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85 Cards in this Set
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New York Times v. Sullivan (1964)
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Brennan: Structural Self-Government argument - Chilling effect, if we censor “bad ideas”, then people might self-censor, silencing good ideas as well. Under First Amendment, public official may not recover for defamatory statements without proving actual malice/reckless falsity. “Democracy is not for the thin-skinned”. Black (Con): NO limits on speech concerning public officials.
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Whitney v. California(713)(1927)
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Sanford: “Bad tendency test” Speech that has the tendency to incite unlawful actions is not protected, trumped by police power. W was prosecuted for attending a Communist Labor Party meeting which advocated violent overthrow of gov. Brandeis (Dis): “Clear and present danger” test. Speech may only be restricted when the danger will befall before more speech can counter it. OVERRULED.
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Dennis v. United States(719)(1951)(Plurality)
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Vinson: Weak Form C&PD. Adopts Hand formula (B>PL) but focuses on the gravity and neglects the imminence. Writing articles for Communist Party advocating the overthrow of the government deemed serious enough to allow abridgment of free speech (regardless of non-imminence)
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Brandenburg v. Ohio(728)(1969)
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Per Curiam: Strong Form C&PD. Incitement to imminent lawless action. Cannot proscribe advocacy of the use of force or violation of law, except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to produce or incite such action. Involved some KKK speech. Overrules Whitney.
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Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire(733)(1942)
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Murphy: Fighting words are not protected speech. Fighting words are “those which by their very utterance tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Rationalistic model where only certain expressions can convey ideas. Two levels of speech: “Low value” speech, such as obscenity, libel etc (deferential scrutiny) and “High Value” speech (strict scrutiny)
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Cohen v. California(762)(1971)
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Harlan: Fighting words must be directed at an individual. Jacket that says “Fuck the Draft” is not fighting words b/c it is not directed at an individual. Content-based restrictions trigger strict scrutiny. Regulations of time, place, and manner trigger less scrutiny. Rejects rationalistic model of speech.
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Beauharnais v. Illinois(736)(1952)
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Frankfurter: Group libel is not protected speech, there does not need to be a clear and present danger. B was passing out pamphlets that had racist speech inside. This may not be good law after Brandenburg and RAV. Applied only deferential scrutiny.
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R.A.V. v. St. Paul(742)(1992)
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Scalia: Content or viewpoint restrictions are presumptively invalid (strict scrut). The government must be viewpoint neutral. Even Fighting Words must incite imminent lawless action to warrant restriction. 3 exceptions where content restrictions are okay: 1) Threats against prez, 2) speech prohibited not for content but for "secondary effects" (sexual harassment), 3) Restriction precludes the possibility that suppression of free speech is afoot. Statute forbidding swaztikas or other targeted hate symbols held unconstitutional. Stevens (Dis): Ordinance is evenhanded.
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American Booksellers v. Hudnut (767)(1985)
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Easterbrook: Porn is not obscenity. Ordinance banning porn displaying subordinate women is a content-based restriction. The government is supporting the view that women are equal and disapproving the viewpoint that women are subordinate. Law and Econ Market of Ideas analogy – government should not take sides. Power of porn shows its value as speech.
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Minersville School District v. Gobitis(1266)(1940)
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Frankfurter: Jehovah’s Witness’s required to salute the flag. NOT viewpoint neutral (government can inculcate patriotism). Deferring to the representative process. Stone (Dis): Carolene Products F.4, ¶1(specific prohibitions) and ¶3(discrete minorities).
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West Virginia v. Barnette(1275)(1943)
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Jackson: Protecting Fundamental Rights approach. Compelling speech is also a violation of First Amendment rights. You have a right not to speak. Rights like Free Speech were deliberately removed from the “vicissitudes of political controversy”. Cannot compel flag saluting.
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United States v. O’Brien(775)(1968)
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Warren: Government can regulate conduct that incidentally affects speech. 4 part test for regulation: 1) Is it withing const. power of congress? 2) Does it further an substantial gov interest? 3) Is the gov interest unrelated to the suppression of speech? 4) Is the incidental speech-restriction no greater than necessary? Draft card burning. Court will not strike down an otherwise Constitutional statute for an alleged illicit motive. Conviction under law prohibiting draft card destruction upheld as passing test.
