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76 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Marbury v. Madison
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Midnight appointments. Analyzed the power of the Constitution versus the laws of the United States and determined that the Constitution is superior
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Cooper v. Aaron
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Arkansas segregation case; States are bound by the Court's decisions, and cannot choose to ignore them. This case also reinforced the notions of federalism in that the SC ruling is supreme and can't be overridden by the states
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The Federalist Papers, No. 78
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Discusses the three branches and the interplay between the three branches; discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the judicial branch -- it has no "power of the purse" or anything, but they're the ones who say what the law IS, which is ultimately the greatest power of all. These are the best contemporaneous account of what the Framers were thinking
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Ex Parte McCardle
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Examines the extent of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review decisions of lower courts under federal statutory law.
The Constitution gives the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, but it gives Congress the express power to make exceptions to that appellate jurisdiction. Also, the Court must always determine first if it is has jurisdiction to review a case. Congress cannot say that certain results will lead to certain appellate jurisdiction while other results will have different jurisdiction... |
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Baker v. Carr
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Unequal voting power. Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge to a legislative apportionment if it's a legal question, not a political question. Here there was no political question.
There is a "Jackson spectrum" of factors to be considered by the court in determining whether a case presents a political question: i) Is there a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department (i.e. foreign affairs or executive war powers)? ii) Is there a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the issue? iii) The impossibility of deciding the issue without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion. iv) The impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government. v) Is there an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made? vi) Would attempting to resolve the matter create the possibility of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question? |
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McCulloch v. Maryland
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Maryland cannot tax a federal bank. A federal bank is constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause; kind of the birth of the rational basis test without saying it's the rational basis test
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Gibbons v. Ogden
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States do not have the power to regulate interstate commerce (which includes navigation in waterways), or inconsistent with federal law. State laws must yield to acts of Congress.
The Court also uses a rational basis test, saying it's not up to the Courts to decide what's best, but if Congress has the power and a rational basis for the legislation, it's valid |
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Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona
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an Arizona law affected transportation in other States. The rule constructively regulated interstate commerce, in violation of the Commerce Clause.
Balancing test: compare the nature and extent of the burden that the state regulation imposes on interstate commerce and the state interest involved WITH the national interest in uniformity of regulation of commerce Dormant Commerce Clause -- states can regulate where the Commerce Clause does not; here since the Commerce Clause didn't say States could have different regulations about trains but the Courts decided that this regulation encroached on the Commerce Clause's desire to promote the easy flow of commerce |
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Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison
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A pasteurization law discourages and constructively prevents interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause.
The Court uses a "least restrictive means" test to decide how the statute SHOULD be to accomplish both the intentions of the statute and the federal interest in uninterrupted flow of commerce |
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Reeves, Inc. v. State
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State institutions may give preference to State citizens without violating the Commerce Clause, because the purpose of the State is to serve its citizens, and State institutions use the State's tax money which comes from the citizens
SD was a market participant which is allowed, but market regulators are bad; In Alaska when they required people to process their timber there that was a regulation; ex - in-state tuition is okay to prefer in-state citizens |
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Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.
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The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s exclusive authority to establish safety standards for the operation of nuclear power plants does not foreclose the availability of state law tort remedies. State law may be preempted to the extent that it conflicts with federal law. In a conflict, Congress and federal law will win. Supremacy Clause'd!
