Con Law Final

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Gibbons v. Ogden (V)

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1824 - If a state law conflicts with conretional act regulating commerce the cong act is controling.

Ogden after getting monopoly from NYC and NJ sought to enjoin Gibbons (D) from operating his ships, tween same ports.

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NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (V)

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1937 - Under the Commerce clause congress has the power to regulate any activity even intrastate production if the activity has an appreciable effect either direct or inderect on interstate commerece.

Manufacturing comp (D) subs in sev states, chargeed w/unfair lab practice, under NLRAct in def D claimed that the act was an unconstitutional attempt to regulate intrastate production.

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Wickard v. Filburn (V)

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1942 - Farm production which is intended for consumption on the farm is subject to Congrs's com pow since it may have a substantial economic effct on interstate Commerce.

Filburn (D) was ordered to pay a penalty imposed by the agriculture adjustment act for producing wheat in excess of his assigned quota, he argued that fed regs couldn't be const applied to his crops bec part of his crop was intended for his own consumption.

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City of Boene v. Flores (v)

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1997 - The RFRA unconstitutionally exceeds congress's enforcement pow under the due process clause of the 14th am.

The Rel Frdom Rest Act. prohibited the gov from subs burdnng, a per's exrcs of rel, even if burd is reslt of gen app law, unless the gove has a compelling interest in using the least restrictive means. Flores (P) sought to build a permit to expand chrch (landmark). The city denied, an P sued invoking RFRA exceeded cong powe but the 5th cir reversed holding act const. B Appealed.

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Board of Trustees v. Garret (V)

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2001 - The ADA prov requiring employers to make reasonable accomodations for disabled workers is unconstitutional as applied to state employees.

When G (P) and Ash (P) both partially physically disabled state employees they were refudsed their requests under ADA for reasonable accomodations, they sued the state (D) for money damages.

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Katzenbach v. Morgan (V)s

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Appellee registered voters challenged the constitutionality of § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1973b(e), which provided that no person who met specified educational requirements could be denied the right to vote due to inability to speak or write English, insofar as the Act prohibited enforcement of N.Y. Const. art. II, § 1 and N.Y. Elec. Law § 150, which provided that no person could become entitled to vote unless such person was also able, except for physical disability, to read and write English. The district court granted declaratory and injunctive relief to appellees, holding that in enacting § 4(e) Congress exceeded the powers granted to it by the Constitution and usurped powers reserved to the states by U.S. Const. amend. X. Appeal was taken directly to the Court, which reversed. It held that under the McCulloch v. Maryland standard, § 4 of the Act was "plainly adapted" to furthering the Equal Protection Clause and that its remedies constituted means consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution.

It therefore held that the state English literacy requirement could not be enforced to the extent that it was inconsistent with § 4(e) of the Act.

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US v. Morrison (V)s

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The pub, which defendant owned but was unable to maintain mortgage payments on, burned down one day before a foreclosure sale was to be held. Four experts agreed that the fire was probably of incendiary origin and that an accelerant could have been introduced into the locked building through holes in a wall above the dance floor. On appeal, the court found that sufficient circumstantial evidence of guilt was introduced to convict defendant, including his surreptitious purchase of two gallons of gasoline the night before the fire, his asking a government witness to supply him with a false alibi, and an acquaintance's testimony that defendant admitted injuring his eyes when trying to burn down the pub once before. Because the pub was leased by lessors who bought liquor from out-of-state distributors, the interstate commerce element of 18 U.S.C.S. § 844(i) was satisfied. Defendant's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered impeachment evidence, i.e., a government witness's specific instances of misconduct under Fed. R. Evid. 608(b), was properly denied. An obstruction of justice enhancement under USSG § 3C1.1 for threatening a witness after trial had ended was proper.

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Gonzales v. Oregon (V)s

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The interpretive rule determined that using controlled substances to assist suicide was not a legitimate medical practice and that dispensing or prescribing drugs for that purpose was unlawful under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C.S. § 801 et seq. The validity of the interpretive rule was the issue before the Court. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04 (2005) used the terms "legitimate medical purpose" and "the course of professional practice," but this just repeated these statutory phrases while giving little or no instruction on the question of who was to decide whether a particular activity was in "the course of professional practice" or done for a "legitimate medical purpose." The court held that since the regulation gave no indication how to decide that issue, the Attorney General's effort to decide it could not be considered an interpretation of the regulation. The issue was not the meaning of the regulation, but the meaning of the statute. The Attorney General's rulemaking power to fulfill his duties under the CSA did not include the power to declare illegitimate a medical standard for care and treatment of patients that was specifically authorized under state law.

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US v. Mclung (V)s

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An injunction restraining appellant from enforcing Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against appellee came before the court on direct appeal. The court stated that it was important that a decision on the constitutionality of the Act be announced quickly because interference with governmental action had occurred. Appellee served food procured via interstate commerce and served interstate travellers, but refused to serve Negroes. The district court held that the Commerce Clause did not apply because there was no demonstrable connection between food purchased in interstate commerce and the conclusion of Congress that discrimination in the restaurant would affect commerce. The court stated that the enforcement of Title II had already been found to be a valid exercise of the power to regulate commerce by requiring hotels to serve transients without regard to their race or color and held it was equally valid in the case of restaurants. By refusing to serve Negroes, the restaurant spent less money, restricted the ability of Negroes to travel interstate, and obstructed interstate commerce. The court therefore held the regulatory scheme of Title II was valid.

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Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States (V)s

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The motel, which discriminated in the renting of its rooms on the basis of race, sought review of a judgment by attacking the constitutionality of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The motel contended that in enacting the statute Congress exceeded its power to regulate commerce under the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 3, and violated the Fifth and Thirteenth Amendments. Affirming the judgment, the Court held that the power of Congress over interstate commerce extended to those intrastate activities that so affected interstate commerce or the exercise of Congressional power over it to make regulation of them an appropriate means to exercise its power over interstate commerce. Further, the power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also included the power to regulate the local incidents thereof, including local activities in both the state of origin and destination, which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce. Accordingly, Congress was within its power to prohibit racial discrimination by motels serving travelers, however local their operations appeared.

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United States v. Lopez (v)s

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The Supreme Court held that while Congress had broad lawmaking authority under the Commerce Clause, it was not unlimited, and did not apply to something as far from commerce as carrying handguns, especially when there was no evidence that carrying them affected the economy on a massive scale. (A later case, United States v. Morrison (2000), ruled that Congress could not make such laws even when there was evidence of aggregate effect.)

Chief Justice Rehnquist, delivering the opinion of the court, wrote that Congress had the power to regulate only:

the channels of commerce,
the instrumentalities of commerce,
or persons or things in interstate commerce,
even if the threat comes from intrastate activities, and
action that substantially affects interstate commerce, in relation to a broad regulatory scheme

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Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (V)s

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Petitioner shareholders brought their actions to enjoin enforcement of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 991. Respondents, coal mining companies, their directors, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue of the United States, all claimed that the statute was a constitutional regulation under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Court reversed those orders that upheld the constitutionality of the statute. The Court held that the action of the shareholders was not premature because of the impending action of respondents. The Court held that coal mining was not part of commerce in a constitutional sense. The Court held that mining was a local industry, and that the result that Congress undertook to achieve was beyond the power of Congress because it could not be realized by any exercise of specific power granted by the Constitution. The Court found that the primary contemplation of the Act was stabilization of the mining industry through the regulation of labor and prices. The Court held that the regulation of labor on a local level was beyond the purview of the Commerce Clause.

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ALA Shechter Poultry Corp v. US (V)s

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Following the conviction of appellant marketmen of illegal trade practices in the sale of poultry in violation of the National Industrial Recovery Act (Act) and provisions of the Code of Fair Competition for the Live Poultry Industry of Metropolitan New York, appellant sought review of the decision. Appellants contended that the Act was an invalid delegation of legislative power by congress to the president. The court held that the authority to delegate to the president by 15 U.S.C.S. § 703 (a) and 15 U.S.C.S. § 703 (b) was confined within constitutional limits. The court reasoned that the section was an effective means of the congressional exercise of its constitutional functions. The court found that the president was to make detailed regulations in conformance with the general standards in order that the congressional purpose might be realized. The court concluded that such was a valid delegation. The court also found that there was ample evidence to support the conviction for conspiracy. The court reversed the convictions regarding the hours per week for slaughterhouse employees because they had no direct concern with interstate commerce. All other convictions were affirmed.

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Griswold v. Connecticut (IV)

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Defendants appealed from their convictions under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-32 (rev. 1958) as accessories. They contended that the application of the accessory statute, which was Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-196 (rev. 1958), violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The appellate court affirmed their convictions, as did the state supreme court. On further appeal, the Court first held that as accessories, defendants had standing to challenge the substantive law and to raise the constitutional rights of the married people with whom they had a professional relationship. In examining the United States Constitution, the Court found a right of privacy implicit in the Third Amendment's prohibition against the quartering of soldiers, the Fourth Amendment's right of people to be secure in their persons, the Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination, and the Ninth Amendment's right to retain rights not enumerated in the Constitution. The right of privacy to use birth control measures was found to be a legitimate one. Thus, the Court concluded that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-32 (rev. 1958) was unconstitutional.

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Eisenstadt v. Baird (IV)s

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Appellant was convicted of, among other things, giving vaginal foam to an unmarried woman at the close of a lecture, a violation of Mass. Gen. Law Ann. ch. 272, § 21. The district court dismissed appellant's petition for habeas corpus relief, but the circuit court vacated the district court's order, and remanded with instructions to grant the writ. The Court affirmed the circuit court's order. Appellant had standing to assert the rights of unmarried people to access the contraception because he served as an advocate for this third-party right. In so ruling, the Court emphasized that the reason for giving away the foam was to test the statute. Then, the Court held that the state statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of U.S. Const. amend. XIV. There was no rational reason for the different treatment of married and unmarried people. The right of privacy to be free of unwanted intrusions into the fundamental decision of whether to have children was the same for married and unmarried alike. The Court rejected appellee's argument that the distinction was health related, noting that unmarried persons had as great an interest in avoiding the spread of harmful diseases.