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United States v. Eichman(780)(1990)
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Brennan: Anti-Flag Burning statute is unconstitutional because it is content-based restriction(b/c no one burns flags except to make a statement). Flag burning ≠ fighting words. Argument that majority of population supports the ban is rejected – weight of popular opposition to specific speech is “foreign” to the 1st Amendment. Stevens (Dis): Statute bans all flag burning, so it is content-neutral.
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Reynolds v. Sims(814)(1964)
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Warren: The right to vote is a fundamental right protected under the EPC, and therefore, if the right is to be granted it must be granted equally. Right not to have one’s vote diluted. “One person, one vote = equal participation. The division of legislative districts that resulted in gross differences in populations was dilution of vote
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Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections(238)(1966)
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Douglas: Voting is a fundamental right (once granted by states, must conform with EP) and cannot be conditioned. Wealth as a suspect class but ONLY in the context of voting rights. Poll tax is unconstitutional, even in state elections, because it violates EPC by making a wealth/payment a condition on the right to vote.
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Bush v. Gore(1558)(2000)
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Court steps in and presumes to decide election (ignoring 12th amend). Recount would require remand to FL S.Ct to conform with EP, but “there’s no time!” Dissent: Um… yes there is you fucking ass-hats.” Recounting of votes in only some counties and using varying counting methods is unconstitutional because it would make votes count unequally (EP).
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NAACP v. Alabama(847)(1958)
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Harlan: Compulsory disclosure of membership is unconstitutional. Disclosure has a “chilling effect” on freedom of association when group espouses “dissident” beliefs. Beliefs need not be political (religious, cultural etc, are protected too). Here, Government action opens the door to private harassment. “Closest scrutiny”, similar to strict scrutiny. This was based on and distinguished from an anti-KKK law that was held constitutional (probably “viewpoint discrimination under R.A.V.)
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Roberts v. Jaycees(853)(1984)
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Brennan: Freedom NOT to associate. “Freedom of Intimate Association” (based in DPC) and “Freedom of Expressive Association” (based in 1st Amend). Expressive association can be regulated when 1) “Compelling state interest”, 2) Unrelated to suppression of ideas, 3) least restrictive means. Act requiring admission of women into an all male group passed “strict scrutiny”. The group was too large to be intimate and its expressive message was commerce so admitting women would not affect that message. O’Conner (Con): JC’s are “commercial” association; real expressive associations can exclude whomever they want.
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Buckley v. Valeo(872)(1976)
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Donating Money to political campaigns = speech. Spending limits are suppression of communication and is not closely related to eliminating corruption = fail strict scrutiny. Limiting contributions and disclosing the names of persons who contributed over $10 was constitutional since it was closely related to the compelling interest in eliminating corruption and survived strict scrutiny.
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McConnell v. Federal Election Commission
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Court upheld ban on unlimited soft money contributions in the interest of avoiding the appearance of corruption in politics.
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Dred Scott v. Sandford(207)(1857)
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Taney: Held Scott wasn’t a citizen and was property, protected under DP clause of 5th amendment. Quasi originalist argument: Slaves were universally considered property at time of Const. drafting. (OVERRULED)
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Williamson v. Lee Optical(932)(1955)
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Douglas: When neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right is implicated, the court will be remarkably deferential to the legislature’s judgment. Deferential Scrutiny requires only “legitimate” state interest and means “rationally related” to achieving it. No need to select the best means. Legislatures could rationally have found that Optician ordinance was in public’s health interest.
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Korematsu v. United States(1548)(1944)
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Black: Race is a suspect classification and triggers strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny requires compelling interest and necessary/narrowly tailored law. Rare case where statute survives strict scrutiny. The court held that the internment of Japanese met compelling gov security interest. Never officially overruled – rehabilitation of opinion post 9-11.
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Brown v. Board of Education I(936)(1954)
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Warren: Education is NOT a fundamental right but, like voting, is subject to the EPC once IF provided. The segregation of schools is a violation of EPC because “intangibles” are different.
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Bolling v. Sharpe(941)(1954)
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Warren: DPC of 5th applies EPC of 14th to the federal government. DPC is the official basis of the decision. Held that District of Columbia could not have segregated schools.
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Loving v. Virginia(948)(1967)
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Warren: Anti-miscegenation statute unconstitutional. White supremacy is not a compelling or even legitimate interest. Violates EPC because it discriminates based on race. “Central purpose of the EPC is to eliminate all invidious sources of state racial discrimination”. Also, marriage is a fundamental right, which gets DPC protection. “The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Inclusion of Declaration as source of Const. meaning.