Ask did Congress legislate or intend to legislate? Dissent points out that the nature of the law and its complexity makes it harder for juries and judges to really know what's going on and make a well-informed decision |
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Wickard v. Filburn
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The Commerce Clause can regulate products that never actually enter the interstate market, because their aggregate effects can still affect the interstate market. Used rational basis
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Steward Machine Co. v. Davis
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The Court upheld the unemployment compensation provisions of the Social Security Act, signaling the Court's acceptance of a broad interpretation of Congressional power to influence State laws; enticement v. duress; Courts cannot force States to do stuff but they can entice/encourage/incentivise
This is similar to the raising of the drinking age – federal gov't offered kind of unrelated incentives for states to raise their ages, like increased funding for roads |
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Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. US
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Congress has the power to regulate a hotel that is "local in nature" because of its aggregate effects on interstate commerce. In particular, hotels like this that discriminated had a huge effect on African-American interstate travelers
Used rational basis here, even though it's race -- but the statute itself was not discriminatory. You use strict scrutiny when a law discriminates on race, but here the law says the opposite Also didn't need to use equal protection because HoA clearly fit within the statute - only commerce clause was addressed |
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US v. Lopez
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The Court ruled that Congress cannot regulate guns in public schools because it has nothing to do with interstate commerce. This case marked a more limited interpretation of the Commerce Clause, saying aggregate effects were no longer as important as they were in Filburn.
The Court also laid out three broad categories of activities the commerce clause may regulate: 1. channels of interstate commerce (Heart of Atlanta) 2. the instrumentalities of interstate commerce 3. those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce |
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US v. Morrison
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Congress cannot regulate crime, thus cannot regulate gender-motivated crime, because there is no federal police power
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Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
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Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution to extend the Fair Labor Standards Act, which requires that employers provide minimum wage and overtime pay to their employees, to state and local governments; a) The Court rejects the rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is “integral” or “traditional," a distinction which was impossible at best
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New York v. United States
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There were three radioactive waste proposals states could adopt, but the Courts said to force states to take title to their waste and be liable goes against the historical balance of federalism. Congress may give states incentives to legislate a particular way, but they may not force them; since neither option was constitutional, courts could not ask States to choose; in addition, state officials cannot consent to the enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond those enumerated in the Constitution
Although State officials consented to the program, their consent cannot undo the Constitution's separation of powers |
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Printz v. United States
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Again, Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program such as a background check on prospective handgun purchasers, it must be an incentive, not coercion
Federalism: Congress cannot impose responsibilities on the states without their consent What makes this worse is that the federal power here is infringing on State executive power, putting sheriffs "at the mercy of the federal gov't" Efficiency is a good reason for nothing but tyranny! |
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Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure Case)
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the President's emergency powers to not allow him to seize private property because the Taft-Hartley Act specifically and purposely lacks an amendment which would have authorized such governmental seizures in cases of emergency
List of when the President may use his executive powers, in order from most to least power (Jackson spectrum): i) when acting pursuant to an express authorization of Congress ii) in absence of either a congressional grant of denial of authority iii) when the President acts contrary to the express or implied will of Congress; this power must be scrutinized with caution because the equilibrium established by the Constitution is at stake |
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ex parte Milligan
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ruled that the application of military tribunals to citizens when civilian courts are still operating is unconstitutional.
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Ex Parte Quirin (the Nazi Saboteurs case)
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upheld the jurisdiction of a United States military tribunal over the trial of several Operation Pastorius German saboteurs in the United States. Quirin has been cited as a precedent for the trial by military commission of any unlawful combatant against the United States.
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Johnson v. Eisentrager
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U.S. courts had no jurisdiction over German war criminals held in a U.S.-administered German prison. The prisoners had at no time been on American sovereign territory.
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Rasul v. Bush
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the U.S. court system has the authority to decide whether foreign nationals (non-U.S. citizens) held in Guantanamo Bay were wrongfully imprisoned
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Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
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a U.S. citizen was detained indefinitely as an "illegal enemy combatant." The Court recognized the power of the government to detain enemy combatants, but ruled that detainees who are U.S. citizens must have the ability to challenge their enemy combatant status before an impartial judge with rudimentary due process. Hearsay will not be prohibited, for example
Involved a balancing test: weighed Hamdi's interest in due process and the government's in military prerogatives – Hamdi's interests as a US citizen are important to O'Connor and the risk of erroneous deprivation and liberty |
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Rumsfeld v. Padilla
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José Padilla sought habeas corpus relief against Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, as a result of his detainment as an "unlawful combatant."
