Crim Pro Cases

Front 1

Katz V United States (1967)

Back 1

f: petitioners attached listerning device to the outside of the public telephone booth where petitioner placed calls

H: court declindes to adopt holding of court of appeals that were was no violation of the fourth amendment because there was no physical entrance into the are

"fourth amendment protects people not places"

"what a person knowingly exposes to the public even in his own home or office is not a subject of fourth amendment protection. but what he seeks to preserve as private even in an area accessible to the public may be constitutionally protected:

one who occupies the phone booth and places a call is surely eneitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to world

H: we have expressly held that the fourth amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items but extends as well to the recording of oral statements overheard wihout any technical trespass under local property law

trespass doctrine is no longer holding

f did not begin their electronic surveillance until investigation of the petitioner's activities had established a strong probability that he was in other states

f:surveillance was limited in scope and duration

violated the constitution becase they were not require before commencing the search to present their estimate of probably cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate. they were not compelled during the search itself to obbserve precise limits by a court orders. nor were they ordered to notify a magistrate of the precise nature of everything they seized.

H: fourth amendment requires adherence to judicial processes and that searches conducted outside the judicial process without prior approval by judge or magistrate are per se unreasonable

crucial question: when does a person have a reasonable expectation of privacy

Hint 1

What is a Search:

Front 2

Oliver v United States(1984)

Back 2

open field doctrine: permits police officers to enter and search a field wihout a warrant.

f:agents walked around gate with no trespassign sign. found a field of marihuna orver a mile from petitioners home. lower court concluded it was not an open field because he had done all that could be expected of him to asser his privacy

H: governmens intrusion upon the open fields is not one of those unreasonable searches protected by the 4th amendment

H: factors whether an individual may claim that a place should be free of government intrusion not authorized by a warrant: intention of the framers of the fourth amendment, the uses to which an individual has put a location, our societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from government invasion.

H: an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields except in the are immediately surrounding the home.

the asserted expectation of privacy in open fields in not an expectation that society recognizes as reasonable

a property interest in premises may not be sufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to particular items located on the premises or activity conducted theron

Hint 2

What is a Search: Open Fields

Front 3

United States v. Dunn (1987)

Back 3

q: what is the distinction between curtilage and open fields

H: barn approximately 50 yards from a surrounding a ranch house is not within the curtilage protected by the 4th amendment

f: conspiracy to manufacture amphetamines. dea discovered that large quantities of chemical for meth were purchasesd agents put a beeper in an hot plate stirrer. determined that it ws on respondents ranch property. two barns located 50 yards from permiter fence. locked waste high gates and netting from the ceiling to the top of the wooden gaates. agesnts crossed a couple of fences smelled meth cooking . Looked through and say the meth lab. did not enter at that time. then got a warranat from a federal magistrate.

H: curtilate factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. not mechanical application but instead are relevant upon the consideration whether the are in question is so inimately tied to the home itself that it should not be placed under the home's umbrella of fourth amendment protection.

finding: barn not ouside the curtilage substantial distance from the house. not within the areas surrounding the house that was enclosed by a fence. barn is distinct. third it is especially significant that there was objective data fourth fences were designed for livestock not people

Hint 3

What is a Search: Open Fields

Front 4

California v. Ciraolo(1986)

Back 4

certiorari to determine whether the fourth amendment is violated by aerial observation without a warrant from an altitude of 1000 feet of a fenced in backyard within the curtilage of a home.

katz test: has an individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challeged search and second is society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable

finding: respondent took precautions to mantain his privacy

nor does the mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict some views of his activities preclude an officer's observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders the activities clearly visible

any member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers observed.

Hint 4

What is a Search:Aerial Searches

Front 5

Florida v. Riley(1989)

Back 5

q: whether surveillance of the interior point of a partially covered greenhouse in a residential backyard from the vantage point of a helicopter located 400 feet above the house constitutes a search

f: mobile with greenhouse 10 to 20 feet behind it. was obscured form viewing on the ground. had roof panels but 10 percent were missing. cops saw marijuana from air at 400 feet.

H:riley could not reasonably have expected that his greenhouse was protected from public or official observation from a helicopter had it been flying within the naviagable airspace for fixed wing aircraft.

H: might have been different if the helicopter was flying below the bounds of legal naviagable airspace but helipcopters arent subject to thos limits.

inspection of a the curtilage of the house from an aircraft will not always pass muster but it is of obvious importance that the helicopter in this case was not violating the law and there is nothing in the record or vefore us to suggest that helicopters flying at 400 feet are sufficiently rare in this country to lend substance to respondents cliam that he reasonably anticipated that his greenhouse would not be subject to observation from that altitide.

H: neither is there any intimation here that the helocpter interefered with respondents normal use of the greenhouse.

concurring the relevant inquiry iis not whether the helicpter was where it had a right to be under faa regulation, whether the helicopter was in the public airways at an altitude at which members of the public travel with sufficient regularity

concurring burden on the defendant to say that a search was a reasonable one

Hint 5

What is a Search: Aerial Searches

Front 6

Kyllo v. United States

Back 6

q: whether the use of a thermal imaging device aimed at a private home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home constitutes a search

f: agent obtained scan kyllos home from across the street. sacan showed garage and a side wall of peitioners home were relatively hot. based on tips from informants, utility bills and the thermal imaging magistrate issued a warrant authorizing a search of petitioners home and found an indoor growing operation.

q: what limits there are upon the power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy

H: obtaining by sense enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physixal intrusion into a constitutionally porected area constitutes a search as least where the technology in question is not in general public use

H: no substance to distinction between off the wall and through the wall

H:limiting the prohibition of thermal imaging to intimate details would not only be wrong in principle it would b eimpractical in application

Hint 6

What is a Search: Thermal Imaging of Homes

Front 7

California V. Greenwood(1988)

Back 7

q: whether the fourth amendment prohibits the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left outside the curtilage of the home.

H: it does not

F: Police got tips that respondent greenwood was smuggling narcotics. police got the trash collector to pick up the bags from greenwoods home so the officers search them. officer found items indicative of narcotics use. recited the information that she had gleaned form the trash search in an affidavit in support of a warrant to search greenwood's home.

H: the warrantless seach and seizure of the garbage bags left at the curb outside the greenwood house would violate the fourth amendment only if respondent manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in their gabage that society acceepts as objectively reasonable.

H: here we conclude that respondents exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat thier claim to fourth amendment protection.

r: accordingly having deposited their garbage in an area particularly suited for public inspection and in a manner of speaking public consumption for the express purpose of having strangers take it respondents could have had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the inculpatory items they discarded.

H: the police cannot reasonably be expected to avert thier eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of the public.

Hint 7

What is a Search: Searches of Trash

Front 8

United States v. Knotts (1983)

Back 8

f: beeper was placed in a five gallon drum containing chloroform purchased by one of respondent's codefednants. by monitoring the progress of a car carrying the chloroform minnesota law enforcement agents were able to trace the can of chloroform from its place of purchase to respondents cabin. charged with conspiracy to manufacture controlled substances. after arstrong made the purchase of the chloroform officers followed the car in which the chlorofor had been places. After driver began making evasive maneuvers the agents ended their visual surveillance. Officers lost the signal but picked up with the help of a helicopter an hour later. officers obtained a serach warrant from the location of the beeper.

H: respondent as the owwner of the cabin had a traditional expectation of privacy as far as the cabin was converned byt that did not extend to visual observation of the automobile arriving on his premises nor to the movement of objects outside the cabin.

H:nothing in the fourth amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory facilities bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case.

q; whether such use of a beeper biolated respondent's rights secured by the fourth amendment

Hint 8

What is a Search: Observation and Monitoring of Public Behavior

Front 9

United States v. Karo (1983)

Back 9

q whether installation of a beeper in a container of chemicals with the consent of the original constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the fourth amdendment when the buyer has no knowledge of the beeper

q: whether montioring of a beeper falls within the ambit of the fourth amendment when it reveals information that could have been obtained through visual surveillance.

f:goverment obtained a court order authorizing the installation and monitoring of a beepr in one of the cans of ehter that was supposed being used to extract cocaine. agents followed the ether to one house and then used the beeper to determine it had been move to another house. kept using the beeper to find it in diffrent location. agents tracked the ether to a commercial storage facility and then using a combination of there noses and a subpoena fo the recrods of a storage company obtained located the ether in locker 143. put an entry tone alarm into the door jamb of the locker so they would be able to tell when it was opened. alarm didnt work and the ther ended up in another self storage facility. again using smell they found out it was in locker 15. then tracked it to a house where they got a warrant to search the house.

H: it is clear that the actual placement of the beeper into the can violated no one's fourth amendment rights. consent was sufficient to validation the placement of the beeper into the can.

H: we conclude that no FA interest of karo or any other resp. was infringed by the stall of the beeper. any impair of their privacy interests that may have occured was occasioned by the monitoring of the beeper.

H: the monitoring of a beeper in a private resident a location not open to visual surveillance violates FA rights.

H: even if visual surveillance has revelaed that that the aricle to which the beeper is attached has entered the house the later monitoring not only veirifies the officers observation but also established that the article remains on the premises.

H: this case is not like knotts for there the beeper told the authorities nothing about the interior of the cabin.

H:it will still be possible to describe the object into whicch the beeper is to be placed the circumstnaces that led agensts to wish to install the beeper and the length of time for which beeper surveillance is requested. this information will suffice to permit issuance of a warrant authorizing beeper installation and surveillance.

concurrence test: when a closed container is moved by permission into a home the homeowner and others with an expectation of privacy in the home itself surrender any expectation of privacy they might otherwise retain in the movements of the container. unless it is their container or under their dominion and control.

con h: a privacy interest in a home itself need not be coextensive with a privacy interest in the contrents or movements of everything situated inside the home.

Hint 9

What is a Search: Observation and Monitoring of Public Behavior

Front 10

Smith v. Maryland

Back 10

q: whther the installantion and use of a pen register consititutes a search within the meaning of the FoA.

F: women who was robbed began receiving threatening and obscene phone calls from a man identifying himself as the robber. man said he was out fornt. women saw a car driver by registered to michael lee smith. at police request police installed a pen register at its central offices to record the numbers dialed from the telephone at petitioners's home. register revealed that a call was placed from peitioner's home to victim's home home. victim identified petitioner in a lineup.

H: a pen resister differs significantly from the listening device employed in katz for pen registers do not acquire the contents of communication.

H: all telephone users realize that they must convey phone numbers to the telephone company. they also realize that their is a record of the numbers they dial because they appear on long distance bill.

H: telephone users in sum typically know that they must convey numerical information to the phone phone company, that the phone cmp has facilities for recording this information, and that the phone does in fact record this information for a variety of legitimate business purposes.

H: although the petitioner's conduct may have been calculted to keep the contents of his conversation private his conduct was not and could not have been calculated to preserve the privacy of the number he dialed.

H: court consistently has held that a person has no legiitmate expectation of privacy in infromation he voluntarily turns over to third parties.

Hint 10

What is a Search: Observation and Monitoring of Public Behavior

Front 11

Illinois v. Caballes (2005)

Back 11

F: state trooper stopped the respondent for speed on an interstate highway. radioed to a second tropper in charge of a drug interdiction tem. second trooper walked dog around the car and alerted at trunk. Officers searched the trunk, found marijuna and arrested respondent caballes.

q: whether the foA requires reasonable articulable suspicion to justify using a drufg detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop.

H: any interest in possessing contraband is not a legitmate interest and therefore not a search subject to the FoA.

H: the use of a well trained narcotics detection dof one that does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remian hidden hidden from public biew during a lawful traffic stop generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests.

Hint 11

What is a Search: Use of Dogs to Sniff for Contraband

Front 12

Illinois V. Gates (1983)

Back 12

police received a letter that copule in town was selling drugs. Letter said their name where they buy the drugs. How they travel and then how the husband drives the drugs back. Tells when they will be driving down next. Police found out who gates was and learned that he was flying to florida. Had dea survey them in florida. Saw that gates checked into a hotel then left with a women the next on a road frequently used by travelers to the chicago area. All these facts combined with the letter were sent to a judge who issued a search warrant for the gateses residence and automobile. The police were waiting for them and searched the trunk and found 350 pounds of marijuana.

H: The letter stading alone was not enough basis for probably cause. There is nothing one might conclude that the author is either honest or his information reliable and there is nothing indicating how the author knew the information.

H: we agree that an informant's veracity reliability and basis of knowledge are all highly relevant in determining the value of his report. we do not agree that these elements should be understood as enitely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case. Rather they should be understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may usefully illiuminate the question whether there is probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place.

H: the magistrate could rely on the anonymous letter which had been corroborate in major part by mader's efforts.

H: because an informant is right about some things he is more probably right about other facts.

H: probable cause requires only a probability of substantial chance of criminal activity not an actual showing of such activity.

H: in making a determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is the defree od suspicion that attaches to particular types of non-criminal acts.

Hint 12

The Requirements of Probable Cause: What is Sufficient Belief to Meet the Standard for Probable Cause.

Front 13

Maryland v. Pringle

Back 13

F: police officer stopped a car for speeding. officer saw a large roll of money in the glove compartment when the driver went to get his license and registration. Partlow gave officer permission to search the vehicle and found five plastic bags containing cocaine behine the armrest. None of the men would admit whose drugs they were so the officer arrested them all.

q: wether the officer had probable casue to believe a felony had been committed.

H: we think it an entirely reasonable inference from these facts that nay or all three of the occupants had knowledge of and exercised dominion and control over the cocaine.

H: where the standard is probable cause a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person.

Hint 13

The Requirements of Probable Cause: What is Sufficient Belief to Meet the Standard for Probable Cause.

Front 14

Whren v. United States

Back 14

F: police officers stopped a car with black males inside and temporary plates for teurning without signaling. They pulled up alongside the car and petitioner whren had two plastic bags of crack in his hand.

H: temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose constitutes a seizure of persons withing the meaning of this provision.

H: as a general matter the decision to stop an automibile is reasonable where the police have reasonable cause to believe that a traffic violation has ovvured.

Hint 14

The Requirements of Probable Cause: Is It an Objective or Subjective Standard

Front 15

Andersen v. Maryland

Back 15

between 2 and 3 percent of lawyers files were seized. The application for the warrant sought permission to search for specified documents pertaining to the sale and conveyance of lot 13t.

argument: petioner contends that the warrant were rendered fatally general by phrase " together with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this at this (time unknown)

H: the challenged pharase is not a separate sentence instead it appears in each warrant at the end of sentence containing a lengthy list of specified and particular items to be seized.