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University of California v. Bakke(955)(1978)
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Powell: Strict scrutiny applies to ALL racial classifications, invidious (discriminate to disfavor) or benign (discriminate to advantage the group). Racial Neutrality. Quota system held unconstitutional, however 1) Diverse student body and 2) remedying “identified” discrimination (general discrimination not OK) are both compelling state aims. Race cannot be sole factor, person has to be looked at as a whole and compared to everyone. Brennan (Con/Dis): Intermediate scrutiny for benign racial classifications. Race conscious discrimination OK if 1) purpose is to remove disparate impact of Gov actions AND 2) Disparate impact is the result of past discrimination by Gov or society. Marshall (Con/Dis): Discrimination was racially based, so solution can be racially based. Blackmun (Con/Dis): Treating people differently to treat them equally.
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Adarand Constructors v. Pena(970)(1995)
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O’Connor: Strict scrutiny applies both invidious as well as benign discrimination. BUT: strict in theory but not fatal in fact. Government program favoring subcontractors run by “socially/economically disadvantaged individuals”. Remanded. Thomas(Con): AA is “racial paternalism” with negative unintended consequences. “Government cannot make us equal; it can only recognize us as equal before the law.”
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Grutter v. Bollinger(984)(2003)
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O’Connor: Selecting a “critical mass” of minority students passed strict scrutiny. It was a narrowly tailored program that served a legitimate interest of achieving academic benefits of diversity and academic freedom. Sets 25 year horizon on AA.
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Frontiero v. Richardson(1022)(1973)
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Brennan: Strict scrutiny applied to gender classification. (not binding). Used intermediate scrutiny. Automatic benefits for wife and proved benefits for husbands was not constitutional. (Plurality)
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Craig v. Boren(1027)(1976)
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Brennan: Intermediate scrutiny for gender classification. Substantially related and important governmental interest. Differentiating between men and women in purchase of 3.2 beer is violation of EPC. “Gender often employed as an inaccurate proxy”. Court rejects use of statistics to prove “broad social propositions”
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United States v. VMI(1033)(1996)
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Ginsburg: Officially intermediate scrutiny applies to gender classification but unofficially it is intermediate plus. Interest must be “exceedingly persuasive.” Public military school may not exclude females. Rehnquist (Con): Separate but equal would be okay for Gender, but the schools are not equal here. Scalia (Dis): Strong/long tradition of single sex education, why mess with it?
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San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez(1050)(1973)
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Powell: Wealth is NOT as suspect classification and education is NOT a fundamental right. Differentiated from Harper: Poor are not being targeted by invidious discrimination, but merely losing out as a side effect of a general policy. Maybe a right to a minimally sufficient education. Tax-based education funding is constitutional. Marshall (Dis): Rejects multi-tier analysis in favor of “Spectrum of standards”
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Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center(1135)(1985)
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Tards are not a suspect class. Officially deferential scrutiny but it is actually Deferential scrutiny with Bite. “Bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group” will not pass Deferential Scrutiny. Requiring a permit in this case appears to rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded.
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Romer v. Evans(1062)(1996)
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Gays are NOT a suspect class. Officially deferential scrutiny, but it has bite. Amendment violates EPC, a law reflecting animus is alien to our tradition (i.e. not legitimate). A state cannot deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws. Scalia (Dis): Criticizes maj for inconsistency with Bowers.
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Skinner v. Oklahoma(1093)(1942)
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Procreation is a fundamental right for purposes of EP, and therefore for the state to take away such a right, it must survive strict scrutiny. Now cited under DPC. Sterilization of blue collar criminals is unconstitutional.
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Shapiro v. Thompson(1098)(1969)
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Brennan: Freedom of interstate travel is a fundamental right. Not based on a specific constitutional provision, but travel enables other fundamental rights. A statute denying welfare benefits solely on the basis of one’s length of residency, infringes upon the fundamental right to travel, and thus is unconstitutional absent a compelling justification. One year residency requirement is an undue burden on the fundamental right to travel, does not pass strict scrutiny.