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Dames & Moore v. Regan
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The Supreme Court approved the suspension of claims filed in U.S. courts even though no specific statutory provision authorized that step. In so doing the Court relied on inferences drawn from related legislation, a history of congressional acquiescence in executive claims settlement practices, and past decisions recognizing broad executive authority. The Court also "substantially refined the applicable test" of Jackson's three factors; narrowly applied because the Court doesn't want to set any precedent
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United States v. Nixon
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The President claims his powers are needed to protect communications in the executive branch and also his immunity caused by the separate executive branch, but neither separation of powers nor the need for confidentiality “can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege”; this wasn't just an "intra-executive" dispute, but a criminal investigation; must weigh the President's privilege against the needs for justice
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Clinton v. Jones
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Clinton wanted the courts to wait until he was out of office to be prosecuted claiming official immunity, but “an official's absolute immunity should extend only to actions performed in a purely administrative capacity” (p. 422); immunities are grounded in “the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it”; thus his sexual dalliances are NOT part of his official duties
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Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha
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The House alone voted to deport Chadha, but the are only four provisions set forth in the Constitution in which only one house of Congress would have to act: initiating impeachments, Senate power to conduct impeachment trials, Senate power to confirm presidential appointments, and Senate's power to ratify treaties. Also this had something to do with a legislative veto
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Clinton v. City of New York
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the line item veto; the Court says this line item veto power violate[s] Article I section 7 of the Constitution
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Dames & Moore v. Regan
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President Jimmy Carter's Executive Order 12170, which froze Iranian assets in the United States on November 14, 1979 in response to the Iran hostage crisis which began on November 4, 1979; the courts are deferential to a strong executive power in foreign affairs
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United States v. Nixon
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a “generalized interest in confidentiality... cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial” (p. 403)
Nixon tried to claim the issue was intra-executive, but this is not true when there is a criminal proceeding |
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Clinton v. Jones
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the reason certain public servants get immunity is so they can better do their job without fear; they can do what they believe is right and necessary and be less cautious to save their own skin, and this serves the public by making officials better at their job; this clearly should not apply to unofficial conduct by those servants
Clinton's behavior is not protected because 1) it occurred before he was President and 2) it was not in his duties as President The Court narrowed this holding by saying this only applies to the President's charges in federal courts, he can't be compelled to attend, and there will be stays in extraordinary moments |
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Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha
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ruling in 1983 that the one-house legislative veto violated the constitutional separation of powers.
The are only four provisions set forth in the Constitution in which only one house of Congress would have to act: initiating impeachments, Senate power to conduct impeachment trials, Senate power to confirm presidential appointments, and Senate's power to ratify treaties. |
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Clinton v. City of New York
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The President's power to line-item veto and the Act's cancellation provisions violate Article I section 7 of the Constitution; although the President had traditional authority to decline to spend appropriated funds and later wide discretion, this gives him too much unilateral power
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Morrison v. Olson
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the Court ruled that the Independent Counsel Act was constitutional. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the sole dissenting opinion. The act does not increase the power of one branch at the expense of another because the officer was "inferior" and the how much does the executive branch care about a low-ranking officer/employee?