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Roe v. Wade (IV)

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Plaintiffs, a pregnant single woman and a married couple, and intervenor physician sued defendant district attorney challenging the constitutionality of Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 1191-1194, and 1196 (abortion laws), and sought an injunction. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas declared that the laws violated U.S. Const. amends. IX and XIV privacy rights and was vague and overbroad, but denied the injunction.

OVERVIEW: Plaintiffs and intervenor appealed directly to the instant Court on the injunctive rulings. The State cross-appealed from the declaratory judgment. The Court affirmed the judgment, holding that abortion was within the scope of the personal liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. This right was not absolute, but could be regulated by narrowly drawn legislation aimed at vindicating legitimate, compelling state interests in the mother’s health and safety and the potentiality of human life. The former became compelling, and was thus grounds for regulation after the first trimester of pregnancy, beyond which the state could regulate abortion to preserve and protect maternal health. The latter became compelling at viability, upon which a state could proscribe abortion except to preserve the mother’s life or health. The Texas statutes made no distinction between abortions performed early in pregnancy and those performed later, and it limited the legal justification for the procedure to a single reason --saving the mother's life -- so it could not survive the constitutional attack. This conclusion made it unnecessary for the Court to consider the doctor's vagueness challenge.

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Maher v. Roe (IV)s

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Appellee indigent women challenged a regulation of appellant Commissioner of Social Services of Connecticut, which imposed conditions on its payment for abortion services. On remand from the court of appeals, the district court invalidated the regulation. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment as it erred in holding the regulation violated the equal protection clause of U.S. Const. amend. XIV. There was no suspect class involved as an indigent woman desiring an abortion did not come within the limited category of recognized disadvantaged classes, and the fact that the impact of the regulation fell upon those who could not pay did not lead to a different conclusion. The regulation placed no obstacle to obtaining an abortion and did not create the indigency that made it difficult or impossible to obtain an abortion. The funding scheme did not involve a suspect class or the impingement of a fundamental right. The regulation rationally furthered the state's legitimate interest in encouraging normal childbirth and it was not unreasonable to insist upon a prior showing of medical necessity to insure that state money was being spent only for authorized purposes.

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Harris v. McCrae (IV)s

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Appellees, class of pregnant women, sought an injunction to prohibited enforcement of the Hyde Amendment to the Medicaid Act, Title XIX of the Social Security Act, arguing that it contravened the equal protection guarantees of the Due Process Clause, under U.S. Const. amend V, and the Religion Clauses, under U.S. Const. amend. I, by denying public funding for medically necessary abortions. The district court invalidated the amendment. The government sought review by the court. The court reversed, holding that Title XIX did not require a participating state to pay for medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement was unavailable under the Hyde Amendment. The court held that the funding restrictions of the Hyde Amendment did not violate U.S. Const. amends. I, V. Appellees lacked standing to raise a challenge to the Hyde Amendment under the Free Exercise Clause of U.S. Const. amend. I. The Due Process Clause did not confer an entitlement to funds in order to obtain an abortion or any other protected right. The fact that the funding restrictions coincided with the religious tenets of the Roman Catholic Church did not, without more, contravene the Establishment Clause.

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Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (IV)

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A Missouri statute stated in its preamble, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 1.205.1(1), (2) (1986), a finding that human life began at conception and that unborn children had protectable interests in life and well-being. Among other things, the statute prohibited the use of public employees and facilities to perform abortions not necessary to save the mother's life, and it prohibited the use of public funds to counsel a woman to have an abortion that was not necessary to save her life. On appeal, the Court reasoned that it was not necessary to determine the constitutionality of the statute's preamble because it simply expressed a value judgment and did not regulate abortions. The Court declined to invalidate the statute's prohibition against the use of public funds, employees, and facilities to provide abortions because the prohibition placed no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chose to have an abortion. She was no less off than if the state had chosen not to provide public health care. The Court found that the statute's prohibition against public funded counseling in favor of abortions was moot because appellees contended that they were not adversely affected by this provision.

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Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. CASEY(IV)

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On remand from the Supreme Court and the court of appeals, the district court allowed applicants to reopen the record in their constitutional challenge to Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act (Act), 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 3203-3220 (1990), and continued its order enjoining the Commonwealth from enforcing various provisions of the Act. After the court of appeals held that the district court's order was inconsistent with law set forth by the Supreme Court and the court of appeals, the Court declined to stay the mandate of the court of appeals. The Court analyzed three factors to determine whether such application should be granted: likelihood of irreparable injury if the stay were not issued, reasonable probability that the Court would grant certiorari, and a fair prospect that the applicants would ultimately prevail on the merits. The Court found that, if applicants' allegations were proven, the first factor would support a stay, but that the other two factors pointed against such a ruling. The Court ruled that the court of appeals' opinion was not such an arguable departure from the Court's mandate as to warrant discretionary review or an award of the relief the applicants sought.

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Stenberg v. Carhart (IV)

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Plaintiff physician filed suit challenging the constitutionality of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-328 (Supp. 1999), which criminalized performance of "partial birth abortions." The district court found the statute unconstitutional, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it lacked any exception for the preservation of the health of the mother. Where substantial medical authority supported the proposition that banning a particular abortion procedure could endanger women's health, a prohibitory statute must include a health exception when the procedure is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother. The statute was also unconstitutional because it imposed an undue burden on a woman's ability to choose a more common abortion procedure, thereby unduly burdening the right to choose abortion itself. The Court rejected a proffered narrowing interpretation of the statute because it conflicted with statutory language, and held that it was not required to certify the interpretation question to state court because the statute was not fairly susceptible to a narrowing construction.

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Gonzales v. Carhart (IV)

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The Court applied the Casey standard, which included the central premise that the Government had a legitimate, substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life. The Court concluded that this premise would be repudiated if it affirmed the judgments. The Court held that the Act, on its face, was not void for vagueness and did not impose an undue burden from any overbreadth. The Court rejected respondents' contention that the scope of the Act was indefinite. The Act clearly proscribed performing only the intact dilation and evacuation procedure. Further, the Act's scienter requirement narrowed the scope of the Act's prohibition and limited prosecutorial discretion. The restrictions on second-trimester abortions were not too broad because the Act provided specific anatomical landmarks and included an overt-act requirement. The Court also held that the Act's failure to allow the banned procedure's use where necessary for the mother's health did not have the effect of imposing an unconstitutional burden of the abortion right because safe medical options were available. The Court found that the proper means to consider exceptions was by as-applied rather than facial challenges.

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Moore v. City of East Cleaveland (IV)s

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Appellant argued that appellee municipality's housing ordinance, which categorized a second grandchild living in appellant's home as an illegal occupant, violated the Due Process Clause of U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The court agreed, saying that the ordinance bore no rational relationship to permissible state objectives. This ordinance did not distinguish between related and unrelated individuals, the court explained, but sliced into the family and regulated what categories of relatives might live together. Such intrusion into family life was not constitutionally protected. Rejecting arguments that the ordinance served to prevent overcrowding, minimize traffic, and avoid burdening the public school system, the court held that the provision had but a tenuous relation to the alleviation of these objectives. Nor was the constitutional right to live together as a family limited to the nuclear family, the court ruled, as the extended family traditionally played a role in providing sustenance and security. Cutting off protection of family rights at the first convenient boundary, the nuclear family, was arbitrary and could not be justified.

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Zablocki v. Redhail (IV)s

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Wisconsin residents were prevented under Wis. Stat. § 245.10 (1973) from marrying if they were behind in their child support obligations or if the children to whom they were obligated were likely to become public charges. In a class action brought by the residents under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983, the county clerks contended that the statute assisted the state to counsel residents on their financial obligations and protected the children to whom support was owed. The Court, however, found that the statute violated equal protection in that it directly and substantially interfered with the fundamental right to marry without being closely tailored to effectuate the state's interests. The Court noted that other future financial obligations were not curtailed, only those that might be associated with marriage, and further found that the effect of the statute was that more illegitimate children would be born.

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Michael H. v. Gerald D. (IV)

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Mother and respondent were married. Mother had an adulterous relationship with petitioner father. As a result petitioner child was born. Respondent was listed as father on child's birth certificate and held child out to the world as his daughter. Blood tests showed a 98.07 percent probability that petitioner was child's father. For a time, mother resided with petitioner, who held child out as his daughter. Mother subsequently moved and rebuffed father's attempts to visit child. Petitioner filed a filiation action to establish his paternity and right to visitation. Child filed a cross-complaint asserting that if she had more than one de facto father, she was entitled to maintain her filial relationship with both. Mother and respondent reconciled. Respondent intervened, and the superior court granted his motion for summary judgment against petitioner and child. The California Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court denied discretionary review. The Supreme Court affirmed.

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Bowers v. Hardwick (IV) (Red marked)

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Respondent was charged with violating O.G.C.A. § 16-6-2 (1984), which criminalized sodomy. Respondent allegedly engaged in sodomy with another adult male in the bedroom of his home. After the district attorney decided not to present the matter to the grand jury unless further evidence developed, respondent brought suit in federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of the statute insofar as it criminalized consensual sodomy. The court of appeals held that § 16-6-2 violated respondent's fundamental rights because his homosexual activity was a private and intimate association that was beyond the reach of state regulation by reason of U.S. Const. amends. XI and XIV. Reversing that judgment, the Court held that the Due Process Clause of U.S. Const. amend. XIV did not confer any fundamental right on homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy, even if the conduct occurred in the privacy of their own homes.

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Lawrence v. Texas (IV)

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n the 6-3 ruling, the justices struck down the sodomy law that had criminalized homosexual sex in Texas. The court had previously addressed the same issue in 1986 in Bowers v. Hardwick, where it upheld a challenged Georgia statute, not finding a constitutional protection of sexual privacy.

