi-count indictment with committing various criminal offenses. Both entered not guilty pleas and were released on bail pending trial. Co-defendant later confessed to police and agreed to cooperate with the prosecution of respondent. Co-defendant was wired by police and met with respondent under the guise of discussing their pending charges and trial strategy. Respondent made several incriminating statements in this recorded conversation. The prosecution introduced the statements into evidence at trial and defendant was convicted of burglary and theft.

The Court granted certiorari and affirmed the ruling excluding the statements, because the police knowingly circumvented respondent's 6TH Amendment right to assistance of counsel since they knew he would make incriminating statements.

Back 207

MAINE V. MOULTON

Front 208

Once the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, and the accused requests counsel,
the government may not initiate conversation with the accused relating to the crime at
hand in the absence of counsel, even if the accused waives the right in response to the
police elicitation.

However, if the accused initiates conversation with the police, and
waives his right to counsel, interrogation in the absence of counsel may proceed.

Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986) (defendant was appointed counsel whom he
had not yet met when the police contacted the defendant, read him his Miranda [384 U.S.
436] rights, obtained a waiver, and questioned him, even though the defendant had asked
for his lawyer several times; the Court held that the waiver was invalid because the police
initiated the conversation after the defendant had requested counsel).

Back 208

MICHIGAN V. JACKSON

Front 209

D was arraigned, charged with murder, and a lawyer was automatically appointed to him. He did not specifically ask one because in LA they were automatically appointed.

A defendant has to affirmatively invoke his right to counsel while incarcerated in order to have the police leave them alone. Invoking this right before is a judge is not enough.

There is no way to prevent police interrogation if you are not incarcerated.

Back 209

MONTEJO V. LOUISIANA

Front 210

Defendant and a co-defendant were charged with murder and other crimes. Prior to trial, an informant planted in defendant's cell heard him admit to shooting and robbing the victim, but defendant testified at trial that his co-defendant committed the crimes. When the State sought to call the informant to testify to his contradictory statement, defendant objected.

The U.S. Supreme Court held the interests safeguarded by such exclusion were outweighed by the need to prevent perjury and to assure the integrity of the trial process.

Therefore, the Court held that the informant's testimony, concededly elicited in violation of the Sixth Amendment, was admissible to challenge defendant's inconsistent testimony at trial.

Back 210

KANSAS V. VENTRIS

Front 211

If the police tell you that you have been indicted, Miranda warnings might be sufficient.

On the facts of this case, the Miranda warnings were sufficient.

How do you waive your 6th Amendment rights?

Back 211

The same way you waive Miranda rights.

PATTERSON V. ILLINOIS

kiv

Front 212

Statements taken in violation of the 6th Amendment can be used to impeach when a D takes the stand.

Back 212

MICHIGAN V. HARVEY

Front 213

D was not allowed to have his attorney present at his post-indictment line-up identification. This line-up was live and in-person.

A post-indictment/post-arraignment line-up right to counsel is automatic.

A critical stage typically involves the accused and the prosecution or his witnesses. The court used the phrase, “trial like confrontation.”

A D can waive their right to be present at their own trial.

An attorney can insure against possible suggestiveness.

No right to an attorney at any pre-AJP line-up.

What if you do have a bad out of court ID. No reference can be made to it at trial.

When can the witness make an in the court ID when it was preceded by a bad out of court ID. Independent Origin
You always have a “due process” argument if you do not have a “right to counsel” argument.

Back 213

UNITED STATES V. WADE

critical stages are high risk that df will not get a fair trial.

Front 214

the prior opportunity of the witness to observe the alleged criminal act.

the existence of any discrepancy between any pre-lineup description and the
defendant’s actual appearance.

any identification prior to lineup of another person.

the identification by picture of the defendant prior to the lineup.

failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion.

the lapse of time between the crime and the lineup identification.

Back 214

WADE FACTORS

Front 215

Two men were arrested and brought to a squad room with other officers. They were the only two in the room that were not officers. The victim entered the room and identified the men.