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Dandridge v. Williams(1115)(1970)
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Stewart: There is no fundamental right to welfare, and therefore SS does not apply. It is enough that the state’s action be rationally based and free from invidious discrimination. Welfare based on number of children with a cap discriminated against families with many children, but is constitutional under deferential scrutiny. (unanimous)
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Plyler v. Doe(1128)(1982)
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Brennan: Education is not a fundamental right and illegal aliens are not a suspect class. However, without substantial justification, it fails deferential scrutiny with bite and statute is unconstitutional. (It won’t stop immigration) (Unanimous) Now reconstrued as intermediate scrutiny.
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Saenz v. Roe(1106)(1999)
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Stevens: The Privileges or Immunities clause has always protected a right to travel, the right or newly arrived citizens of a state to the same P or I enjoyed by those of the same state. Nature of Federal government requires that citizens can settle in the state of their choice. A law that limited the welfare benefits of a person who newly came to a state to the levels they would have received in their old state is unconstitutional. Scalia (Dis): Travel IS protected, but this is right to become a citizen of a state, which is NOT protected (states can limit).
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Calder v. Bull(134)(1798)
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Chase: The constitution contains not only text, but also certain vital principles inherent in the structure of our government. Now laws can take away rights vested by previous laws (ex post facto), but they can ADD rights or relax standards (Retrospective). Not all Retrospective laws are Ex Post Facto laws. Iredell (Dis): Birth of Textualism. “Only what’s in the text” no “natural law”.
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Lochner v. New York(1199)(1905)
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Strict scrutiny under Economic Substantive Due Process applies when the state interferes with freedom of contract. Limiting the number of hours a baker could work, did not sufficiently relate to health, and therefore is illegitimate statute. Harlan (Dis): Defer to the representative process. Only if Leg is CLEARLY in excess of its power. Holmes (Dis): Constitution does not embody a specific economic theory (this is a question for the Legislature) OVERULED
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West Coast Hotel v. Parrish(1213)(1937)
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Hughes: Applies deferential scrutiny to economic matters. Regulation that is reasonably related to a proper legislative purpose that is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory is constitutional and is due process. Minimum wage/maximum hour law OK. “The bare cost of living must be met” (possible support for affirmative obligations of government?) Overruled Lochner.
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Ferguson v. Skrupa(1221)(1963)
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Black: “Courts may not substitute their own social or economic beliefs for the judgment of legislatures”. Possibly presupposes SOME sort of private property bases capitalism. Did not strike down law regulating debt consolidation.
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Meyer v. Nebraska(1369)(1923)
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McReynolds - Law that prohibited teaching of German language to children was unconstitutional. Liberty means not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also “the right to contract, engage in common occupations, acquire useful knowledge, marry, establish a home, raise kids, worship, and those rights recognized at common law as essential to the orderly purist of happiness by free men.” (Dec of independence) Possible anti-totalitarian principle against sculpting people. Fundamental right of parents to raise their kids. Illustrates Protecting Fundamental Rights theory.
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Pierce v. Society of Sisters(1374)(1925)
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McReynolds - Law requiring kids to go to public school only was unconstitutional. A child is not a mere creature of the state. Like Meyers, rejects state sculpting people. Fundamental right of parents to raise their kids.
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Poe v. Ullman(149)(1965)
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CT anti contraception statute upheld by Majority. Douglas (Dis): Privacy is a necessary element in a free society and that the right to privacy “emanates from the totality of the constitutional scheme under which we live.” Harlan (Dis): Liberty is not a series of isolated points pricked out, but is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints that require careful scrutiny of the state’s justifications. Tradition is a living thing.
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Griswold v. Connecticut(158)(1965)
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Douglas: Does not officially use SDP. Zone of privacy, implied in the penumbras of the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 9th amendments. Privacy of Marriage as a sacred institution is the technical holding, but it is nowadays cited as stating a broader principle. Reconstrues Myers and Pierce as 1st amend cases. Harlan (Con): The court is really using DP and should say so. “The Due Process clause stands on its own bottom.” Goldberg (Con): 9th amendment is a rule of construction for the Const., not a source of substantive rights. Black (Dis): No unenumerated rights.
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Roe v. Wade(1381)(1973)
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Blackmun: Protecting fundamental rights approach. The right to privacy includes abortion. Dependant on the level of generality with which one interprets Poe/Griswold. Abortion is a Fundamental right and protected with strict scrutiny. “Implicit in our concept of ordered liberty” (Palko) As the pregnancy progresses the states interest in protecting the mother’s life or the viable fetus becomes sufficiently compelling.