Lawrence explicitly overruled Bowers, holding that it had viewed the liberty interest too narrowly. The majority held that intimate consensual sexual conduct was part of the liberty protected by substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Lawrence has the effect of invalidating similar laws throughout the United States that purport to criminalize homosexual activity between consenting adults acting in private. It may also invalidate the application of sodomy laws to heterosexual sex based solely on morality concerns.

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Cruzan v. Director, MIssouri Dept. of Health (IV)

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Petitioners, parents suing on their behalf and on behalf of their daughter, requested a court order directing the withdrawal of their daughter's artificial feeding and hydration equipment after she was rendered vegetative in an auto accident. The appellate court denied their petition holding that petitioners lacked authority to effectuate the request because there was no clear and convincing evidence of the daughter's desire to have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn as required under the Missouri Living Will statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 459.010 et seq. (1986). The United States Supreme Court affirmed. It said that the Due Process Clause, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, did not require the state to repose judgment on matters concerning the right to refuse treatment with anyone but the patient herself. The Court held that a state could choose to defer only to the patient's wishes rather than confide the decision to close family members.

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Washington v. Glucksberg (IV)

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Respondents brought a suit seeking a declaration that Washington state's ban on physician-assisted suicide, Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060(1) (1994), was unconstitutional on its face. On review, the United States Supreme Court held that history, legal traditions, and practice support criminalizing assisted suicide. The Court held that the assisted-suicide ban was rationally related to a legitimate government interest because Washington sought to preserve human life and also uphold the integrity and ethics of the medical profession. Additionally, Washington's statute sought to protect vulnerable groups, such as the poor, elderly, and disabled from abuse, neglect, and mistakes. Finally, the Court held that Washington's ban on assisted-suicide effectively prevented a broader license to voluntary or involuntary euthanasia. Thus, the Court reversed judgment in favor of petitioners.

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Slaughterhouse Cases (IV)

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Privileges and immunities of citizenship of the United States were to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment not privileges and immunities of citizenship of a state.
" there is a citizenship of the United States, and a citizenship of a state, which are distinct from each other, and which depend upon different characteristics or circumstances in the individual."
Justice Stephen J. Field - embracing the common law presumption in favor of an individual right to pursue a legitimate occupation. Field's reading of the due process clause of the amendment would prevail in future cases in which the court read the amendment broadly to protect property interests against hostile state laws.

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Barron v. Baltimore (IV)

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State governments are not bound by the Fifth Amendment's requirement for just compensation in cases of eminent domain.

established a precedent on whether the United States Bill of Rights could be applied to state governments. John Barron owned a profitable wharf in the Baltimore harbor. He sued the mayor of Baltimore for damages, claiming that when the city had diverted the flow of streams while engaging in street construction, it had created mounds of sand and earth near his wharf making the water too shallow for most vessels.

5th amendment does not restrict states.

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Murray v. Hoboken Land & improvement (IV)

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This case arose from an action of ejectment, in which both parties claimed title to certain property. Defendants claimed title under a sale by virtue of what was referred to as a distress warrant, issued by the solicitor of the treasury under an act of Congress. The judges for the court below were in disagreement as to whether the sale was valid in that there was some question as to whether the statute that produced the distress warrant proceeding was constitutional. The United States Supreme Court found that under the constitution of the United States, an individual from whom a balance of account had been found due, would not be deprived of his liberty, or property by having payment of that balance enforced without the exercise of the judicial power of the United States. The Court also found that after the levy of the distress warrant had begun, that individual could bring before a district court the question of whether he was actually indebted as recited in the warrant. Thus, the Court answered the lower court's question by finding that there was no constitutional problem with the distress warrant and that the sale was valid.

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Twining v. New Jersey (IV)

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(1908), was a 1908 U.S. Supreme Court case. The case involved two men charged with fraud in New Jersey who claimed 5th Amendment protection and refused to testify during their trial. The jury was told of the men's failure to testify, and the men were convicted. They appealed, arguing that the instructions to the jury violated their 5th Amendment privilege to not incriminate themselves.

The Supreme Court used the case to decide if the 5th Amendment right was valid during trials by state courts and not just federal courts. Before the adoption of the 14th Amendment, the Bill of Rights, including the 5th Amendment, did not apply to state courts. The court cited the decision in the Slaughter-house cases that the language in the 14th Amendment, "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States...", did not curtail state power. The Supreme Court voted 8 to 1 that the 5th Amendment rights to not self incriminate applied only to federal court cases. John Marshall Harlan was the lone dissenter.

The Supreme Court overruled this decision in 1964 in Malloy v. Hogan.

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Palko v. Connecticut (IV)

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Defendant appealed a judgment that affirmed the death sentence imposed on the ground that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 6494, which allowed the State to appeal in a criminal case, violated U.S. Const. amend. XIV because it allowed defendant to be tried twice and thus subjected him to double jeopardy in violation of U.S. Const. amend. V. The United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that not all U.S. Const. amend. V rights were applicable to the states through U.S. Const. amend. XIV, and the state could choose not to adopt a right if it was not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty, and its abolishment would not violate a principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of the American people as to be ranked as fundamental. The Court ruled that the state statute did not deny petitioner due process of law because allowing a retrial did not violate fundamental principles of liberty and justice where it was only done to ensure a trial free from substantial legal error.

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Adamson v. California (IV)

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Defendant contended that he could not take the stand to deny the evidence against him because he would be subjected to a cross-examination as to former crimes to impeach his veracity and the evidence so produced could have brought about his conviction. Such cross-examination was allowable in California under Cal. Penal Code § 1323 and Cal. Const. art. I, § 13, and defendant contended that they denied him due process. The court affirmed. The due process clause did not protect defendant's freedom from giving testimony by compulsion in state trials. The Fourteenth Amendment prevented a state from abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, but a state was free to abridge, within the limits of the due process clause, the privileges and immunities flowing from state citizenship. Failure of defendant to testify was not an admission of the truth of the adverse evidence. Instructions told the jury that the burden of proof remained upon the state and the presumption of innocence with defendant. Comment on failure to deny proven facts did not in California tend to supply any missing element of proof of guilt.

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Duncan v. Luisiana (IV)

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Defendant was charged with simple battery, a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum of two years imprisonment and a $ 300 fine. Defendant sought trial by jury, but because the Louisiana Constitution grants jury trials only in cases in which capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor may be imposed, the trial court denied the request. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to serve 60 days in the parish prison and pay a fine of $ 150. After the state supreme court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari, defendant sought review in the federal court. The Court held that a crime punishable by two years in prison was a serious crime and not a petty offense. Consequently, defendant was entitled to a jury trial and the trial court erred in denying it. In so ruling, the Court opined that the right to trial by jury guaranteed defendants in criminal cases in federal courts by the U.S. Const. art. III and by the Sixth Amendment was also guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to defendants tried in state courts.

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Lochner v. New York (IV)

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The state supreme court, which found that the employer allowed his employee, a baker, to work more than 60 hours in one week in violation of 1897 N.Y. Laws art. 8, ch. 415, § 110, upheld the labor law as a constitutional exercise of the state's police power. The United States Supreme Court reversed. The general right to make a contract in relation to one's business, and the right to purchase or to sell labor, was part of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The statute was not necessary as a health law to safeguard the public health or the health of the individuals who labored as bakers. The trade of a baker was not an unhealthy one to such a degree that would authorize the legislature to interfere with the right to labor and the right of free contract on the part of the individual. Various regulations already governed the cleanliness of the quarters in which bakeries were to be conducted. Restricting the number of hours that a baker could work would not further the purpose of those regulations. It was not possible to discover the connection between the number of hours a baker could work and the quality of the bread that he produced. Seen as a bad case today

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Lochner Rejected? (IV)

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In the post-Lochner era, the Supreme Court has applied a lower standard (rational basis test) in reviewing restrictions on economic liberty, but stricter standards in reviewing legislation impinging on personal liberties, especially privacy. A line of cases dating back to the 1923 opinion by Justice McReynolds in Meyer v. Nebraska (citing Lochner as establishing limits on the police power) has established a privacy right under substantive due process. More recently, in Roe v. Wade (1973), the Supreme Court held that a woman had a privacy right to determine whether or not to have an abortion. In 1992, Planned Parenthood v. Casey reaffirmed that right, though the Court no longer used the term "privacy" to describe it.

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Nebbia v. New York (IV)

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The New York Legislature passed a Milk Control Law that established a Milk Control Board with the power to fix minimum and maximum retail prices charged by stores to consumers for milk. Defendant was a storekeeper who was found to have sold milk for less than the price fixed by the Board's order. Defendant asserted that the statute and order violated the equal protection clause and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that the contention that discrimination deprived defendant of equal protection was not well founded because there was no showing that the order placed him at a disadvantage or affected him adversely. As the dairy industry was one subject to regulation in the public interest, there was no constitutional principle barring the state from correcting existing deficiencies by legislation fixing prices. In light of the fact that the board's order was not unreasonable or arbitrary and that constitutional due process protections did not prohibit the state from fixing the selling price of milk, defendant's conviction was appropriate.

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West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (IV)

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A female employee filed an action for back wages under the Washington Minimum Wages for Women Act. The Supreme Court held that the Act did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it was a valid exercise of the state's police power to protect the health and safety of women. The Court reasoned that the state had a valid interest in the wages paid to women because their support would fall on the state if women were not paid adequate wages. The Court specifically overruled a case relied on by the employer which held that minimum wages laws for women were an unconstitutional burden on the right to contract. The Court reasoned that the case could not stand because employers and employees did not stand on equal footing in the contract process, and the state's interest in the protection of women was valid. The Court held that equal protection was not violated because there was no doctrinal requirement that required the legislation to be couched in all-embracing terms. The Act was directed at a social position unique to women, so the Act did not constitute arbitrary discrimination.