"For it is only then that the Government has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of Government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law."

"We decline to impose a per se exclusionary rule upon testimony concerning an identification that took place long before the commencement of any prosecution whatsoever."

Back 215

KIRBY V. ILLINOIS

Front 216

Rape victim was sitting in courtroom where petitioner was waiting for a hearing to determine whether he would go before a grand jury or not. The victim identified him in this proceeding. He was not given an attorney for these proceedings.

On certiorari, the Court held that defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were violated by a corporeal identification conducted after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings and in the absence of counsel.

The Court rejected the State's argument that the victim's testimony at trial that she had identified defendant at an uncounseled pretrial confrontation was admissible if there was an independent source for the victim's identification. --The Court noted that the State could not buttress its case-in-chief by introducing evidence of a pretrial identification made in violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, even if the State could prove that the pretrial identification had an independent source.

Back 216

MOORE V. ILLINOIS

Front 217

Three years after D had been incarcerated and indicted, government conducted a photographic display without notifying counsel. The prosecutor showed 5 color photographs to witnesses who previously had identified the black and white photo.

The Court held that U.S. Const. amend. VI did not grant the right to counsel at photographic displays conducted by respondent for the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an identification of the offender.

Back 217

UNITED STATES V. ASH

Front 218

Defendant was brought to victim’s hospital room to identify him. He She was stabbed and they thought she might die in surgery.

Despite the overwhelming suggestiveness, the court allowed this identification to stand because of the “exigent circumstance.”

The test for suggestiveness is TOC. The burden is on the D to convince the judge that it is so suggestive that there was a “substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”

Back 218

STOVALL V. DENNO

Front 219

Undercover officer sold drugs to seller. Called another officer and gave a description of seller. That officer pulled a photo of who he thought the seller was and left on undercover officer’s desk. That officer came back to office and identified the D.

The Court adopted the totality of the circumstances test and concluded that the criteria applicable in determining the admissibility of evidence offered by the prosecution concerning an identification were satisfactorily met and complied with in respondent's case.

The Court reasoned that the factors that had to be considered included:

--the opportunity of the witness to view respondent at the time of the crime,

--the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal,

--the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation.

Against these factors was weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself.

Back 219

MANSON V. BRAITHWAITE

Front 220

“Petitioner, an indigent, was indicted for robbery. His request for counsel was denied because local practice permitted appointment only in rape and murder prosecutions. Petitioner then plead not guilty and elected to be tried without a jury. At trial, he chose not to take the stand. He was convicted and sentenced to eight years imprisonment.”

Prior to 1963, the court said the 6th Amendment was not applicable to the states. Which meant that the states were free to appoint counsel if they wanted to.

Back 220

BETTS V. BRADY

Front 221

--Defendant was indigent but denied an attorney because in Florida you had no right to an attorney unless charged with a capital offense.

--You have a right to an attorney when you are charged with a felony.

1. If you cannot afford one, the state must provide you with one.

You have the right to an attorney for a misdemeanor if at the end of the case you end up going to jail.

2. The judges know, so if they don’t give you an attorney, they are limiting their sentencing options.

Back 221

GIDEON V. WAINWRIGHT

Front 222

Florida struck down a rule requiring that counsel only be appointed for nonpetty offenses punishable by more than six months imprisonment imprisonment, and instead they held that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony unless he was represented by counsel.”

Back 222

ARGERSINGER V. HAMLIN

Front 223

“We therefore hold that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments [require] only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense.”

Back 223

SCOTT V. ILLINOIS

Front 224

After being convicted of a misdemeanor, third-degree assault, Shelton, an indigent defendant who had not been afforded counsel, was sentenced to a jail term of 30 days, which the trial court immediately suspended. He was then placed on two years unsupervised probation.