H: clear from the context that the term crime refers only to the crime of false pretenses.

H: in both searches of documents and telephone call responsible officials must take care to assure that are conducted in a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy.

Hint 15

warrant particularilty

Front 16

Groh v. Ramirez

Back 16

f: peitioner conducted a serach of respondents home pursuant to a warrant that failed to describe the persons or things to be seized

q: is it a violation of the FoA

f: peitioner prepared and signed an application for a warrant to search the trance for automatic weapons. peitioner suppored it with a detailed affidavit. petitioner presented these documents along with a warrant form to a mistrate. the warrant itself failed to identify any of the items that petitioner intended to seize. also did not incorporate by reference the itemized list contained in the application.

H: the warrant was plainly invalid.

H: the warrant was deficient in paricularlity because it provided no description of the type of evidence sough.

H: most court of appeals have held that a court may construe a warrant with reference to a supporting application if the warrant uses appropriate words of incroporation and if the supporting document accompanies the warrant.

H: a particularity requirement also assureds the individual whose property is search or siezed of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to seach and the limits of his power to search.

Hint 16

The Warrant Requirement: What form Must the Warrant Take

Front 17

Mehler v. Mena

Back 17

H: peitioner muehler hasd reason to believe at least one member of a gang lived at 1363 particia avenue. Muehler obtained a search authorizing a broad search of the house and premises for among other things deadly weapons and evidence of gang membership. A swat team was used to secure the residence. four people were detained in the garage by handcuffs. INS officers came along and asked all of the detainess for name dob, pob and imigartion status, and documentation.

H; menas detention for the druation of the search was reasonable under summers because a warrant ecisted to search the house and she was an occupant of that address at the time of the search.

H: inherent in summers authorization to detain an occupant of the place to be searched is the authority to use reasonable force to effectuate the detention.

H: though this safety risk inherent in executing a search warrant for weapons was sufficient to justify the use of handcuffs the need to detain multiple occupants made the use of handcuffs all the more reasonable.

H:the duration of a detention can affect the balance of interest but the 2 to 3 hour detention in this case does not outweigh the government's continuing safety interest.

H: we have held repeatedly that mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure.

Hint 17

What are the Requirements in Executing Warrants? How May Police Treat Those Who Are Present When a warrant is being executed

Front 18

Wilson v. Arkansas(1995)

Back 18

H: a common law knock and announce principle forms a part of the reasonableness inquirey under the FoA

F: wilson made a series of narcotics sales to an informant . During another sale informant waived a gun in the informants police before selling a bag of marijuana. police applied for and obtained warrants to search petitioner's home. Police opened an unlocked screen door, identifies themselves as police and stated they had a warrant. Seized frugs and gun.

H: knock and announce is part of the reasonableness inquiry

H: common law presumption in favor of announcement would yield under circumstances presenting a threat of physical violence. similarly where a prisoner escapes from him and retreats to his dwelling. unnannounced entry may be justified where police officers have reason to believe would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given.

H: for now we leave to the lower courts the task of determining the circumstances under which an unannounced entry is reasonable under the fourth amendment

Hint 18

What are the Requirements in Executing Warrants? Do Police Have to Knock and Announce Before Searching a Dwelling?

Front 19

Richards v. Wisconsin

Back 19

H: we disagree with the court's conclusion that the FoA permits a blanket exception to the knock and announce requirement for this entire category of criminal activity (drug warrants)

f: police got warrant for drugs. specifically requested knock and announce requirement. man openend the door with chain on it saw it was police. salmmed the door cloased and after two of three seconds the officers began kicking and ramming the door to gain entry to the locked room.

H felony drug investigation may frequently involved the threa of violence or likely destruction of evidence if advance notice were given.

H: not every drug investigation will pose risks of of a subtantial defree.

H: if per se exception were allowed for each category of criminal investigation that included a considerable albeit hypothetical risk of danger to officers or destruction of evidence the knock and announce reasonableness requirement would be meaningless.

H: in each case it is the duty of a court confronted with the question to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the pariticular entry justified dispensing with the knock and announce
requirement.

H: in order to justify a no-knock entry the police must have a reasonable supicion that knocking and anouncng thier presence under the particular circumstance would be dangerous or futile or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by for example allowing the destruction of evidence.

H: a magistrate's decision not to authorize a no-knock entry should not be interpreted to remove the officer's authority to exercise independent judgment concerning the wisdom of a no-knock entry at the time the warrant is being executed.

Hint 19

What are the Requirements in Executing Warrants? Do Police Have to Knock and Announce Before Searching a Dwelling?

Front 20

Maryland v. Garrison (1987)

Back 20

F: police officers fot warrant to search one apartment. before they realized that it was in fact two apartments and that they were in respondent garrsons apartment they discovered drugs that were used to convict repsondent. once they realized they were in the wrong apartment they discontinued the search.

H: in this case there is no cliam that the persons or things to be seized were inadequately described or that there was no probable cause to believe that those things might be found in the place to be searched as it was described in the warreant.

H: we must judge the consitutionality of their conduct in light of the information available to them at the time they acted.

H: the validity of the warrant must be assessed on the basis of the information that officers disclosed or had a duty to discover and disclose to the issuing magistrate.

H: the validity of the search of respondent's apartment pursuant to a warrant authorizing the search of the entire floow depends on whether the officer's failure to realize the overbreadth of the warrant was objectively understandable and reasonable.

Hint 20

What are the Requirements in Executing Warrants? What if There are Unforeseen Circumstances or Mistakes While Executing a Warrant?

Front 21

las angeles county, california v. rettele

Back 21

F: Lapd obtained a valid warrant to search a house but were unaware suspects had moved out three months earlier. deputies searched the house and found in a bedroom two residents who were a different race than the suspect. Orderd the unclothed resident out of bed for a few minutes before allowing them to dress. respondents did not dispute the validity of the method in which the warrants were obtained. By the time the deputies realized they had made a mistake they apologized to rettelle and sadler, thanked them for not becoming upset and left within five minutes.

H: when the deputies ordered resondents from thier bed there was no way of knowing whether the black suspects were somewhere else in the house.

H: unreasonable actions include the use of excessive force or restraints that cause unnecessary pain or are imposed for a prolonged and unnecesary period of time.

Hint 21

what are the requirements in executing a warrant:what if there are unforeseen circumstances or mistakes while executing a warrant

Front 22

chimel v. california(1969)

Back 22

q: basic questions concerning the permissible scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest

f; three police officers arrived at the home of chimel the petitioner handed him the arrest warrant and asked for permission to look around. peitioner objected but was advised on the basis of the lawful arrest that a search would take place. They searched the entire house including draweres. They seized numerous items inlcuding coins.

H: when an arrest ismade it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any wepaons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape:

H It is entirely reaonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.

H: there is ample justification therefore, for a serach of the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control, the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.

H: there is no comparaable justification for routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs or for searching through the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itelf.

Hint 22

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement:Searches Incident to Arrest

Front 23

knowles v. iowa (1998)

Back 23

f:police officer stopped knowles for speeding but issued him a citation rather than arresting him.

q: whether such a procedure authorizes the officer to conduct a full search of the car.

F; officer could have arrested him but didn't.

H: the threat to officer safety in dealing with a traffic citation is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arreat.

H: no authority to search car when only there is not a a reason for concern for safety nor there is there likely to be found a any more evidence

Hint 23

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement:Searches Incident to Arrest

Front 24

warden, md penitentiary v. hayden (1967)

Back 24

F: armed robber entered the premises of the diamond cab company took money and ran. he was followed to a residence that he entered. Officers came to the house knocked and announced their presence. Women opened the door and gave consent to search the house. Found the robber in an upstairs bedroom feigning sleep. Oficer was attracted to an adjoining bathroom and disicoverd a shotgun and a pistol in a flush tank. Another officer who was serching the cellar for a man or the money found in a wasking machine a jacket and trousers of the type the fleeing ma was said to have warn.

H: neither the entry without warrant to search for the robber, nor the search him without warrant was invalid.

H: the FoA does not require police officers ro delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger thier lives of the lives of others.

H: here the seizures occurred prior to or immediately contemporaneous with haydens arrest as part of an effort to find a suspected felon arement withn the house house into which he had run only minutes before the police arrived.

H: the permissible scope of search must at the least be as broad as may reaonsbale be necessary to prevent the dangers that the supect at large in the house may resist or excape.

Hint 24

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement:Searches Made in Hot Pursuit

Front 25

payton v. new york (1980)

Back 25

q: appeals challenging the constiutionality of New York stautues that authorize police officers to enter a private resident without a warrant and with foce if necessary to make a routine felony arrest.

H: we hold that the fourth amendment to the united states constitution prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect;s home in order to make a routine felony arrest

f:police entered petitioner's home without a warrant to arrest him for murder. seized a 30 caliber shell that was seized and later admitted into evidence.

Hint 25

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement:Searches Made in Hot Pursuit

Front 26

coolidge v. new hampshire (1971)

Back 26

H: it is ell established that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant.

H: an example of the applicability of the plain view doctrine is the in the situation in which the police hace a warrant to search a given area for specfied objects and in the course of the search come across some other article of incriminating character. where the intial intrusion that brings the police withn plain view of such an article is supported by by a warrant but by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, the seizure is also legitimate.

H: plain view doctrine has also been applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incrminating object.

H: what the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertenly across apiece of evidence incriminating the accused.

h: of course the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them.

H: limits on the docrtrine : plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence and discovery of evidence in plain view must be inadverternt

H: where the police known in advance the location of the evidence and intend to seize it the situation is altogether different.

H: if the intial intrusion is bottomed upon a warrant that fails to mention a particular object though the police know its location and intend to seize it then there is a violation of the express constitutional requirement of warrants particularly describing the things to be seized.

Hint 26

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement:Plain View

Plain Cool New View

Front 27

horton v. california (1990)

Back 27

q: whether the warrantless seizure of evidence of crime in plain view is prohibited by the FoA if the discovery of the evidence was not inadvertent.

H: even though inadvertence is a characteristic of most legitimate plain view seizures it is not a necessary condition.

F:police officer determined that there was probable cause to search peitioner's home for the proceeds of the robbery and for the weapons used by the robbers. magistrate issued a warrant only for the proceeds of the robberey. officer searched the residence but he did not find the stolen property however he found the weapons in plain view and seized them. He testified that while he was seraching for the proceeds he was also interest in finding other ecidence connecting petioner to the rovvery.

H: two additional considerations for evidence that was plainly viewed. Not only must the item be in plain view, its incriminating character must also be immediately apparent. Not only must the officer be lawfully located in a place which the object can be plainly seen but he or she must have a a lawful right of access to the object itself.

H: in this case the scope of the search was not enlarged in the slightest by the omission of any reference to the weapons in the warrant.

H: if the three rings and other items named in the warrant had been found at the outset or if the petioner had them in his possession and responded to the warrant by producing them immediately no search for weapons could have taken place.

Hint 27

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement:Plain Viewent:Plain View

Front 28

minnesota v. dickerson (1993)

Back 28

f: respondent began walking toward the police but upon spotting the squad car abruptly halted and began walking in the opposite direction. Officer's decided to investigate rspondent. Officers order him to stop and submit to a patdown search. The search revealed no weapeons but he did feel a small lump in the front of his jacked which he examined with his fingers and believed it be cocaine. He then reached into respondent's pocket and retreiced a small plastic bag.

q: the question is whether police officers may seize nonthreatening contraband detected during a protectice patdown search.

H: the answer is that they may

H:plain view doctrine has an obvious application by analogy to cases in which an officer discovers contraband through the sense of touch during an otherwise lawfyl search.

H: if a police officer lawfully pats down a suspects outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identify immediately apparent there has been no invasion of the suspect'r privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons.

H: it is clear that the cout ws ocrrect in holding that the police officer in this case overstepped the bounds of the strictly circumscribe search for weapon. here the officer's continued exploration of respondent's pocket after having concluded that it contained no weapon was unrelated to the sole justification of the search.

Hint 28

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement:Plain View

Front 29

California v. Carney(1985)

Back 29

q: decide whether law enforcement agents violated the fourth amendment when they conducted a warrantless search based on probable cause.

F: youth said he received marijuana in exchange for sexaul contact to carney inside his motor home. Without a warrant agent entred the motor home and observed marijuana. They then took possession of the motor home.

H: IN carroll b US the court recognized that the privacy interest in an automobile are constitutionally protected however it held that the ready mobility of the automobile justifies a lesser degree of protection.

H: besides the element of mobility less rigorous warrant requirment govern because the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significant less than relating to one's home or office.

H: even in cases where an automobile was not immediately mobile the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use as a readily mobile vehicle justified application of the vehicular exception.

H: but even when enclosed repository area have been involved we have concluded that the lesser expectation of privacy warrant appliction of the exception.

H: these reduced expectations of privacy derive not from the fact that the area to be searched is in plain view but from the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways.

H:the exigencies attendant to ready mobility justify searches without prior recourse to the authority of a magistrate so long as the overriding standard or probable cause is met.

H: like the automobile in carroll respondent's motor home was readily mobile. furthermore the vehicle was licensed to operate on the streets.

Hint 29

The Automobile Exception: The Exception and Its Rationale

Front 30

California v. Acevedo (1991)

Back 30

q: consider the so called automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the FoA and its application of the search of a closed container in the trunk of a car.

F: agent informed police officer that he seized a package contaiing mairjuana which was supposed to go to daze. Agent sent it to the police officer instead who was supposed to arrest the person who arrived to cliam it. Man picked it up and drove it his aparment. Officer observed man leave the aprtment and drop the box and paper that contained the marijuana into a trash bin. Officer left the scen to get a serach warrant. Respondent acevedo arrived walked out of the apartment carrying a bag full that loked like one of the wrapped marijuana packacked. Acevedo put the bad in the trunk of his car and started to drived awau. officers in a poice car stopped him. They opened the trunk and the bag and found marijuana.

H" Thus if probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search

H: fourth amendment does not require the police to btain a warrant to open the sack in a movable vehicle simply because they lack probable cause to search the entire car.

