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47 Cards in this Set
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Barron v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore |
Facts: - Barron was an owner of a wharf - He filed suit against City officials, seeking compensation for loss of value to his property - City redirected the course of streams that caused sand & dirt to go into his wharf - County court award him $4,500, but an appellate court reverse the decision - Barron appealed, maintaining that the 5th Amendment prohibited the states as well as the gov't from taking private property without just compensation Legal Q: Is the taking of private property without just compensation a violation of the 5th amendment Takings Clause? Court Opinion: - Justice Marshall gave the opinion: - The court refused to incorp. the 5th amendment to the states - Dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction
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Butchers' Benevolent Association v. Crescent City Livestock Landing & Slaughterhouse Co. [The Slaughterhouse Cases] |
Facts: - Louisiana legis. passed an act to clean up the Miss. River - the cause of the pollution and resulting contamination of the city's water supply, was because of the dumping of refuse by many small independent slaughterhouses - LA legis. prohibited all landing and slaughtering of livestock in the city or surrounding parishes except at one large slaughter house for 25 yrs. Legal Questions - Does a state imposed monopoly violate the 14th amendment under the Privileges & Immunities clause, due process clause, equal protection clause? - Does a state policy that singles out one particular company a violation 14th amendment equal protection clause? - Does a state law that compels citizens to do business with one corporation involuntary servitude? Court Opinion: - Justice Miller delivered the opinion - court dismissed all 3 clauses - court failed to incorp. the Bill of Rights to the states |
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Palko v. Connecticut |
Facts: - Palko was found guilty of second-degree murder and was sentence to life in prison - The state appealed the decision - Palko was found guilty of first-degree murder and was sentenced to death - this case was appealed to the Sup. Crt. - Palko contended that the Conn. statute was unconstitutional because the 14th amendment due process clause protects individuals from being tried twice for the same offense Legal Q: - Is trying a defendant for the same offense a violation of the 14th amendment due process clause? Court Opinion: - Justice Cardozo delivered the opinion - Is the kind of double jeopardy to which the statute has subjected hime a hardship so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it? Does it violate those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions? No... - The Court upheld Palko's 2nd conviction |
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Hurtado v. California |
Facts: - Hurtado was found guilty of crime and sentenced to death - a district attorney filed an information charging Hurtado with murder, after it was reviewed by magistrate judge - he appealed to 2 state courts, and then appealed to US Sup. Crt. Legal Q: - Is a state criminal trial based on an information rather than a grand jury indictment a violation of the 5th amendment due process clause at the "state level"? Court Opinion: - Justice Matthews issued the opinion - the court failed to incorporate the 5th amendment due process clause to the "states" - Tried by these principles, we are "unable" to say that preceding by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate, certifying to the probable guilt of the defendant, with the right on his part to the aid of counsel, and to the cross-examination of the witnesses produced for the prosecution, is "not" due process of law - the court upheld the states decision |
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Twining v. New Jersey |
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Certain provisions of the Bill of Rights may apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, if the provisions are necessary for the due process of law. Facts. A New Jersey law provided that a jury may be instructed to view a criminal defendant’s failure to testify as something negative. New Jersey was one of the few states that did not incorporate in its constitution the right against compelled self-incrimination. The Defendant, Twining (Defendant), challenged the law under both the Due Process Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Legal Q: Does the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution make the right against self-incrimination applicable to the States? Court Opinion: Held. No, provisions of the Bill of Rights may apply to the states if they are part of the Due Process of Law. |
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Adamson V. California |
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not a part of the right to a fair trial protected by the Due Process clause of Fourteenth Amendment. Facts. At murder trial, appellant chose the strategy of not taking the stand and subjecting himself to cross-examination regarding former crimes of burglary, larceny and robbery that he had committed. Under a California statute, his attempt to protect himself from impeachment of his veracity nonetheless allowed prosecution to make reference to his refusal to testify, and he was convicted. Appellant argues that the California statute’s allowing opposing counsel to comment on his refusal to testify ran counter to the Fifth Amendment’s ban on a defendant’s compulsion to testify, and that the Fifth Amendment applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Legal Q: Is the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and thus applicable to the states? Court Opinion: Held. No. The court affirms the appellant’s conviction. The court rejected the argument that the Fifth Amendment’s protection versus self-incrimination was made effective by freedom from testimonial compulsion that is a right of national citizenship within the Fourteenth Amendment. They also rejected the idea that protection versus self-incrimination was a personal privilege or immunity secured by the Federal Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment prevents a state from abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, but a state may abridge the privileges and immunities flowing from state citizenship as long as due process is not violated. The decision to not testify did not serve as an admission of any element of the crime. Proof of the commission of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt still remained with the prosecution, thus the federal constitutional due process standard was met. |
