Con Law Cases

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Marbury v. Madison

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Before the inauguration of President Jefferson, outgoing President Adams attempted to secure Federalist control of the judiciary by creating new judgeships and filling them with Federalist appointees. Included in these efforts was the nomination by President Adams, under the Organic Act of the District of Columbia (the District), of 42 new justices of the peace for the District, which were confirmed by the Senate the day before President Jefferson’s inauguration. A few of the commissions, including Marbury’s, were undelivered when President Jefferson took office. The new president instructed Secretary of State James Madison to withhold delivery of the commissions. Marbury sought mandamus in the Supreme Court, requiring James Madison to deliver his commission. Case dismissed for want of jurisdiction. As the President signed Marbury’s commission after his confirmation, the appointment has been made, and Marbury has a right to the commission. Given that the law imposed a duty on the office of the president to deliver Marbury’s commission, that the Supreme Court has the power to review executive actions when the executive acts as an officer of the law and the nature of the writ of mandamus to direct an officer of the government “to do a particular thing therein specified,” mandamus is the appropriate remedy, if available to the Supreme Court. To issue mandamus to the Secretary of State really is to sustain an original action, which is (in this case) outside the constitutional limits of jurisdiction imposed on the Supreme Court.

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Martin v. Hunter's Lessee

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The supreme court has the power to review state court decisions. Article 3 says the judicial power shall be vested into one supreme court and judicial power includes reviewing determinations of federal questions. Sct. makes a textual argument (power vested in ONE supreme court) must hear all cases. Theorizes that S. Ct can hear cases from state court

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Baker v. Carr

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Challenged malapportionment of state legislatures under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the past, apportionment challengers have generally based their challenge on the Guaranty Clause of Art. IV, Section: 4 of the Constitution (guaranteeing republican form of government). These claims are nonjusticiable as they address issues solely directed to the political branches of the government by the Constitution. This is a separation of powers issue. In Baker v. Carr, the claim is that the Appellants are being denied equal protection of the laws by being underrepresented in the state legislature. The Supreme Court rules that the equal protection challenge in this case is separable from the political questions. An apportionment case may be reviewed on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, so long as these grounds are independent from political question elements.

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McCullogh v. Maryland

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Congress chartered the Second Bank of the United States. Branches were established in many states, including one in Baltimore, Maryland. In response, the Maryland legislature adopted an Act imposing a tax on all banks in the state not chartered by the state legislature. James McCulloch, a cashier for the Baltimore branch of the United States Bank, was sued for violating this Act. McCulloch admitted he was not complying with the Maryland law. McCulloch lost in the Baltimore County Court and that court’s decision was affirmed by the Maryland Court of Appeals. The case was then taken by writ of error to the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court). Counsel for the state of Maryland claimed that because the Constitution was enacted by the independent states, it should be exercised in subordination to the states. However, the states ratified the Constitution by a two-thirds vote of their citizens, not by a decision of the state legislature. Therefore, although limited in its powers, the Constitution is supreme over the laws of the states. There is no enumerated power within the Constitution allowing for the creation of a bank. But, Congress is granted the power of making “all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.” The Supreme Court determines through Constitutional construction that “necessary” is not a limitation, but rather applies to any means with a legitimate end within the scope of the Constitution. Because the Constitution is supreme over state laws, the states cannot apply taxes, which would in effect destroy federal legislative law. Therefore, Maryland’s state tax on the United States Bank is unconstitutional.

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Gibbons v. Ogden

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The New York legislature enacted a statute granting Fulton and Livingston an exclusive right to operate a steamboat in New York waters. Thereupon, Fulton and Livingston licensed Ogden to operate a ferry between New York and New Jersey. Later, Gibbons began operating a ferry, licensed under a statute enacted by Congress that necessarily entailed Gibbons entering into New York waters, thereby violating Ogden’s monopoly. Ogden obtained an injunction against Gibbons from a New York court. The New York monopoly was invalid under the Supremacy Clause.
Gibbons was given a license to move within the New York waterway, i.e., to navigate.
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution (Constitution) grants Congress the power to regulate commerce among the several states. Contrary to Ogden’s assertion, “commerce” means more than traffic. It also encompasses navigation. The phrase “among the several states” means “intermingled with them”. Therefore, Congress’ power to regulate “among the several states” must not stop at the external boundary line of each State. Congress’ power must also extend to each States’ interior. Moreover, the power of Congress to regulate within its proper sphere, e.g., interstate commerce, is exclusive.

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South Dakota v. Dole

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23 U.S.C. Section: 158 directs the Secretary of Transportation to withhold a percentage of federal highway funds otherwise available to states that allow the purchase or public possession of alcohol by individuals under 21 years of age. South Dakota allows individuals nineteen and over to purchase beer with up to 3.2% alcohol. As a consequence, the Department of Transportation will withhold approximately 5% of the federal highway funds earmarked for the state. A withholding of a small amount of funds is not a coercive measure and a proper exercise of taxing and spending power.

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Massachusetts v. Mellon

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The state of Massachusetts along with private individuals asked the Court to stop federal funds from being used for the Maternity Act. The challenge to the act was premised on the argument that the expenditures emanated from an additional taxation on the People, and violated the Tenth Amendment by virtue of it being a deprivation or seizure of property (tax funds) without due process. Dismissed because the state did have the option to refuse the federal funding reserved for the provision of the program at the state level. For the individual petitioners, there had been no proof of rights being denied without due process – Frothingham had failed to demonstrate a direct injury since the nature of taxation is inherently public, any burden upon him would be “comparatively minute and indeterminable.” Ultimately, the Court dismissed the case and refused to review its merits because there was no actual controversy (the State) in addition to a lack of standing (the private/individual petitioners).

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Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for the Separation of Church and State

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The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare conveyed a 77-acre parcel to the Valley Forge Christian College. AUSCS sued on behalf of its 90,000 “taxpayer members,” alleging that Congress violated the Establishment Clause with its grant of property. No standing. Because Respondents sue on an administrative action authorized under the property clause, they fail the first prong of the standing test developed in Flast v. Cohen, requiring Congressional action under the taxing and spending clause.

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Flast v. Cohen

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Congress had funded writing, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious schools. Flast and other Appellants brought suit, claiming that these expenditures violated the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses of the First Amendment of the Constitution. The only claim to standing provided was that all Appellants were taxpayers. Court held no standing. Supreme Court states that standing refers to the plaintiff(s) having a “personal stake in the outcome” of the case. In the taxpayer context, the Supreme Court outlines two requirements to show this personal stake: 1) The taxpayer must challenge the constitutionality only of exercises under the taxing and spending clause of the Constitution. Expenditures which are incidental to a regulatory statute or other incidental expenditures do not give rise to taxpayer standing. 2) The second requirement is that the moving party must allege that Congress acted beyond the scope of a particular constitutional provision. It is insufficient to allege spending beyond the powers delegated under Art. I, Section: 8 of the Constitution.