Hint 30

The Automobile Exception: Searches of Containers in Automobiles

Front 31

New York v. Belton

Back 31

q: when the occupant of an automobile is subjected to a lawful custodial arrest does the contitutionally permissible scope of a search incident to his arrest include the passenger compartment of the automobile in which he was riding?

f: officer passed by a vehicle traveling an excessive rate of speed. pulled the vehicle over. four men in car and officer smelled marijuana and saw on the floor of the car an evelope marked superfold. directed the men to get out of the car. patted the men down. Searched each one of the men them and then serached the passenger compartment of the car. ON the back seat found a black leather jacket belonging to belton. Found cocaine in one of the poclets.

H: the police may also examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment for if the passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee so will container in it be within his reach.

H: the jacker was located inside the passenger compartment of the car in which the respondent had been a passenger just before he was arrested. The jacket was thus within the area which we have concluded was within the arrestee's immediate control within the meaning of the chimel case.

Hint 31

The Automobile Exception: Searches Incident to Arrest

Front 32

Thornton v. United States(2004)

Back 32

h: belton governs even when an officer makes contact with the occupant while the occupant is inside the vehicle.

f: before officer had an opportunity to pull peitioner over. pet pulled into a parking lot, parked, and got out of the vehicle. officer accosted pet and aked for his lickence.Officer was concerned for his safety so he patted down nichols and asked him if he had any illegal narcotics on him.. Found drugs on him, handcuffed him, then informed him he was under arrest. After that he searched pet vehicle and found a gun.

H: an officer may seach a vehicle under belton only if the suspect is arrested.

H: the stress is no less merely because the arrestee exited his car before the officer initiated contact nor is an arrestee less likely to attempt to lnge for a weapon or to destroy evidence if he is outside of but still in control the vehicle.

H: to be sure not all ocntraband in the passenger comparment is likely to be reaily accesible to a recent occupant.

H: once an officer determines that there is probable cause to make an arrest it is reasonable to allow officers to ensure their safety and to preserve evidence by searching the entire passenger compartment.

concurrence

Hint 32

The Automobile Exception: Searches Incident to Arrest

Front 33

South Dakota v. Opperman

Back 33

F: respondent oppermans car was towed for parking violations. car was inventoried and officer found marijuan that a plastic bag.

H: procedures for securing and inventoring automibile contencts developed in response to three distinct need: the protection of the owner's property while it remain in police custody, the protect of the police against cliams or disputes over lost or stolen property, and the protection of police from potential danger.

H: with repsect to nonivestigative police inventories of automobiles lawfully within govermental custody however the policies underlying the warrant requirement are inapplicable.

H: inventories pursuant to standard police procedures are reasonable

H: the Court carefully noted that the protective search was carried out in accordance with standard procedures in the local police department a factor tending to ensure that the intrusion would be limited in scope to the extent necessary to carry out the caretaking function. on this recrod we conclude that in following standard police procedures, precailing throughout the country and approved by the overwhelming majority of courts the conduct of the police was not unreasonable under the fourth amendment.

Hint 33

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement: Inventory Searches

Front 34

Illinois v. Lafayaette

Back 34

whether at the time an arrested person arrives at a police station the police may without obtaining a warrant search a shoulder bag carried by that person.

f: officer arrested respondent for fight, handcuffed him, and took him to the police station. respondent lafayette carried a purse tyype shoulder bag on the trip to the station. officer took him to the booking room and ordered resp. to empty his pockets and place the contents on the counter. Respondent took a pack of smokes from his shoulder bag and officer removed the contents of the bag and found ten amphetamine pill inside.

q; whether consistent with the FoA it is reasonable for police to serch the personal effects of a person under lawful arrest as part of the tourtine adminstrative procedure at a police station house incident to booking and jailing the suspect.

H: justification for such searches doe snot rest on prob cause. absence of warrant is immaterial to the reasonableness of the search.

H: inventory search not an an independent legal concept but rather an incidental adminstrative step.

H: Police conduct that would be impractical or unreasonable or embarrassingly intrusive on the street can more readily and privately be performed at the station. the practical necessities of routine jail adminstration may even justify taking a prisoner's clothers before confining him. although that step would be rate.

H: at the station house it is entirely proper for police to remove and list or inventory property found on the person or in possession of an arrested person who is to be jailed.

H:government interests: police might steal propety, arrestees might make false claims.

h: inventory deters false claims but also inhibits theft or careless handling of articles. also dangerous items may be present. also may assist the police in ascertaining or verifying identify.

H: it is not unreasonable for police as part of the routine procedure incident to incarcerating an arrested person to serach any container or article in his possession in accordance with established inventory procedures.

Hint 34

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement: Inventory Searches

Front 35

United States v. Flores-Montano (2004)

Back 35

Customs officials seized 81 pounds of marijuana from respondent flores montano gas tank at an internation border. Officials tapped th tank noted it sounded solid. Within 20 to 30 minutes a mechanin arrived. ligted the gar and removed the gas tank. Hammered off bondo and 37 bricks of pot. process took 15 to 25 minutes.

H congress since the beg of our gov has granted the exec plenary auth to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border without prob cause or a warr in order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the introductin of contraband into this country.

H: on many occasions we have noted that the expectation of privacy is less at the border than it is in the interior.

H: if damage to a vehicle were to occur the motorist might be entitled to recovery.

H: delays of one to two hours at the international borders are to be expected.

H we conclude that the gov's authoirity to ocnduct suspicionless inspections at the border includes the auth. to remove and disassemle and reassemble a vehicle's fuel tank.

H: while it may be true that some seraches of property are so destructive as to require a different result this was not one of them.

Hint 35

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement: Border Crossing and Checkpoints

Front 36

United States v. Ramsey

Back 36

f: customs official acting with reasonable cause to supect a violation of customs laws opened for inspection incoming international letter class mail without first obtaining a search warrant.

f: respondent ramsey had herooin by mail enterprise. letters from bangkok sent to Dist of Col. Letters form thailand with heroin were linked to respondents. Inspector based on the fact that letters were from thailand, were rather bulky supsected the envelopes might contain merchandise or contraband. letter weighed three to six times as much as a normal letter. then sent to dea where agents obtained a serach warrant and opened the envelopes. After ramsey recieved envelopes they were arrested by federal agents.

H: the critical fact is that the envelopes cross the border and enter this country not that they were brought in by one mode of transportation or another.

Hint 36

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement: Border Crossing and Checkpoints

Front 37

United States v. Montoya-Hernandez (1985)

Back 37

f: customs official noticed that respondent had made at least eight recent tripes to either miami or LA. Was referred to a second customs desk for further questioning. Sh e revelaed that she spoke no english, had no friends in the US and that she came to the US to purchase goods for her hubands store in bogata. Bogata was recognized by the officials a as a source city for narcotics. Respondent had 5000 in case. She had no appointments but planned to ride around visiting retail stores. She could not recall how her airline ticket was purchased. She four changes of cold weather clothing and only the high hells that she was wearing. She had no cashflow besides th ecash. Officials supected she was a ballon slwallowed. Female customes inspector noticed a firm fulness her abdomen area. the searched revealed no contrapand but respondent eas wearing two paris of eleastic underpants with a paer towel lining the crotch area.Was going to be xrayed then respondent said she was pregant. She was given the option of returning to columbia, agreeing to an x ray or remaining in detention until she pooped. she choose the first option. She was place in a room for observation and told she would have to shit in a wastebasket. Inspectors refusted her request for a telephone call. She stayed in the room remainder of night and was not permitted to leave. She didnt go to the bathroom for 16 hours. customs officials sought a court ordedr. they recieved the oder for a pregnancy test, e ray and rectal examination. She passed 88 ballons at the hospital.

H: we hold that the detention of a traveler at the border beyond the scope of a routine customs search and inspection is justified at its inception if customs agents surrounding the traveler and her trip reaonsable supect that the traveler is smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal.

H: her detention for the period of time necessary to either verifiy or dispel the suspicion was not unreasonable.

Hint 37

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement: Border Crossing and Checkpoints

Front 38

Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz

Back 38

q: this case poses the question whther a state's use of a highway sobriety checkpoint violates the Fo and Fth a.

H: they do not.

F: mich dept of state police setup a sobriety checkpoint. advisory comm create guidelines setting foth procedures governing checkpoint operatoins, site selection and publicity. unders gls chps set up at selected sites along state roads. All vehicles stopped and their drivers briefly examined for signs of intoz. where signs of intox were found further sobriety test would be administred and drivers would be permitted and if intoxicated an arrest would be made. average delay was 25 seconds. one driver was arrested dui.

H: seizure occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.

f: directive instruct the officers that they may conduct a serach only by consent or based on the appropriate quantum of particularized suspicion.Officers have no discretion to stop a vehicle out of sequence and must conduct each stip in the same manner until paricularized suspicion develops.

Q: we address only the intial stop of each mororist pass through a checkpoint and the associated prelminary questioning and observation by checkpoint officers.

H: the balance of the state's interest in preventing drunken driving the extent to which this system can reasonably be said to advance that interest and the degree of instrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped weighs in favor of the state program

Hint 38

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement:Checkpoints

Front 39

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond

Back 39

q: the consituttionality of a highway checpoint program whose primary prurpose is the discovery and interdiction of illegal narcotics

f: city of Indianapolis began to operate vehicle checkpoints on Indianapolis roads in an effort to interdict unlaeful drugs. overall hit was 9 percent. at each checkpoint police stop a predetermined number of vehicles. at least one officer approaches the vehicles advistes the driver that he or she is being stopped briefly at a drug checkpoint and asks the driver to produce license and registration.Dog walks around the outside. Directives instruct the officers that may conduct a search only by consent on the appropriate quantum of paricularized suspicion.

H well established that a vehicle checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the FoA. Walking the dog around foes not transform it into a search.

h: what principally distinguies these checkpoints from those we have previously approved is theri primary purpose.

H: we have never approved a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrong doing. each of the checkpoint programs we have approved was designed primarily to serve purposes closely related to the problems that we have approved was designed primarily to serve pruposes closely related to the problems of policing the border or the necessity of ensuring roadway safety.

H: we decline to suspend the usal requirement of individualized supicion where the police seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes.

H: there are circumstances that may justify a law enforcement checkpoint where the primary purpose would otherwise but for some emergency relate to ordinary crime control.

Hint 39

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement:Checkpoints

Front 40

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973)

Back 40

q: what is the defintion of consent.
f: cop stopped an automobile. six men in the car. officer asked the men if he could search the car. One of the men who was not the respondent said go ahead. Man opened the trunk for police officer and found three checks that had been stolen from a car wash.

HL when a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search he has the burn of proving that the consent was in fact freely and voluntarily given.

q: precise question is what must the prosection prove to demonstrate that a consent was voluntarily given.

H: the question of whether a consent to search was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied is a question of fact to be detrmined from the totality of all the circumstances.

H: knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account but is not completely necessary.

H: two important concerns for the meaning of voluntary - the legitimate need for such searches and the equally important requirement of assuring the absence of coercion.

H: a search pursuant to consent may result in considreably less inconvenience for the subject of the search and properly conducted is a permissible and legitimate aspect of police activity.

H Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined form all the circumstances and while the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the proseuction is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent

Hint 40

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement:Consent

Front 41

Georgia v. Randolph(2006)

Back 41

q: whether evidentiary seizure is lawful when one occupant givers permission and the other who is at the scene expressly refuses to consent.

H: a physicallly present co-occupant's stated refusal to permit entry revails rendering the warrantless search unreasonable and invalid.

H: wife volunteered that were drugs in the house and scott randolph refused consent to search the house. wige gave consent.

H: since the cotenant wishing to open the door to a thrid party has no recognized authoirty in law or socail practicte to prevail over a present and objecting cotenant his disputed invitation without more gives a police officer no better claim to reasonablenss in enterng than the officer would have in the absence of any consent at all.

Hint 41

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement:Consent

Front 42

United States v. Knights(2001)

Back 42

f knights signed to a probation condition where he would submit himself to search without a reasononable cause by an prob officer or law officer.

q: whether a search pursuant to a probation condition and supported by reasonable suspicion satifies the FoA.

F: PGE was damgaged. The incident began after PGE filed a theft of services complaint againt knightss and discontinued his service for failure to pay bill. Other suspicious cluses. Sheriff's deputy setup surveillance of knights redisence. SHeriff saw a bunch of things in friends tuck including a molotov cocktail, explosive materials and two brass padlocks that fit the description of those removed from the PGE vailt. Detective performed a serach of Knights apartment and did not believe a warrant was necessary because of the conditions of his probation.

q; whther the foa limits searches pursuant to this probation condition to those with a probationary purpose.

H: we conclude that the serach of knights was reasonable under our general fourth amendment arpproach of examining the totality of the circumstances.

H the probation order clearly expressed the search condition and knights was unambigiguously informed of it. The probation condition this significantly diminished knights reasonable expectation of privacy.

H: the recidivism rate for probationers s higher and they have even more of an inventive to conceal their criminal activities and quickly dispose of incrminating evidence thatn the ordinary crimanl.

H: we hold that the balance of these considerations requires no more than resonable supicion to conduct a search of this probationer's house.

H: although the FoA oridnarily requires the defree of probability embodied in the term probable cause a lesser degree satisfies the constitution when the balance of govermenatl and aprivate interest majes such a standard reasonable.

Hint 42

Exceptions to the warrant requirement: Searches of Those on Probation or Parole

Front 43

Samson v. California(2006)

Back 43

f: officer stopped parolee because hey believed there was a warrant out for him. and officer was aware petitioner was on parole. Officer confirmed that there was no outstanding warrant but searched him because of his status as a parolee and found meth on.

H: Parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers because parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment.

H: condition for suspicionless searches was clearly expressed to peitioner. and significantly diminished any reaosnable expectation of privacy.

H: states interest are substatntial. state has an overwhelming interest in supervising parolees

Hint 43

Exceptions to the warrant requirement: Searches of Those on Probation or Parole

Front 44

Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco (1967)

Back 44

q: examine whether administrative inspection programs as presently authorized and conducted violate FoA rights as those rights are enforced against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.

F; the building manager informed DPH inspector that appellant leasee of the ground floor was using the rear of his leasehold as personal residence. inspector confronted appellant and demanded that he permit an inspection of the prmeiss. Appellant refused because inspector lacked a search warrant. Appellant kept refusing the inspector if they didnt have a search warrant. Appellant was arrested for refusing to permit a lawful inspection.

H: under the present sustem when the inspector demands entry, the occupant has no way of knowing whether enforcement of the munincipal code involved requires inspection of his premises, no way of knowing the lawful lmits of the inspector's power to search, and no way of knowing whether the inspector himself is acting under proper authorization.