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Rochin v. California |
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The police cannot extract evidence from inside of a person’s body by force. Facts. Three officers entered the Appellant’s home and saw two capsules on a nightstand. When they inquired as to who owned the capsules, the Appellant swallowed them. After an unsuccessful attempt to dislodge the capsules from Appellant’s mouth, the officers took the Appellant to a hospital. At the hospital, the Appellant’s stomach was pumped against his will to induce vomiting. Two capsules containing morphine were found within the vomited material. Legal Q: Does the forceable inducing to vomiting by a state agent to coerce a defendant to provide evidence a violation of the 5th Amendment? Court Opinion: Yes.The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) prohibits the use of coerced confessions. There is no distinction between a coerced verbal confession and a coerced physical confession. To hold otherwise would be to sanction police brutality in obtaining physical evidence, while prohibiting police brutality in obtaining a verbal confession. |
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Thompson v. Utah |
Supreme Court set the 1st rule for a jury trial - Supreme Court set the number of jury members to 12 |
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Patton V. United States |
- the Supreme Court allowed a defendant to give up his right to a jury trial - Jury trial is a guaranteed, but not required - trial court must make sure the defendant knows what he is giving up - the judge and prosecutor must agree on the waiver - waiver must be in writing, and then approved by a judge - any fundamental right is in writing |
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Andres V. United States |
- Federal case - Supreme Court held that a defendant in a federal criminal trial has to have an anonymous trial of 12-0 - district attorney could retry the case if the jury is not anonymous - next a new jury would be impaneled (because of a hung jury) - |
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United States v. Jackson |
Facts: The Federal Kidnaping Act provides that interstate kidnapers "shall be punished (1) by death if the kidnaped person has not been liberated unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if the death penalty is not imposed." The District Court dismissed the count of an indictment charging appellees with violating the Act because it makes "the risk of death" the price for asserting the right to trial by jury, and thus "impairs . . . free exercise" of that constitutional right. The Government appealed directly to this Court. Legal Q: Ask Professor Guirguis??? Held: The death penalty clause imposes an impermissible burden upon the exercise of a constitutional right, but that provision is severable from the remainder of the Act and the unconstitutionality of that clause does not require the defeat of the Act as a whole. |
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Duncan V. Louisiana (1968) |
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Because trial by jury in a criminal case is fundamental to the American scheme of justice, the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments secure the right to trial by jury in state criminal prosecutions where a sentence as long as two years may be imposed. Facts. Appellant, Gary Duncan, was charged with a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum of two years in imprisonment and a $300 fine. He sought trial by jury, but since Louisiana’s constitution grants trials only in cases in which capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor may be imposed, his request was denied. Appellant was convicted and sentenced to sixty days in prison and fined $150. Appellant alleged that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments secure the right to trial by jury as long as two years may be imposed. Legal Q: Whether the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments secure the right to trial by jury in state criminal prosecutions where a sentence as long as two years may be imposed? Court Opinion: Held. Yes. Judgment reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Constitution was violated when Appellant’s demand for a jury trial was denied. The Court stated that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by jury in criminal cases was “fundamental to the American scheme of justice,” and that the states were obligated under the Fourteenth Amendment to provide such trials. Thus, a general grant of jury trial for serious offenses is a fundamental right |
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Baldwin v. New York (1970) |
CASE SYNOPSIS Appellant sought review of a ruling of the Court of Appeals of New York, which affirmed appellant's conviction for "jostling," and rejected his argument that N.Y. City Crim. Ct. Act § 40 violated his right to a jury trial under U.S. Constitutional amends. VI and XIV. * On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction, without reaching a majority as to the grounds for its decision.