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Allen v. Wright

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Parents of black public school children sued the IRS, alleging that by not denying tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools, the IRS was harming their children in two ways. First, the IRS conduct was in fact giving federal financial aid to racially segregated institutions. Second, the conduct encourages the operation and expansion of such schools and this interferes with desegregation of the public schools.

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Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife

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The ESA was created to protect endangered and threatened animals. Under the authority of the ESA, the Secretary declared that the ESA applied to actions outside of the United States. Upon further review, the Secretary reinterpreted the ESA to be applicable to actions only within the United States or the high seas. The Plaintiffs, organizations dedicated to wildlife conservation, filed an action against the Secretary seeking an injunction requiring the Secretary to reinstate the initial interpretation of the ESA. No standing. The case and controversy requirement of Article III creates three minimal elements in order to have standing. The plaintiff must have suffered (i) an “injury in fact”; (ii) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (iii) it must be likely that this injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. In this case, the Plaintiffs failed to establish injury in fact or redressability. Because of the limited effect of the ESA, it is too speculative to claim that not enforcing an injunction on the Secretary would result in an injury in fact to any of the Plaintiffs. Likewise, it is too speculative to assume that any redress by the courts would have substantial impact on threatened species outside of the United States. The Plaintiff’s claim that they suffered a “procedural injury” established by a citizen-suit provision within the ESA is also without merit. To permit standing based on this Congressional Act would usurp the power of the Executive to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”

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DeFunis v. Odegaard

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Marco DeFunis, Jr. sued the University of Washington Law School, a state operated university. DeFunis argued that the University’s admissions policies and criteria were racially discriminatory. However, DeFunis was allowed to attend the law school during the case and was in his third year when the case was heard by the Court. Further, the University has agreed to let him graduate upon completion of his last year. Court found the case to be moot. There must be an actual case or controversy for the court to have jurisdiction. (Art III) DeFunis no longer had a stake in the case.

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Hammer v. Dagenhart

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The Act prohibited the shipment of goods in interstate commerce produced in factories employing children. The father of two children, one age fourteen and the other under age sixteen, sought an injunction against the enforcement of the Act on the grounds that the law was unconstitutional. The Act on two grounds violates the United States Constitution (Constitution): (a) it transcends Congress’ authority to regulate commerce; (b) it regulates matters of a purely local concern (thus, presumably violating the Tenth Amendment). The injunction against the enforcement of the Act issued by the lower court is sustained.
The Act regulates the manufacturing of goods. The goods, however, are not in and of themselves harmful when they are offered for shipment. The mere fact that they are intended for in interstate transportation does not make their production subject to federal control.
The Act exercises control over a matter for which no authority has been delegated to Congress: the ages at which children may be employed in mining and manufacturing within the States.

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Champion v. Ames

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Defendant was indicted under an 1895 act criminalizing the interstate shipment of lottery tickets and similar instruments. Defendant argues that the act overreaches Congress’s commerce powers, as the mere transport of the tickets is not interstate commerce. Congress is not prohibiting the sale of lottery tickets, only their shipment across state lines.

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United States v. Darby

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Darby, a lumber manufacturer challenged the constitutionality of the Act. Darby paid employees below the prescribed minimum wage and forced employees to work beyond the prescribed maximum weekly hours. The District Court found the Act was beyond the powers of Congress because it attempted to regulate hours and wages of employees in local manufacturing activities. The finding was appealed to the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court). The Supreme Court found that the manufacture of goods is not itself interstate commerce, but that the shipment of manufactured goods interstate is within the regulatory powers of Congress. The current legislation is an attempt to stop interstate competition in the distribution of goods produced under substandard labor conditions.
Regardless of Congress’s motive, Congress may regulate commerce so long as the regulations do not infringe on any other constitutional prohibitions. This decision overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), which came to the opposite conclusion.
Congress’s power over interstate commerce extends to intrastate activities, so long as the intrastate activities have a substantial effect on the commerce or the exercise of Congressional power over it.

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Wickard v. Filburn

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Appellee was an owner/operator of a small farm in Ohio. He sold milk, poultry, and eggs. He also grew a small crop of winter wheat every year. Appellee sold a portion of the wheat, used some as feed for poultry and livestock, used some to make flour for home consumption, and the kept the rest for the following seeding. Pursuant to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (Act), the Appellee’s 1941 wheat allotment was 11.1 acres and a normal yield of 20.1 bushels per acre. In the Fall of 1940, however, he planted 23 acres, which yielded 239 bushels from his excess acreage. He was assessed penalties on this amount of 49 cents a bushel, or $117.11. Although the wheat may be entirely for personal consumption, it does compete for wheat in commerce, by taking away the demand for wheat by the one who grows it. As the one growing the wheat does not have to buy wheat, the demand for wheat goes down. When viewed in the aggregate (if everyone overgrew wheat “for personal consumption”), this decrease in demand would have a significant effect on interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) acknowledges that the effect of the single farmer may well be negligible to interstate commerce, but when viewed in the aggregate of all farmers “similarly situated” it may significantly affect the value of wheat in commerce.

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Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States

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Heart of Atlanta Motel had 216 rooms available to transient guests and had historically rented rooms only to white guests. Appellant solicits business from outside the State of Georgia through advertising in national travel magazines and other media. Approximately 70% of its guests are from outside the state. Appellant contends that Congress has overreached its authority under the Commerce Clause in enacting the Act. Congress heard testimony from many sources describing the hardships blacks face in securing transient accommodations throughout the United States. With an increasingly mobile populace, this brought increasing difficulties to many United States citizens.
It does not matter that Congress was addressing a moral issue (see the dissent in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) and the Supreme Court of the United States’ (Supreme Court) opinion in Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). What the Supreme Court is examining is Congress’ power to enact the legislation, not the impetus behind the Act.
Concurrence. Justice William Douglas (J. Douglas) concurs in the judgment, but he is uneasy resting the decision on the Commerce Clause, rather than Section: 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). He feels that it is more appropriate to rest civil rights legislation on the constitutional status of the individual, than the impact on commerce.

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Katzenback v. McClung

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Ollie’s refused to serve Negroes. The restaurant was not close to a highway, served mostly locals, and did not advertise out of state. However, 46% of its food was purchased from a supplier who bought the food outside of the state. Ollie’s cannot discriminate against Negroes. Even though Ollie’s was primarily a local restaurant and its food supply purchases didn’t really affect commerce, there is a lot of discrimination in the country at this time. Ollie’s is perpetuating this discrimination along with similar establishments in the country. In the aggregate, this conduct could have a harmful affect on interstate commerce. Furthermore, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applied to establishments when a substantial portion of their food supplies moved in commerce.