A suspended sentence constitutes a “term of imprisonment” within the meaning of Argersinger and Scott even though incarceration is not immediate or inevitable. Accordingly, the court affirmed Sheldon’s conviction and the monetary portion of his punishment, but invalidated “that aspect of his sentence imposing 30 days of suspended jail time.” By reversing Shelton’s suspended sentence, the court also vacated the two-year probation term. THIS COURT AFFIRMED.

Back 224

ALABAMA V. SHELTON

Front 225

What decisions does the D get to make by himself, and what decisions will only be made by the attorney?

Back 225

JONES V. BARNES

1. plead guilty or go to trial
2. waive their right to jury
3. whether or not to testify
4. appeal or not

Front 226

Defendant claimed IAC, ineffective assistance of counsel. Just saying ineffective in a case.

The court agrees that you have the right to reasonably effective assistance of counsel.

An attorney has a duty to consult with the client regarding important decisions including strategy.

The first thing you have to show is that they did something wrong (unreasonable, deficient, below the standard of care).

Do this by getting an expert witness.

Next thing you have to show is harm.

To show this, “but for” counsel errors, the D would not have been prejudiced.

Must overcome the presumption that the attorney acted with due diligence and must evaluate the attorney’s decisions based on what the attorney knew at that time.

Back 226

STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON

Front 227

There are three ways to NOT have to show prejudice.

1. no attorney at all

2 .the state interferes with your counsel’s ability to do his job

3. sometimes the performance of the attorney’s attentiveness at the trial is so bad, it is if they are constructively ineffective

Back 227

UNITED STATES V. CRONIC

Front 228

Respondent’s counsel did not introduce evidence of mitigating factors at his sentencing hearing, and waived making a final argument. Respondent argued constructive denial of counsel.

The Supreme Court disagreed. The court indicated that when they spoke of, in Cronic, the possibility of presuming prejudice based on an attorney’s failure to test the prosecutor’s case, they indicated that the failure must be complete.

Back 228

BELL V. CONE

Front 229

D’s attorney warned his client about lying on the stand (committing perjury) and threatened to tell on him if he did.

The D has the right to testify, but the D’s attorney does not have to defy the rules and allow a D to commit perjury.

Back 229

NIX V. WHITESIDE

Front 230

Upon the investor's indictment for making false statements to a bank, he claimed that dismissal was warranted because the prosecutor failed to fulfill its obligation to present "substantial exculpatory evidence" to the grand jury.

The Court reversed the dismissal holding that the rule requiring disclosure to the grand jury of "substantial exculpatory evidence" was not supported by the trial court's "supervisory power," because the grand jury was an institution over whose functioning the courts did not preside.

The Court found that the rule was inconsistent with the traditional function of the grand jury, which was to determine whether enough evidence existed to prosecute, not to allow the accused to put on a defense.

The Court refused to convert a non-existent duty of the grand jury itself into an obligation of the prosecutor.

Back 230

UNITED STATES V. WILLIAMS

Front 231

Defendant was convicted of criminal contempt for refusing to obey a federal court order requiring him to answer questions asked in a grand jury investigation. The conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals, and the Court granted certiorari. The grand jury was investigating frauds upon the federal government, including violations of the customs, narcotics and internal revenue liquor laws, the White Slave Traffic Act, perjury, bribery, and other federal criminal laws, and conspiracy to commit all such offenses. Defendant refused to answer questions as to his occupation, as to when he had last seen another named individual, and the whereabouts of that individual, on the ground that his answers might tend to incriminate him of a federal offense.

The Court reversed defendant's conviction, holding that, under all of the circumstances, defendant's concern that answering the questions might subject him to federal criminal liability was reasonable, and defendant was therefore entitled to the protection afforde

Back 231

HOFFMAN V. UNITED STATES

Front 232

Petitioners were subpoenaed to appear before a federal grand jury. Petitioners refused to answer questions, asserting their privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, despite a grant of immunity proffered by respondent, the United States. Petitioners contended that the scope of immunity was less broad than the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination.