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McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971) |
Facts: Joseph McKeiver was charged with robbery, larceny, and receiving stolen goods. All three offenses were felonies under Pennsylvania law. However, McKeiver was only sixteen at the time of his arrest. Represented by counsel at the time of his adjudication hearing, McKeiver requested a jury trial. His motion was denied. Tried by a Pennsylvania Judge in the Family Division, McKeiver was adjudged as a delinquent based on his guilt in the crimes charged. He was sentenced to probation and his sentence was affirmed, without opinion, on appeal. Consolidated with another Pennsylvania case and a group of North Carolina cases, McKeiver appealed on this issue of his right to a jury trial for juvenile proceedings. Legal Q: Whether a jury trial is constitutionally required in a juvenile delinquency proceeding in state court? Court Opinion: No, juvenile defendants are not entitled to a jury trial for the adjudicative phase of state delinquency proceedings. Justice Blackmun announced the judgment of the Court. While a fractured Court failed to reach a consensus regarding their reasoning, the Court held that jury trials are not required for the adjudicative proceedings in the juvenile justice systems of the States.The Sixth Amendment does not require jury trials for juvenile court proceedings, and the Court continued in its refusal to classify juvenile proceedings as trials under the terms of the Sixth Amendment. This case produced a fractured Court and no majority opinion, with the plurality suggesting substantial room for state variation so long as fundamental fairness was guaranteed. |
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Johnson v. Louisiana (1972) |
Facts:Appellant, Frank Johnson, was convicted by a split decision of 12 jurors: nine voted to convict and three to acquit. He contended that provisions under the Louisiana law violated the Constitution because the jury verdict was not unanimous. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, held that a "split-verdict" system was constitutionally "inoffensive" and reasoned that less-than-unanimous jury verdicts did not deprive defendants in criminal prosecutions of their rights under the due process of law. They concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require unanimity in state criminal cases. Do less-than-unanimous jury verdicts in certain cases violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment? Court Opinion: * The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court because it determined that disagreement of three jurors did not alone establish reasonable doubt, particularly when such a heavy majority of the jury, after having considered the dissenters' views, remained convinced of guilt.* The Court concluded that verdicts rendered by nine out of 12 jurors were not automatically invalidated by the disagreement of the dissenting three. * Defendant was not deprived of due process of law. * The Court determined that it was not a denial of equal protection of the law for the State to treat capital offenders differently from those charged with lesser crimes. * The Court further found that no evidence that might properly have been characterized as the fruit of an illegal entry and arrest was used against defendant at his trial. The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. |
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Apocada v. Oregon (1972) |
Brief Fact Summary. Three defendants were convicted in Oregon by less-than-unanimous juries, per Oregon law. The appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds.
Legal Q: “[W]hether the Sixth Amendment’s right to trial by jury requires . . . unanimity.” Court Opinion: Held. No. The requirement of unanimity is based in custom, rather than in the Constitution of the United States. In contemporary society, “the essential feature of a jury . . . lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment in a group of laymen”, able to deliberate on the defendant’s guilt, “free from outside attempts at intimidation.” The court saw “no difference between juries required to act un-animously” and those of majority rule. Further, unanimity does not satisfy reasonable doubt because, when this burden of proof was formulated, “the Court purported to draw no support from the Sixth Amendment.” As to the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment requirement that a jury “reflect a cross section of the community” is furthered by unanimity, the court held that not “every distinct voice in the community has a right to be represented on every jury and a right to prevent conviction of a defendant in every case,” and that it would not assume that “minority groups [on a jury] will not adequately represent the viewpoint of those groups simply because they might be outvoted in the final result.”
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Williams v. Florida (1970) |
Brief Fact Summary. Petitioner, Williams, appealed from an action denying him relief from a Florida statute which required he divulge information regarding his alibi prior to trial, on the grounds that it was testimony in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.
Court Opinion: Held. Pre-Trial discovery is not testimony in the sense of the Fifth Amendment, and a defendant must participate if he intends to use evidence that is to be discovered at trial. |
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Ballew v. Georgia (1978) |
CASE SYNOPSIS Certiorari was granted to the Court of Appeals of Georgia, which had rejected, inter alia, a contention by petitioner that the State's use of a five-member jury in a criminal proceeding had deprived him of his U.S. Constitutional Amendment VI and XIV right to a trial by jury.
Facts: * The United States Supreme Court reversed a decision rejecting, inter alia, a contention by petitioner that the use of a five-member jury deprived him of his U.S. Constitutional Amendment VI and XIV right to a trial by jury.
Legal Q: Is a 5-member jury a violation of the 6th amendment right to a Jury trial?
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Burch v. Lousiana (1979) |
Brief Fact Summary. Petitioners were convicted on obscenity charges by a six-person jury that was not unanimous.