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New York v. United States

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Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (the Act). The Act attempted to force states to arrange for the disposal of radioactive waste. The three parts of the Act were: (1) a monetary incentive to encourage states to open their own waste sites; (2) an access incentive, where states without waste sites could be denied access to waste sites in other states; and (3) a take title incentive, where a state that did not arrange for disposal of its waste would be required to take ownership of the waste. Under the take title provision, states would be liable for damages incurred by the waste owner or as a result of failure to have their own waste disposal site. New York claimed the Act violated the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution), by invading the sovereignty of the state. New York appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court). The Tenth Amendment of the Constitution is violated when Congress directs states to regulate in a particular field and in a particular way. The Constitution does not authorize Congress to commandeer the state legislative process by compelling states to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.
The take title provision is Congressional coercion. The monetary and access incentives are a permissible exercise of Congressional spending power. The take title provision gave a state two options. Either the state could (i) take title to the waste and risk whatever liability that followed, or (ii) regulate the disposal according to the congressional mandate. Either way, the state would be forced to implement the federal regulatory scheme and would be agents of the federal government.
If Congress orders states to enact regulations, federal officials can avoid accountability if local citizens disapprove of the regulation.

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Printz v. United States

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Congress passed the Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act (the Act). The Act required the Attorney General to establish a national background check system. Until the national system became computerized, interim provisions for background checks were established. Those provisions provided that state and local law enforcement officers must do background checks before issuing permits to buy firearms. Two local law enforcement officers challenged the constitutionality of the Act’s interim provisions. In New York v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held the federal government could not compel the states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program. Thus, the background check provisions of the Act violated this prohibition.
Even if there is no policy-making involved, Congress cannot take away a state’s sovereignty. Federalism mandates states remain independent from the federal government.

Front 21

United States v. Lopez

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Congress passed the Act making it a federal crime “for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.” Lopez (D), a 12th grader, was convicted for carrying a concealed handgun into his high school. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court on the grounds that the law was outside the scope of the commerce power.
The activity being regulated must “substantially affect” interstate commerce.
There are three broad categories of activity Congress may regulate under the commerce power. First, the channels of interstate commerce. Second, the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Third, activities having a substantial effect upon interstate commerce.
In the instant case, only the third category applies. In order for the statute to be deemed valid, the activity must substantially affect interstate commerce. The Act is a criminal statute, which does not regulate economic activity. In passing the Act, Congress banned possession of a gun that has never traveled in, or affected, interstate commerce. Congress provided no findings in the statute showing possession of guns in schools affected commerce.
The federal government argues possessing a firearm could affect the national economy in two ways. First, by imposing high financial costs upon society through insurance. Second, by preventing individuals from traveling into areas where violent crime occurs. Thus, the government concludes, the Act substantially affects interstate commerce.
The majority rejected these arguments because under the government’s theories, there would be no limits on federal power. The commerce power would extend to any activity that leads to violent crime and any activity related to the economic productivity of individuals. Congress does not have plenary police power. Possession of a gun in a school zone is not an economic activity that affects interstate commerce.

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United States v. Morrison

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Christy Brzonkala enrolled at Virginia Tech in the fall of 1994. Shortly after enrolling, she was allegedly repeatedly sexually assaulted by two varsity football players, including Respondent. After the incident Brzonkala suffered severe emotional distress. She twice participated in academic hearings against Respondent and later dropped out of the school. She finally brought suit against the two male students, including the Respondent and the university in Federal District Court. Applying the three-prong test from Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) determined that violence against women does not substantially affect interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court further defined the aggregate effects test (see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)) by noting that intrastate activities must be considered in the aggregate only if the activities themselves are economic in nature.

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Gonzales v. Raich

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(2005) The regulation (ban on homegrown medical marajuana) is squarely within Congress' commerce power because production of the commodity meant for home consumption, be it wheat (Wickard) or marijuana, has a substantial effect on supply and demand in the national market for that commodity.

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National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius

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Affordable Care Act. Supreme Court upheld individual mandate under tax and spending clause (didn't work under commerce clause) Struck down the medicaid provision. 1) Severability (ability to deny part of an act and uphold another part) 2)medicaid provision was not essential to act 3)criticized for "rewriting" act--states are free to accept it if they want 4) Struck down because coerces states Dole is applied.

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City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey

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A New Jersey law prohibited the importation of solid or liquid waste that originated or was collected from outside of the State. The stated purpose of the statute was to protect the quality of the environment of New Jersey. Protectionism measures can be unconstitutional for their means as well as their ends.
Whatever the purpose of the statute, it may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of out-of-state commerce, unless there is some reason, apart from their out-of-state origin, for doing so.
On its face, the statute imposes on out-of -state commerce the full burden of conserving the state’s landfill space.
The statute violates the principle of non-discrimination both on its face and by its effect.

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Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission

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North Carolina adopted a statute requiring all containers of apples shipped into the state display “no grade other than the applicable U.S. grade or standard.” The statute applied to apples shipped from all States, even those whose standards surpassed the USDA’s, such as Washington State’s. Washington state apple growers, who could only comply with the North Carolina statute by drastically altering their packaging methods, challenged the statute as an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. North Carolina defended the statute, arguing that it constituted a valid exercise of its police powers to protect its citizenry from fraud and deception. Although facially neutral, the statute had the effect of not only burdening interstate sales of Washington apples, but also discriminating against them.
For example, the statute raised the costs of doing business in North Carolina for Washington growers, while leaving the costs for North Carolina growers unaffected. In addition, by prohibiting Washington growers from marketing their apples under their state’s more stringent grading system label, the statute has a “leveling effect” which operated to benefit local growers. Moreover, non-discriminatory alternatives to the statute could have been used to accomplish the State’s local objectives. North Carolina could have permitted out-of-state growers to display their state labels only if they also used the USDA label.

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Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.

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An Arizona law requires that all cantaloupes grown in Arizona and offered for sale must be packed in closed standard containers approved by government officials. Loren Pike, the Defendant state’s official in charge of enforcing the law, issued an order prohibiting the Plaintiff, a cantaloupe farming company, from transporting uncrated cantaloupes from their Arizona ranch to the California packing place. The closest available packing shed to the Defendant state was California and calculated they would suffer $700,000 in losses unless the order was enjoined. The Plaintiff filed suit in district court to enjoin the order on the ground that it was unconstitutional because it violated the Constitution’s Commerce Clause. Supreme Court developed a test for determining whether nondiscriminatory state laws violate the dormant commerce clause. Where a nondiscriminatory law effectuates a legitimate local interest and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. Where there is a legitimate local interest it must be measured against the burden it composes. Arizona's interest do not outweigh the $200,000 cost to the plaintiff.

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Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice

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Wisconsin statutes do not allow trucks longer than 55 feet or pulling more than one other vehicle to be operated on highways within that State without a permit. Appellant motor carriers were denied permits to operate 65-foot double trailer units on certain interstate highways in Wisconsin on the ground that their proposed operations were not within the narrow scope of the regulations specifying when "trailer train" permits will be issued. The challenged regulations violate the Commerce Clause because they place a substantial burden on interstate commerce and make no more than the most speculative contribution to highway safety. The great number of exceptions to the general 55-foot rule, and especially those that discriminate in favor of local industry, weaken the presumption of validity in favor of the general limit because they undermine the assumption that the State's own political processes will act as a check on local regulations that unduly burden interstate commerce.