H: administrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant intrusions upon the interests protectd by the FoA, that such searches when authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure lack the traditional safeguards which the FoA guarantees to the individual and the reasons put forth for upholding thse warrantless searches are insufficent to justify so sibstantial a weakening of the FoA protections.


H: unlike the search pursuant to a criminal investigation the inspection programs at issue here are aimed at securing city wide compliancw with mimimum physical standards for private property.

H: we think that a number of persuasive factors combine to support the reasonableness of area code enforcement inspections

H: having concluded that the area inspection is a reasonable search of private property withn the meaning of the FoA it is obvious that probable cause to ussue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling.

H: standards will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular swelling.

h: if a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restircted search warrant.

H: nothing we say today is intended to foreclose prompt inspections even without a warrant that the law has traditionally upheld without a warrant.

Hint 44

Searches when there are special needs:Administrative Searches

Front 45

New York v. Burger (1987)

Back 45

q: whether the warrantless search of automobile junkyard conducted pursuant to a statute authorizing such a search falls within the exception to the warrant requirement for adminstrative inspections of pervasively regulated industries

q: whether an otherwise proper adminstrative inspection is unconstitutional because the ultimate purpose of the regulatory statute pursuant to which the search is done the deterrence of criminal behavior is the same as that of penal law with the result tha tthe inspection may disclose violations not only of the regulatory statute but also of the penal statutes.

F. Respondent burder owns a junkyard in NY. A high metal fence surrounds. 4 members of the Auto Crimes Division entreed respondent's junkyard to conduct an inspection pursuant to new york law. 5 to 10 inspections a day. Officers determined that he was in possession of stolen vehicles and parts.

H: an expectation of privacy in commercial premises is different from and indeed less than a simlar expectation in an individual's This expectation is particularly attenuated in commercial property employed in closely regulated insudtries.

H: where the privacy interest of the owner are weakened and the govermenment interests in regulating particular businesses are concomitantly heightended a warrantless inspection of commercial premises may well be reasonable within the meaning of the FoA

H: warrantless inspection of a pervasively regulaed business will be deemed to be reasonable so long as three criteria are met. 1 there must be a substantial government interest that informs the rgulatory schelme pursuant to which the inspection is made. 2 the warrantless inspections must be necessary to further the regulatory scheme. 3. the statutes inspection program in tems of the certainty and regularity of its application must provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. The regulatory statute must advise the owner of the commercial premisis that the search is being made pursuant to the law and has a properly defined scope and it must limit the discretion of the inspecting oggicers. To perform the first function the statute must be sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the ownwer of the commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes. it also must be carefully lmited in time place and scope.

Hint 45

Searches when there are special needs:Administrative Searches

Front 46

Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton (1995)

Back 46

f: random urinalysis drug testing og student who participate in the districts school athletics programs. drug use in the are rose sharply. student athletes were among the user and the leaders of the drug culture. Particular concenring because the effects of drugs on athletic performacne. purpose of drug testing is to prevent studetn athlettes drom using drugs, to protect their health and safety, and to provide drug users with assistance programs. Applies to all studetn involved in interscholastic athletics. Identity of a student does not determine the drugs that are tested.

H Fourth amendment rights are different in schools than elsewhere. legitimate privacy expectations are even less for student athletes. By choosing to go otu for the team they voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on student generally.

H: degree of intrusion for a urniary sample depends upon the manner in whih production of the urnine sample is monitored. Situations here are simlar to a public restroom. There is also a privacy interest in the information that the urninalysis reveals it is important that the test only looks for drugs, the drugs that are screened for are standard and the results of test are disclosed only to a limited class of personell.

h: compelling state interst describes an interest that appears important enough to justify the particular search at hand in light of other factors that show the search to be relatively intrusive unpon a genuine expectation of privacy.

H: deterring drug use by schoolchildren is at least as important as drug laws regarding the importation of drugs or deterring drug use by train worker. Drugs effects are worde on children.

H: it must not be lost sight of that this program is directed more narrowly to drug use by school athletres where the risk of immediate physical harm to the druf user or those with who whome he isplayhis sport is particularly high.

H: finally we turn to consider the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue here and the efifcay of this means for meeting it.

H: the most siginificant elemement in this case is the first we discussed tht the policy was undertaken in furtherance of the government's responsibilities udner a public school system as guardian and tutor of the children entrusted to its care.

Hint 46

Searches when there are special needs: Drug Testing

Front 47

Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls

Back 47

f: drug testing of all students who participate in competitive extracurricular activities to submit to drug testing.

H because the policy reasonably serves the school districts important interest in detecting and preventing drug use we hold that it is consitutional.

H respndents argue that beecause childrent in nonathletic activities are not subject to physicals and communcal undress they have a higher expectation of privacy.

H:veronia depended primarlily ipon the school's custodial responsibility and authority

H: intrusion here is equal or less than veronia.

H: tests are not turned over to any law enforcement authority.

H: the nationwide drug epidemic makes the war gainst drugs a pressing concern in every school

H: additionally the school district this case has presented specific evidence of drug use at District school.

H: demosntrated problem of drug abuse is not in all cases necessary to the validity of a testimg regime but some showing does shore up an assertion of spcial need for a suspicionless general search program

H: this court has not required a particularized or pervasive drug problem before allowing the government to conduct suspicionless drug testing.

F: respondents are correct that safety factor into the special needs anlysis but the safety interest furthered by drug testing is undoubtedly substantial for all children.

H: we conclude that the drug testing of student who participate in extracurricular activities effectively serves the school districts interest in protecting the safety and health of tis students.

Hint 47

Searches when there are special needs: Drug Testing

Front 48

Ferguson v. City of Charleston (2001)

Back 48

F hospital began to order drug screens to be performed on urine samples from maternity patients who were suspected of using coaine. Counseling and treatment were offered byt failed so they started working on prosecuting mothers whose children tested positive for drugs at birth.

H we note that the invasion of privacy is far more substantial in those cases. in the previous four cases there was no misundertstanding about the purose of the test of the potential use of the test results to third parties.

H: theuse of an adverse test to disqualify one from eligibility for a particular benefit such as prmotion or an opportunity to particpate in an extracuyrricular activity involves a less srious intrusion on privacy than the unauthorized dissemination of such results to thid parties.

H: the reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is that the results of those tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel without her consent.

H in each of the earlier cases the special need that was advanced as justification for the absence of a warrant or individualized suspicion was one divorced form the state's general interest in law enforcement.

H: the immediate objective of the searches was to generate evidence for law enforcement purppsoses in order to reach that goal.

Hint 48

Searches when there are special needs: Drug Testing

Front 49

Welsh v. Wisconsin (1981)

Back 49

q: whether and if so under what cicrumstances the FoA prohibits the police from making a warrantless night entry of a person's home in order to arrest him for a nonjailable traffic offence.

F: Witness saw drunk driver swerving all over. Welsh left his car before police arrived. Police entred the home without a warrant and found welsh laying naked in bed. At this point the pet was placed under arrest for driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. He refused to submit to a breath test.

H whether there is a reasonable necessity for a serach certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the offense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of the method of attempting to reach it.

H: when an officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate he ought to be in a position justify it by pointing to some real immediate and serious consequences if he postponed action to get a warrant.

H: although no exigency is created simply because there is a probable cause to believe that a srious crime has been committed, application of the exigent circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offencse such as the kind at issue in this case has been comitted.

H: the claim of hot pursuit is unconvincing because there was no immediate or continuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a crime. there was little remaining threat to public safety because he abandoned his car.

Hint 49

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement: Exigent Circumstances

Front 50

Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart

Back 50

Officers went into party to break up a fight.

H: On exigency obviating the requirement of of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.

Hint 50

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement: Exigent Circumstances

Front 51

United States v. Watson (1976)

Back 51

q legality of a warrantless arrest and of an ensuing search of the arrestee automobile carried out with his purported consent.

H borad of governors of the postal service pursuant to statute are allowed to authroize postal service officers and employees to perform duties related to the inspection of postal matters to make arrests without for warrantforfelonies cognizable under the laws of the united states if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such a felony.

H: there is nothing under the courts prior cases to indicate the under the FoA a warrant is required to make a valid arrest for felony.

Hint 51

Seizures and Arrests: Is a Warrant Needed for Arrests?

Front 52

United States v. Mendenhall (1980)

Back 52

rspondent was detained at the airport for suspicion of heroin smuggle. She was was aked her address and her name and asked to show her ticket. Agent identified himself as a narcotics agent and women became nervous. She was asked to accompany agent to dea office. She was asked if she would allow a search of her person and handbag and told her she had a right to decline. She resonded go ahead. Was asked several times if she consented to search and she replied that she did. Agent found heroin.

H: if the respondent was seized when the DEA agents approached her on the concurse and asked questions of her, the agents conduct in doin so was constitutional only if they reasonably suspected the respondent of wrongdoing.

H: we adhere to the view that a person is seized only when by means of physical force or a show of authority his freedom of movement is restrained. As long as the person to whom question are put remains free to disregard questions and walk away there had been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require some particularized and objective justification.

H: we conclude that a person has been seized within the meaning of the FoA only if in view of all the cicrumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.

H: Examples: the threatening preence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compleeled.

H: No seixure of the rspondent occured. public concourse. no uniforms, no weapons, did not summon but instead approached. responded but did not demand ID and ticket.

Hint 52

Seizures and Arrests: When is a Person Seized

Front 53

California v. Hodari D (1991)

Back 53

youths ran away. cops started chasing them through alleys. hodari didnt see cop until he was almost upon him. During that time he tossed what appeared to be a small rock which was found to be cocaine.

q: whether with respect to a show of authority with respect to application of physical force a seizure occurs even though the subject does not yield.

H: assuming that Pertoso's pursuit in the presetn case constituted a show of authority enjoining Hodari to halt, since Hodari did not comply with that injunction he was not seized until he was tackled.

Hint 53

Seizures and Arrests: When is a Person Seized

Front 54

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001)

Back 54

q: whether the FoA forbids a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense such as a misdmeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine.

F: Atwater was pulled over for a seatbelt violation. Officer handcuffed atwater, placed her in a squad car, and drover he to the local police station. Where was booked and released on 310 bond.

H: atwater might win if the rule was specific to her case but we have traditionally recognized that a responsible FoA balance is not well served by standards requiring sensitive cae- by case detrminations of government need.

H: if an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence he without violating the FoA arrest the offender.

Hint 54

Seizures and Arrests: For what crimes may a person be arrested

Front 55

Terry v. Ohio (1968)

Back 55

officer looked over and petitioner dint look right to him. He saw them walk btack in forth in front of the same store windows roughly 5 or 7 times. He suspect the two men of casing a stickup job. He added that he feared that they might have a gun. Officer approached the men identified himself as police officer and asked for their names. Officer grabbed terry and patted down the outside of his clothing. Found a gun in respondents overcoat. Officer testified that he only patted the men down see whether they had weapons and that he did not put his hands beneath the outer garmers of either terry or chilton until he felt thier guns.

H: when an officer is justified in believing tha the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close reange is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whethre the person is in fact carrying a weapon to neutralize the threat of physical harm

H: suffice it is to note that such a search unlike a search incident to laeful arrest is not justiified by the need to prvent the destruction or loss of evidence.

H: The officer need not be absollutely certain that the individual is armed the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.

H: we hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the person with whome he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous where in the course of investigatin gthis behavior he idnentifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries and wher enothin in the intial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others safety he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discvover wapons which might be used to assault him.

Hint 55

Stop and Frisk: The Authority for Police to Stop and Frisk

Front 56

Hibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada (2004)

Back 56

F: Officer explained that he was investigating a report of a fight. Man Hibel appeared intoxicated. Officer asked for identification. Man refused. Officer asked 11 times and refused each time. Officer arrested him.

H; asking questions is an essentail part of police investigations.

H: Our decisions make clear that questions concerning a suspect's identity are a routine and accepted part of many Terry stosp.

H: The principles of Terry permit a state to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop.

H: Nevadas statute on request for identity has an immediate relation to the purpose rationale and practical demands of a terry stop.

H: A state law requiring a suspect to disclose h is name in the course of a valid Terry stop os consistent with Fourth Amendment prohibitons against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Hint 56

Stop and Frisk: What may police do when they stop an individual

Front 57

United States v. Arvizu (2002)

Back 57

F: respondent was stopped by a border patrol agent while driving on an unpaved road in arizona. Agent received a report that trigger had been tripped. Signled that the vehicle might be trying to cicrumvent the checkpiont and it was at at a time alien smuggler knew to be a shift change. Minivan a type smuggler used. Slowed dremativally upon approaach. The driver had very rigid posture. knees of the children were very high. Odd waing for four or five minutes. Driver turned on to a road that was unlikely a van would drive on and where there was no picnic grounds. Radioed for investigation and learned that the vehicle was registered to an area known for alein and narcotixs smuggling. Pulled the vehicle over and found marigjuan.

H: When discussing how courts should make reaonable supicion determinations we have said repeatedly that they must look at the totality of the cicrumstances to whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.

The court's evaluation and regjection of seven of the listed factors in isolation from each other does not take into account the totaility of the ciccumstances as our cases have understood that phrase.

H: a determination that reasonable suspicion exists however need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.

Hint 57

Stop and Frisk: What is Sufficient for Reasonable Suspicion: Resonable Suspicion for Stopping Cars

Front 58

Alabama v. White (1990)

Back 58

q: whether a tip abour drugs corroborated by independent police work exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to provide suspicion to make the investigatory stop.

H: it did

F; montogomery police department received a top that respondent white would be leaving certain apartments at a particular time in a brown station wagan with right lens broken, that she would be going to dobey's motel, and she would be in possession of about an ounce of cocaine insde a brown attache case.
F: Officers saw the respondent leaving the building carrying nothing in her hand and leaving the station wagan. Followed the vehicle as it drove the most direct route to dobeys motel. WHen it got to the hotel patrol unit stopped the vehicle. Police asked to look in vehicle and attache case. Officers found marijuana in the attache case. Also found coke in her puse.

H: veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge remain relevant in reasonable suspicion context although allowance must be made in apoly them for the lesser showing required to meet that standard.

H: THe tip was not as detailed and the corroboration was not as complete as in gates but the required degree os supeicion was likewise not as high.

H: If a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reliable.

H: we think it also important that as in gates the anonymous tip contained a reange of details relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip but to future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted.
H" what was important was the caller's ability to predict respondent's future behavior because it demonstrated inside information - a special familiarity with respondent's affairs... it is reasonable for police to believe that a person with access to such information is likely to also have access to reliable information about that individuals' illegal actitivities.