Legal Q: Does a conviction by a nonunanimous six-member jury in a state criminal trial for a nonpetty offense violate the accused's right to a trial by jury as protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments? Court Opinion:
The Court found that convictions by the nonunanimous six-member jury violated the Constitution. Tracing the development of the Court's considerations of this issue, Justice Rehnquist indicated that Burch's case sat at the "intersection of our decisions concerning jury size and unanimity." Rehnquist relied on the Court's holding in Ballew v. Georgia (1978) and the practices in several of the states to find against convictions by nonunanimous juries of six members. Only two of the states that used six-member juries in trials for petty offenses allowed verdicts to be less than unanimous. This "near uniform judgment of the Nation" of the inappropriateness of this jury arrangement, argued Rehnquist, provided the Court with a "useful guide" in determining constitutionally allowable jury practices. |
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Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) |
Brief Fact Summary. Racially-motivated crime brought a sentence well above what he could have received.
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Ring v. Arizona (2002) |
Facts: At Timothy Ring's trial for murder, the jury deadlocked on premeditated murder, but found Ring guilty of felony murder occurring in the course of armed robbery. Under Arizona law, Ring could not be sentenced to death, unless further findings were made by a judge conducting a separate sentencing hearing and only if the judge finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. Because the jury had convicted Ring of felony murder, not premeditated murder, Ring would be eligible for the death penalty only if he was the victim's actual killer. Citing accomplice testimony at the sentencing hearing, the judge found that Ring was the killer. The judge then found two aggravating factors, one of them being that the offense was committed for pecuniary gain, as well as one mitigating factor, Ring's minimal criminal record, and ruled that the latter did not call for leniency. Legal Q: Does Arizona's capital sentencing scheme violate the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee by entrusting to a judge the finding of facts sufficient to impose the death penalty? Court Opinion: Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operates as "the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense," the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury. Under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, in which the Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not permit a defendant to be "exposed...to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone," the Court overruled Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, insofar it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. "The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to death," wrote Justice Ginsburg. |
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Powell v. Alabama (1932) |
Facts: A group of young, indigent African-American defendants were accused of the capital crime of rape. They were not given the opportunity to retain counsel before trial; counsel was appointed on the day of trial and had prepared no defense. The defendants were convicted and sentenced to death.
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Betts v. Brady (1942) |
Brief Fact Summary. The petitioner, Betts (the “petitioner”), was indicted for robbery in circuit court in Maryland. He was indigent and unable to retain an attorney. When he requested the Court appoint him an attorney, the Court informed the petitioner that it was not the practice of the Court to appoint counsel for indigent defendants, except in prosecutions for murder and rape.
Legal Q: Whether Betts had exhausted all state remedies in state court? Whether the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution demands that in every criminal case, whatever the circumstances, a State must furnish counsel to an indigent defendant?
Court Opinion: Held. Judge Bond’s order was a final disposition by the highest court of Maryland in which judgment could be had on the issues contained in the petitioners’ petition. The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits the conviction and incarceration of one whose trial is offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right, and while want of counsel in a particular case may result in a conviction lacking in such fundamental fairness, we cannot say that the Amendment embodies an inexorable commandment that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel. Dissent. Justice Hugo Black (”J. Black”), writing for the dissent, stated that the instant case could be determined by a resolution of a narrower question: whether in view of the nature of the offense and the circumstances of his trial and conviction, was the petitioner denied the procedural protection to which he was entitled under the Constitution. J. Black reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution made the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution applicable to the States and further stated “a practice cannot be reconciled which subjects men to increased dangers of conviction merely because of their poverty. Whether a man is innocent cannot be determined from a trial in which, as here, denial of counsel had made it impossible to conclude, with any satisfactory certainty, that the defendant’s case was adequately presented.” |
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Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) |
Brief Fact Summary. Gideon was charged with a felony in Florida state court. He appeared before the state Court, informing the Court he was indigent and requested that the Court appoint him an attorney. The Court declined to appoint Gideon an attorney, stating that under Florida law, the only time an indigent defendant is entitled to appointed counsel is when he is charged with a capital offense.
Court Opinion: The right to counsel is a fundamental right essential to a fair trial and due process of law. |
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Argersinger v. Hamlin (1972) |
Brief Fact Summary. An indigent was convicted on a misdemeanor weapons charge. He was tried before a judge without counsel.