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United States v. Carolene Products (IV)

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Appellant United States obtained an indictment against appellee corporation for a violation of the Filled Milk Act (Act), 21 U.S.C.S. §§ 61-63, which prohibited the shipment of adulterated milk in interstate commerce. Holding that a rational basis for legislation was all that the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process required, the Court reversed. The Court first declared the Act a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. The Court then held that the Act did not infringe the Fifth Amendment, as nothing in the guarantee of due process prohibited a national or state legislature from enacting laws for the protection of their citizens. Further, the Court noted the presumption of constitutionality inherent in legislative acts. The Court held that its function, at least with respect to acts not implicating specific constitutional prohibitions, restricting political processes aimed at the repeal of undesirable legislation, or prejudicing "discrete and insular minorities," was to determine if a rational basis existed for the act, and if so, to uphold it.

Front 42

Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma (IV)

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The optician sought to have Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 59, §§ 941-947 (1951) declared unconstitutional because the effect of § 941 was to forbid an optician from fitting or duplicating lenses without a prescription from an ophthalmologist or optometrist. In practical effect, it meant that no optician could fit old glasses into new frames or supply a lens without a prescription. The trial court found that portions of the statute were unconstitutional. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that, although the law might have exacted a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases, it was for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement. In reversing the judgment, the Court held that the law did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the law's prohibition on the use of advertising for the sale of eyeglasses and lenses was constitutional because the legislature could treat all who dealt with the human eye as members of a profession who should use no merchandising methods for obtaining customers.

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Ferguson v. Skrupa (IV)

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The statute enjoined by the district court made it a misdemeanor for any person to engage in the business of debt adjusting, except as an incident to the lawful practice of law. The business owner alleged he was in the business of debt adjusting, that his business was a useful and desirable one, and that, therefore, the business could not be absolutely prohibited by the State. On appeal from the district court's decision, the Court held that the legislation did not violate the Due Process Clause. States had the power to legislate against what were found to be injurious practices in their internal commercial and business affairs so long as their laws did not run afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibition or of some valid federal law. When the subject lay within the State's police power, debatable questions as to reasonableness were not for the courts but for the legislature. The Court further held that the statute's exception of lawyers did not constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws to nonlawyers. Statutes created many classifications that did not deny equal protection; it was only invidious discrimination that offended the Constitution.

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Strauder v. West Virginia (IV)

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Defendant, plaintiff in error, was convicted of murder. Prior to trial, he petitioned for removal under U.S. Rev. Stat. § 641, which provided for removal when individuals in state court were denied their civil rights. Defendant objected to the fact that black men were ineligible for jury duty under 1873-73 W. Va. Act 102. The court held that the state statute unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of race and that it amounted to a denial of equal protection. The court further ruled that the congressional power to enforce U.S. Const. amend. XIV gave Congress sufficient authority to enact the federal removal statute. The court concluded that Congress had the power to authorize removal when a right under federal law or the U.S. Constitution was involved. Therefore, it was error for the state trial court to proceed to trial after defendant filed for removal based on a denial of equal protection.

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Korematsu v. United States (IV)

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Petitioner challenged the assumptions underlying the order and claimed that when the exclusion order was enacted, all danger of Japanese invasion of the exclusion area had disappeared. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the exclusion order under which petitioner was convicted was valid and, thus, upheld the conviction. Because the order curtailed the rights of a group based on national origin, the order was inherently suspect and rigid scrutiny was applied. The Court found that the exclusion order, like a previously upheld curfew order, was intended to prevent espionage and sabotage in threatened areas during war. The exclusion from such an area was closely related to the intent of the order. Moreover, the Court could not reject the judgment of the military and Congress that there were disloyal members of the population who constituted a menace to the national defense and safety. Compulsory exclusion of groups of citizens from their homes, except under circumstances of direst emergency and peril, was inconsistent with the basic governmental institutions. However, the Court held that the exclusion order was justified by the exigencies of war and the threat to national security.

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Loving v. Virginia (IV)

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Appellants were indicted on charges of violating the state's ban on interracial marriages. After their conviction, appellants took up residence out-of-state and instituted a class action requesting that Va. Code Ann. §§ 20-58 and 20-59, the state antimiscegenation statutes, be declared unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, which had affirmed appellants' convictions and had upheld the constitutionality of the statutes. The Court rejected the notion that the mere "equal application" of a statute containing racial classifications was enough to remove the classification from the U.S. Const. amend. XIV's proscription of all invidious racial discriminations and held there was no legitimate overriding purpose which justified the classification. The Court found that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violated the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause and deprived appellants of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

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Hunter v. Erickson (IV)

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The buyer filed a complaint with the housing commission, asserting that she was denied equal housing opportunity in violation of the fair housing ordinance because of her race. The commission refused to process the complaint because of the charter amendment. The buyer then brought her action. The Supreme Court held that the charter discriminated against minorities, and constituted a real, substantial, and invidious denial of the equal protection of the laws. Although the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, and Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112 et seq. were related to open housing, they were not intended to preempt local housing ordinances or provide rights and remedies that were effective substitutes for the ordinance. The case could not be considered moot since the ordinance provided an enforcement mechanism unmatched by either state or federal legislation. The city charter placed special burdens on racial minorities within the governmental process, which was not permissible. The mayor was subject to those constitutional limitations that had been duly adopted and remain unrepealed.

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Washington v. Davis (IV)

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Racial discrimination by the state must contain two elements: a racially disproportionate impact and discriminatory motivation on the part of the state actor.

was a United States Supreme Court case regarding the application of the Equal Protection Clause. Two African Americans had applied for positions in the Washington, DC police department, and sued after being turned down. They claimed that the department used racially discriminatory hiring procedures, by implementing a test of verbal skills (Test 21), which was failed disproportionately by African Americans. The Court ruled against them, finding that use of the test did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.

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Village of Arlington Heights v. MHDC (IV)

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Respondent Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (MHDC), a nonprofit developer, contracted to purchase a tract within the boundaries of petitioner Village in order to build racially integrated low- and moderate-income housing. The contract was contingent upon securing rezoning as well as federal housing assistance. After the Village denied rezoning, MHDC and minorities claimed viol of EPC14th Amendment and the Fair Housing Act.

Rule of Law and Holding
Official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact. "[Such] impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination." A racially discriminatory intent, as evidenced by such factors as disproportionate impact, the historical background of the challenged decision, the specific antecedent events, departures from normal procedures, and contemporary statements of the decisionmakers, must be shown.

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Rogers v. Lodge (IV)

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Facts: Burke Cnty is a large rural cnty with a population of 19K, 10K or 35% are Af. American. Whites constitute a maj or the voting age population. Cnty Bd governs the Cnty and is composed of 5 members for 4yr terms, all are white. No Af. American has been elected to the Bd.

Issue(s): Whether the at-large system of elections in Burke Cnty GA dilutes the voting power of Af. Americans and therefore violates the 14th Amend rights of the black citizens of that Cnty?

Holding: An at large election system that is maintained for the purpose of denying Af. Am’s equal access to the political process is UnConst’l.

Front 51

Personnel Administrator of Massachussetts v. Feeney (IV)

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During her 12-year tenure as a state employee, appellee, who is not a veteran, had passed a number of open competitive civil service examinations for better jobs, but because of Massachusetts' veterans' preference statute, she was ranked in each instance below male veterans who had achieved lower test scores than appellee. Under the statute, all veterans who qualify for state civil service positions must be considered for appointment ahead of any qualifying nonveterans. Appellee brought an action in Federal District Court, alleging that the absolute-preference formula established in the Massachusetts statute inevitably operates to exclude women from consideration for the best state civil service jobs and thus discriminates against women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Rule of Law and Holding
Massachusetts, in granting an absolute lifetime preference to veterans, has not discriminated against women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Front 52

Regents of the U of CA v. Bakke (IV)

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The Court held that while affirmative action systems are constitutional, a quota system based on race is unconstitutional. Universities could use race as a plus factor.

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City of Richmond v. Croson (IV)

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Appellant city council adopted a plan that required prime contractors to whom the city awarded construction contracts to subcontract at least 30 percent of the dollar amount of the contract to one or more Minority Business Enterprises. The purpose of the plan was to promote wider participation by minority business enterprises in the construction of public projects. Appellee contractor brought an action under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983, arguing that the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face. The appellate court found the ordinance to be unconstitutional. The Court affirmed that decision. Applying the two prongs of the strict scrutiny standard, the Court found that the evidence did not point to any identified discrimination in the construction industry. Appellant had failed to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest in apportioning public contracting opportunities on the basis of race or that its remedy had been narrowly tailored to the achievement of that interest. The Court found the ordinance to be unconstitutional.

Front 54

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (IV)

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Petitioner, low bidder on a federal contract, was denied the contract because a presumptive preference was given to minority business entities; petitioner sued, claiming violation of its U.S. Const. amend. V equal protection rights. Lower federal courts rejected claim, relying upon precedent which subjected U.S. Const. amend. V equal protection claims to intermediate scrutiny. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that (a) petitioner could claim injury owing to a discriminatory classification which prevented it from competing on an equal footing (petitioner need not allege that it would have obtained a benefit but for the discriminatory classification); (b) U.S. Const. amends. V and XIV equal protection claims are analyzed precisely the same way - applying strict scrutiny analysis (that is, government racial classifications must serve a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to further that interest); and (c) since lower courts applied intermediate scrutiny, remand for strict scrutiny analysis was required.

Front 55

Grutter v. Bollinger (IV)

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The law school had long been committed to racial and ethnic diversity, especially to the inclusion of students from groups that, historically, had been discriminated against. Rather than imposing quotas, the law school admissions program focused on academic ability and a flexible assessment of applicants' talents, experiences, and potential to contribute to the learning of those around them. It did not define diversity solely in terms of race and ethnicity but considered these as "plus" factors affecting diversity. The Court found that the Equal Protection Clause did not prohibit this narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further the school's compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from diversity. The goal of attaining a "critical mass" of underrepresented minority students did not transform the program into a quota. Because the law school engaged in a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant, giving serious consideration to all the ways the applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment, it ensured that all factors that could contribute to diversity were meaningfully considered alongside race.