On review, the court held that the immunity provided by respondent left the witness and the prosecutorial authorities in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. The immunity therefore was coextensive with the privilege and sufficed to supplant it. The court held that petitioners had been offered both use immunity and immunity from transactions arising from the testimony (transactional immunity), therefore, petitioners could be compelled to testify. The judgment of the appellate court compelling petitioners to testify was therefore affirmed.

Back 232

KASTIGAR V. UNITED STATES

Front 233

Two defendants were tried for criminal contempt of court for violating court orders that prohibited them from engaging in conduct that was later the subject of a criminal prosecution. The Court considered whether the subsequent criminal prosecutions were barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The Court concluded that where the two offenses for which defendants were punished or tried could not survive the same-elements test, the double jeopardy bar applied.

The same-elements test inquired whether each offense contained an element not contained in the other. If not, they were the same offense and double jeopardy barred additional punishment and successive prosecution.

Back 233

UNITED STATES V. DIXON

the test was called blockburger test

Front 234

The respondent was indicted by a grand jury for theft. The case was called for trial and a jury impaneled and sworn. Before any evidence was presented, the prosecutor realized that the indictment was fatally defective under Illinois law and moved for a mistrial. The trial court declared a mistrial over the respondent's objection. He was re-indicted, tried, and convicted. The Court held that (1) the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not bar the respondent's retrial under a valid indictment, and (2) the mistrial met the "manifest necessity" requirement, because the trial court could reasonably have concluded that the "ends of public justice" would be defeated by allowing the trial to continue.

The Court observed that the error would make reversal on appeal a certainty, and it would not serve the ends of public justice to require that the state proceed with its proof when, if it succeeded before the jury,

Back 234

ILLINOIS V. SOMERVILLE

Front 235

Respondent prisoner was charged with theft of an oriental rug, but was granted a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct occasioned by what amounted to overreaching. When the State later sought to retry respondent, the trial court denied respondent's motion to dismiss on the basis that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not bar retrial. Respondent was tried and convicted.

The state court of appeals accepted the trial court's finding that it was not the intent of the prosecutor to cause a mistrial, but nevertheless, sustained respondent's double jeopardy claim because it held that the prosecutor's conduct was a direct personal attack on respondent's character and overreaching.

The Court granted the writ of certiorari and reversed the judgment of the state court of appeals. It held that the court of appeals decision was based solely on federal law, and because the state trial court found, and the state court of appeals accepted, that the prosecutorial conduct culminating in the termin

Back 235

ORGEON V. KENNEDY

Front 236

Respondent was charged in a three-count indictment with distribution of narcotics. Before and during the trial, respondent moved to dismiss two counts of the indictment on the ground that his defense had been prejudiced by pre-indictment delay. At the close of the evidence, the court granted respondent's motion. The court concluded that respondent had presented sufficient proof of prejudice with count one. The court submitted the third count to the jury, which returned a verdict of not guilty. Petitioner appealed the dismissal of the first two counts but the appellate court concluded that any further prosecution of respondent was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Petitioner sought review by the Supreme Court only with regard to the dismissal of the first count.

The Supreme Court held that double jeopardy did not relieve respondent from the consequence of his voluntary choice. Because respondent avoided submission of the first count by persuading the court to dismiss it on a basis that did not depend

Back 236

UNITED STATES V. SCOTT

Front 237

Defendant pleaded guilty to burglary, a felony, and misdemeanor theft. He was sentenced under Arkansas' habitual criminal statute, § 41-1001(2)(b). At the sentencing hearing, he claimed that one of the four prior felony convictions relied upon by the state had been pardoned, but agreed after questioning that the conviction had been commuted. During habeas proceedings, the district court learned the conviction had been pardoned.