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Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer

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In 1952, after the employees of steel companies threatened to strike, the President of the United States Harry Truman (President Truman) ordered the Secretary of Commerce to seize the Nation’s steel companies. The steel companies sued. Justice Hugo Black stated that there was no statute that expressly conferred upon President Truman the power to seize the mills. There are no provisions of the Constitution, or combination of provisions thereof, which gave the President the authority to take possession of property as he did.

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Immigration & Naturalization Services v. Chadha

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Chadha challenged the constitutionality of a provision in Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act authorizing one House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the Executive Branch, pursuant to authority delegated by Congress to the Attorney General of the United States, to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United States. The Immigration Naturalization Service (INS) suspended Chadha’s deportation. A year and a half later the House passed a resolution to veto the suspension. Because the resolution was passed pursuant to Section 244(c)(2) it was not treated as an Article I legislative act. As a result, it was not submitted to the Senate nor was it presented to the President for action. Chadha appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The INS agreed with Chadha’s position before the court of appeals and joined him in arguing that Section 244(c)(2) was unconstitutional. The court of appeals held that
the House was without constitutional authority to order Chadha’s deportation. Congress first argued that Section 244(c)(2) was not severable. Therefore, if that provision was unconstitutional then the whole statute was, and then the Attorney General could not suspend Chadha’s deportation order. He would lack standing because he would receive no relief from an order declaring Section 244(c)(2) invalid. The Court pointed out that Congress itself had provided for severability in Section 406 of the Act. Even if this law or procedure were efficient, convenient and useful in facilitating functions of government, that alone would not save it if it is contrary to the United States Constitution. The very structure of Articles I, II, and III exemplify the concept of separation of powers. The Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency. They sought to define and limit the exercise of the newly created federal powers affecting the states and the people. The one-house veto violated Article I, Section: 7, the Presentment Clause, because a bill must be presented to the President to sign or veto. The Presentment Clause is an effort to check whatever propensity a particular Congress might have to enact oppressive, improvident or ill-considered measures. The one-house veto was unconstitutional because it violated Article I, Section:Section: 1 and 7, Bicameralism. The Framers were trying to balance the legislative process. The President’s participation was to protect the Executive branch from Congress and to protect the whole people from improvident laws. The Attorney General is part of the executive branch. When Congress is vetoing his decision, they are encroaching upon territory reserved for the Executive branch. Both Houses had to vote on the bill because splitting the legislative power means it will be exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate in separate settings. This action was legislative in character and effect because it was to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, it altered the legal rights, duties and relations of persons, including the Attorney General, executive Branch officials and Chadha.

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Morrison v. Olson

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Title VI of The Ethics in Government Act allows for the appointment of an “Independent Counsel” by a special court, upon the recommendation of the Attorney General. The purpose is to investigate and if necessary, prosecute government officials for certain violations of federal criminal laws. The Act provides that the independent counsel can be removed from office only by impeachment or by personal action of the Attorney General for good cause. The Appointments Clause, reads “the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper . . . in the courts of Law . . . . ” Art II. This language seems to clearly give Congress the power to vest the appointment of an executive official in the “courts of Law.” Thus, Congress is authorized to make “interbranch appointments.” There’s no separation of powers problem with regard to the Act because the statute (1) appropriately puts the removal power in the hands of the Executive Branch: an independent counsel may only be removed by the Attorney General for good cause and (2) does not impermissibly interfere with the functions of the Executive Branch.

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United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.

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Congress passed a Joint Resolution authorizing the President to ban the sales of arms to countries involved in the border dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay. The President immediately made an Executive Order banning such sales. The Defendant was indicted for conspiracy to sell fifteen machine guns to Bolivia in violation of the Joint Resolution and the Executive Order. Held there is a fundamental difference in the role of government in foreign affairs and domestic affairs. The federal government has both constitutional and inherent authority to conduct foreign affairs as it sees fit. The President is the United States’ sole representative to foreign nations. In order to achieve the United States’ foreign policy aims, the President is better able than Congress to judge conditions that exist in foreign nations and is afforded substantial discretion and wide latitude in those decisions. The President has confidential information as well as consular, diplomatic and foreign affairs officers to help in his decision.

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Dames & Moore v. Regan

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On November 4, 1979, the United States Embassy in Iran and United States diplomats were held hostage so President Carter froze all Iranian assets in the United States. In January 1981, President Carter signed an executive agreement containing a provision terminating all legal proceedings against the Iranian government in the United States Courts and requiring United States citizens to arbitrate all claims against Iran. President Carter did so under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The Plaintiff, Dames and Moore (Plaintiff) brought suit claiming that the executive agreement was unconstitutional and beyond the President’s power. An Executive Agreement has the same force and effect as a treaty and can alter the rights of the United States Citizens. The President of the United States does not have the plenary power to settle claims against foreign governments through an Executive Agreement. However, where Congress is seen to assent to the president’s action, then the president can settle such claims. Here, although what President Carter did under the IEEPA was not specifically sanctioned, Congress gave the president substantial powers to seize and handle foreign assets, so President Carter’s actions were appropriate.

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War Powers Resolution

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a federal law intended to check the president's power to commit the United States to an armed conflict without the consent of Congress. The resolution was adopted in the form of a United States Congress joint resolution; this provides that the President can send U.S. armed forces into action abroad only by declaration of war by Congress, "statutory authorization," or in case of "a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces."

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Slaughter House Cases

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A Louisiana statute granted to the Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company the exclusive rights to engage in the livestock landing and slaughterhouse business in the City of New Orleans. Plaintiffs argued that the monopoly granted to Slaughter-House violated several provisions of the Constitution. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) gave scant attention to the involuntary servitude, equal protection, and due process claims, holding that the amendments these claims involved, the thirteenth and fourteenth, were established for the purpose of invalidating laws that discriminated against blacks. The Supreme Court conceded that these amendments could possibly extend to persons other than blacks, but said that under any fair construction of these amendments one had to first look to the purpose of their enactment.
With regard to the Privileges and Immunities claim, the Supreme Court also reasoned, through Justice Samuel Miller (J. Miller), as follows: The Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to safeguard Plaintiffs against the types of injuries for which they seek relief. The Fourteenth Amendment textually distinguishes between citizens of the United States and citizens of the States. Plaintiffs seek relief as a citizen of a State against the actions of a State. But, the section of the Fourteenth Amendment Plaintiffs rely upon safeguards only rights (i.e., Privileges and Immunities) of citizens of the United States against the actions of the States.