Front 56

Gratz v. Bollinger (IV)

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The university's undergraduate admissions policy was based on a point system that automatically granted 20 points to applicants from underrepresented minority groups. This class-action equal protection suit against respondents, a university, a college, and university officials, alleged racial discrimination. The parties appealed the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan's rulings. The appellate court heard the case en banc on the same day as a parallel case concerning the university's law school admissions program, which it upheld. Although the circuit court had not yet ruled in the instant case, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court held as an initial matter that the lead plaintiff had standing, having been denied freshman admission and having the potential to be denied transfer admission. The Court also found that the policy made race the decisive factor for virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant. As the policy was not narrowly tailored to achieve respondents' asserted compelling interest in diversity, it violated the Equal Protection Clause, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C.S. § 1981.

Front 57

Parents involved in community schools v. Seattle School district No. 1 (IV)

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Both school districts adopted plans whereby, after place of residence and availability of space were considered, school assignments were made on the basis of race to ensure that schools were racially balanced. The U.S. Supreme Court first held that the cases were not moot, even though the plans were not currently being applied to children of the association's members or the student, since it was not absolutely clear that application of the racial guidelines could not reasonably be expected to recur. Further, the Court held that the districts, which did not operate legally segregated schools, denied students equal protection by classifying students by race and relying upon the classification in school assignments. The districts failed to establish a compelling interest in racial diversity since their plans relied on racial classification in a nonindividualized, mechanical way as a decisive factor, and racial imbalance in the schools was not unconstitutional by itself. Further, the minimal effect the classifications actually had on assignments indicated that other means would be effective to achieve the districts' goals and that the use of racial classifications was unnecessary.

Front 58

Bradwell v. Illinois (IV)

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Illinois constitutionally denied law licenses to women, because the right to practice law was not one of the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.

Front 59

Minor v. Happersett (IV)

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was a United States Supreme Court case appealed from the Supreme Court of Missouri concerning the Missouri law which ordained "Every male citizen of the United States shall be entitled to vote."


The Court held that voting is not a privilege of citizenship.

the Fourteenth Amendment does not add to the privileges and immunities of a citizen, and that historically "citizen" and "eligible voter" have not been synonymous. Since the United States Constitution did not proviand citizens. It rested solely on the lack of provisions within the Constitution for women's suffrage.

Front 60

Reed v. Reed (IV)

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Administrators of estates cannot be named in a way that discriminates between sexes.

To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and whatever may be said as to the positive values of avoiding intrafamily controversy, the choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex.

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Frontiero v. Richardson (IV)

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Appellants, female military personnel, filed an action contending that the statutory difference in treatment of male and female military personnel for purposes of determining "dependent" benefits under 37 U.S.C.S. §§ 401, 403 and 10 U.S.C.S. §§ 1072, 1076 violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The district court rejected appellants' contention and appellants sought review. Appellants asserted that the discriminatory impact of the statutes was twofold: first, as a procedural matter, a female member was required to demonstrate her spouse's dependency, while no such burden was imposed upon male members; and, second, as a substantive matter, a male member who did not provide more than one-half of his wife's support received benefits, while a similarly situated female member was denied such benefits. The court reversed, holding that the statutory scheme involved the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the United States Constitution because it drew a sharp line between the sexes, solely for the purpose of achieving administrative convenience, necessarily commanding dissimilar treatment for men and women who were similarly situated.

Front 62

Craig v. Boren (IV)

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To regulate in a sex-discriminatory fashion, the government must demonstrate that its use of sex-based criteria is substantially related to the achievement of important governmental objectives.

Front 63

United States v. Virginia (IV)

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State of Virginia's exclusion of women from the Virginia Military Institute violated Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

the VWIL would not provide women with the same type of rigorous military training, facilities, courses, faculty, financial opportunities, and/or alumni reputation and connections that VMI affords male cadets

Front 64

Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service (IV)

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8 U.S.C.S. § 1409 imposed different requirements for a child's acquisition of citizenship depending upon whether the citizen parent was the mother or the father. The question before the instant court was whether the statutory distinction was consistent with equal protection. The instant court found that the imposition of the requirement for a paternal relationship, but not a maternal one, was justified by two important governmental objectives. The first objective was the importance of assuring that a biological parent-child relationship existed. The second objective was the determination to ensure that the child and the citizen parent had some demonstrated opportunity or potential to develop a relationship that consisted of the real, everyday ties that provided a connection between child and citizen parent. The means adopted by Congress to further its objectives substantially related to the facilitation of a relationship between parent and child. The difference between men and women in relation to the birth process was a real one, and the principle of equal protection did not forbid Congress to address the problem at hand in a manner specific to each gender.

Front 65

Romer v. Evans (IV)

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In Colorado, various ordinances that afforded protection to persons discriminated against by reason of sexual orientation gave rise to a statewide controversy. In a statewide referendum, voters passed what was known as Amendment 2 (Colo. Const. art. II, § 30b). Amendment 2 prohibited all legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect homosexual persons. Respondents, homosexual persons and municipalities whose ordinances were invalidated, commenced litigation to declare Amendment 2 invalid and enjoin its enforcement. The state supreme court affirmed the judgment that enjoined enforcement of Amendment 2. The United States Supreme Court affirmed. Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection clause, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, because the classification was unrelated to any legitimate state interest. Amendment 2 withdrew from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbid reinstatement of protective laws and policies. Amendment 2 thus classified homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else.

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Dred Scott v. Sandford (IV)

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States do not have the right to claim an individual’s property that was fairly theirs in another state. Property cannot cease to exist as a result of changing jurisdiction. The majority decision held that Africans residing in America, whether free or slave, could not become United States citizens and the plaintiff therefore lacked the capacity to file a lawsuit. Furthermore, the parts of the Missouri Compromise creating free territories were unconstitutional because Congress had no authority to abolish slavery in federal territories. Judgment of Circuit Court for the District of Missouri reversed and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

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Thirteenth Amendment (IV)

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officially abolished and continues to prohibit slavery, and with limited exceptions, such as those convicted of a crime, prohibits involuntary servitude. Prior to its ratification, slavery remained legal only in Delaware, Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, and New Jersey; everywhere else in the USA slaves had been freed by state action and the federal government's Emancipation Proclamation. Abraham Lincoln (who had issued the Emancipation Proclamation) and others were concerned that the Emancipation Proclamation would be seen as a temporary war measure, and so, besides freeing slaves in those states where slavery was still legal, they supported the Amendment as a means to guarantee the permanent abolition of slavery.

Front 68

Civil Rights act of 1866 (IV)

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Throughout American history several pieces of legislation have been called the Civil Rights Act - this was the third such act. It was the most important action by Congress towards protecting the rights of Freedmen during Reconstruction. The Republican-dominated United States Congress passed the act in March 1866, as a counterattack against the Black Codes in the southern United States, which had been recently enacted by all former slave states following the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Included in the Civil Rights Act were the rights to: make contracts, sue, bear witness in court and own private property. President Andrew Johnson vetoed the bill, saying that blacks were not qualified for United States citizenship and that the bill would "operate in favor of the colored and against the white race."

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Civil Rights Act of 1871 (IV)

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The Civil Rights Act of 1871, also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, is an important federal statute in force in the United States. Several of its provisions still exist today as codified statutes, but the most important still-existing provision is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Act was originally enacted a few years after the American Civil War, along with the 1870 Force Act. One of the chief reasons for its passage was to protect southern blacks from the Ku Klux Klan by providing a civil remedy for abuses then being committed in the South. The statute has been subjected to only minor changes since then, but has been the subject of voluminous interpretation by courts. Violators of rights shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, Suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission take... originally not useful. But today it's very powerful.

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Fifteenth Amendment (IV)

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The Fifteenth Amendment is one of the Reconstruction Amendments. This amendment prohibits the states or the federal government from using a citizen's race, color, or previous status as a slave as a voting qualification.

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Enforcement Act of 1870 (IV)

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This Act was designed to protect black voters. Unfortunately, those who witnessed such violations were usually unwilling to testify so further legislation was soon necessary. There was a Second Enforcement Act in 1871 and a Third Enforcement Act (also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act), also in 1871, which served the same basic purposes. This Third Act strengthened sanctions against those who impeded black suffrage. It gave the President the right to use federal forces to enforce the law.

Front 72

Cunming v. Board of Education (IV)

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(1899) ("Richmond") was a class action suit decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. It is a landmark case, in that it sanctioned de jure segregation of races in American schools. The Supreme Court overturned its decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). The Supreme Court's decision predicates its affirmance on economic arguments, among others. It claims that there are many more colored children than white children in the area, and that the Board could not afford to supply everyone with education. The court argued that there was a choice between educating 60 white children and educating no one.

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Plessy v. Fergusson (IV)

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Petitioner, who was charged by information with violating 1890 La. Acts No. 111, p. 152, argued that the statute was unconstitutional. The state supreme court disagreed and denied petitioner's request for a writ of prohibition. The United States Supreme Court affirmed. The statute did not conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment. A statute that implied merely a legal distinction between differing races did not tend to destroy the legal equality of the two races or to reestablish a state of involuntary servitude. The statute also did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. In determining whether the statute was a reasonable regulation, the Louisiana legislature was given a large amount of discretion; the legislature was at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, customs, and traditions of the people, and with a view to preserving public peace and good order. The Court rejected petitioner's argument that the separation of the two races stamped one race with a badge of inferiority. A legislature had to secure for its citizens equal rights before the law. If one race was inferior to another socially, the Federal Constitution could not put the two races upon the same plane.