H: we conclude that under the totality of the cicrumstances the anonymous tip as corroborated exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the investigatory stop of respondent's car.

Hint 58

Stop and Frisk: What is Sufficient for Reasonable Suspicion: Resonable Suspicion for Stopping Cars

Front 59

Florida v. J.L. (2000)

Back 59

Q: whether an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is without more sufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person

H: we hold that it is not

F: anonymous caller reported to the miami dade police that young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun. Officers reported to the scene. Saw one man resondent JL wearing a plain shirt. No reason to suspect illegal conduct other than the tip. Onr of the officres appraced him asked him to put his hands up and frisked him and seized a gun.

H: adams v willaims(1972) an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity.

Q: question here was whether the tip was suitably corroborated to provide a sufficient indicia of reliability

H: that the allegation about the gun turned out to be correct does not suffest that the officers prior to the risks had a reasonable bais fro suspecting JL of engaging JL in unlawful condect.

H: the reasonableness of official supsicion must be measured by what the officers knew before they conducted thier search.

H: report of an unknown, unaccountable informaant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about JL.

H: An accurate description of a subject's readily observable location and appearance if of course reliable in this limited sense.

H: we do not say for example that a report of a person carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a person carrying a firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a frisk.

H: nor do we hold that public safety officials in quarters where the reasonable expectation of FoA privacy is diminished such as airports and schools cannot conduct protective searches on the basis of information insufficient to justify searches elsewhere.

H: Finally the requirement that an anonymous tip bear standard ndicia of reliability in order to justify a stop in no way diminishes a policie officer's perogative in accord with terry to conduct a protective search of a person who has been legitimately stopped.

Hint 59

Stop and Frisk: What is Sufficient for Reasonable Suspicion: Reasonable Suspicion based on informants tips

Front 60

Illinois v. Wardlow (2000)

Back 60

F: As officers approached corner they observed wardlow standing next to the building holding an opaque bag. Respondent looked in the direction of the officers and fled. Officers eventually cornered him and conducted a protective patdown search for weapons. During the frisk officer squeezed the bag and felt a heavy hard object similar to the shape of a gun.

H: Terry held that an officer may consisten with the FoA conduct a brief investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.

H: an individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime.

H: but officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.

H: It was not only respondent's presence in a high crime area but his unprovoked flight upon noticing police.

H: nervous evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determing reasonable suspicion.

Hint 60

Stop and Frisk: What is Sufficient for Reasonable Suspicion: Reasonable Suspicion on a person's trying to avoid a police officer

Front 61

United States v. Sokolow (1989)

Back 61

Stop and Frisk: Reasonable Suspicions based on profiles

Hint 61

F: when respondent was stopped by DEA at the airport they knew he (1) paid 2100 for two airplane tickets from a roll of 20s (2) traveled under a name that did not match the name under which his telephone was listed (3) his original destination was miami a source for illicit drug (4) he stayed in miami for only 48 hours even though a round trip from honuolulu to miami takes 20 hours. (5) he appeared nervous during his trip (6) checkd none of his luggage. Was topped by dea agenets and drug alteted on bag detecting drugs. Found cocaine in the bag.

H: a court sitting to determine the existence of reasonable suspicion must require the agent to aritculate the factors leading to that conclusion.

H: there was reasonable suspicion to stop him.

Front 62

United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan(1972)

Back 62

q: involves the delicate question of the president's power acting through the AG to authorize electronic surveillance in internal security matters without prior judicial approval.

H: we therefore think the conclusion inescapable that congress only intended to make cleat that the Act simply did not legislate with respect to national security surveillances.

H: this court has never sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive means consistent with that end.

we emphasize this case inolves only the domestic aspects of national security. we have not addressed and express no opinion as the issues which may be inolved with respoect to activities of foreign powers or their agents.

H we do not hold that the same type of standards and procedures prescrived by Title III are necessarily applicable to this case.

H: we do hold that prior judicial approval is required for the type of domestic security surveillance involved in this case and that such approval may be made in accordance with such reasonable standards as the congress may prescribe

Hint 62

Electronic Surveillance:Warrantless Eavesdropping

Front 63

hudson v. michigan (2006)

Back 63

H: The exclusionary rule has never been appplied where its detrrence benefits outwigh its substantial social costs.

H: imposing that massive remedy for a knock and announce vilation would gnerate a constant flood of alleged failures to observe the rule.

H: Another consequence of the incongrouent remedy Hudosn proposes would be police officers refraining from timely entry after knocking and announcing.

H: a mere reasonable supicion that knocking announcing under the particular circumstances would be dangerous or futile or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime will cause the requirement to yield.

H: next to these substantial social costs we must consider the deterrence benefits. existence of which is a necessary condition for exclusion.

H: deterrence depends upon the strength of the incentive to commit the forbidden act.

H: as far as we know civil liability is an effective deterrent here as we have assumed it is in other contexts.

H In sum the social costs of applying the exclusionary rule to knock and announce violations are considerable, the incentive to such violations is minimal to begin with and the exatn dterrences against them are susbtantial, resort to the massive remedy of suppressing evidence of guilt is unjustified.

Hint 63

Is the exclusionary rule a desirable remedy for unconstitutional police behavior

Front 64

weeks v. united states(1914)

Back 64

defendant was arrested by a police officer without a warrant. Other police officers entered weeks house. There was no warrant and they seized letter.

H: if letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense the protection of the 4th amendment declaring his right to be secure agianst such searches and seizures is of no value.

H in holding them and permitting thier use upon the tril we think prejudicial error was committed.

Hint 64

the origins of the exclusionary rule

Front 65

mapp v. ohio (1961)

Back 65

F: unlawful search of mapps home. found lewd material which was was used for a conviction at trial.

H: since the FoA right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the fed.

H: the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effective available way by removing the incentive to disregard it.

Hint 65

the origins of the exclusionary rule

Front 66

Rakas v. Illinois (1978)

Back 66

f: prosecution offered into evidence a sawed off rifle and rifle shells that had been seized by police during a search of an automobile in which petitioners had been passengers. Neither petitioner is the owner of the automobile. nor did they assert that they owned the rifle or the shells seized

q: whether or not the proponent of the motion to suppress has had his own FoA rights infringed by the search and seizure which he seeks to challenge.

H FOA rights are personal rights which may not be viariously asseted.

H: A person who is aggrieved by illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his FoA rights infringed.

H: There is no reason to think that a party whose rights have been infringed will not if evidence is used against him have ample motivation to move to suppress it.

H: we can think of no decided cases of this court that would have come out differently had we concluded as we do now, that the type of standing requirment discussed in JOnes and reaffirmed today is more properly subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine.

H: Petitioner asserted neither a property nor a possessory interest in the automobile nor any interest in the property seized.

H: the fact that they were legitimately on the premies in the sense that were in the car with permission of its owner is not determinative of whether they had legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular areas of the automobile searched.

H: No comment about the same situation in a house.

Hint 66

who can object to the the Introduction of Evidence and Raise the Exclusionary Rule

Front 67

Minnesota v. Carter

Back 67

F: police officer saw respondent baggin cocaine through a drawn window blind.

H: Minnesota v. Olson: We decided that an overnight guest in a house had the sort of expectation of privacy that the fourth amendment protects.

H: An overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment but who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not.

H: But the purely commercial nature of the transaction engaged in here the relatively short period of time on the premises and the lack of any previous connection between respondents and the householder all lead us to conclude that respondents situation is close to that of one simply permitted on the premises.

Hint 67

who can object to the the Introduction of Evidence and Raise the Exclusionary Rule

Front 68

Brendlin v. California (2007)

Back 68

H: we hold that a passenger is seized as well as the driver and may challenge the constitutionality of the stop

F: brendlin was a passenger in a car that stopped. Police saw Brendlin briefly open and close the passenger door. he was ordered out of the car and the police found an orange syringe cap and syringes and pot incident to arrest.

H: we think that a reasonable passenger would have understood the police officers to be exercising control to the point that no one in the car was free to depart wihout police permisssion.

H: his attempt to leave the scne would be so obviously likely to prompt an objection from the officer taht no passenger would feel free to leave in the first place.

Hint 68

who can object to the the Introduction of Evidence and Raise the Exclusionary Rule

Front 69

Murray v. United States(1988)

Back 69

H: In Segura v.United States we held that police officers illegal entry upon private premises did not require suppression of evidence subsequently discovered at those premises when executing a search warrant obtained on the basis of information wholly unconnected with the intial entry.

q: whether asuuming evidence pursuant to an an independently obtained search warrant the portion of such evidence that had been observed in plain view at the time of prior illegal entry must be suppressed.

F: federal law enforcement agenets had been surveilling peitioner murray. they observed murray drive a truck into a warehouse in south boston. murray turned over the truck to another driver who was in turn followed and arrested for poss of pot. agents forced entry into the warehouse and saw several blaes containing pot. In applying for the search warrant the agents did not mention the prior tnry. Then then entered the warehouse with the search warrant and seized all the pot.

H: the exclusionary rule prohibits introduction into evidence of tangible materials seized during an unlawful seach and of testimony concerning knowledge acquired during an unlawful search. Beyond that the exclusionary rule also probitis the intro of derivative evidence both tangible and testimonial that is the product of the primary evidence or that is otherwise acquired as indirect result of the unlawful search up to the point at which the connection with the unlawful search becomes so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.

H: the intrest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same not a worse position that they would would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occured . . . when the challenged evidence has an independent source exclusion of such evidence would put the police in a wose position than they would have been in absent any error or violation.

H: evidence intially discovered during or as a consequence of an unlawful search but later obtained independently from activities untainted by the intial illegality is allowed.

H knowledge was also acquired at the time of entry pursuant to the warrant and if that later acquisition was the result of the earlier entry there is no reason why the independent source doctrine should not apply.

Hint 69

Exceptions to the exclusionary rule: Independent Source

Front 70

Nix v. Williams (1984)

Back 70

F: Search party for little girl. Williams surrendered in police to davenport. When the search was called off one tea was only two and one half miles from where williams guided the officers to the body. The body was essentially within the area to be searched.

H: if the prosecution can establish by a predonderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means here the volunteers search then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be recieved.

Hint 70

Exceptions to the exclusionary rule: Inevitable Discovery

Front 71

Brown v. Illinois (1975)

Back 71

F: Petitioner was arrested without probable cause and without a warrant. Given MIranda warning and while in custody he made two inculpatory statements.
Q: whether evidence of those statements was properly admitted or should have been excluded.
Q whether the statements were to be excluded as the fruit of the illegal arrest or were admissible because the giving the miranda warnings sufficiently attenuated the taint of the arrest.

H: wong sun: we need not hold that all eviidence is fruit of the posinous tree simply becasue it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather the more apt question in such a case is whether granting establishment of the primary illegality the evidence to which isntant objectin is made has been come at by explotitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.

H; in short exclusion of a confession made without Miranda warnings might be regarded as necessary to effectuate the Fifth Amendment but it would not be sufficient fully to protect the Foruth.

H: Miranda warnings and the exclusion of a confession made without them do not alone sufficiently deter a fourth amendment violation.

H: The miranda warnings are an important factor to be sure in determing whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest. But they are not the only factor to be considered. The temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession. the presence of intervening cicrumstances and particularly the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are all relevant. The voluntariness of the statement is a threshold requirement.

H: we conclude that the state failed to sustain the burden of showing that the evidence in question was admissible under Wong Sun.

H: Factors: first statement was separated from his illegal arrest by less than two hours and there was no intervening event of significance wahtsoever. The second statement was clearly the result and the fruit of the fitst. Th eimpropriety of the arrest was obvious awaremeness of that fact was virtually conceded by the two detectives when they repeatedly acknowledged inthier testimony that the purpose of their acttion was for investigation and for questioning.

H: We decide only that the Illinois courts were in error in assuming that the miranda warning by themselves under wong sun always purge the taint of an illegal arrest.

Hint 71

Exceptions to the exclusionary rule: Inadequate Causal connection -- Attenuation of the Taint

Front 72

United States v. Leon (1984)

Back 72

F: Warrant issued by magistrate ruled to narrowly not satisfy the probable cause issue.
Q: whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the admission of evidence seized in reasonable- good faith realiance on a search warrant that is subsequently held to be defective.

H: the fourth amendment has never been interpreted to proscibe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.

The exclusionary rule operates as a judicially created remedy designned to saeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect rather that a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.

H: whether the ex rule is appropriately imposed must be resolved by weighing the costs and benefits of preventing the use in the prosecution's case in chief of inherently trustworth tangible evidence obtained in reliance ona search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that ultimately is found to be defectibe.

H: because we find taht the rule can have no substantial detrrent effect in the sorts of situations under consideration in this case we conclude that it cannot pay its way in those situations.

H: united states v havens: evidencce inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief or otherwise as substantive evidence of guilt may be used to impeach statements by a defendant in response to proper cross examination reasonably suggested by the defendant's direct examination.

H: it is clear first that the deference accorded to a magistrate's finding of probable cause does not preclude inquiry into the knowing or reckless falsity of the affidavit on which that determination was based. Second the courts must also insist that the magistrate purport to perform his neutral and detached function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police. Third reviewing courts will not defer to a warrant based on an affidavit that does not provided the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause.

H: even if the application was supported by more than a bare bones affidavit a reviewing court may properly conclude that nws the deference that magistrates deserve the warrant was invalid because the magistrates probable cause detrmintion reflected an improper analysis of the totatlity of the circumstances or because the form of warrant was improper in some respect.

H: First the exclusionary rule is designed to prevent police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates. Second there exists no evidence suffesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore or subvert the FoA or that lawlessness among these actor requires application of the extreme sanction of exclusion. Third we discern no basis for believing that exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant will have a significant deterrent effect on the issuing judge or magistrate.

H: we conclude that the marginal or nonexistenet benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable teliance on a subsequenlty invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of eclusion.

H: nevertheless the officer's reliance on the magistrate's probable cause determination and on the rechnical sufficiency of the the warrant he issues must be objectively reasonable and it is clear that in some circumstances the officer will have no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued.

H: Suppression therefore remains an appropriate remeddy if the the magistrate or judge in issuing a wrrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard for the truth.

H: suprression would also happen in warrants so lacking in dicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. Finally a warrant may be so facilly deficient, lacking in aprticularization that the officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.

H: in the absence of an allegation that the magistate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause.