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Adamson v. California

Back 36

At murder trial, appellant chose the strategy of not taking the stand and subjecting himself to cross-examination regarding former crimes of burglary, larceny and robbery that he had committed. Under a California statute, his attempt to protect himself from impeachment of his veracity nonetheless allowed prosecution to make reference to his refusal to testify, and he was convicted. Appellant argues that the California statute’s allowing opposing counsel to comment on his refusal to testify ran counter to the Fifth Amendment’s ban on a defendant’s compulsion to testify, and that the Fifth Amendment applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The due process clause does not include all of the federal Bill of Rights. Here, it did not protect a defendant’s freedom from giving testimony by compulsion in state trials. The court rejected the argument that the Fifth Amendment’s protection versus self-incrimination was made effective by freedom from testimonial compulsion that is a right of national citizenship within the Fourteenth Amendment. They also rejected the idea that protection versus self-incrimination was a personal privilege or immunity secured by the Federal Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment prevents a state from abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, but a state may abridge the privileges and immunities flowing from state citizenship as long as due process is not violated. The decision to not testify did not serve as an admission of any element of the crime. Proof of the commission of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt still remained with the prosecution, thus the federal constitutional due process standard was met.

Front 37

Lochner v. New York

Back 37

The 1897 Labor Law stated that no employee can be required or permitted to work in a biscuit, bread, or cake bakery or confectionery establishment more than sixty hours in a week or more than ten hours in one day, unless to make work on the last day of the week shorter. And the number of hours worked in a week could not average out to be more than ten hours per day. This law is an abridgment to the liberty of contract and a violation of due process.
The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the “liberty” of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. No state can deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The right to purchase or sell labor is part of that liberty protected. The only way a state may counter this right is to show they are exercising a valid police power with their regulation. Those powers relate to the safety, health, morals and general welfare of the public.
The Court rejected the labor law justification of the statute on police power grounds because this was not a valid exercise of police power.
First, that power is extended to the protection of “public welfare” and not the readjustment of bargaining power between employees and employers. The effect of this legislation was to regulate labor conditions and not to protect workers. The effect of such statutes, not just the stated or proclaimed purpose, is determinative in whether this statute is repugnant to the United States Constitution.
Second, there is no valid health of safety rationale in this case. Bakers were not endangered like miners were in the Holden v. Hardy case. Mining is a profession that needed regulation, but this is not. The state could accomplish its goals with means that did not interfere with the freedom to contract. Because the police power exercised here is not strong, the Court suspected that there were legislative motives behind the enactment of this law. New York was using its power to upset the free market.

Front 38

Nebbia v. New York

Back 38

The New York legislature established a Milk Control Board that was vested with the power to “fix minimum and maximum retail prices” for milk sold within the state. Appellant, Mr. Nebbia, an owner of a New York grocery store, was convicted of selling milk for prices in excess of the price set by the Board. The production and distribution of milk is a paramount industry of the state and largely affects the health and prosperity of its people. Property rights and contract rights are not absolute in nature and may be subject to limitations. Since the price controls were not “arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant” to the policy adopted by the legislature to promote the general welfare, it was consistent with the Constitution.

Front 39

United States v. Carolene Products Co.

Back 39

The Appellee, Carolene Products Co. (Appellee), was convicted of the commercial shipment of “Milnut.” This is a product composed of skimmed milk and coconut oil blended together to imitate whole milk or cream.
Before passing the regulation, Congress reviewed over 20 years of evidence indicating that a mixture such as “Milnut” posed a danger to the public health because of the stripping of essential healthful elements. There is sufficient evidence to support the reasoning of Congress that this type of product is a danger to public health and should be eliminated from the market.

Front 40

Griswold v. Connecticut

Back 40

Appellant Griswold, Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and Appellant Buxton, a licensed physician who served as Medical Director for the League at its Center in New Haven, were arrested and charged with giving information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons on means of preventing conception. Appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each. Appellants appealed on the theory that the accessory statute as applied violated the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. Appellants claimed standing based on their professional relationship with the married people they advised. The First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion, which although not expressly included in the Amendment, is necessary to make the express guarantees meaningful. The association of marriage is a privacy right older than the Bill of Rights, and the State’s effort to control marital activities in this case is unnecessarily broad and therefore impinges on protected Constitutional freedoms.

Front 41

Eisenstadt v. Baird

Back 41

Appellee was convicted for exhibiting and distributing contraceptive articles under a law that forbid single as opposed to married people from obtaining contraceptives. The dissimilar treatment of similarly situated married and unmarried persons under the Massachusetts law violates the Equal Protection Clause.

Front 42

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern PA v. Casey

Back 42

The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982 contained certain provisions that were challenged as being unconstitutional. First, the Act requires that a woman seeking an abortion give her informed consent prior to the abortion procedure and specifies that she be provided with certain information at least 24 hours before the abortion is performed. Second, the Act requires a minor obtain parental consent, but provides for a judicial bypass. Third, the Act requires that, unless certain exceptions apply, a married woman seeking an abortion must sign a statement indicating that she has notified her husband of her intended abortion. Finally, the Act imposes reporting requirements on facilities that provide abortion services. The Act exempts these conditions in the event of a “medical emergency.” Before these provisions took effect, Petitioner, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, brought this suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Each provision was challenged
as being unconstitutional on its face. The District Court held all the provisions at issue unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals upheld all of the regulations except for the husband notification requirement. Applying the undue burden test, the Court found that there was no evidence on the record showing that requiring a doctor to give information as provided by the statute, would amount to a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion. Therefore, no undue burden exists and the provision is constitutional.
Yes. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirmed. If neither a parent nor a guardian provides consent, a court may authorize an abortion upon the determination that the minor woman is mature and capable of giving informed consent and has in fact given her informed consent or that the abortion would be in her best interests. By providing a judicial bypass to this requirement, there is no undue burden. The provision is constitutional.
No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court found that in a large fraction of cases in which this provision is relevant (pregnancies with an abusive husband or from extramarital affairs), it will operate as a substantial obstacle in a woman’s choice to undergo an abortion. The husband’s interest in the life of the child does not permit a state to empower him with this degree of authority over his wife. This provision creates an undue burden and is therefore invalid.
Yes. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirmed. Since the identity of each woman receiving an abortion remains confidential, the provision requiring reporting requirements on facilities that provide abortion services is constitutional.
The essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and affirmed. The basic decision in Roe v. Wade was based on a constitutional analysis which cannot be repudiated. The Court concluded that the line should be drawn at viability, so that any time before viability, a woman has a right to choose to terminate her pregnancy.

Front 43

Michael H. & Victoria D. v. Gerald D.

Back 43

Carole had an adulterous affair with Michael while married to Gerald. A child was born while Carole and Gerald were together, but was likely Michael’s child. Michael and the child by guardian ad litem brought suit to establish paternity and a right to visitation. Michael contends as a matter of substantive due process that because he has established a parental relationship with Victoria, protection of Gerald and Carole’s marital union is an insufficient state interest to support termination of the relationship. However, Michael’s interest must be a fundamental liberty to be constitutionally protected.

