Cpe Of Ldcs

Front 1

Przeworski 1991

Back 1

Why certain systems fail. Economic reforms success depend on political support. If young dems are to survive, they will need strong economic growth. Also speaks of tradeoffs to pursuiing both at the same time. Ex. participation versus reforms

Front 2

Garland and Biglaiser 2009

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DO institutions--electoral rules--influence FDI? Candidate centered electoral systems increase access to FDI. As district magnitude increases, FDI inflows expected to increase as well.

Front 3

Person and Tabellini 2006

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Does democracy promote development? Argue yes but positive effects depend on details of democratic reform. Timing matters. PRes v parl matters.

Front 4

Glaeser et al 2004

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Do political institutions or high human capital lead to institutional improvements? Find that institutional measures are poor, and evidence for high human capital is significant. Poor states get out of poverty through good policies. And can be pursued by dictators or democrats. Secure property rights.

Front 5

Przeworski and Limongi 1993

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Does democracy foster or hinder growth? Find little evidence that it does, but suggest it must. We know property rights matter, but not who secures them better. Different paths--democracy and short term

Front 6

Barro 1996

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Effect of democracy on growth should be there, but hard to detect. Suggest a U curve

Front 7

Ross 1999

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mainly a review of arguments on resource curse. on economic side much of the effect may be through price instability and declining terms of trade. but we dont know much about the political effects

Front 8

Sachs and Warner 2001

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test for spuriousness of geographic arguments. say resource curse not drivent by omitted geog vars, instead resource abundant states tend to be hiugh price economies and because of this they dont diversify and miss out on export-led growth

Front 9

Robinson, Torvik and Verdier 2006

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When are abundant natural resources a curse? Political incentives generated by resources are key. Instiuttions mediate incentives as well--need accountability, etc.

Front 10

Mehlun, MOene and Torvik 2006

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Why is there a high level of variance in growth rates of natural resource? institutions are key: grabber versus producer friendly

Front 11

Lerner 1954

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modernization theory. inertia, and economic, political, cultural factors interact. case of Turkey

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Deutch 1961

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social mobilization and political development. migration, occupational changes, relationsal changes, changes in institutions, etc all happen together. change from local/traditional to national

Front 13

Rostow 1956

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big push for development--happens consistently over a few years, will be sustainable

Front 14

Bates 1981

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why African agriculture in trouble and why harmful policies are adopted. past work focuses too much on geography adn not enough on domestic politics. urban/rural divides matter, policies less harsh if large # of farms. lobbyuing and significance of interests in pushing for policy

Front 15

Van de Walle 2001

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economic problems of Africa...why? can explain African failures by looking at how African political leaders have priviledged maintaining longevity of their rules and economic rents at the expense of populations

Front 16

Keefer and Khemani 2005

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REview political market failures. occur for 3 reasons:
1. info problems make it hard for voters to assign blame
2. politicians promises lack credible commitments
3. social polarization caused relative gains to also be polarized

-decentralization and free press can limit the market distortions studied here

Front 17

Huntington 1968

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economic development and political liberalization may be separate processes. focuses on degree and stability of government rather than type of government and economic growth. problems arise when liberalization/social cahnges occur too rapidly and institutions cant reinforce them. this is when instability happens.

Front 18

Ross 2005

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Is democracy good for the poor? challenges the assumptions that it is, existing models have data flaws. rather, finds democracy has no effect once the necessary controls are in place--global trends, etc

Front 19

Keefer 2009

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very poor democracies and very poor autocracies have littledifference in poilicy outcomes due to lack of capabiities

Front 20

Bloom and Sachs 1998

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What best explains Africa's poverty? Gepography. Poliitcs matter, but should be considered in light of the ways in which geography mediate them.

Front 21

Holzner 2010

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develops a political and institutional explanation for participation and test it in MExico. Here porr have always participated less, but even worse after market reforms. Why? economically costly to do so. *critique* rich participation also declined

Front 22

Baker 2009

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challenges idea that market reforms unpopular and suggests that they arent. turned voters from laborers to consumers. also, is sector specific.

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Brown and Hunter 1994

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Democracies spend more on primary education

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Brown and Hunter 1999

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Democracies more likely to increase their aggregate social spending than authoritarians. Esp in poor countries

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Brown 1999

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Relationship between democracy and human capital accumulation by examining link betw reg type and school enrollment. Democracies higher.

Front 26

Avelino, Brown and Hunter 2005

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How democracies and economic integration impact social spending.

Front 27

Stasavage 2005

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Shift to multiparty elections in Africa has increase social spending

Front 28

Frieden 1991

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Why absence of good, stable government in LA? Look at making of economic policies by leaders and argues that economic performance related to economic policies. material interests are strong where economic interests lead governments to negatively affect national politiucs.

Front 29

Birdsall and Nellis 2003

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How does privatization in e eurpe and lat been fair? professionals say it has been good, publics dont. hastn been as negative as thought. better to undertake reforms slowly and not focus on efficiency right away

Front 30

Frye 2010

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Does democracy prmoote creation of market economies and good state instiuttions? argues somewhat against Hellman by saying that poliarization in democracies can slow reforms. story of credible commitments

Front 31

Hellman 1998

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market reforms in post communist. reforms often slowed by short term winners. top down reform exacerbates this. states who reformed politically also saw deepest market reforsm

Front 32

Haggard and Kaufman 2008

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try to explain factors resulting in divergent welfare policies in developing world. both within and across region variation. argue need to focus on economic and fiscal restraints facing governments and political legacy of former social spending. changes in current spending predicted by retraints + past policy

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Kurtz 2004

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argues of problems of market liberalization but tests wrong period

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Svensson 2005

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solid predictors of corruption inc lude developing and closed economies, french colonial heritage, majority catholic states, low freedom of press.

to reduce corruption:
-support for higher wages for bureaucrats and competition between business and government--effect ambiguous
-increasing government regulation may increase corruption

Front 35

Mauro 1995

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How does corruption and bureaucratic qualiuty affect growth? bivaritalye it is significant, but at whole level, unclear

Front 36

Campos, Lien,a nd Pradham 1999

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both degree and type of corruption can harm investments. better if it is predictable. case of east asia.