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Slaughter-House
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Due process and the privileges and immunities clause
"Read out" the privileges or immunities clause because the Court claimed it only protected the privileges and immunities guaranteed by federal citizenship, not by the States. So the butchers' rights were not violated by the State because the State didn't owe them the protection of the privileges or immunities clause Some thought the p/i clause was meant to incorporate the amendments but after this case that seemed like it wouldn't work the 14th amendment doesn't apply to the States but the 13th might |
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Lochner v. New York
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“there is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person or the right of free contract” (p. 492)
High watermark of substantive due process Overturns Slaughter-house which said that due process is procedural only, where here they add a substantive element |
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Incorporation of the Bill of Rights
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i. only a few substantive limitations in the body of the Constitution applied to the states, such as the prohibitions against bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and impairments of contracts
ii. Post-Civil War, the Court's attention shifted – the 14th amendment uses almost identical language to the 5th, but it applied to the states iii. The Due Process Clause has been interpreted: a) as giving parents a substantive due process right to raise their children b) “To fashion nontextual rights, most notably what is often called a right to 'privacy'” (p. 506) c) “to incorporate some, but not all, of the substantive limitations of the Bill of Rights, and to apply those limitations to the states by virtue of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment” |
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Board of Regents v. Roth
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Roth claimed Wisconsin State University's failure to rehire him violated his rights; the Court held “the requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the 14th amendment's protection of liberty and property”
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Goldberg v. Kelly
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a state that terminates public assistance payments to a particular recipient without affording him the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to termination denies the recipient of procedural due process
although the cost of a pre-hearing adjudication involves some greater expense, “the State is not without weapons to minimize these increased costs:” the interest of the eligible recipient in uninterrupted receipt of public assistance and the State's interest in not erroneously terminating benefits “clearly outweighs the State's competing concern to prevent and increase in its fiscal and administrative burdens” (p. 519) |
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Mathews v. Eldridge
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individuals have a statutorily granted property right in social security benefits (life, liberty, and here, property) and that the termination of those benefits implicates due process, but that the termination of Social Security benefits does not require a pre-termination hearing. Uses a balancing test, looking at the property interest involved, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the government interest
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The Civil Rights Cases
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Congress lacked the constitutional authority under the enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to outlaw racial discrimination by private individuals and organizations, rather than state and local governments. Effing racism and the construction of segregation...
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Shelley v. Kraemer
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courts cannot enforce racial covenants on real estate. They're not invalidated or unconstitutional, but they won't be enforced, which effectively repeals them
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Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority
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pre-Civil Rights Act case trying to distinguish what types of institutions could discriminate; here, since the restaurant was situated in publicly owned land and in a publicly owned building so it was financed by the State and an agent of the State as well -- no discrimination in State action; the restaurant and the State had a symbiotic relationship, thus the State was benefiting from the restaurant's discriminatory behavior
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Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.
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some person didn't want to pay for electricity and argued that the electric company was an agent of the State (State action) so it couldn't shut off her electricity because it would deprive her of her property without procedural due process; the Court said this is too far to be state action, even though the electric co. has a monopoly on power. The termination of her electricity was not a State action.
The line has to be drawn somewhere and this just isn't on the same side as Burton |
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Yick Wo v. Hopkins
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Where legislation is on its face fair but in its effects so dramatically discriminatory, especially in the way that it's applied, it is unconstitutional
It triggered the protection of the 14th amendment under due process |
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Plessy v. Ferguson
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"separate but equal"; 'separation of the races doesn't stamp one as inferior to the other; if it does, it's only because you think that, not because it's true'
Harlan's dissent: the Constitution is colorblind; public policy arguments |
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Brown v. Board
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you know; desegregation, it hurts children's feelings, segregation marks blacks as inferior, etc. etc.
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Bolling v. Sharpe
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desegregates DC, even though 14th only applies to the States because our nation's ideas of fairness and equal protection require it
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Brown v. Board II
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how to desegregate? "with all deliberate speed" which means absolutely nothing
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Washington v. Davis
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black cops failed the DC cop test A LOT; the Court looked to other factors of the program and saw that it was not discriminatory; the end results of the test were not conclusive of the program as a whole
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Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.
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“absent a pattern as stark as Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the Court must look to other evidence”
Court lists factors to look for, add these to this flashcard |
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Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
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it was unconstitutional that minorities could compete for 100 seats in the entering class, while white applicants could only compete for 84; “the guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color"; ethnic diversity is not the only kind of diversity; "minority whites"; Brenan dissent
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Grutter v. Bollinger
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U. Mich. Law School can take race into account as one indicator of diversity among many other factors considered in their admissions decisions; student body diversity is a compelling state interest and it's narrowly tailored; all legislation based on race is subject to strict scrutiny, not just to legislation affecting minorities; Scalia dissent -> the Const prohibits all race discrimination
Courts presume good faith in anti-discriminatory programs so the burden is on the challenger; but 'strict scrutiny' is not necessarily fatal Critical mass is not a quota but it means a certain unnamed number so that minorities will be completely overwhelmed |
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Plyler v. Doe
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Texas cannot deny education to illegal immigrants' children; illegal immigrants are not a suspect class, but their children's need for education is an important governmental interest and thus intermediate scrutiny kind of; Burger's dissent that "the Supreme Court is not some platonic guardian"; rational basis "with a bite"?