Court Opinion: No. The Supreme Court of the United States first held that the Duncan case the Florida Court had relied upon actually “limited the right to trial by jury to trials where the potential punishment was imprisonment for six months or more.” The Court also noted that “problems associated with the misdemeanor and petty offenses often require the presence of counsel to insure the accused a fair trial.” The Court did not consider the right to counsel as applied to people facing actual jail time.
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Scott v. Illinois (1979) |
Facts of the Case Scott was convicted in a bench trial of shoplifting and fined $50. The statute applicable to his case set the maximum penalty at a $500 fine and/or one year in jail. Legal Q: Did the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require Illinois to provide Scott with trial counsel? Court Opinion: A plurality held that Illinois had not violated the Constitution. Writing for four of the justices, Rehnquist clarified the Court's holding in Argersinger v. Hamlin (1972) and argued that states could only sentence a convicted criminal to imprisonment if that person had been represented by counsel. Since Scott was not sentenced to imprisonment, even though the applicable statute allowed for it, the state was not obligated to provide counsel. Rehnquist called that line of reasoning "the central premise of Argersinger." |
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Halbert v. Michigan (2005) |
Facts of the Case Halbert pleaded no contest in a Michigan court to two counts of criminal sexual conduct. The day after Halbert's sentence was imposed, Halbert moved to withdraw his plea. The trial court denied the motion and told Halbert the property remedy for his complaint was the state appellate court. Michigan required a defendant convicted on a guilty or no contest plea to apply for leave of appeal to the state appellate court. Halbert asked the trial court twice to appoint counsel to help him with his application. The trial court refused. Without counsel, Halbert still applied for leave to appeal, which the court of appeals denied. The state supreme court also denied Halbert's application for leave to appeal to that court. Legal Q: Did the due process and equal protection clauses require the appointment of counsel for defendants, convicted on their pleas, who sought access to a Michigan appellate court? Court Opinion: Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the due process and equal protection clauses required Michigan to provide counsel for defendants who wanted to appeal to the state appellate court. The Court reasoned that if indigent defendants convicted on their pleas did not have counsel to guide them through Michigan's complex appellate process, their right to appeal would not be meaningful. |
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Alabama v. Shelton (2002) |
Brief Fact Summary. After not being offered counsel at state expense, indigent defendant represented himself in a state court assault trial that resulted in his receiving a thirty-day suspended sentence.
Court Opinion: Held. No. The Alabama Supreme Court’s vacation of the suspended sentence was affirmed. The court did not view the suspended sentence as a contingent penalty at the violation of probation capable of being cured by giving the defendant an attorney at subsequent probationary hearings. They viewed it as a prison term that would be imposed as a result of the assault trial at which he had ineffective assistance of counsel, and thus his Sixth Amendment rights were violated. Dissent. J. Scalia. The established “Actual Imprisonment” rule requires that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, a defendant may not merely have faced the possibility of imprisonment, but have actually been imprisoned to be able to bring a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. |
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Massiah v. United States (1964) |
Brief Fact Summary. Petitioner was recorded by a co-conspirator with the aid of the authorities. Evidence was exculpatory.
Court Opinion: Held. Yes. The Supreme Court used the previous Spano rule. The Court did not “question that in this case . . . it was entirely proper to continue an investigation” of the petitioner. It simply held that “the defendant’s own incriminating statements, obtained by federal agents under [these] circumstances . . ., could not constitutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against him at his trial.” |
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Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) |
Brief Fact Summary. The petitioner Danny Escobedo asked to speak with his lawyer while in police custody but before being formally charged and was denied.
Court Opinion: Held. Yes. Reverse the petitioner’s conviction and remand the case. |
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Miranda v. Arizona (1966) |
Brief Fact Summary. The defendants offered incriminating evidence during police interrogations without prior notification of their rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution (the “Constitution”).
Court Opinion: Held. The government needs to notify arrested individuals of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights, specifically: their right to remain silent; an explanation that anything they say could be used against them in court; their right to counsel; and their right to have counsel appointed to represent them if necessary. Without this notification, anything admitted by an arrestee in an interrogation will not be admissible in court. |
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United States v. Wade (1967) |
Brief Fact Summary. Two men were indicted for bank robbery and appointed counsel to defend them. They were brought before the employees to participate in a line up identification procedure without the benefit of the presence of counsel, after indictment, but prior to trial.