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McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. (IV)

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The Separate Coach Law required the railroads to provide separate, but equal, compartments for African-American and Caucasian passengers. Section 7 of the law allowed the railroads to provide sleeping cars, dining cars and chair cars exclusively for Caucasian persons. Appellants filed suit against the railroads before the law went into effect, but amended their claim after the law became effective. The appellate court's order upholding the order sustaining the railroads' demurrers to the complaint was affirmed. The court held that § 7 of the law was improperly enacted based on the consideration of the limited demand by African-Americans for sleeping, dining, and chair cars. However, appellants' suit was properly dismissed because appellants had not traveled on any of the railroads, had not requested transportation on the railroads, and had not requested any of the facilities described in § 7 of the law. Further, there was no proof that the railroads had refused to provide the facilities described in § 7 of the law to appellants. Finally, there was no proof that appellants would have had an adequate remedy at law if the railroads had denied equal facilities to appellants.

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The NAACP’s Road to Brown: Missouri Ex rel. Gaines v. Canada (IV)

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Student filed suit for the denial of admittance to a law school. The court determined that the student was not denied equal protection of the law. Student filed a mandamus action to compel the law school to admit him. The student contended that the discrimination constituted a denial of his constitutional rights. The student insisted that there were special advantages for a person intending to practice law in Missouri to attend the university to which he had applied. The court determined that the denial of the right for black students to pursue a legal education in Missouri was a denial of a legal right to the enjoyment of a privilege which the State had set up. The court further concluded that the payment of tuition fees in another State did not remove the discrimination. The court determined that the student was entitled to the equal protection of the laws and that the state was bound to furnish it for him within the borders of the state. The court concluded that petitioner was entitled to be admitted to the school of law at the state university in the absence of other and proper provision for his legal training. The court remanded and reversed the decision of the lower court.

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Sweatt v. Painter (IV)

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Petitioner law school applicant filed an action for mandamus against respondent school officials to compel his admission to a state law school from which he had been excluded on the basis of his race. The appellate court denied a writ of error and upheld lower court judgments that denied mandamus on the grounds that a new law school for Negro students offered petitioner substantially equivalent opportunities to those offered to white students at the University of Texas. He sought a writ of certiorari, claiming a violation of his right to equal protection under U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The United States Supreme Court reversed and held that the equal protection clause required that petitioner be admitted to the University of Texas Law School. Whether the University of Texas was compared with the original or new law school for Negroes, the Court could not find substantial equality in the educational opportunities offered to white and Negro law students by the state. Petitioner had a constitutional right to a legal education equivalent to that offered to students of other races and it was not available in a separate law school.

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McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents (IV)

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reversed a lower court decision upholding the efforts of the state-supported University of Oklahoma to adhere to the state law requiring African-Americans to be provided instruction on a segregated basis.

The United States Supreme Court ruled that a public institution of higher learning could not provide different treatment to a student solely because of his/her race as doing so deprived the student of his/her Fourteenth Amendment rights of Due Process.

Front 78

Brown v. Board of Education I (IV)

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Segregation of students in public schools violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because separate facilities are inherently unequal. District Court of Kansas reversed.

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Brown v. Board of Education II (IV)

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In their decision which became known as "Brown II" the court delegated the task of carrying out school desegregation to district courts with orders that desegregation occur "with all deliberate speed," a phrase traceable to Francis Thompson's poem, The Hound of Heaven. For example, based on "Brown II," the U.S. District Court ruled that Prince Edward County, Virginia did not have to desegregate immediately. When another court case in 1959 ruled that the county's schools finally had to desegregate, the county board of supervisors stopped appropriating money for public schools which remained closed for five years, from 1959 to 1964. White students in the county were given assistance to attend white-only "private academies" that were taught by teachers formerly employed by the public school system, while black students had no education at all unless they moved out of the county.

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Keyes v. Sch. Dist. (IV)

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The district court retained jurisdiction of the litigation, issuing various orders to implement its school desegregation plan. The State challenged an order for salary increases and for funding of remedial "quality education" programs. The Court held that the orders were not an acceptable implementation of a permissible means to remedy previous legally mandated segregation. The district court's end purpose was not only to remedy the violation to the extent practicable, but also to restore state and local authorities to the control of a school system that was operating in compliance with the Constitution. The order of salary increases was an attempt to remedy the vestiges of segregation by improving the desegregative attractiveness of the school district. That plan was beyond the scope of the intradistrict violation originally identified by the district court because it was not designed solely to redistribute students within the school district to eliminate racially identifiable schools, but was intended to attract non-minority students from outside the school district.

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Mo. v. Jenkins (IV)

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The district court retained jurisdiction of the litigation, issuing various orders to implement its school desegregation plan. The State challenged an order for salary increases and for funding of remedial "quality education" programs. The Court held that the orders were not an acceptable implementation of a permissible means to remedy previous legally mandated segregation. The district court's end purpose was not only to remedy the violation to the extent practicable, but also to restore state and local authorities to the control of a school system that was operating in compliance with the Constitution. The order of salary increases was an attempt to remedy the vestiges of segregation by improving the desegregative attractiveness of the school district. That plan was beyond the scope of the intradistrict violation originally identified by the district court because it was not designed solely to redistribute students within the school district to eliminate racially identifiable schools, but was intended to attract non-minority students from outside the school district.

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Missouri v. Holland (III)

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The State brought a bill in equity, which challenged the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of July 3, 1918, 40 Stat. 755, and the regulations made by the Secretary of Agriculture in pursuance of the same, claiming that the treaty was an unconstitutional interference with appellant's sovereign rights under the Tenth Amendment, which included absolute control of wild game and birds within the State's borders. The State also alleged a pecuniary interest, as owner of the wild birds within its borders. The district court dismissed the action on the ground that the act of Congress was constitutional. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court affirmed the dismissal, concluding that the power to make the treaty had been expressly delegated to the United States under U.S. Const. art. II, § 2 and art. VI. The Court noted that the treaty did not contravene any prohibitory words found in the federal constitution, nor was the subject matter, the regulation of migratory birds, forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment. Rejecting the State's claim upon title, the Court stated that the wild birds were not in the possession of anyone.

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Reid v. Covert (III)

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The Constitution supersedes all treaties ratified by the United States Senate. The military may not try the civilian wife of a soldier under military jurisdiction. because the Fifth Amendment's grant for military jurisdiction, i.e. "except in cases arising in the land and naval forces" cannot sweep in the jury-trial requirement reflected in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.

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Federalist 45 (III)

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is an essay by James Madison, the forty-fifth of the Federalist Papers. It was published on January 26, 1788 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. Madison argues that the strength of the federal government under the proposed United States Constitution does not pose a danger to the individual states, a major concern of the Anti-Federalists. The paper is titled, " The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered." Madison writes that the new Constitution does not in principle enlarge the powers of the Federal government, but merely renders that government more effective in carrying out its existing duties... Not New Pows, but Invigoration of Old Pows. Armies, fleets, treaties and finance vested by the articles of confederation. More effctv adminstr of old Conf pows.

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Federalist 46 (III)

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Madison stresses that the federal and state governments are two totally different agencies. He articulates that they are separate yet can collaborate together, and that the power lies in the people. The natural attachment of the people will always be to the governments of their respective states, so the federal government must be, in a sense, extraordinarily congenial to the people.

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Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (III)

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Appellee, a public mass transit authority that received substantial federal funding, brought action for declaratory judgment to determine whether it was entitled to U.S. Const. amend. X immunity from the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 52 Stat. 1060, 1067 (1938). The lower court held that municipal ownership and operation of the transit system was a traditional governmental function and immune from wage and overtime standards. On appeal, appellant solicitor general argued that the court erred in extending immunity to appellee. On appeal, the Court held that it was not immune from the minimum wage and overtime standards. The Court overturned the previous determination that the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to enforce minimum-wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA because the provisions of FLSA did not destroy state sovereign immunity or violate any constitutional provision. The court reversed and remanded.

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New York v. United States (III)

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Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the majority, found that the "Take Title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 iolates the Tenth Amendment and exceeds Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.

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Printz v. United States (III)

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The Brady Act, note following 18 U.S.C.S. § 922, amended a detailed federal scheme that governed distribution of firearms established by the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.S. § 921. Interim provisions directed state law enforcement officers to participate in administration of a federally enacted regulatory scheme. Petitioners, chief law enforcement officials (CLEO) of their respective counties, objected to being pressed into federal service and contended that congressional action that compelled state officers to execute federal laws was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court agreed and held that the interim provisions violated constitutional principles of dual sovereignty and separation of powers. Congress could not compel states to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Congress could not circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the state's officers directly. The Brady Act effectively transferred the executive branch's responsibility to administer federal laws to thousands of CLEOs in 50 states, who were left to implement the program without meaningful presidential control.

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Federalist 47 (II)

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No. 47 advocated the ratification the United States Constitution. In No. 47, Madison addressed criticisms that the Constitution did not create a sufficient separation of powers among the executive, judiciary, and legislature. Madison acknowledged that the three branches intertwined but asserted that the blending did not violate the principle of separation of powers. To support his argument, Madison referred to the writings of Montesquieu. Madison attributes the widespread support of a separation of powers to Montesquieu. According to Montesquieu, tyranny results when one branch of government simultaneously holds the powers of another branch. However, Madison argues that Montesquieu "did not mean that these departments ought to have no PARTIAL AGENCY in, or no CONTROL over, the acts of each other."[1]

Madison's interpretation of Montesquieu supported a system of checks and balances quite similar to checks and balances the former thirteen colonies had created in their state constitutions. Madison tried to enlist the support of the young states by analyzing their individual constitutions.

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Federalist 48 (II)

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Madison: in this one he argues that the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government must not be totally divided. that the branches of government can be connected, while remaining "separate and distinct". The argument of No. 48 is that, in order to practically maintain the branches as "separate and distinct", they must have "a constitutional control" over each other... legislative over-reaching is more likely in a "representative republic", as distinct from other types of government. These reasons include the claim that the legislature is "sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude, yet not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions" and that its powers are both "more extensive, and less susceptible of precise limits".