Front 44

Bowers v. Hardwick

Back 44

The Respondent, Hardwick (Respondent), brought suit in a federal district court challenging the constitutionality of a Georgia statute insofar as it criminalized consensual sodomy. The Respondent asserted that he was a practicing homosexual, that the Georgia statute placed him in imminent danger of arrest and that the statute violated his constitutional rights. The District Court granted a motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision ruling that the statute violated the Respondent’s “fundamental rights because his homosexual activity was a private and intimate association . . . .” The Eleventh Circuit remanded the decision for trial ruling that the Georgia statute must pass strict scrutiny before it can be upheld.
The act of consensual sodomy is not protected under the fundamental right to privacy or any right protected under the United States Constitution (Constitution). There is no precedent to support the Respondent’s claimed constitutional right to commit sodomy. Fundamental liberty interests recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) throughout history and through its traditions have in no way set any foundation to include a case such as this under the Constitutional umbrella of protection. “The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution. . . . There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach of those Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental.” The judgment of the Eleventh Circuit is reversed.

Front 45

Lawrence v. Texas

Back 45

(2003) Overruled Bowers, holding that it had viewed the liberty interest too narrowly. The majority held that intimate consensual sexual conduct was part of the liberty protected by substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. the Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual," the majority did not appear to apply the standard of review, strict scrutiny, which would be appropriate if Lawrence recognized a "fundamental right." Had a fundamental right been present, any burden on that right would only have been held constitutional had it survived "strict scrutiny" and been found to be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. Scalia insists the majority, instead, applied "an unheard-of form of rational-basis review that will have far-reaching implications beyond this case."

Front 46

Civil Rights Cases

Back 46

Several individuals of color were denied admission to theaters, cabs, cars, and inns based on their race. These individuals claimed that this violates their under a federal law passed in 1875 that entitles all individuals in the United States the right to equal treatment in places of public accommodation and the quasi-public facilities of this country. These individuals won their lawsuits under this act, and the Defendants appeal claiming that this act is an unconstitutional. Such discrimintation has nothing to do with slavery. It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of discrimination, which a person may see it fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take in his coach or cab, or admit to his concert. If the laws make unjust discriminations according to the Fourteenth Amendment is it up to Congress to provide an adequate remedy. There is a point at which a former slave becomes a normal citizen and ceases to be a special favorite of the laws. In conclusion the Court finds that there is no ground of authority in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, and therefore invalidates the rule in question in this case.

Front 47

Evans v. Newton

Back 47

Upon his death, the senator devised land to Macon, Georgia that was to be used as a park for whites only. The city was named trustee, and a Board of Managers was created under the trust to administer the park. The park was eventually opened by the city and Negroes were allowed to use it. The City argued they could not enforce segregation in a public park. The Defendants, individual Managers from the Board of Managers (Defendants) sued to remove the city as trustee so as to effectuate the Senator’s will. The city resigned as the trustee and a state court appointed private trustees to continue the exclusion of Negroes from the park. The Plaintiffs, a group of Negroes (Plaintiffs), intervened alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution’s Equal protection clause. Supreme Court held that operating a park is a public function and therefore subjected to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.

Front 48

Shelley v. Kraemer

Back 48

Petitioners Shelley, who were black, bought a home in a neighborhood in which thirty out of thirty-nine parcel owners had signed a restrictive covenant which stated that no home was to be sold to any person who was black, which led to the suit by the neighborhood to undo the sale of the property to Shelley. The Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection applies in this case to prohibit the enforcement of the restrictive covenant at issue due to the fact that the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment apply only where there is state action, which is found in this case due to the action of the Supreme Court of Missouri in enforcing the agreement, the result of which is to deprive the Petitioners of their property.

Front 49

Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority

Back 49

A coffee shop, located in a government owned parking garage, refused to serve the Appellant, Burton, simply because he was black. The construction and maintenance of the building were derived completely from governmental funds and the Appellee was responsible as the facility landlord. The Coffee Shoppe received a benefit from the state by being located in the parking garage. At the same time the state received the benefit of increased revenue from the restaurant’s customers. Therefore, a “symbiotic relationship” existed, whereby the state “elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination.” When a state leases its property in the manner present in this case, then the 14th Amendment applies as if it were a covenant written into the lease agreement.

Front 50

Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis

Back 50

Appellee, an African-American, was the guest of a member of Appellant Moose Lodge No. 107 in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania to a function at Appellant’s facility. While at the facility, Appellee was refused service by Appellant. Appellee claims that because the Pennsylvania liquor board had issued Appellant a private club license that authorized the sale of alcoholic beverages on the premises of Appellant, that the state action requirement is satisfied. Appellee named both appellant and the Pennsylvania liquor board as Defendants seeking an injunction that would revoke Appellant’s liquor license as long as it continues its discriminatory practices. The actions of Appellant do not rise to the level of state action because the bar and the land upon which it sits is owned by appellant, there is nothing in the facts of this case showing a symbiotic relationship between the appellant and the state, and there is no state funding of appellant organization. Other than regulating the terms of which Appellant can sell liquor the Pennsylvania Liquor Board plays no part in establishing or enforcing the membership or guest policies of the club. Furthermore, there is no evidence in this case showing that the Pennsylvania liquor law, as written or applied, discriminates against minority groups in any way.

Front 51

Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.

Back 51

Petitioner sought damages and injunctive relief against Respondent for terminating her electrical service for alleged nonpayment, claiming she had not been afforded notice, hearing and an opportunity to pay amount due. She claimed that under state law, she was entitled to reasonably continuous electrical service and that the Respondent’s termination constituted state action without procedural due process. The lower courts dismissed her claim. Although Respondent had a monopoly, that fact is not determinative in considering whether Respondent’s termination of service constituted state action. Approval by a state utility commission of such a request from a regulated utility, where the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission has not put its weight on the side of the proposed practice by ordering it, does not transform a practice initiated by the utility and approved by the PPUC into “state action.” All of Petitioner’s arguments taken together show no more than that the Respondent was a heavily regulated private utility, enjoying a partial monopoly and that it elected to terminate service to Petitioner in a manner which the PPUC found permissible under state law.

Front 52

Railway Express Agency v. New York

Back 52

Appellant operates about 1,900 delivery trucks in New York City. To increase revenue, Appellant sold the use of the sides of the truck as advertising billboards to its clients. Appellee passed a law specifically prohibiting such advertising unless it was connected to the business of the vehicle. This classification has a relation to the purpose for which it was made and does not contain the kind of discrimination against which the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution protects. The burden of showing unreasonableness should always be on the person questioning the regulation. Even a law that appears to be too narrowly drawn will survive rational basis review because complete deference is given to the state for its reasoning.