Court Opinion: Held. Yes. The court must analyze whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant’s rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice. The in court identification must be found to have independent origin, free of the primary taint of the improperly conducted lineup, in order to be admitted. |
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Brewer v. Williams (1977) |
Brief Fact Summary. The defendant, Robert Williams (the “defendant”), after being arraigned on charges of abducting a 10-year old girl, was traveling with an officer between Davenport and Des Moines, Iowa. Although the defendant’s lawyers instructed that no questioning should take place outside their presence, the defendant was convinced by the officer to give directions to the body of the girl.
Court Opinion: Held. The evidence should be suppressed because the defendant was denied counsel during an interrogation environment. Once judicial proceedings begin, such as the arraignment, assistance of counsel is required. In this case, the defendant not only did not waive his right to counsel, he affirmatively maintained it through several exchanges between the officers. |
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Nix v. Williams (1984) |
Brief Fact Summary. Williams was arrested for the murder of a 10 year old girl whose body he disposed of along a gravel road. State law enforcement officials engaged in a search for the child’s body. During the search, in response to an officer’s appeal for assistance, Williams made statements to the police (without an attorney present) which helped lead them to the body. Williams was only read his Miranda rights after he was arrested.
Court Opinion: Held. Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, because the evidence would have been discovered within a short period of time, the method in which it was obtained became irrelevant and it was still allowed against the defendant. |
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Boyd v. United States (1886) |
Brief Fact Summary. Certain documents were requested by the government in connection with a proceeding regarding fraud to avoid paying duties on certain items.
Court Opinion: Held. There need not be a physical invasion of one’s home to constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects against the invasion into a person’s private matters. This extends to the compulsory production of a person’s papers. |
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Schmerber v. California (1971) |
Brief Fact Summary. DUI suspect had a blood sample taken. Analysis was used against him.
Court Opinion: Held. No. The Supreme Court based its finding on precedent. While acknowledging that the State “compelled [petitioner] to submit to an attempt to discover evidence that might used to prosecute him,” it did no mean that he had been compelled “to be a witness against himself.” The Court concluded that the privilege is “a bar against compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’ but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate it.” The Court also listed fingerprints, photographs, measurements, writing or speaking samples, and the like as not being privileged.
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California v. Byers (1971) |
Facts: People involved in car accidents where there is property damage, the party involved must provide ahem to the owner, and exchange information. The driver refused to give name and address at the scene of the accident, because he felt that he was incriminating himself. Legal Q: Is providing your name and address in a car accident that results in property damage a violation of the 5th Amendment self-incrimination clause? Court Opinion: Court stated that it was not a violation of the 5th amendment self-incrimination clause, and compared it to filing income taxes. The Self-incrimination clause only applies when the case is substantial |
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Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board (1965) |
Facts: The Communist Party of the United States of America was required to register with the Attorney General as ordered by the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 and sustained in Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board. Despite the requirement, the Party failed to register, and no list of members was filed. The Attorney General, in accordance with §13(a) and §§8(a) and (c) of the Act, asked the Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB) to order petitioners, as Party members, to register and submit a registration statement. The SACB did order petitioners to register and submit the registration statement, and the Court of Appeals affirmed these orders, finding the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination issue not applicable in this situation.
Legal Q: Did a federal order for the Communist Party to register its members violate the Party's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination?
Court Opinion: "The risks of incrimination which the petitioners take in registering are obvious. From IS-52a requires an admission of membership in the Communist Party. Such an admission of membership may be used to prosecute the registrant under the membership clause of the Smith Act... Accordingly, we have held that mere association with the Communist Party presents sufficient threat of prosecution to support a claim of privilege... It follows that the requirement to accomplish registration by completing and filing Form IS-52a is inconsistent with the protection of the Self-Incrimination Clause... |
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Fisher v. United States (1976) |
Brief Fact Summary. The Supreme Court of the United States (”Supreme Court”) granted cert in this case to resolve the conflict between the Third and Fifth Circuits regarding the extent to which the Fifth Amendment constitutional privilege of a client extends to an attorney when that attorney has been subpoenaed to produce documents given to him by his client.
Court Opinion: Held. Documents which were protected in a client’s hands lose any Fifth Amendment constitutional protection when they have been transferred to an attorney because the potential compulsion to testify against oneself has been removed.
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Andersen v. Maryland (1976) |
Brief Fact Summary. State authorities obtained search warrants to search the defendant, Andreson’s (the “defendant”) law office, for papers evidencing a fraudulent sale of land.