Hint 72

Exceptions to the exclusionary rule: The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule

Front 73

Brown v. Mississippi

Back 73

q: whether convictions which rest solely upon confessions shown to haven been extorted by officers of the state by brutality and violence are consistent with the due process of law required by the 14th Amendment

F: defendant was tortured to get confession.

Hint 73

Due Process and the Requirement for Voluntariness: The Requirement for Voluntariness

Front 74

Arizona v. Fulminante (1991)

Back 74

F: Fulminante became a supect in his stepdaughters killing in Arizona. No charges were filed and he was subsequently charged and incarcerated in new jersey on possession of a fiewarm by a felon. Fulminante became friends with a paid FBI informant. Informant raised the subject of stepdaughters killing several taime with Fulminante. Informant offered to protect Fulminante but he had to tell him about it for him to give him any help. Fulminante then admiteed that he killed the girl.

H: ourcases have made clear that a finding of coercion need not depend upon actual violence by a govermenment agent; a credible threat is sufficient.

H: it was the fear of physical violence which motivated Fulminante to confess.

Hint 74

Due Process and the Requirement for Voluntariness: Determining whether a confession is voluntary:The of Use of Force and Threats of Force

Front 75

Spano v. New York (1959)

Back 75

F:Spano confessed murder to a friend and fellow police officer who relayed the information to authorities. He surrendered to authorities and attorney cautioned him not to answer any questions. Petitioner kept refusing to answer any questions. Friend cop was told to use sympathy to get him to confess. Petitioner kept refusing to talk. Finally at 405 am he made a statment.

H: Foreign born. progressed only one half year into high school. history of emotional instability. no narrative statement but was subject to leading question of a skillful prosecutor. questioned by many men. eight straight hours before he confessed. was conducted at night instead of normal business hours. questioners persisted in the face of his repeated refusals to answer on the advice of his attorney. friends with the interrogator.

H: we conclude that the petitioners will was overborned by official pressure, fatigue and sympath falsely aroused after considering all the facts in thier post indictment setting.

Hint 75

Due Process and the Requirement for Voluntariness: Psychological Pressure Tactics

Front 76

Colorado v. Connely (1986)

Back 76

q: whether the mental state of the defendant at the time he made the confession interfered with his rational intellect and his free will.

H: we conclude that the admissibility of this kind of statement is governened by state frules of evidence rather than by our previous decisions regarding coerced confessions and Miranda waiver.

F: respondent connely approached officer and without any prompting stated that he had murdered someone and wanted to talk about it. He was immediately advised of his miranda's rights. COnnelly denied that he had been drinking denied that he had been taking any drugs and stated that in the past he had been a patient in several mental hospotal. Officer told him he was under no obligation to say anything. Connelly talked anway. Another detective came and connelly was again advised of his rights. Kept talking and took respondents to the scne of the killing. No indications to the officers that he was suffrering from mental illness at the time. The next morning during an interview with the public defender's office he became visibly disoriented and that voices told him to come to denver and confess.

H: while each confession case has turned on its own set of factors justifying the conclusion that police conduct was oppressive all have contained a substantial element of coercive police conduct.

H: This fact does not justify a conclusion that a defendant's mental condition by itself and aprat from its relation to official coercion should ever dispose of the inquiry into constitutional voluntariness.

H: we hold that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding the a confession is not vluntary within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth.

Hint 76

Due Process and the Requirement for Voluntariness: The Age Level and Mental Condition of a Suspect

Front 77

Miranda v. Arizona (1966)

Back 77

H: the prosection may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.

H: by custodial interrogatoin we mean questioning intiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.

H: as for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of thier right of silence and to assure a coninuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required: Prior to any questioning the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney either retained or appointed.

H: The defendant may waive efectuation of these rights provided the waiver ismade voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.

Hint 77

Fifth Amendement Limits on In-Custodial Interrogation: Miranda v. Arizona and Its Affirmation by the Supreme Court

Front 78

Dickerson v. United States (2000)

Back 78

H: We hold that Miranda being a constitutional decision of this Court may not in effect overruled by an Act of congress.

H: Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of statement made during custodila interrogation in both state and federal courts.

H: Miranda announced a constitutional rule that COngress may not supersede legislatively.

Hint 78

Fifth Amendement Limits on In-Custodial Interrogation: Miranda v. Arizona and Its Affirmation by the Supreme Court

Front 79

Oregon v. Mathiason 1977

Back 79

F: Defendant came into to the police station to talk to officer at the request of the officer but was not placed under arrest until he admitted to the crime then the officer read him his Miranda rights.

H: By custodial interrogation we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.

F: In the present case there is no indication that the question took place in a a context where respondent's freedom to depart was restrict in any way.

H: Miranda warning are required only where there has been such a restriction non a person's freedom to render him in custody.

Hint 79

What are the Requirements for Miranda to Apply?: When is a person in custody?

Front 80

Yarborough v. Alvarado

Back 80

What are the Requirements for Miranda to Apply?: When is a person in custody?

Front 81

Berkemer v. McCarty (1984)

Back 81

F: drunk driving case. Williams concluded that respondent would be charged with a traffic offense and therefore his freedom to leave the scene was terminated. while still at the scene of the traffic stop williams asked respondent whether he had been usiing intoxicatants.

H: we hold therefore that a person subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to the benefit of the procedural safeguards enunciated in Miranda regargless of the nature or severity of the offense of which he is suspected or for which he was arrested.

H: Traffic stop is only temporary and brief. and circumstances associated with the tupical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. (Traffic stop is public)

Hint 81

What are the Requirements for Miranda to Apply?: When is a person in custody?

Front 82

Rhode Island v. Innis (1980)

Back 82

H: Respondent said that he wanted to talked to a lawyer. he was place in the back of a police car. One officer started talking to the other about the danger of having a shotfun out there. Rspondent interrupted the conversation and told the officers that he wanted to tell them where the gun was. Once they got back to the scene of the arrest respondent was again advised of his Miranda rights.

H: We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. (any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminationg response from the suspect.

F: nothing that the officers should have known the respondent would be particularly susceptible to their conversation.

Hint 82

What are the Requirements for Miranda to Apply?: What is an Interrogation?

Front 83

Illinois v. Perkins

Back 83

F: Undercover agent placed in the same cell as the respondent. Respondent made statements that implicated him the crime the agent sought to solve. He did not receive Miranda warnings.

H: Miranda warnings are not required when the suspect is unaware that he is speaking to a law enforcement officer. The essentail ingredients of a police dominated atmosphere and compulsion are not present when an incarcerated person speaks freely to someone whom he blieves to be a fellow inmate.

H: we hold that an undercover law enforcement officer posing as a fellow inmate need not give Miranda warnings to an incarcerated supect before asking questions that may elicit an incriminating response.

Hint 83

What are the Requirements for Miranda to Apply?: What is an Interrogation?

Front 84

California v. Prysock (1981)

Back 84

H: Miranda does not require rigid exact words.


H: This Court has never indicated that the rigidity of Miranda extends to the precise formulation of the warnings given a criminal defendant.

Hint 84

What are the Requirements for Miranda to Apply?: What is Required of the Police

Front 85

Duckworth v. Eagan (1989)

Back 85

F: Respondent confessed to stabbing a woman. Respondent was given warnings by the police which included that a lawyer would be appoint if and when you go to court

H: the inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably convery to a supect his rights as required by Miranda.

H: If the police cannot provide appointed counsel Miranda requires only that the police not question a suspect unless he waives hir right to counsel.

Hint 85

What are the Requirements for Miranda to Apply?: What is Required of the Police

Front 86

Oregon v. Elstad (1985)

Back 86

F: Warrant for son's arrest. Son was already in his room. Officers talked to him in his room then transported him to the police station. After an hour respondent respondent was for the first time advised of his miranda rights. He then waived his rights and gave a statement.

H It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer the warnings unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for som eindeterminate period.

H; Though Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must suppressed the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made.

H: A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement.

Hint 86

What are the Requirements for Miranda to Apply?: What are the consequences of a violation of Miranda?

Front 87

Missouri v. Seibert (2004)

Back 87

F: police protocol for custodial interrogation that calls for giving no warnings of the rights to silence and counsel until interrogation has produced a confession.

H: Because this midstread recitation of warnings after interrogation and unwarned confession could not effectively comply with Miranda's constitutional requirement we hold that a statement repeated after a warning in such circumstances is inadmissible

H: These cicrumstances must be seen as challenging the comprehensibility and efficacy of the Miranda warnings to the point that a reasonable person in the supsect's shoes would not have understood them to convery a message that she retained a choice about continuing to talk.

Hint 87

What are the Requirements for Miranda to Apply?: What are the consequences of a violation of Miranda?

Front 88

United States v. Patane 2004

Back 88

H: A failure to give a suspect the warnings required by Miranda requires suppression of the physical fruits of the suspects unwarned but voluntary statements because the miranda rule protects against violation of the self incrimination clause, which in turn turn is not implicated by the introduction at trial of evidence resulting from voluntary statements.

Hint 88

What are the Requirements for Miranda to Apply?: What are the consequences of a violation of Miranda?

Front 89

Harris v. New York (1971)

Back 89

H: A statement that doesn't satisfy Miranda but is stilll considered voluntary CAN be used for impeachment purposes.

Hint 89

What are the Requirements for Miranda to Apply?: What are the exceptions to Miranda:Impeachment

Front 90

New York v. Quarles (1984)

Back 90

H: We conclude that under the circumstances involved in this case overriding considerations of public safety justify the officer's failyre to provide Miranda warnings before he asked questions devoted to locating the abandoned weapon.

F: Officer frisked noticed he was wearing a hoslster with no gun. And asked him where the gun was. After he retreived the gun he formally placed respondent under arrest and read him his rights.

H: We hold thta on these facts there is a public safety exception to the requirement taht Miranda wanings be given before a supects answers may be admitted into evidence and that the availability of that exception deos not depend upon the motivation of the officers involved.

H: We conclude that the need for answers to questions in a situtation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylatic rule protecting the fifth amendment's privilege against self incrimination.

Hint 90

What are the Requirements for Miranda to Apply?: What are the exceptions to Miranda: Emergencies

Front 91

Pennsylvania v. Muniz

Back 91

What are the Requirements for Miranda to Apply?: What are the exceptions to Miranda: Booking Exception

Front 92

North Carolina v. Butler

Back 92

f: at the time of his arrest respondent was fully advised of his rights in the miranda. after that he was given the bureau's advice of rights form which respondent read. respondent refused. wasw told that he didnt need to speal or sign the form but that the agents would like to talk him. respondent said he would talk but not sign the form. he then made inculpatory statements. At no time did he rqequest counsel or attempt to terminate the agent's questioning.

H: an express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver.

q: whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the miranda case

at least in some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated

f: no reasoning that he didn't waive his right to a lwayer

Hint 92

What are the Requirements for Miranda to Apply?: What are the exceptions to Miranda: Waiver: What is Sufficient to Constitute a Waiver

Front 93

Michigan v. Mosley(1975)

Back 93

f: officer advised mosely of his ruights under Miranda and had him read and aign the department's constitutional rights notification certificate.when mosley said he did not want to answer any questions about the robberies cowie promptly ceased the interrogation. at no time did mosley indicate a desire to consult with a lawyer. mosley ws brought to a different floor for questioning about a murder. mosley had not been arrested on this charge or intrrogated about it by the robbery detective. before the second questioning he was advised of his miranda rights. mosley read the notification both silently and aloud and the dectective then read and explained the warning to him and him sign the form. after first denying it mosley made a statement implicating himself in the murder. he never said he didnt want to discuss the homocide.

q: under what circumstances is a resumption of questioning permissible after the suspect in custody indicates that he wishes to remain silent.

H: the critical safeguard identified in the passage is a person's right to cut off questioning.
H: the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored.

r: the police here immediately xeased the interrogation, resumed questioning only after the passage of a significant period of time and the provision of a fresh set of warnings and restricted the second interrogation to a crime that had not been a subject of the earlier interrogation.

Hint 93

What are the Requirements for Miranda to Apply?: What are the exceptions to Miranda: Waiver: How is a Waiver after the assertion of Rights Treated

Front 94

Edwards v. Arizona

Back 94

q: whether the fifth sixth and fourteenth amendments require suppression of a post arrest confession which was obtained after edwards had invoked his right to counsel before further investigation.

edwards sought the right to an attorney before he made a deal. detectives halted questioning at that point. the next morning two detectives came to the jail and asked to see edwards even though he said he didn't want to talk to him. he went on to implicate himself in the crime

H: it is reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege which depends on all the facts of the case including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.

H; when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police intiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.

Hint 94

What are the Requirements for Miranda to Apply?: What are the exceptions to Miranda: Waiver: How is a Waiver after the assertion of Rights Treated

Front 95

Minnick v. mississippi(1990)

Back 95

q: whether edwards protection ceases once the suspect has consulted with an attorney

f: day after arrest two fbi agents came to the jail to interview him. petitioner refused to go to the interview but he was told he had to. fbi agents read petitioner his miranda warnings and he acknowledged he understood his rights. refused to sgin a rights waiver. after hee made some statements minnick stated come back monday when i have a lawyer. after he consulted with his lawyer he talked to the mississippi sheriff explaining what happened.

H; we do not interpret edwards to mean as the Mississippi court thought that the protection of edwards terminates once counsel has consulted with the suspect.

H: a fair reading of edwards and subsequent cases demonstrates that we interpreted the rule to bar police-initiated interrogation unless the accused has counsel with him at the time of questioning

H: we now hold that when counsel is requested interrogation must cease and officials may not reinitiate interrogation without consel present, whether or not the accused has consulted with an ttorney

r: a single consultation with an attorney does not remove the suspect from persistent attempts by officials to persuade him to waive his rights or from the coercive pressures that accompany custody that may increase as custody is prolonged.

Hint 95

What are the Requirements for Miranda to Apply?: What are the exceptions to Miranda: Waiver: How is a Waiver after the assertion of Rights Treated

Front 96

Davis v. United States

Back 96

q: how law enforcement officers should respond when a suspect makes a reference to counsel that is insufficiently clear to invoke the Edwards prohibition on further questioning

F:Petitioner said maybe I should talk to a lawyer. Investigator clarified asking if he indeed want a lawyer. He said no talked for an hour more than said "I think I wasnt a lawyer before saying anything else" and then questioning ceased

Hint 96

What are the Requirements for Miranda to Apply?: What are the exceptions to Miranda: Waiver: How is a Waiver after the assertion of Rights Treated

Front 97

Massiah v. United States (1964)

Back 97

F: Peetitioner was indicted for violating the federal narcotics law he ratained a lawyer plead not guilty and was released on bail. While he was free on bail a federal agent succeeded by surreptitious means in listening to incriminating statements made by him.