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Harris v. McRae(1394)(1980)
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Stewart: The right to terminate a pregnancy is a negative right. A state cannot interfere with that right but it can encourage alternative choices. Wealth is not a suspect classification and this only gets deferential scrutiny. The government can unequally provide funding for childbirth and abortion. The Brennan (Dis): Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine – the government may not penalize people by conditioning governmental benefits up relinquishment of a Constitutional right. All but a dead in current court.
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Planned Parenthood v. Casey(1404)(1992)
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O’Connor (joint-opinion): Undue Burden Test, (like intermediate scrutiny). “substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.” The state may persuade but not unduly burden the choice. Rejects the Roe trimester framework. Right is grounded on personal autonomy and bodily integrity, not privacy (as in Roe). DPC jurisprudence conceived as “reasoned judgment” and a “rational process”. Court upholds 24 hour waiting period, providing information on alternatives, minor to obtain consent of one parent or judicial order, and the keeping of public records where the name was kept confidential. However, the court held that the requirement to notify the husband was an Undue Burden, thus unconstitutional.
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Moore v. East Cleveland(1437)(1977)
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Powell: Family is fundamental right, scrutiny is “heightened”. There is a fundamental right in personal choice in marriage and family life. DP inquiry: Is the right “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”? Family is not limited to the nuclear family but covers the extended family too. The state cannot standardize what a family is.
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Zablocki v. Redhail(1122)(1978)
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Court says there is a fundamental right to marry. Court strikes down statute because is it denies marriage to some but not all, and therefore violates EPC. Court does not apply strict scrutiny, applies “sufficient state interest” and “significantly interfere” with fundamental right. Court intimates DPC with “fundamental right” language, but uses EPC because it is narrower (doesn’t “cast doubt on the network of restrictions that the States have fashioned to govern marriage and divorce”). Statute preventing marriage by persons who are in arrears in child support is unconstitutional.
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Michael H. v. Gerald D.(169)(1989)
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DPC protection requires a right that is both “fundamental” and “traditionally protected in our society.” “We refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.” Man fathered child with a married woman. There is a presumption that the child is the husbands. Therefore, looking to tradition, there is no fundamental right for the natural father of a child born into a marriage. Brennan (Dis): The right being asserted is Parenthood.
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Bowers v. Hardwick(1445)(1986)
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White: Overruled by Lawrence. Right narrowly framed: No fundamental right of homosexuals to engage in sodomy. It limits prior privacy cases to there facts, finding privacy only in family, marriage, and procreation. Two tests for “heightened judicial scrutiny”: 1) “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”(Palko), 2) “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” (Moore). Court finds neither and applies Deferential Scrutiny, deferring to the “supposed belief of the majority” that homosexual sodomy is immoral. Blackmun (Dis): Frames right asserted as “right to be left alone” and “fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of their intimate associations with others.”
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Romer v. Evans(1062)(1996)
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Homosexuality not a fundamental right or a suspect class, but applied deferential scrutiny with bite. Denying them equal protection of the laws because of animosity towards them violates EP and is unconstitutional. Scalia (Dis): This is not a “bare attempt to harm a politically unpopular group”, but rather an attempt by “seemingly tolerant Coloradoans” to “protect traditional sexual mores against a politically powerful minority.”
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Lawrence v. Texas(1461)(2003)
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Kennedy: Liberty under the DPC, under spatial privacy and autonomy, extends to protect private homosexual conduct. Court does not recognize sodomy as a fundamental right and applies deferential scrutiny with bite. Court does not use EP but disapproves of laws that “demean the lives of homosexuals”, implying an equal citizenship to which all are entitled. Overrules Bowers. Scalia (Dis): Predicts the death of all “morals” legislation and a lubed slope into “bestiality, incest, bigamy” etc. What a dick.
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Baker v. State(1076) (1999)
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VT State Supreme Court. There was an EP argument that gays are entitled to the “common benefits” (under VT const.), such as insurance and tax purposes, that married people get. Court leaves it up to the legislature to find a way to give gays the same rights as straights. The result is the civil union.
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Goodridge v. Department of Public Health(SR9)(2003)
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Right to marriage extends to homosexuals, applies deferential scrutiny with bite. First, court says marriage is about commitment and not procreation. Then, court says that marriage is about providing best environment for upbringing of children and the fact that gays can adopt means that they should also be able to marry for the best interest of the children. State court also uses Lawrence in its justification. Court says that constitution is not a moral code, brings up autonomy argument, and the “would demean the existence of gays” from Lawrence.