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Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer (II)

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On the eve of a strike against certain steel companies, an executive order was issued directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of most of the nation's steel mills. The steel companies obeyed the orders but brought proceedings against the government, charging that the seizure was not authorized by an act of Congress or by any constitutional provision. The district court granted a preliminary injunction restraining the government's continued seizure and possession of the mills, and the court of appeals stayed the injunction. Certiorari was granted. The Court found that a final determination of the constitutionality of the order was proper. The Court held that the presidential power exerted here could not be sustained as an exercise of the President's military power nor under the several constitutional provisions that granted executive power. The seizure could not stand because Congress had the exclusive constitutional authority to make laws necessary and proper to carry out the powers vested by the Constitution. Accordingly, the district court's judgment was affirmed.

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Dames & Moore v. Regan (II)

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Petitioner company filed an action against defendants, the Government of Iran and Iranian banks, seeking money owed for services performed. The district court issued orders of attachment directed against the property of defendants. Petitioner was granted summary judgment. However, pursuant to an unrelated hostage agreement, American hostages in Iran were released. The U.S. President issued executive orders to implement the agreement. The orders nullified all non-Iranian interests in Iranian assets and suspended all settlement claims. Petitioner filed an action for declaratory relief against the government to prevent enforcement of the executive orders. The district court dismissed the complaint. Petitioner then sought a writ of certiorari. The Court affirmed, holding that the executive orders were sustained by the broad authority granted under the Trade With the Enemy Act. Thus, attachments obtained by petitioner were specifically made subordinate to further actions that the President might take under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C.S. §§ 1701-1706. Also, the President was authorized to suspend pending claims because Congress consented.

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Executive Assertions: United States v. Curtiss-Wright (II)

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A joint resolution of Congress authorized the President to declare the sale of arms to certain countries illegal. Though the President initially issued a proclamation that declared that sales to Bolivia were unlawful, the President later revoked his proclamation. Defendants allegedly sold arms to Bolivia before the revocation of the proclamation, and demurred to the charges against them on the ground that the revocation of the proclamation precluded their prosecution. On appeal, the granting of defendants' demurrer was reversed and the case was remanded. The President had broad discretion to determine the benefit of enforcing a joint resolution on international relations. The power to make decisions regarding international affairs was vested in the President, especially in areas that could lead to embarrassment of or security issues for the nation. Defendants' argument that the power to declare certain arms sales illegal was invalidly delegated to the President was unjustified. The revocation of the proclamation did not change defendants' violation of the joint resolution; the revocation only stopped the joint resolution from being enforced against sales to Bolivia in the future.

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Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (II)

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The citizen-detainee was born in the United States, detained in Afghanistan during the United States' military action against the Taliban regime, and transferred to the United States. Pursuant to a government official's declaration, the Government contended that the citizen-detainee was an enemy combatant. Aside from unspecified screening processes and military interrogations, the citizen-detainee received no due process. The Court determined that the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), 115 Stat. 224, authorized the detention of individuals in the citizen-detainee's circumstances and that the AUMF satisfied 18 U.S.C.S. § 4001(a)'s requirement that a detention be "pursuant to an Act of Congress." However, under the Mathews analysis, the Court determined that the citizen-detainee, seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant, was entitled to receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker. The Court rejected the Government's assertion that separation of powers principles mandated a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in such circumstances. DPC means that "enemy combatants get to challenge their detainment".

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Rumsfeld v. Padilla (II)

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The President ordered the Secretary to place the detainee in military custody. The detainee was transferred from federal custody to military custody in another judicial district. The detainee sought habeas corpus relief in the original district, contending that the Secretary was the proper custodial official for habeas purposes since he possessed the legal reality of control over the detainee and was subject to state long-arm jurisdiction in the original district through subordinate officials. The United States Supreme Court held, however, that habeas corpus jurisdiction was limited to the district in which the detainee was confined and the commander of the military confinement facility was the only proper custodial official for habeas purposes. The detainee sought release from present physical confinement. Thus the recognized exceptions to the immediate custodian rule did not apply. Further, the court in the district where the petition was filed lacked jurisdiction over the commander since the commander was a resident of the district where confinement occurred. Any unique circumstances of the case were insufficient to alter the traditional habeas corpus jurisdiction rules.

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Rasul v. Bush (II)

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The U.S. military had held the aliens, along with approximately 640 other non-Americans captured abroad, at the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay. The court distinguished them from the Eisentrager detainees in important respects: They were not nationals of countries at war with the United States, and they denied that they have engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against the United States; they had never been afforded access to any tribunal, much less charged with and convicted of wrongdoing; and for more than two years they had been imprisoned in territory over which the United States exercised exclusive jurisdiction and control. No party questioned the district court's jurisdiction over the aliens' custodians. The court held that 28 U.S.C.S. § 2241 required nothing more and that it conferred on the district court jurisdiction to hear the habeas corpus challenges. Furthermore, the fact that the aliens were being held in military custody was immaterial to the question of the district court's jurisdiction over their nonhabeas statutory claims. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1350 explicitly conferred the privilege of suing for an actionable tort on aliens.

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Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (II)

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The government's motion to dismiss was denied because Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2739, 2740 (2005), did not repeal federal jurisdiction over pending habeas actions. Abstention was not warranted as petitioner was not an Armed Forces member and the tribunal convened to try him was not part of the integrated system of military courts established by Congress. Review of the commission's procedures in advance of a final decision was appropriate as petitioner had no automatic right to review of the commission's decision before a federal court under the Detainee Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005). The fact that petitioner already had been excluded from his own trial provided a basis to presume that the procedures employed would violate the law. On the merits, the military commission convened to try petitioner lacked power to proceed as its structure and procedures violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The President's practicability determination was insufficient to justify variances from the procedures governing courts-martial. The procedures also violated the Geneva Conventions as they did not meet common article 3's requirements.

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Ex parte Milligan (II)

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Lambdin P. Milligan and four others were accused of planning to steal Union weapons and invade Union prisoner-of-war camps. Once the first prisoner of war camp was liberated they planned to use the liberated soldiers to help fight against the Government of Indiana and free other camps of Confederate soldiers. They also planned to take over the state governments of Indiana, Ohio, and Michigan. When the plan leaked, they were charged, found guilty, and sentenced to hang by a military court in 1864. However, their execution was not set until May 1865, so they were able to argue the case after the Civil War ended. Rule: Suspension of habeas corpus is unconstitutional when civilian courts are still operating; the Constitution provided for suspension of habeas corpus only if civilian courts are actually forced closed.

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Legislative Assertions: The War Powers Resolution (1973) (II)

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the War Powers Act of 1973 (Pub.L. 93-148), also referred to as the War Powers Resolution, is a resolution of Congress that the President can send troops into action abroad only by authorization of Congress or if American troops are already under attack or serious threat.

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United States v. Nixon (II)

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The Supreme Court does have the final voice in determining constitutional questions; no person, not even the President of the United States, is completely above law; and the president cannot use executive privilege as an excuse to withhold evidence that is 'demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial.' Archibald Cox, an investigator in the Watergate case, obtained a subpoena for audiotapes of Nixon and his staff. Cox's successor, Leon Jaworski, subsequently pursued that subpoena, and Nixon refused access to the tapes and as justification claimed their confidentiality was protected by executive privilege. Jaworski sought further court orders, and the Supreme Court accepted the case.

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Executive Civil Liability: Nixon v. Fitzgerald (II)

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Respondent, a former government employee, filed a suit against petitioner, a former United States President, for retaliatory discharge. After petitioner's motion to dismiss based upon a claim of absolute immunity was denied, petitioner filed a motion for a writ of certiorari. In reversing the lower court's decision, the Court noted that a grant of absolute immunity to the President would not leave the President with unfettered power. The Court stated that there were formal and informal checks on presidential action that did not apply with equal force to other executive officials. The Court observed that the President was subjected to constant scrutiny by the press. It noted that vigilant oversight by Congress would also serve to deter presidential abuses of office, as well as to make credible the threat of impeachment. The court determined that other incentives to avoid misconduct existed, including a desire to earn reelection, the need to maintain prestige as an element of presidential influence, and a President's traditional concern for his historical stature.

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Executive Civil Liability:
Clinton v. Jones (II)

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Respondent, a private citizen, sought to recover damages from petitioner, the President of the U.S., based on actions that allegedly took place before his term began. Petitioner argued that in all but the most exceptional cases, the U.S. Constitution requires federal courts to delay such litigation until the President's term ends. The court held that the doctrine of separation of powers did not require federal courts to stay all private actions against the President until he leaves office. However, the court held that it was appropriate for the district court to consider potential burdens on the President in evaluating the management of the case. It was an abuse of discretion for the district court to delay the trial until after petitioner leaves office.

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Impeachment (II)

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In the United States, impeachment can occur both at the federal and state level. The Constitution defines impeachment at the federal level and limits impeachment to "The President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United States" who may only be impeached and removed for "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." [2]. Several commentators have suggested that Congress alone may decide for itself what constitutes an impeachable offense. In 1970, then-House Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford defined the criteria as he saw it: "An impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given moment in history." [3] Four years later, Ford would become president when President Richard Nixon resigned under the threat of impeachment (see below).

Article III of the Constitution states that judges remain in office "during good behaviour," implying that Congress may remove a judge for bad behavior via impeachment. The House has impeached 13 federal judges and the Senate has convicted six of them.

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Legislative Veto: INS v. Chadha (II)

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Respondent deportable alien initially brought an action to challenge the constitutionality of the provision in § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), 8 U.S.C.S. § 1254(c)(2), authorizing the House of Representatives, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the Executive Branch, pursuant to authority delegated by Congress to the Attorney General, to allow respondent to remain in the United States. The lower court held that the House was without constitutional authority to order respondent alien's deportation because § 244(c)(2) violated the doctrine of separation of powers. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed and held that the House's action pursuant to § 244(c)(2) was legislative in function and did not fit within any exceptions authorizing one House to act alone. As a result, the House's action was subject to certain checks contained in U.S. Const. art. I, such as the bicameral requirement, presentment to the President, and the Presidential veto. Because the House failed to act in conformity with the express procedures for enacting legislation, the Court held that the congressional veto provision in § 244(c)(2) was severable from the Act and unconstitutional.