H We hold that the petitioner was denied the basic protections of that guarantee when there was used again him at his trial evidence of his own incrminating words which federal agents had deliberately eliecited from him after he had been indicted in the absence of his counsel.

Hint 97

The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and Police Interrogations: The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel During Interrogations

Front 98

Brewer v. Williams (1977)

Back 98

F: Detective gave the Christian burial speech. Williams told him where the body was.

H: There can be no serious doubt that detective delibererately and designedly set out to elicit information from Willimas just as surely and perhaps more effectively than if head fomrally interrogated him.

Hint 98

The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and Police Interrogations: The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel During Interrogations

Front 99

Texas v. Cobb (2001)

Back 99

H: The sixth amendment right to counsel is offense specific.

F: Officer question respondent about burgalary. He denied involvement. WHile uner arrest for an unrelated offese 6 months later respondent again was questioned. Gave a statement confessing to the burglarly but denied involvement related to the offenses. Respondent was indicted and an attorney was appointed to represent him on the charge.

Hint 99

The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and Police Interrogations: The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Is Offense Specific

Front 100

Michigan v. Jackson (1986)

Back 100

H: Written waivers are insufficient to justify police initiated interrogations after the request for counsel in sixth amendment analysis

H: Edwards is grounded in the understanding that the assertion of the right to counsel is a significant event and that additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel

Hint 100

The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and Police Interrogations: Waivers

Front 101

United States v. Henry (1980)

Back 101

F: government informant was in custody with Henry and Hnery made incriminating statements to him.

H: The question here is whether under the facts of this case a Government agent deliberately elicited incriminating statements from Henry within the meaning of Massiah.

H: THree factors are important. First Nichols was acting under instructions as a paid informant form the government. Second nichols was ostensibly no more than a fellow inmate of Henry and third Henry was in custody and under indictment at the time he was engaged in conversation by Nichols.

H: By intentionally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel the fovernment violated Henry's Sixth Amendment right to counsel

Hint 101

The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and Police Interrogations: What is Impermissible Police Eliciting of Statements?

Front 102

Kuhlmann v. Wilson. (1986)

Back 102

F: Respondent made statements to his cellmate who was a police informant. Informant never asked any questions. He just passively listened.

H. Not a violation of the sixth amendment when cellmate informant does nothing to elicit the statements from the suspect.

Hint 102

The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and Police Interrogations: What is Impermissible Police Eliciting of Statements

Front 103

United States v. Wade (1967)

Back 103

Question: whether courtroom identifications of an accused at trial are to be excluded from evidence because the accused was exhibited to the witnesses before tail at a post indictment lineup conducted for identifaction purposes without notice to and in the absence of accuseds appointed counsel

Fact
Defendant was arrested for a bank robbery and after counsel was already assigned to him he was put in a lineup without his counsel being notified.

H: Being put in a lineup didn't violate his privilege against self incrimination

H: The Accused is guaranteed that ne need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial

H: Eleciting of Identification Evidenceis riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factor which might seriously derogate form a fair trial

H:lineups or suspects alone both have obvious risk of suggestion

hard to reconstruct a lineup at trial

H: Wade eas entitled to counsel absent as intelligent waiver

question open whether substitute counsel might suffice

applied the wong sun test"the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint"

vacate the conviction pending a hearing to determine whether the in-court identifications had an independent source

Hint 103

The Right to Counsel: The Right to Counsel In Lineups

Front 104

Illinois v. Kirby(1972)

Back 104

F:Identification of robbery suspect after he wad arrested but not indicted. No lawyer was present nor had they had been advised of any right to counsel. Identification was done in a room. Just the two suspects no others.

while members of the Court have differed as to existence of the right to counsel in the contexts of some of the above case, all those cases have involved points of time at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings

h: we decline to import into a routine police investigation an absolute constitutional guarantee hirstrically and ratiionally applicable only after the onset of formal prosecutorial proceedings.

H: due process clause still applicable to an unnecessarily suggestive lineup

Hint 104

The Right to Counsel: Limits on the Right to Counsel in Identification Procedures

Front 105

United States v. Ash

Back 105

Q: Whether the sixth amendment grants an accused the right to have counsel present whenever the government conducts a post-indictment photographic display containing a picture of the accused, for the prupose of allowing a witness to attempt an identification of the offender.

F: Photo Lineup done bfore Ash was in custody or charged. Photo Lineup done again after ash was indicted before his trial

H: the dangers of mistaken identification mentioned in wade are not applicable in the context of photo identifications.

If accurate reconstruction is possible the risks inherent in any confrontation but the opportunity to cure defects at trial causes the confrontation to cease to be crticial.

R; Since the accused himself is not present at the time of the photographic display and asserts no right to be present no possibility arises that the accused might be misled by his lack of familiarity with the law or over-powered by his professional adversary

if the ethical safegards of the prosecutor fails review remains available under due process standards

h sizth amendment does not grant th eright to counsel at photographic displays conducted by the Government for the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an identification of the offender

Hint 105

The Right to Counsel: Limits on the Right to Counsel in Identification Procedures

Front 106

Foster v. California (1969)

Back 106

q: whether the conduct of the police lineup resulted in a violation of petitioner's constitutional rights.

f:robber brought in day after murder. threemen in the lineup. petitioner and two men six inches shorted than him. could not positively identify him. accuser was brought into a room to speak one on one with petitioner but was still unsure wether he was one of the robbers. Second lineup went down a week to 10 days later. Petitioner was the only person in the second lineup who had appeared in the first. This time accuser was convinced petitioner was the man.

test= totality of the circumstances approach used in stovall

f: this case presents a compelling example of unfair lineup procedures

"in effect the police repeatedly said to the witness this is the man.

"procedure so undermined the reliability of the eyewitness identification as to violate due process"

only case in which the suprmem court has found that an identification procedure violates due process.

Hint 106

Due Process Protection for identification Procedures: Unnecessarily Suggestive Identification Procedures Violate Due Process

Front 107

Simmons v. United States

Back 107

f:bank tellers were shown photos of just simmons because he was identified through identififcation of the car

q: whther the circumstances of the identification procedure were so undyly prejecidicia that they fatally tainted the conviction

"depite the hazards of initial identification by photograph this procedure has been used widely and effectively in criminal law enforcement

h: each xase must be considred on its own facts

HL convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on the ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive at to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification

r: it is not suggested that it was unncessary for the FBI to resort to photogrpahic identification in this instance. serious felony with perpetrators still at large.
r:essential for the fbi agents swiftly to determine whether they were on the right track. not less compelling then stovall
r: little chance for misidentification in these circumstances. afternoon well lighted. no masks. witnesses saw him to five minutes. shown photo only a day later while the memory was still fresh. witness alone when he or she saw the photographs. no other evidence that fbi agents suggested which persons in the pictures were under suspicion. none identified andrews who was also prominent in the photographs. confirmed by all five witnesses at trial. no doubts by the witnesses.

Hint 107

Due Process Protection for Identification Procedures: Limits on the Ability of Courts to Find That Identification Procedures Violate Due Process

Front 108

Neil v. Biggers

Back 108

f: rape victim gave only a very general description intially. on several occasions over the course of the next seven months she viewed suspects in her home or at the police station: some in lineups and others in showups. Police couldnt find a suitable lineup for the respondent so they conducted a showup instead where two detectives walked the respondent past the victim and instructed him to say shut up or ill kill you.

r: primary evil to be avoided is a very substantail likelihood of irreparable misidentification.

likelihood of misidentification which violates a defendant's right to due process.

q: whether under the totality of the circumstances the identification was reliable eben though the confrontation procedure was suggestive.

H; factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include: the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, time between crime and view

f: district court's conclusions on the critical facts are unsupported by the record and clearly erroneious

r: her record for reliability was a good one.

Hint 108

Due Process Protection for Identification Procedures: Limits on the Ability of Courts to Find That Identification Procedures Violate Due Process

Front 109

Manson v. Brathwaite(1977)

Back 109

q: whether the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment compels the exclusion in a state criminal trial, apart from any consideration of reliability, of pretrial identification evidence obtained by a police procedure that was both suggestive and unnecessary.

f: narcotics officer identified a man he bought drugs from because another police officer recognized the suspect by the description and put a photograph of the suspect on the original officers desk for him to identify

officer identified him when he was along

glover identified him in court and from the photo.

sole evidence linking respondent to crime was police officer identfication

h: two part inquiry. 1first inquiry qwas whether the police used an impermissibly suggestive procedure in obtaining the out of court identification.2 if so under all the circumstances, that suggestive procedure gave rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification

factors to be taken into account: 1. concern that jury not hear eyewitness testimony unless that evidence has aspects of reliability 2. deterrence 3. administration of justice

reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony for both pre and post stovall confrontations

Hint 109

Due Process Protection for Identification Procedures: Limits on the Ability of Courts to Find That Identification Procedures Violate Due Process

Front 110

gilbert v. california

Back 110

per se exclusionary rule for testimony that that is the driect result of illegal lineup: one that doesn't include notification to counsel. Different from an independent source allowed for in court identification if it can be proven that the in court identification was in fact independent

Front 111

stovall v. denno (1967)

Back 111

h: unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures violate due process

f: negro man was brought to victims beside at the hospital for identification without giving him time for counsel

no other people in the room

H: wade and gilbert do not apply retroactively

q: whether in any event the confrontation conducted in this case was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that he was denied due process of law

h: a claimed violation of due process of law in the conduct of a confrontation depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding it

f:showing of stovall to mrs behrendt in an immediate hospital confrontation was imperative

r: she was the only person who grant his freedom. No one knew how long she was going to live. police followed the only feasible procedure considering the victim was confined to the hospital

Hint 111

due process protection for identification procedures: unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures violates due process

Front 112

Fare v. Michael C. (1979)

Back 112

H:totality of the cicrumstances approach is adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver even when interrogation of juveniles is involved

Hint 112

fifth amendment limits on in custodial interrogation:waiver

Front 113

colorado v. connely

Back 113

miranda protects defendants from government coercion but goes no further than that

Hint 113

ifth amendment limits on in custodial interrogation:waiver

Front 114

moran v. burbine (1986)

Back 114

H:there can still be a knowing and voluntary waiver if police withhold from a suspect the information an attorney sought to consult with him

f: suspect in a murder case waived his miranda rights including his right to counsel and confessed. suspects sister hired an attorny who telephoned the police station and was told that no interrogation would occur until the next day.

h: events occuring outside the presence of the suspect and entriely unknown to him can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right

Hint 114

fifth amendment limits on in custodial interrogation:waiver

Front 115

spring v. colorado (1987)

Back 115

h:police had no duty to infrom a supect of the nature of the crime for which he or she is under suspicion

Hint 115

fifth amendment limits on in custodial interrogation:waiver

Front 116

Fare v Michael C (

Back 116

H:asking to talk to probation officer is not a lawyer.

F: Minor was looking for help.

Front 117

Moran v Burbine (1986)

Back 117

There can still be a waiver if police withold from suspect the information that an attorney sought to consult with him.

Front 118

dow chemical v. united states (1986)

Back 118

HL the taking of aerial photographs of an industrial plant complex from navigable airspace is not a search prohobited by the fourth amendmenteven if there were elaborate security measures

Hint 118

what is a search: aerial surveillance

Front 119

united states v. white (1971)

Back 119

q: whether there was a search when a government informer carrying a a radio transmitter engaged in a coversation with a suspect.

H:listening to this conversation by another agent in possession of a radio receiver was not search

H: if the conduct and revelations of an agent operating without electronic equipment do not invade the defendant's constitutionally justifiable expectations of privacy neither does a simultaneious recording of the same conversation made by the agent or by others from transmission recieved from the agent

Hint 119

what is a search: public behavior

Front 120

cal bankers assn. v. schultz (1974)

Back 120

involved the bank secrecy act which required that banks file reports with the federal government of certain types of transaction.

H:FoA challenge was rejected by the Court on the grounds that people have no reasonable expectation of privacy as to this information because it is known by others, the banks that process the transactions.

Hint 120

what is a search: public behavior

Front 121

united states v place (1983)

Back 121

H: canine sniff of closed luggage is not a search.

H: we have affirmed that a person possesses a privacy interest in the contents of personal luggage that is protected by the FoA.

H: A canine sniff by a well-trained narcotics detection dow does not require opening the luggage it does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden ffrom public view. The manner in which information is obtained through this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a typical search. Sniff only tell about the absence of presence of narcotics a contraband item.

Hint 121

what is a search. Use of Dogs to sniff for contraband.

Front 122

Aguilar v Texas (1964) Spinelli v. Texas.

Back 122

First: Was the informant credible was it likely that he or she was telling the truth.

Second: Was the informant reliable? Was it likely that the informant had knowledge.?

Hint 122

Two part test for probable cause

Front 123

devenpeck v. alford (2004)

Back 123

f: alford was arrested for recording without permission a conversation with the police office who stopped him for allegedly impersonating a proabable cause.

H: court held that the arrest did not violate the FoA because there was probable cause that alford violated other state laws

H: subjective intent of the arresting officer is simply no basis for invalidating an arrest

Hint 123

what is the standard for probable cause.

Front 124

united states v. grubbs(2006)

Back 124

F;federal law enforcement officers obtained a seach warrant for respondent's housr on the basis of an affidavit explaining that the warrant would be executed only after a controlled deliver of contraband to that location

H: anticipatory warrants are, therefore no different in principle from ordinary warrants.

H: they were the magistrate to determine that it is (1) now probable that (2) contraband evidence of a crim will be on the described premises (3) when the warrant is executed.

H: where the anticipatory warrant places a condition other than the passage of time upon its execution, the first of these determinations foes not merely to what will probably be found if the condition is met.

H: for a conditioned anticpatory warrant to comp;y with the FAs requirement of porbable cause, two prerequisites of probability must be satisfied. it must be true not only that if the tirggering condition occurs there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place but also that there is probable cause to believe the triggering condition will occur.

Hint 124

the warrant requirements: anticipatory warrants

Front 125

ybarra v. illinois (1979)

Back 125

H:a person who happens to be present in the premises that are subject to a search cannot be searched just by viture of being

H: a search must be supported by probable cause partixularized with respect to that person

Hint 125

the warrant requirement: who may be searched

Front 126

Michigan v. Summers (1981)

Back 126

H: when there is a search of a residence those present at the time of the search may be detained. Serves the purpose of preventing flight by the individual in case incriminating evidence if found, minimizing the risk of harm to the police and helping the police complete the search in the event that questions arise.