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Craig v. Boren
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gender discrimination-based alcohol purchase statute; it's subject to intermediate scrutiny
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Michael M. v. Superior Court
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statutory rape laws discriminate against men? no because there is an important state interest and this is substantially related to that aim; women have a natural sanction and punishment to sex – pregnancy; men have no such deterrence, so this law 'equalizes' the deterrents of the sexes; empirical data showed that sexual abuse of young females is a more serious problem than sexual abuse of young males
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Rostker v. Goldberg
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women not required to register for draft; the exclusion of women is closely related to Congress' purpose in authorizing registration because the purpose of the draft is to prepare combat troops; all branches of the army prohibit the participation of women in combat as a matter of established policy, thus men and women are simply not similarly situated for purposes of a draft or registration for a draft
Brennan, dissenting: the government should still register all women, then when the time comes, if only combat troops are required, they can only draft men |
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Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney
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a Massachusetts law prefers the hiring of veterans over non-veterans, resulting in an an overwhelming number of male employees, very few women; it's not unconstitutional on its face and passes intermediate scrutiny because we love veterans
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Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan
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male nurse denied admission to all-women nursing school; it fails the intermediate scrutiny (it discriminates based on gender) because the State interest wasn't seen as legitimate or important enough -- women lack no opportunities in nursing and there is no history if treating women unfairly in nursing; "exceedingly persuasive"
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United States v. Virginia
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VMI case; women will not fundamentally alter for the worse the "unique education opportunity" at the school
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San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
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different school districts spend vastly different amounts per child; education is not a fundamental right although it's very important so only rational basis test required
no strict scrutiny because the poor are not a suspect class because: i) they're not “saddled with disabilities” (p. 785) ii) no history of purposeful unequal treatment iii) no political powerlessness |
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Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson
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held that compulsory sterilization could not be imposed as a punishment for a crime because it punished similar white-collar crimes differently (extortion)
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Griswold v. Connecticut
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there is a fundamental right to privacy found in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights; use strict scrutiny for fundamental rights
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Roe v. Wade
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woman's right to an abortion; trimester framework; in the line of privacy rights; the privacy right is not absolute, and it must be considered against important state interests in regulation; “compelling state interest”; “a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health”
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Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
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Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause”
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Gonzales v. Carhart
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no partial birth abortions; this is no undue burden because there are other options which are just as safe, and this option will never be the only available/safe procedure to women
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Bowers v. Hardwick
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decided there is nothing in the Constitution or the traditions of the US that protect one's fundamental right to engage in gay sex
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Romer v. Evans
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a law in Colorado basically allows discrimination based on one's sexuality because the statute has little to do with the stated goals of the state; what is the legitimate state interest and what does this have to do with it??
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Lawrence v. Texas
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just kidding, there is a right to privacy which encompasses the right to consensual private sex; although the majority said that this was part of the right to privacy, which usually involves strict scrutiny, the Court only applied the rational basis test -- do homosexuals only get rational basis?
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Washington v. Glucksberg
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the “right to die” is not part of America's history, legal traditions, or practices; in fact, many of the old laws against assisting suicide; there is a right however to refuse medication; the State's interest in life is very strong and there are many ways this right could be abused by others (Denmark study)
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Vacco v. Quill
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It ruled that a New York ban on physician-assisted suicide was constitutional, and preventing doctors from assisting their patients, even those terminally ill and/or in great pain, was a legitimate state interest that was well within the authority of the state to regulate; again, no right to die
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Boumediene v. Bush
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Habeus is required, but if it's suspended there must be adequate substitutional aliens, not citizens
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Bush v. Gore
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nothing is a political question anymore
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