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Myers v. United States (II)

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Administrative Agencies: Appellant, the administratrix of postmaster's estate, sought review of a judgment that rejected a claim for the postmaster's salary where he was removed from office before the expiration of his term by an order of the President, without the Senate's approval, in contravention of § 6 of the Act of Congress, 19 Stat. 80 (1876). The lower court's judgment was premised on a finding that the postmaster had lost his right of action because of his delay in suing. The Supreme Court held he had not lost his right to sue where he acted conscientiously in asserting his rights. In the absence of a constitutional or statutory provision otherwise, the President could by virtue of his general power of appointment remove an officer on the ground that the power of removal inhered in the power to appoint, even though he was appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and notwithstanding specific provisions for his removal for cause. Thus, the Court held that § 6 of the Act under which the unrestricted power to remove first class postmasters was denied to the President, violated the Constitution was invalid. Thus, the Court affirmed the judgment.

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Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (II)

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Plaintiff, executor of an estate, filed suit against defendant government to recover a sum of money due the deceased for his salary as a Federal Trade Commissioner from the time when he was allegedly relieved of his duties by the President until the time of his death. Plaintiff contended that the estate was entitled to the sum of money because the deceased had not been removed by the President under one of the causes enumerated in the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 41. Upon certification of two questions, the United States Supreme Court held that the provisions of the Act restricted the power of the President to remove a commissioner only upon one or more of the causes listed in the Act. The Court further held that such a restriction was valid under the Constitution of the United States.

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Buckley v. Valeo (II)

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Plaintiffs, candidates, contributors, political parties, and others, brought suit against defendant government officials, in their official capacity and as members of the Federal Election Commission. Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Act, related Tax Code provisions, and the validity of the Commission. The court of appeals upheld the Act. The Court found that the individual and political committee contribution limits, the disclosure and reporting provisions, and the public financing scheme were justified by weighty interests in restricting influences stemming from the dependence of candidates on large campaign contributions. The Court held, however, that the limitations on campaign expenditures were unconstitutional because they placed substantial and direct restrictions on the ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in political expression that was protected by the First Amendment. The Court found that U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, required that most of the powers conferred by the Act upon the Commission could be exercised only by officers of the United States. The court held that the Commission's present membership was invalid.

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Bowsher v. Synar (II)

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Congress passed the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, under which the Comptroller General was responsible for preparing and submitting to the President a report specifying deficit reductions for a fiscal year. The President in turn was to order the reductions specified by the Comptroller General. The Comptroller General was removable from office only by Congress. Respondents, Congressmen and others, initiated an action challenging the Act's constitutionality. The trial court ruled that the Comptroller General's role in the deficit reduction process violated the constitutionally imposed separation of powers. On direct appeal, the court affirmed. Responsibility for execution of the Act was placed in the hands of the Comptroller General. Congress retained control over such execution and thus intruded into the executive function in violation of separation of powers. The Act was unconstitutional because it gave the Comptroller General, an officer of the legislative branch over whom Congress retained removal power, the ultimate authority to determine the budget cuts to be made, functions plainly entailing execution of the law in constitutional terms.

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Morrison v. Olson (II)

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Independent Counsel: The Special Division appointed appellant as independent counsel to investigate appellees for violations of federal criminal laws pursuant to the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C.S § 591 et seq. Appellant caused a grand jury to issue and serve subpoenas on appellees. All three appellees moved to quash the subpoenas, claiming that the independent counsel provisions of the Act were unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed appellees' motions, but the appellate court reversed the decision when it found that the Act was invalid. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision when the Court found that: (1) the Act did not violate the Appointments Clause for Congress to vest the appointment of independent counsel in the Special Division; (2) the powers exercised by the Division under the Act did not violate U.S. Const. art. III; and (3) the Act did not violate the separation-of-powers principle.

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Mistretta v. United States (II)

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Judges Serving on Commissions: Petitioner and respondent both requested certiorari before judgment was rendered to consider the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission. The Commission was created under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Act), 18 U.S.C.S. § 3551 et seq. (1982 ed., Supp. IV) and 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 991-998 (1982 ed., Supp. IV). The trial court rejected petitioner's contention that the Act was unconstitutional. On appeal, petitioner's first contention was that Congress had granted the Commission excessive legislative discretion. The Supreme Court did not agree. The Court found that Congress had provided guidelines under which the Commission was to operate and that it had not delegated excessive legislative power to another branch of government. The Court also found that Congress had not upset the constitutionally mandated balance of powers among the branches of government. The Court concluded that the Act was constitutional and therefore affirmed the trial court's decision.

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Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority v. CAAN (II)

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Legislators Serving on Agencies: Pursuant to the Metropolitan Washington Airports Act of 1986, 49 U.S.C.S. §§ 2451-2461, Congress authorized the transfer of two major airports from the federal government to petitioner airport authority but conditioned the transfer on the creation of petitioner board composed of nine members of Congress. It vested petitioner board with veto power over decisions made by petitioner airport authority. Respondent citizens filed an action seeking declaration that the conditional transfer violated the constitutional principle of separation of powers under U.S. Const., art. I. The trial court granted summary judgment to petitioners holding that the veto provisions did not violate the separation of powers doctrine. The appellate court reversed finding that the provisions were unconstitutional. The United States Supreme Court affirmed holding that the provisions were an impermissible encroachment on executive power and thus violated the separation of powers requirement of U.S. Const., art. I.

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Marbury v. Madison (I)

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Congress: The applicant and two others contended that the late President of the United States had nominated them to the Senate and that the Senate had advised and consented to their appointments as justices of the peace. The commissions were signed by the late President and the seal of the United States was affixed to the commissions by the Secretary of State. The commissions were withheld from the applicants and they requested their delivery. The Court granted a rule to show cause, requiring the Secretary to show cause why a mandamus should not issue to direct him to deliver to the commissions. No cause was shown and the applicant filed a motion for a mandamus. The Court determined that the applicant had a vested legal right in his appointment because his commission had been signed by the President, sealed by the Secretary of State, and the appointment was not revocable. The Court found that because the applicant had a legal title to the office, the laws afforded him a remedy. However, the Court held that § 13 of the Act of 1789, giving the Court authority to issue writs of mandamus to an officer, was contrary to the Constitution as an act of original jurisdiction, and therefore void.

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Federalist 78 (I)

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the Judiciary branch of the proposed government would be the weakest of the three. Hamilton believed that because the judiciary had neither "FORCE nor WILL" to enforce its judgments, there was little concern that the judiciary would be able to overpower the political branches. The political branches have the institutional capacity to make and enforce the law: Congress controls the money flow and the President controls the military. Courts, on the other hand, do not have the same clout from a constitutional design standpoint. The judiciary depends on the political branches to uphold its judgments. Legal academics often argue over Hamilton's description of the judiciary as the "least dangerous" branch. [2]

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Martin v. Hunter's Lessee (I)

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During the American Revolution, the state of Virginia enacted legislation that allowed it to confiscate Loyalists’ property. One such Loyalist named Denny Martin sued on the grounds that treaties with Great Britain guaranteed protection of Loyalist property. The Virginia state supreme court upheld the confiscation. It did not do so on the grounds that Virginia law was superior to U.S. treaties, but rather because it argued that its own interpretation of the treaty revealed that the treaty did not, in fact, cover the dispute. Article Three of the U.S. Constitution grants the U.S. Supreme Court jurisdiction and authority over state courts on matters involving federal law.

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Cooper v. Aaron (I)

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In the wake of Brown v. Board of Education, the school district of Little Rock, Arkansas formulated a plan to desegregate its schools. Meanwhile, other school districts in the state opposed the Supreme Court's rulings and attempted to find ways to perpetuate segregation. The Arkansas state legislature amended the state constitution to oppose desegregation, and then passed a law relieving children from mandatory attendance at segregated schools. The Court held that since the Supremacy Clause of Article VI made the U.S. Constitution the supreme law of the land, and because Marbury v. Madison gave the Supreme Court the power of judicial review, then the precedent set forth in Brown v. Board of Education is the supreme law of the land, and is therefore binding on all the states, regardless of any state laws contradicting it.

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Theories of Constitutional Construction:

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Departamental Review - Judicial Supremacy -

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McCulloch v. Maryland (I)

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Though the law, by its language, was generally applicable, the U.S. Bank was the only out-of-state bank then existing in Maryland, and the law is generally recognized as specifically targeting the U.S. Bank. The Court invoked the necessary-and-proper clause in the Constitution, which allowed the Federal government to pass laws not expressly provided for in the Constitution's list of express powers as long as those laws are in useful furtherance of the express powers.

This fundamental case established the following two principles:

that the Constitution grants to Congress implied powers for implementing the Constitution's express powers, in order to create a functional national government, and
that state action may not impede valid constitutional exercises of power by the Federal government. not in const.

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Calder v. Bull (I)

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A probate court decreed a will invalid in favor of plaintiffs in error, who stood to obtain property through inheritance. However, the state legislature passed a law enabling defendants in error to obtain a new hearing on the probate court's decree, which resulted in the will being validated in favor of defendants in error, who stood to take under the will. The Court rejected the contention made by plaintiffs in error that the law authorizing the rehearing was an unconstitutional ex post facto law because there was previously no right to a rehearing. The Court defined the ex post facto laws prohibited by the U.S. Constitution to include only those related to crimes, which (1) made an innocent action done before the passing of the law, criminal; (2) aggravated a crime or made it greater than it was when committed; (3) inflicted a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) altered the legal rules of evidence, and received less, or different, testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence to convict the offender. Thus, the Court held that the state law at issue did not fall within the constitutional prohibition.