Court Opinion: Held. The Fifth Amendment’s protections against self-incrimination protects individuals from complying with a subpoena for the production of incriminating evidence, however, it does not prevent the same materials from being properly seized by law enforcement and subsequently being admitted at trial.
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United States v. Doe (1984) |
Brief Fact Summary. Doe (Respondent), the owner of several sole proprietorships, was served with five subpoenas by a grand jury; the subpoenas sought various business records from the sole proprietorships, including telephone records, bank statements, and listings of all business records. Respondent filed a motion to quash the subpoenas, which the District Court for the District of New Jersey granted, except with respect to records that were required to be kept by law or to be disclosed to a public agency. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the order of the District Court, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari here.
Legal Q: Does the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination apply to the content of the business records of a sole proprietor’s business?
Court Opinion: Held. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. No; there is no compulsion involved when records are made voluntarily, and therefore the content of such records is not privileged. Dissent. Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part, and argued that based on the Court’s holding, the Court of Appeals’ judgment should be affirmed in its entirety, rather than affirmed in part and reversed in part, as it was by the majority. Specifically, Justice Stevens wrote, “[t]his Court’s opinion is entirely consistent with both the reasoning of the Court of Appeals and its disposition of the case. This Court agrees that the subpoena directed to respondent should have been quashed |
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United States v. Hubbell (2000) |
Brief Fact Summary. The defendant, Webster Hubbell (the “defendant”), asserted his privilege against self incrimination when he was subpoenaed to produce documents. The government granted him immunity but then proceeded to use the documents to obtain an indictment against him from the Grand Jury.
Court Opinion: Held. The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects the target of a grand jury investigation from being compelled to answer questions designed to elicit information about the existence of sources of potentially incriminating evidence without first obtaining immunity under 18 U.S.C. Section:6002.
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Oregon v. Mathiason (1972) |
Brief Fact Summary. An individual confessed to the police at a patrol office. after being told he was not under arrest.
Whether incriminating evidence obtained from a suspect during a non-custodial interrogation can be used in a trial if the police did not read his Miranda Rights?
Court Opinion: Held. No. “In the present case [ ] there is no indication that the questioning took place in a context where respondent’s freedom to depart was restricted in any way. He came voluntarily to the police station, where he was immediately informed that he was not under arrest. At the close of a 1/2-hour interview respondent did in fact leave the police station without hindrance. It is clear from these facts that Mathiason was not in custody ‘or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.’ ” |
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New York v. Quarles (1984) |
Brief Fact Summary. After being stopped and frisked, revealing an empty shoulder holster, respondent Benjamin Quarles said “the gun is over there” in response to an officer’s question about its whereabouts. Only then did the officer give the respondent his Miranda warnings.
Court Opinion: Held. Yes. Reverse the decision of the lower court to suppress the gun and statement. Although admittedly this caveat may cloud the Miranda rule, police officers have the ability to distinguish when this exception should apply. His motivation in asking where the gun was is not at issue in this case. Dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented by saying that this statement violated the Fifth Amendment protection versus coerced self-incrimination because it was possible for the officers in this situation to advise the respondent of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. |
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Oregon v. Elstad (1985) |
Brief Fact Summary. An individual was convicted of burglary. A signed confession was used to convict him. He was questioned without the benefit of Miranda warnings.
Court Opinion: Held. The majority first observed “[t]he Oregon court assumed and respondent here contends that a failure to administer Miranda warnings necessarily breeds the same consequences as police infringement of a constitutional right, so that evidence uncovered following an unwarned statement must be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” [The majority] believes this view misconstrues the nature of the protections afforded by Miranda warnings and therefore misreads the consequences of police failure to supply them.” |
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Missouri v. Seibert (2004) |
Brief Fact Summary. Respondent, Seibert, brought appeal after she was convicted of second-degree murder based on a confession that was elicited after she had made an un-Mirandized confession.
Court Opinion: Held. The second Post-Miranda confession is not admissible when a prior confession has been given unless the Miranda warning and accompanying break are sufficient to give the defendant the reasonable belief that she can decide not to speak with police. |
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United States v. Patane (2004) |
Brief Fact Summary. Patane appealed firearm charges when a gun was found as the result of his un-Mirandized statements to police.
Court Opinion: Held. Remanded. The court held such evidence is admissible, so long as the statements have not been coerced; however, the statements, themselves, may not be admissible as un-Mirandized confessions. |