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Washington v. Glucksberg(1494)(1997)
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Rehnquist (unanimous): No fundamental right to commit suicide, deferential scrutiny applies. Rehnquist broadly construes the right. Concurring Justices might support a more narrowly construed right such as “the right to die with dignity (Breyer). The law preventing prescription of pills to assist suicide promotes the legitimate state interest of protecting vulnerable groups from abuse and is rationally related, so passes deferential scrutiny and is constitutional.
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DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services(1513)(1989)
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Rehnquist: Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; The 14th is a limit on state action, not a requirement that the state has an affirmative duty to act. “[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.” There was not affirmative duty to protect the child from harm. A duty only occurs if the state, by its action, had made the child more vulnerable.
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United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export(pg 464)(1936)
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Sutherland: It is constitutionally permissible for Congress to delegate legislative authority to the president on foreign matters (assumed but not held that delegation is improper for domestic affairs). Foreign policy powers inhere in the nature of sovereignty and would vest in the federal government even absent express constitutional provisions. The prohibition of selling guns to warring foreign countries is within powers of President.
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Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer(pg 466)(1952)
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Black: Seizure of private property by the President to avoid a strike is a usurpation of Congress’ lawmaking power. Moreover, there is no justification in the role of the President as commander-in-chief since the action was far too removed from the actual theater of war where President can make policy. Textualist/Formalistic approach. “Legislation” and “Execution” rigidly separated. Jackson (Con): Holistic/Functionalist approach. “The const. diffuses power the better to secure liberty…” but also contemplates branches working together, “separateness but interdependence, autonomy, but reciprocity”. President acting with, neutral, or against Congress. Emergency powers are Congress’ to give.
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United States v. Nixon(pg 337)(1974)
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Burger: Functionalist balancing test between Judicial Art. III criminal responsibilities and Presidential authority. Executive privilege from judicial process is not absolute, absent a need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets. Nixon had to give up his tapes.
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The War Powers Resolution(478)
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Example of President and Congress holding concurrent power. President must consult with Congress before introducing troops.
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INS v. Chadha(pg 518)(1983)
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Burger: Act allowed either house of congress to veto recommendation of the attorney general as to visa decisionsFormalist. Legislative veto violates Bicameralism and the Presentment Clause. This is not part of the “finely wrought and exhaustedly considered, procedure” and therefore is unconstitutional. Four enumerated single house powers are: (1) the house power to impeach, (2) the senate power of impeachment trail, (3) senate power to approve presidential appointments, and (4) the senate power to ratify treaties. Expressio Unis. Political Question not present here. (SEE Baker pg 519). White (Dis): Functionalist, Leg Veto is the price paid by the Exec for a “broad delegation of legislative authority.” Proper inquiry forces on the extent to which [leg veto] prevents the Executive from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions”
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Clinton v. New York(546)(1998)
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The Presidential Line Item Veto was not part of the “finely wrought and exhaustedly considered, procedure” and therefore is unconstitutional, following Chadha. Scalia (Dis): impounding funds is part of the unitary Exec’s inherent prerogative.
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Bowsher v. Synar(531)(1986)
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Burger: Act giving Comptroller General emergency budget cutting powers is unconstitutional insofar as it vests executive authority, which cannot be exercised by Congress or its agents, in an agent of the Congress. The act authorized the Comptroller, who is under the control of Congress, to make budget cuts which is an executive power. White (Dis): Test should be “whether there is encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of another.”
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Myers
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Taft: Limitations on President’s pwer to remove executive employees cannot be constrained by congress. Postmaster’s removal by pres constitutional.
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Humphry's Executor
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Unanimous: Administrative agencies (FTC, FDA etc) are “quasi-legislative” and “quasi executive”. Myers confied to “purely executive” officers. Congress can create independent administrative agencies. Statute saying pres could only remove FTC members for “inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance” is constitutional.
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Morrison v. Olsen(SR10)(1988)
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Rehnquist: Independent Counsel act says attorney general can only remove Independent Counsel for “good cause.” Congress may limit the President’s right to remove even a purely executive officer, independent counsel, so long as the restrictions on removal are “not of such a nature that they impede the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty.” Functionalist. Killed Regan Revolution. This is different from Chadha and Bowsher because Congress cannot have control over executive officer, but can protect them from the power of the President. Scalia (Dis): Executive power means ALL executive power – Unitary Executive.