Front 53

Loving v. Virginia

Back 53

The state of Virginia enacted laws making it a felony for a white person to intermarry with a black person or a black person to intermarry with a white person. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the statutes served the legitimate state purpose of preserving the “racial integrity” of its citizens. The State argued that because its miscegenation statutes punished both white and black participants in an interracial marriage equally, they cannot be said to constitute invidious discrimination based on race and, therefore, the statutes commanded mere rational basis review. The mere fact that a statute is one of equal application does not mean that the statute is exempt from strict scrutiny review. The statutes were clearly drawn upon race-based distinctions. The legality of certain behavior turned on the races of the people engaging in it. Equal Protection requires, at least, that classifications based on race be subject to the “most rigid scrutiny.” The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution) prohibits classifications drawn by any statute that constitutes arbitrary and invidious discrimination. The fact that Virginia bans only interracial marriages involving whites is proof that the miscegenation statutes exist for no purposes independent of those based on arbitrary and invidious racial discrimination.

Front 54

Strauder v. West Virginia

Back 54

A West Virginia statute limited jury service to white men. Strauder, a black man, was convicted of murder by a trial court in West Virginia. Strauder appealed his conviction. Justice William Strong said the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution gave to blacks the right to be free from unfriendly legislation directed at them on the basis of their race. The West Virginia statute concerning juries is the quintessential legislation the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution was designed to prohibit. The fact that blacks as such are singled out and expressly denied by statute the right to participate in the administration of justice, as jurors, places a brand upon them and impedes their ability to secure the equal justice the law aims to secure for all others.

Front 55

Palmore v. Sidoti

Back 55

Respondent petitioned the court for a modification of a previous child custody judgment based on changed conditions after the Caucasian mother married an African-American man. The trial court awarded custody to the respondent. The effects of racial prejudice cannot justify a racial classification removing an infant child from the custody of its natural mother who was found to be an appropriate person to have such custody. The court based its decision solely on the issue of race, without a focus on the parental qualifications of the natural mother or her present husband. This raises important federal concerns arising from the Constitution’s commitment to eradicating discrimination based on race. The court stated the child’s welfare was the controlling factor, but made no effort to place its holding on any ground other than race. A core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with all governmentally-imposed discrimination based on race. To pass constitutional muster, racial classifications must be justified by a compelling governmental interest. The goal of granting custody based on the best interests of the child is indisputably a substantial governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause. It would ignore reality to suggest that racial prejudices do not exist, but the possible injury they might inflict are not permissible considerations for removal of an infant child from the custody of its natural mother. The law cannot give private biases effect, either directly or indirectly.

Front 56

Korematsu v. United States

Back 56

President of the United States Franklin Roosevelt (President Roosevelt) issued an executive order authorizing military commanders to prescribe military areas from which any or all persons may be excluded. Thereupon, a military commander ordered all persons of Japanese descent, whether or not they were United States citizens, to leave their homes on the West Coast and to report to “Assembly Centers.” The Petitioner, a United States citizen of unchallenged loyalty, but of Japanese descent, was convicted under a federal law making it an offense to fail to comply with such military orders. At the time the exclusion was ordered, it was justified. Justice Hugo Black stated that although the exclusion order imposed hardships upon a large number of American citizens, hardships are part of war. When, under conditions of warfare, our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect them must be commensurate with the threatened danger.

Front 57

Yick Wo v. Hopkins

Back 57

The city of San Francisco passed an ordinance that required Laundromats located in wooden buildings to have a permit. The ordinance established a board which would decide who would and would not get the permit. The facts suggest that not a single Chinese applicant was ever granted a permit, despite the fact that Chinese operated Laundromats constituted nearly 90% of the city’s laundry business at the time. The Plaintiffs were held in violation of the ordinance and issued a fine. Plaintiffs then sued under the 14th amendment, citing a violation of equal protection. Yes, the ordinance is invalidated and the appeal ruling is overturned. The court noted that the ordinance did not have any discrimination detectable within its text. However, its enforcement did violate the equal protection clause because its execution was racially unequal. The court held that the new rule should be that the Supreme Court may shoot down state or local laws that are neutral in their text, but discriminatory in their execution. The court wrote that the enforcement of the law was “a practical denial by the state of that equal protection of the law,” and, as such, was a violation of the constitution. Moreover, the court also noted that equal protection is afforded to non-citizens within US borders, as many of the Chinese Laundromat operators were non-citizens.

Front 58

Washington v. Davis

Back 58

A higher percentage of black applicants than white applicants failed a qualifying test administered by the District of Columbia Police Department. Some of the unsuccessful black applicants claimed these effects constituted unconstitutional discrimination against them. Justice Byron White (J. White) said our cases have not embraced the proposition that a law can be a violation of equal protection on the basis of its effect, without regard for governmental intent. Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it alone does not trigger the rule that racial classifications are subject to the strict scrutiny standard of review. The police force’s efforts to recruit black police officers are evidence that the police department did not intentionally discriminate on the basis of race.
The exam is rationally related to the legitimate government purpose of ensuring that police officers have acquired a particular level of verbal skill.
Concurrence. Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Steven) said that frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be a showing of what actually happened. A Constitutional issue does not arise, however, every time some disproportionate impact is shown.

Front 59

Personnel Administrator v. Feeney

Back 59

Respondent claims that by having a hiring preference for veterans over non- veterans for civil service positions, the Petitioner is discriminating against women. The benefit of this act was offered to any person who was a veteran. The law is a preference for veterans of either sex over non-veterans of either sex. It was not designed to favor men over women.

Front 60

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.

Back 60

The Respondent, Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (Respondent), applied to the Petitioner, Village of Arlington Heights (Petitioner), for rezoning of a parcel from single family to multi-family, low-income housing. The rezoning was denied and Respondent sued citing racial discrimination. There was simply no evidence of discriminatory intent or purpose behind this decision to deny the rezoning. The entire area had been zoned for single-family homes since the late 1950’s. In fact, single-family homes surround the site in question.

Front 61

Batson v. Kentucky

Back 61

Petitioner, Batson, was indicted in Kentucky on charges of burglary and receipt of stolen goods. During trial of the matter, the judge conducted voir dire and excused certain jurors for cause. When it came time for peremptory challenges, the prosecutor used his to remove all of the black persons left on the venire, which left Batson, a black man, to be tried by an all-white jury.. Defense counsel objected before the jury was sworn in, and the judge overruled the objection on the grounds that peremptory challenges could be against “anybody they want.” Petitioner was convicted on both counts. Justice Powell, for the court, wrote the opinion, opining that when it appears the prosecutor is using challenges in violation of equal protection, the State bears the burden of proving a reason for the challenges.

Front 62

Plessy v. Ferguson

Back 62

A Louisiana statute required railroad companies to provide separate, but equal accommodations for its Black and White passengers. The Plaintiff, Plessy (Plaintiff), was prosecuted under the statute after he refused to leave the section of a train reserved for whites. Justice Henry Brown (J. Brown) stated that although the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution was designed to enforce the equality between the races, it was not intended to abolish distinctions based on color, or to enforce a commingling of the races in a way unsatisfactory to either. Laws requiring the separation of the races do not imply the inferiority of either. If the law “stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority,” it is because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. Therefore, the statute constitutes a valid exercise of the States’ police powers. The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution does, however, require that the exercise of a State’s police powers be reasonable. Laws enacted in good faith, for the promotion of the public good and not for the annoyance or oppression of another race are reasonable. As such, the statute was reasonable.

