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69 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
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President gets less deference of exercise of foreign affairs power when applied domestically Prez: • No broad emergency powers unless they are part of P’s constitutional powers – probably limited to commander in chief powers Includes Jackson’s Tripartite Approach |
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U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright
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P has some legislative powers derived from his authority as sole organ of fed in regards to foreign nations
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Dames & Moore v. Regan
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P gets greater deference in times of emergency in which domestic issues are affected close but not authorizing action by C is not prohibition = implicit authorization |
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Medellin
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Int’l laws not authorized by C do not fall under P’s “Take Care” powers, so P cannot convert int’l into domestic law
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Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
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P cannot abridge or suspend habeas corpus with authorization from C
Wartime powers limitations • Not a blank check |
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Hamdan |
P cannot establish his own tribunals to try those accused of war
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Boumedienne
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C cannot provide a substitute to habeas corpus w/o meaningful review of facts is unconstitutional suspension of habeas corpus under Art 1 § 9
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INS v. Chadha
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• C can’t delegate legislative power to part of itself bc it bypasses const. leg. procedure
• C cannot have a check on power it has delegated – legislative veto? |
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Myers |
President must be free to fire at will (purely executive officers)
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Humphrey's |
Congress may set terms of office and require that firing before the term ends only for specific cause. (for INDEPENDENT agencies)
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Bowsher v. Synar
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• C can’t delegate exec power to one of its agents
Congress may not be in control of removal of officers who exercise substantial executive powers |
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United States v. Nixon
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• Can’t impair Article III functions of court in criminal proceedings – need for facts
• No constitutional basis for presidential privilege of confidentiality • Could exist in times of emergency/nat’l security (NOT Watergate) • Province of court, not political question, to decide P’s claims of privilege |
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Marbury v. Madison
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• Court established judicial review for itself over constitutionality of executive & legislative acts, although not explicitly enumerated in const.
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Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
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• Congress may not provide for suits for persons who do not meet the standing requirement
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Massachusetts v. EPA
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• Court grants special interest/status to state for standing – lower standards
o Legal action taken by a state to require federal enforcement of a statute can meet standing requirements, as long as it has a concrete injury & some showing that the regulation it seeks will make even a small difference |
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Clapper
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"Certainly impending" standard for injury-in-fact requirement |
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Hollingsworth v. Perry
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o CA gov’t didn’t want to defend Prop 8 when it was struck down & the CA SC authorized the private citizens who put Prop 8 on the ballot to bring the appeal The state cannot create standing & the private citizens do not pass Art III standing requirements just because they have ideological interest in the law being upheld.
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Baker v. Carr
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“Formulations” for finding a political question
1. Textually demonstrable commitment to another branch 2. Lack of judicially manageable standards 3. Impossibility of avoiding a policy determination 4. Lack of respect to coordinate branch 5. Unusual need for adhering to a past political decision 6. Embarrassment of nation not speaking with one voice |
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Gibbons v. Ogden
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• C has power to regulate intrastate in a state as long as it as interstate “intercourse
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Darby |
C can regulate intrastate activity if it has an effect on IC even if it’s local concerns like fair labor conditions – as long as the activity being regulated is moving interstate
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Wickard v. Filburn |
C can regulate intrastate activity if it has effect on IC in the aggregate
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Katzenbach v. McClung |
An activity being regulated doesn’t even have to relate to commerce – as long as there is rational basis between regulated activity & IC
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Lopez |
Look at nature of regulated activity to see how connected it is to commerce – can’t be tenuous & inference on inference
Congress CAN: o 1) Regulate the use of interstate channels (shipment of goods) o 2) Protection of instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons/things, even if threat may come from intrastate activities (railroads; highways) o 3) Regulate activities w/ substantial relation to interstate commerce |
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Morrison |
Must be commercial activity, not just affect commercial activity |
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Gonzales v. Raich |
o Regulation of intrastate activity can be essential to regulation of IC even if activity does not “substantially affect” IC
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Sibelius |
C cannot regulate commercial inactivity, only activity that already exists |
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NY v. US |
Commandeering state legislature violates 10A |
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Printz |
Commandeering state executive branch violates 10A |
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Dole |
Scope of spending power test
• 1) Must be in pursuit of general welfareo Defer to Congress for this – not much of a constraint o Can’t violate another constitutional provision • 2) Conditions must be unambiguous • 3) Must be related to federal interest in particular nat’l projects/programs o Muddy requirement • 4) Not coerciveo Do states have meaningful option of walking away or is it a gun to the head? o Description of condition can make it sound more/less coercive |
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City of Boerne |
o There must be congruence and proportionality between injury prevented/remedied and means to achieve it
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Shelby County |
Need to reassess C and P link as time passes – means of preclearance of VRA no longer C&P to const. violation as it was in 1965
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Lochner and Adkins |