Hint 126

warrant requirment: detaining those present

Front 127

united states v banks (2004)

Back 127

the court held that the poice did not violate the FoA when they waited only 15-20 seconds if they had reason to believe that waiting longer would provide the opportunity for the suspects to destroy contraband.

Hint 127

knock and announce.

Front 128

Hudson v. Michigan (2004)

Back 128

H: the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence gained after police violate the knock and announce requirement

Hint 128

knock and announce

Front 129

united states v. robinson (1973)

Back 129

H: the police may search a person incident to arrest regardless of the crime that led to the arrest.

H:a search incident to arrest is permissible even if there is no reason to believe that the individual has wepons.

Hint 129

exceptions to warrant requirement: incident to lawful arrest.

Front 130

arizona v. hicks (1987)

Back 130

f: police entered an apartment pursuant to warrant and saw stereo equipment that they thought might be stolen merchandise. an officer moved the equipment, found a product identification number and raioed it into headquarters which is how it was found out that the merchandies was stolen.

H: Court help that the plain view doctrine did not apply here and that moving the stereo equipment was a serach.

H:merely inspecting those parts of the turntable that came into view during the latter search would not have constituted an independent search because it would have produced no additional invasion of respondent's privacy interests. but taking action unrelated to the objectives of the authorized the intrusion which exposed to view concealed portions of the aprtment or its contents did produce a new invasion of rspondent's privacy unjustified by the exigent circumstance that validated the entry.

H: no reason is apparent why an object should routinely be seizable on lesser druing an unrelated search than would search and seizure than would have been needed to obtain a warrant for that same object if it had been known to be on the premises.

Hint 130

exceptions to the warrant requirement: plain view.

Front 131

Chambers v Maroney(1970)

Back 131

h: even if the automobile had been taken to the police station and thus was not movable the automobile exception still applies

H: for constitutional purposes we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course if reasonable under the FoA

Hint 131

exceptions to the warrant requirement: vehicle searches

Front 132

united states v. di re (1948)

Back 132

H: passengers could not be search without probable cause simply because the automobile was lafully stopped by police

Hint 132

exception to the warrant requirement: vehicle searches

Front 133

whyomin v. houghton (1999)

Back 133

H: police do not biolate the FoA when they search a passenger's belongings inside an automobile that they have probable cause to believe contains contraband.

f: police were searching a vehicle in response to a hypodermic syringe being found in the driver's shirt poclet. driver said he used it to take drugs. Officers serached the car for drugs and found a purse with passengers id in it which she had lied about. Found drug paraphanelia and meth in purse.

H: when there is probable cause to search for contraband in a car it is reasonable for police officers lto examine packages and containers without a showing of individualized probable cause for each one. Passengers personal belonging attach to the car

Hint 133

exception to the warrant requirement: vehicle searches

Front 134

united states v. martinez-fuerte (1976)

Back 134

F; criminal prosecutions for offenses relating to the transportation of illegal Mexican aliends. defendants were arrested at a permanent checkpoint operated by the border control away form the international border with Mexico.

q: whther FoA was violated depends primarily on whether a vehicle may be stopped at a fixed checkpoint for bfrief questioning of its occupants even though there is no reason to believe the particular vehicle contains illegal aliens.

H: they can
H: also the operation of a fixed checkpoint need not be authorized in advance by a judicial warrant

Hint 134

exceptions to the warrant requirement : border corssing.

Front 135

Illinois v. Lidster (2004).

Back 135

f:hit and run accident killed a man and on a bicycle and police setup a checkpoint in the area a week later to try to find the person that did. Mna who approached the checkpoint was drunk and swerved narly hitting one of the officers.

H: the stop's primary law enforcement purpose was not to determine whether a vehicle;s occupants were committing a crime but to ask vehicle occupants as member of the public for their help in providing information about a crime in all likelihood committed by other. Police expected information not apprehend vehicle occupants but the individual responsible.

H: like certain other forms of police activity say crowed control or public safety, an information seeking stop is not the kind of even that involves suspicion or lack of suspicion of the relevant individual.
H: information seeking stops are less likely to provoke anxiety or to prove intrusive.

H: the law ordianrlily permits police to seek the voluntary cooperatoin of memvers of the public in the investigation of a crime.

H: intrustion was minimal and justified by the importance of the investigation

Hint 135

Exceptions to the warrant requirement: checkpoints

Front 136

United States v Drayton (2003)

Back 136

F officers boarded buss and asked passengers about their travel plans. Officer stood next to or stat next each passernger with whom he spoke. Respondents were approached by officer and asked to check bag. Respondent replied go agead. Officer noticed that they were both wearing baggy pants and heavy coats despite the hot weather. Patted down borown and found drugs on him.

H it was a cooperative search. there was no application of force no brandishing of weapons, no blocking of exits, no threat, no command, not even an authoritative tone of voice. The fact that an encounter takes place on a bus does not on its own transform standard police questioning of citizens into an illegal seizure.

Hint 136

Exceptions to the warrant requirement: consent

Front 137

United States v. Matlock(1974)

Back 137

H: One occupant of a residence may give consent if the other is not present

Hint 137

Exceptions to the warrant requirement: consent

Front 138

Skinner v. Railway Executives(1989)

Back 138

H: Court upheld FRA regus requiring drug testing of railroad workers involved in accident.

H: Court stessed the special needs. the need to ensure the saftery of the traveling public.

H: the privacy expectations of the employees were diminished by their working in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure saftty.

H: there was no discretion so threre was nothing for a neutral magistrate to evaluate.

Hint 138

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirment: Special Needs: Drug Testing

Front 139

National Treasury Employees Uniion v. Von Raab (1989)

Back 139

H: court upheld the US Custom service prgroma requiring drug testhing through urin for customs worker upon their transfer or promotion to postions having a direct involvement in drug interidiction or firearms but stuck it down for handling classified document.

H: court stressed the special need to ensure that those hadnling weapons or involved in drug interdiction thmselves be free of drugs.

Hint 139

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirment: Special Needs: Drug Testing

Front 140

Chandler v. Miller (1977)

Back 140

H Court struck down a statue reuing that canidates for state office pass a drug test.

H: court stressed that georgia asserts no evidence of a drug problem among the states elected officials those officals do not typically perform high risk safety sensitive takes. Need revealed is symbolic not specail

Hint 140

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirment: Special Needs: Drug Testing

Front 141

NJ v TLO (1985)

Back 141

H: school officials could search a student's purse based on reasonable supicion

H: court balanced the expectation of privacy of students in schools and the need for schools to maintain discipline and order.

Hint 141

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirment: Special Needs: Drug Testing

Front 142

Florida v Bostick (1991)

Back 142

q: court considered whether there was a seizure when police boarded a bus and asked passengers for permission to search their luggage.

H: the court said the test was not whether a reasonable person in his situation would have felt free to leave but whether a person would feel free to decline the officers requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.

Hint 142

Seizures and Arrests: when is a person seized

Front 143

Brendlin v. California (2007)

Back 143

H: passengers are seized when they are riding in a car stopped by police officer

Hint 143

Seizures and Arrests: when is a person seized

Front 144

dunaway v. new york (1979)

Back 144

H: detention for custodial interrogation regardless of its label intrudes so severely on interest protected by the FoA as necessarily to the traditional safeguards against illegal arrest.

Hint 144

stop and frisk: the distinction between stops and arrests.

Front 145

Florida v Royer (1983)

Back 145

H: taking a suspect from the public area of an airport into a small room constituted an arrest

H: an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop

H: Hte investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably abailable to verify or dispel the officer's supicion in a short period of time.

H: it is the states buren to demonstrate that the seizure was sufficently limited in scope and time to satisfy the conditions of an invetigative seizure.

Hint 145

stop and frisk: the distinction between stops and arrests.

Front 146

Hayes V. Florida (1985)

Back 146

H taking a supect to the police station house for fingerprinting was an arrest and had to be based upon probable cause.

Hint 146

stop and frisk: the distinction between stops and arrests.

Front 147

United States b Place (1983)

Back 147

Hdetaining a persons luggage for 90 minutes was a seizure.

Hint 147

stop and frisk: the distinction between stops and arrests.

Front 148

US v. Sharpe (1984)

Back 148

F police officer detained the supects between 30 and 40 minutes while waiting for the arrival of DEA.

H nto a stop and that there is no hard and fast time time limit.

H htere was no delay unncessary to the legitimate investigation of the law enforcement officers.

Front 149

Michigan v Long (1983)

Back 149

H: court said it was permisibble for the police to inspect the areas of the car form which supect could obtain a weapon after the car was stopped.

Hint 149

stop and frisk: the distinction between stops and arrests.

Front 150

Michigan v Buie (1990)

Back 150

H sweep for persos may extend only to a cursory inspection of those places where a person may be found.

Hint 150

stop and frisk: the distinction between stops and arrests.

Front 151

Berger v United States (1967)

Back 151

H: New York's electronix eavesdropping statute statute lacks particularity of place to be searched and person to be seized.

H: It lays down no requirmentment for particularity in warrant as to what specific crime has been or is being comitted nor the place to be searched or the persons or things to be seized as specifically required by the FoA.

H: By its very nature eavesdropping involves an intrusion on privacy that is broad in scope.

H: authorization of eavesdropping in a two month period is the equivalent of a series of intrusions searches and seizures pursuant to a single showing of probable cause.

H: the original basis on which the eavesdrop order was initially issued also form the bais of the renewal thus we believe insufficient without a showing of present probable cause for the coninuance of the eavesdrop.

H: Also no termination date on the eavesdrop once the conversation sought is seiazed.

H: No requirements for notice.

Hint 151

Searches and Seizures: Electronic Surveillance: Is Electronic Eavesdropping a search?

Front 152

18 USC 1825

Back 152

no information gained in violation of state and no evidence drived as a result may be admitted in any cour proceeding.

The application for a court a warrant must state with particularlity the basis for the probable cause, a description of the type of communications sought to be intercepted, the identity of the person whose communications are to be intercepted, whether other investigative techniques have been used, and a statement of the period of time during which interception will occur

Court may issue an order auth interception if it finds (1) prb cause to for an enumerated offence (2) prob cause to believe communications concerning the offense will be obtained through intercept (3) normal investigative procedures have been tired and failed.)

H: whose communications, by what agency and for what period time.

H: usually what phone number but now allows roving wiretaps.

H: not for any period longer than to achieve objectives or in any event longer than 30 days. Extensions upon apps demonst necesssity.

H: minimization required.

interception without a court order not to exceed 48 hours in emergency situations: immediate danger of death or serious injury (2) conspiracy on national secutity (3) conspiracy of organized crime. there must also be grouns on which an order can be entered.

requires notification within 90 days to the person whose communications were interecepted.

Hint 152

wiretapping statute

Front 153

50 USC 1801

Back 153

applies if singnificant purpose of the interception is the gathering of foeign intelligence.

to obtain a warrant need not show show probable cause rather the the government must show that the target of the electoronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.

never required to notify the target if AG determines that it is in ther interests of national security to keep this secret.

Patriot Act allowed roving wiretaps and sharing of information for intelligence purposes. Need not be for cirmianl procescitoin.

Hint 153

FISA

Front 154

Rawlings v Kentucky (1980)

Back 154

H: man could not raise the exclusionary rule when contraband belonging to him was found inside a woman's purse when he and the woman were visiting premises that were searched.

H: man had no reasonable expectation of privacy.

Hint 154

who can object to the introduction of evidence and raise the exclusionary rule

Front 155

Minnesota v. Carter (1998)

Back 155

F: rspondents and the lesse of an apartment were sitting in one of its rooms bagging cocaine. Police officer observed them through a drawn window blind. officer looked through a gap in a closed blind. Two men left the building and police pulled them over. Police observed a black zippered pouch and a handgun. Police then searched the aprment. Found baggines and cocain residue. Police learned that carter and johns lived in chicago and had come to the apartment for the sole purpose of packaging cocaine.

H: Minnesota v Olson we decided that an overnight guest in a house had the sort of expectation of privacy that the FoA protects.

H: an overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the FoA but one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not.

H: property for commercial pusposes is treated different for fourth amendment purposes from residential property.

H: the purely commercial nature of the transaction engaged in here, the relatively short period of time on the premises and the lack of any previous connection vetween the respondents and the householder all lead us to conclude taht respondents situation is closer to that of one simply permitted on the premises.

H: No need to decide whether it was a search

Hint 155

Who can object to the introduction of evidence and raise the rule.

Front 156

wong sun v US (1963)

Back 156

f: police illegally broke into won sun's laundry and adjacent apartment. Police handcuffed him and help him at gunpoint. He mad incriminating statemetn was arrested charged and release. He was subsequently question by an agent who read him his wights. Wong again gave incriminating statements

H: First confession was excluded as the fruits of his illegal arrest.
H: Second confession was admissible because the connection with the earlier illegal police activity became so attenuated as to disipate the taint.

Hint 156

Inadequate casual connection: attenuation of the taint.

Front 157

massachusetts v. sheppard (1984)

Back 157

f: officer used a preprinted warrant form which listed controlled substances as the item to be seized. Judge was supposed to make changes but never did.

H: H there was an objectively reasonably belief that the warrant was acceptable.

Hint 157

exceptions to the exclusionary rule: good faith

Front 158

United States v Matlock (1974)

Back 158

H:Judges can rely on heresay evidence at suppression hearing.

Hint 158

Suppression Hearings

Front 159

Bram v. United States (1897)

Back 159

H:a confession in order to be admissible must be free and voluntary that is must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight nor by the exertion of any imporper influence.

Hint 159

Due process and the requirements for voluntariness.

Front 160

zurcher v sanford daily (1978)

Back 160

valid search warrants may be issued to search any property, whether or not occupied by a third party where there is probable cause to believe that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of a crime will found.

Hint 160

What are the requirement's in executing a warran?

Front 161

Michigan v Tucker (1974)

Back 161

Prosecution could use the identity of the witness it learned from an interrogation that was not properly warned.

Hint 161

What are the consequences of a Miranda violation

Front 162

Patterson v Illinois (1988)

Back 162

H: Massiah does not apply to a defendant who is not represented by counsel and has never requested counsel

Hint 162

Waivers of SIxth Amendment right to counsel.