The court held that: (1) the Double Jeopardy Clause did not prevent retrying a defendant whose conviction was set aside because of trial error, (2) the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial of a defendant whose conviction was reversed for insufficiency of the evidence, which was in effect a determination that the trial court should have entered a judgment of acquittal, (3) the Double Jeopardy Clause afforded a defendant who obtained a judgment of acquittal at the trial level absolute immunity from further prosecution for the same offense and it did the same for a defendant who obta

Back 237

LOCKHART V. NELSON

Front 238

Petitioner hired two men to kill his wife. They kidnapped petitioner's wife from her home in Alabama and drove a short distance to Georgia where they killed her. Petitioner was charged with murder in Georgia and pled guilty. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. Alabama charged petitioner with murder during kidnapping, and he was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death despite his protests of double jeopardy. After exhausting his state appeals, petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari raising double jeopardy claims, but no due process objections were asserted.

The Court held that a single act constituted an offense against each sovereign whose laws are violated by that act and, accordingly, each state was permitted to prosecute.

Back 238

HEATH V. ALABAMA

Front 239

Defendant was charged with simple battery, a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum of two years imprisonment and a $300 fine. Defendant sought trial by jury, but because the Louisiana Constitution grants jury trials only in cases in which capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor may be imposed, the trial court denied the request. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to serve 60 days in the parish prison and pay a fine of $ 150.

The Court held that a crime punishable by two years in prison was a serious crime and not a petty offense. Consequently, defendant was entitled to a jury trial and the trial court erred in denying it. In so ruling, the Court opined that the right to trial by jury guaranteed defendants in criminal cases in federal courts by the U.S. Const. art. III and by the Sixth Amendment was also guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to defendants tried in state courts.

Back 239

DUNCAN V. LOUISIANA

Front 240

A jury composed of as few as six persons is constitutional. Twelve jurors are required in federal criminal trials, although fewer may be permissible upon stipulation by the parties or when the court finds it necessary to excuse a juror for cause after the trial begins. Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(a). Many states likewise require a twelve-person jury in criminal trials.

Back 240

WILLIAMS V. FLORIDA

Front 241

Petitioners were convicted in a state court of assault with a deadly weapon, burglary in a dwelling, and grand larceny upon less than unanimous jury verdicts. They were convicted by jury votes of 11 to 1 and 10 to 2, and the convictions were affirmed in their state court appeals. Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United
States Supreme Court in which they sought review of their convictions on the grounds that the less than unanimous verdicts violated their right to a trial by jury under U.S Const. amend. VI.

The Supreme Court affirmed petitioners' convictions and held that U.S. Const. amend VI did not require a conviction by a unanimous verdict.

Back 241

APOCADA V. OREGON

Front 242

what are the factors for a speedy trial.


guy was tried and retired again and again = 8 yrs later.

crt denied b/c person did not assert his right at all.

Back 242

BARKER V. WINGO--know this


1. Length of delay
2. Reason for the delay
3. ∆’s assertion of his right
4. Prejudice to the ∆

Front 243

8 1/2 yrs went by and the speedy trial was violated.

person was in the us for 5 yrs but cop never did their homework.

Back 243

DOGGETT V. UNITED STATES

Front 244

Defendant was charged in an indictment with crimes committed more than 18 months before the indictment was filed. Holding that even a lengthy pre-indictment delay that caused some prejudice did not violate a defendant's U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV rights to a speedy trial and due process, the Supreme Court reversed.

The Court held that a pre-indictment delay was wholly irrelevant for amend. VI purposes because the constitutional right to a speedy trial attached only after defendant was accused by indictment or information, or was actually restrained by arrest and detention to answer for a criminal charge.

The Court also held that amend. XIV had a limited role to play in protecting against oppressive delay.

The Court held that the death of two potential witnesses during the delay was not sufficient prejudice because defendant had not shown how their testimony would have aided the defense.

The Court concluded that it could not discern how the investigatory delay violated those fundamental conceptions o

Back 244

UNITED STATES V. LOVASCO

Front 245

what is the open field exception--

Back 245

oliver case.

Front 246

if person is released from custody lawyer and release

Back 246

cops cant talk to him for 14
--that is when edwards and miranda stops and protects.

Front 247

6th amendment is offense specific.

Back 247

need lawyer for diff. offense.