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Mistretta v. United States(SR11)(1989)
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Blackmun: Judicial sentencing guidelines were OK. Congress may get help/advice from other branches even if it can’t delegate legislative power. Rejects Hermetic Division in favor of “self executing safeguard” against branch encroachment (Federalist 51) Intelligible Principle Test – Congress can delegate so long as it lays down an Intelligible Principle to which the person or body authorized is directed to conform.
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McCulloch v. Maryland(563)(1819)
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Marshall: Where there is a conflict between state and federal law, federal is supreme. The federal government has implied powers that are incidental to its enumerated powers. The enumerated power of collecting taxes implies the power to create a mean to do it. Therefore, the national bank is ok. State cannot tax Federal bank. “[W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.”
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Slaughter-House Cases(577)(1873)
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Miller: Says the purpose of the 14th is to protect the newly freed slaves, not to transfer the role of protecting civil/economic rights to the federal government. The P/I is only to protect rights as national citizens, not state citizenship.
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Gibbons v. Ogden(591)(1824)(NS)
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Marshall: Commerce includes intercourse, and that is within Congresses power to regulate. Congress’ commerce power is concurrent with the States, but trumps them. Dormant Commerce Clause – Even if Congress is silent on a matter, a state cannot regulate interstate commerce. Here, the regulation of a NY/NJ ferry by the state was unconstitutional. First instance of Deferential Scrutiny.
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Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918)(DF)(OVERRULED)
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Congress lacks the authority under the commerce clause to prohibit products made through child labor because Congress only has the power to regulate products that there themselves harmful and then transported across state lines
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United States v. Darby(597)(1941)(NS)
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Stone: Overrules Hammer. The test for whether something can be regulated by Congress is if it has a substantial effect/ is so related/ so affects interstate commerce. Since minimum wage laws have a substantial effect on prices of goods and therefore affect interstate commerce, congress can regulate it (Fail Labor Standards Act)
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Wickard v. Filburn (p. 553) (1942)(NS)
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Aggregation approach to commerce. – If individual activity in aggregate would have an effect on IC, then it can be regulated. Wheat farmer’s extra 11 acres of wheat would have an IC effect in aggregate.
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United States v. Lopez(p. 639)(1995)(DF)
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Rehnquist: National commerce power is subject to “outer limits” so as not to obliterate the “division of authority” between states and Fed Gov. Worried about “general federal police power”. Rational Basis Test for whether regulated activity affects IC: 1) Channels, 2) Instrumentalities, 3) Activities substantially related to IC. Guns in school do not substantially affect interstate commerce and therefore congress cannot regulate them. Souter (Dis): This is like Lochner.
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United States v. Morrison(p. 650)(2000)(DF)
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Rehnquist: Gender related crimes are not economic or commercial problems or activities and therefore are beyond the reach of congress power to regulate under the commerce clause. Thomas (Con): Calls for end to substantial effects test.
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National League of Cities v. Usery(p. 602)(1976)(DF)
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Held that the Fed could not enforce minimum wage limits on State employees using 10 Amendment. OVERRULED
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Garcia v. San Antonio MTA(603)(NS)
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Blackmun: Overrules Nat. League. Aggressive judicial protection of federalism unwarranted, we should rely instead on the National Political Process set up by the constitution. Federal government can impose minimum wage standards on state employees. Rehnquist/O’Conner (Dis): We need judicial protection of Federalism.
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New York v. United States(613)(1992)
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O’Connor: The Federal government cannot Commandeer the state governments. Congress can encourage but not coerce the states to take action. Congress could condition federal funds on complying with their wishes, but cannot force them to (analogy to Casey).
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Printz v. United States(625)(1997)
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Scalia: Extends New York by saying that Congress cannot commandeer executive officials in addition to legislative officials. Just as Congress cannot coerce states to legislate, they cannot control the states executive officials either. The provision that required the states law enforcement officers to conduct background check was commandeering and therefore unconstitutional.
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Nevada Department of Natural Resources v. Hibbs (2003)
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Rehnquist: Court allows a private suit to proceed against the Nevada state government for a violation of the Family Medical Leave Act. Decision grounded in Fourteenth Amendment as a constitutionally-permissible response to what Congress regards as gender discrimination.
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