Laissez-faire court struck down laws that protected stuff |
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Griswold |
Penumbra of privacy = BoR Concurrence more important to development of privacy rights - o Rejects penumbras & rests liberties in 14A o Using incorporation methodology – looking to “traditions and collective conscience of our people” |
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Eisenstadt v. Baird
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Asserts individual broad control over reproductive right including active right to procreate (not just to refrain from it) - “decision whether to bear or beget a child”
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Slaughter-House Cases
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14A • Did not transfer privileges & immunities from Art. IV §2 to the fed • It only accords rights from an individual’s relationship w/ the fed such as travel, high seas, etc that are already protected rights prior to the case |
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West Coast Hotel |
Starts rational basis line of cases (none rule UC until 1995) and overturns Lochner and Adkins |
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Roe v. Wade |
Trimester scheme Abortion = fundamental right |
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Casey |
Rejects trimester scheme Introduces "undue burden" standard |
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Moore v. City of East Cleveland
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14A DPC protects families, including non-nuclear members |
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Zablocki v. Redhail
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Right to marry is fundamental
• A direct and substantial burden on right to marriage requires narrowly tailored means (and maybe compelling state interest) |
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Bowers |
no fundamental right to homosexual sodomy
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Lawerence |
doesn’t explicitly say right of homosexuals to engage in private conduct is fundamental, but uses abstract ideas that suggest that it is and also heightened level of scrutiny implies more than just regular right
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Cruzan |
• Family members do not have an independent liberty right under the DPC to act as surrogate to make decisions for incompetent person
• Cruzan implies that there is fundamental right to refuse life-support when incompetent, but that can be overcome w/ sufficient state interest in protecting life & ensuring that accurate decision is made on behalf of incompetent |
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Glucksberg |
• No broad right to personal autonomy of ability to control “all important, intimate, and personal decisions” regarding life and death
O'Connor suggests we can eliminate unbearable pain |
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Gonzalez |
• Limiting the means of obtaining an abortion is legal and not an undue burden
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Beazer |
• In the absence of concerns about illegitimate motivation, there needs to only be rational basis. The fit between classification and state objective must be reasonable and not arbitrary
o High cost of achieving better fit can make poor fit reasonable |
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Moreno |
• Classification of unpopular group with no rational relation to gov’t objective fails rational basis
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City of Cleburne and Romer |
• Some groups such as mentally disabled or LGB people may be vulnerable to prejudice even though they are not protected class, so it easier to infer illegitimate motive
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Romer |
• Some groups such as mentally disabled or LGB people may be vulnerable to prejudice even though they are not protected class, so it easier to infer illegitimate motive
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Railway Express Agency
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The means partially serving its ends is okay for RB
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Williamson v. Lee Optical
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RB = could be illogical or bad law; loosening means |
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Gomillion |
• Overwhelming impact creates inference of intent |
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Korematsu |
Classifications based on race must be examined under strict scrutiny
• State must show that its law is necessary to achieve a compelling interest |
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Loving v. Virginia |
• Even if statute is neutral on its face, it invites strict scrutiny if line drawn is racial or state purpose is invidious
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Washington v. Davis
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To activate strict scrutiny on a facially neutral law that disproportionally affects a suspect class, the person challenging a policy needs to show intent to create racial classification
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Yick Wo |
• There can be discriminatory enforcement even if no discriminatory intent by
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Arlington Heights |
• When there are mixed motives, state has to show it would have made the same decision without discriminatory motive
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Adarand |
Anything law that involves race warrants strict scrutiny, not just when a suspect class is being burdened
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Grutter |
• Student body diversity can be a compelling state interest, NOT remedying lingering inequalities
• Program must be narrowly tailored. Race can be a “plus” but not a deciding factor or a quota |
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Fisher |
Race can be a factor, but must be a necessary last resort |
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Reed |
Gender preferences that are arbitrary violate EPC |
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Frontiero |
• Animus is not necessary to trigger greater scrutiny in gender classifications bc of history of “romantic paternalism”
Plurality uses SS |
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Craig v. Boren |
Introduces intermediate scrutiny Classifications can't be based on stereotypes |
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US v. Virginia |
o States must demonstrate an exceedingly persuasive justification for gender-based action Must be genuine, not hypothesized or ad-hoc
No overbroad generalizations about gender differences |
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Nguyen |
benefits women and not men. Women get to naturalize babies easier (based on parental certainty and a close relationship formed “through the act of birth”). Court upholds the law using intermediate scrutiny. Breyer dissent attacks the obvious and says that this might not really be “important”
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Romer v. Evans |
Almost RBWB Animus suspected towards gays Fails RB |
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Windsor |
No IS for gays yet Marriage left to states |
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Standing Requirements |
• 1) Injury in fact
o 1) Concrete and particularized; o 2) Actual or imminent (Not conjectural, hypothetical, speculative) o Invasion of legally-protected interest – happened or about to happen o “Certainly impending” – higher standard from Clapper v. Amnesty • 2) Causal connectiono Injury is “fairly traceable” to D’s challenged actions o Not result of third party action • 3) Redressability o Likely that the requested relief from a court can redress the injury |
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Intermediate scrutiny |
Gov’t policy has to be substantially related to an important gov’t interest
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