Front 63

Brown v. Board of Education

Back 63

Black children were denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws that permitted or required segregation by race. The children sued. Chief Justice Earl Warren (J. Warren) stated that even if the “tangible” factors of segregated schools are equal, to separate black children from others of similar age and qualifications solely on the basis of race, generates a feeling of inferiority with respect to their status in the community and may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely to ever be undone.

Front 64

Brown II

Back 64

This case was decided in order to define the manner in which relief, as held in Brown I, is to be accorded. Case remanded to the lower courts to take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion. School authorities have the primary responsibility of desegregating their schools. The courts will then determine whether the action of the school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles. Because of their proximity to local conditions and the possible need for future hearings, the courts which originally heard the cases can best perform this judicial appraisal. The courts will require that the defendants make a prompt and reasonable start towards full compliance with Brown I. Once such a start has been made, the courts may find that additional time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective manner. The burden rests on the school authorities to establish that such time is necessary in the public interest and is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date.

Front 65

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education

Back 65

In the wake of Brown II, many school districts still sought to maintain vestiges of their pre-Brown I segregated systems. Defendant school districts brought suit, alleging that District Courts had overreached their authority, broad as it may be, under Brown II. The authority is broad, but is appropriate only where local districts have failed to bring themselves into compliance with Brown I on their own accord. Remedial authority does not put judges “automatically in the shoes of school authorities.” Mathematical racial quotas are an allowable exercise of judicial authority, when used as a starting point after a “total default” of the school board’s duty. Single-race schools are not per se a “mark of a system that still practices segregation by law.” The court “should scrutinize such schools,” and the burden is on the school district to demonstrate that the school’s racial makeup is not the result of past or present de jure segregation. The courts may redefine district lines to desegregate the systems, even though such redistricting may cause initial inconvenience and burdens. Busing is an appropriate remedy, as well, as long as the time involved in the busing does not risk the health of the children or significantly impinge on the educational process.

Front 66

Keyes v. School District No. 1

Back 66

Petitioners proved that for nearly ten years since 1960 the Denver, Colorado school system implemented an unconstitutional policy of racial discrimination by operating a segregated school system. The defense argued, and the District Court held, that even though one part of the Denver system was guilty of segregation, it did not follow that the entire system was segregated as well. The Court modified and remanded the lower court decision and held that when part of a school system is found to be segregated, a "prima facie case of unlawful [systematic] segregative design" becomes apparent. The school district involved assumes the burden of proving that it operated without "segregative intent" on a system-wide basis. This case is significant because it represents one of the first instances in which the Court identified segregation in northern schools.

Front 67

Milliken v. Bradley

Back 67

Attempts to integrate the Detroit schools had been unsuccessful. The District Court redefined the area in question from the city itself to the outlying school districts in the metropolitan area, a total of 54 school districts, including the Detroit district itself. The proposed redistricting would cause significant administrative and financial problems for the resulting school system. Chief Justice Warren Burger (J. Burger), writing for the majority, notes that there are many practical difficulties in the proposed plan. It is unclear what the status of currently elected school officials would be in the new “super district;” how taxes would be levied and distributed and who should make curriculum decisions. The scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and scope of the constitutional violation. In the present case, the discriminatory acts of a single district must be a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation. Thus, if district lines were drawn on the basis of race, or if discriminatory acts of one district caused segregation in another, an interdistrict remedy may be in order. However, this is not the case here.

Front 68

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke

Back 68

The University of California, Davis Medical School reserved 16 spots out of the 100 in any given class for “disadvantaged minorities.” The Respondent, when compared to students admitted under the special admissions program, had more favorable objective indicia of performance, while his race was the only distinguishing characteristic. The Respondent sued, alleging that the special admissions program denied him equal protection of laws under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The special admissions program is unconstitutional, but race may be considered as a factor in the admissions process. Justice Lewis Powell (J. Powell), writing for the court, says that the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) should not pay attention to past discrimination in reviewing the policies of the University, as this is tantamount to allowing political trends to dictate constitutional principles. J. Powell determines that accepting a minimum number of minorities simply to reduce the traditional deficit of such individuals in the medical profession is facially unconstitutional, as it gives preference to an individual on the basis of race alone. The major determination of the Supreme Court is whether or not racial preference may be used to promote diversity of the student body. J. Powell argues that setting aside a specified number of minority slots is not congruent to the purported goal – minority students in themselves do not guarantee a diversity of viewpoints in the educational environment.

Front 69

Fullilove v. Klutznik

Back 69

In 1977, Congress enacted legislation requiring that at least 10 percent of federal funds granted for local public works programs had to be used to obtain services or supplies from businesses owned by minority group members. H. Earl Fullilove and other contractors filed suit, claiming they had been economically harmed by the enforcement of the statute. The defendant was Philip M. Klutznick, Secretary of Commerce. The Court held that the minority set-aside program was a legitimate exercise of congressional power. The Court found that Congress could pursue the objectives of the minority business enterprise program under the Spending Power. The plurality opinion noted that Congress could have regulated the practices of contractors on federally funded projects under the Commerce Clause as well. The Court further held that in the remedial context, Congress did not have to act "in a wholly 'color-blind' fashion."

Front 70

Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education

Back 70

When the schools laid off some nonminority teachers, while retaining other minority teachers with less seniority, Wendy Wygant, a displaced nonminority teacher, challenged the layoff in district court. Holding that the Board could grant racial preferences without grounding them on prior discrimination findings and that the preferences did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, since they remedied discrimination by providing "role models" for minority students, the District Court upheld the layoff provision's constitutionality. The Court argued that Wygant's layoff stemmed from race and, therefore, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court noted that the government, when embarking on affirmative action, had two duties: first, to justify racial classification with a compelling state interest and second, to demonstrate that its chosen means were narrowly tailored to its purpose.

Front 71

City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.

Back 71

Richmond, Virginia created a set-aside program which required that a percentage of subcontracts for construction projects be reserved for minorities. Without a showing that a race-based initiative was created to remedy past racial discrimination and that it supports a compelling governmental interest, the race-based initiative is unconstitutional and cannot withstand strict-scrutiny. The judgment is affirmed.

Front 72

Metro Broadcasting v. FCC

Back 72

Under the first policy challenged by Metro Broadcasting, Inc., minority applicants for broadcast licenses were given preference if all other relevant factors were roughly equal. The second policy, known as the "distress sale," allowed broadcasters in danger of losing their licenses to sell their stations to minority buyers before the FCC formally ruled on the viability of the troubled stations. Held that the FCC's minority preference policies were constitutional because they provided appropriate remedies for discrimination victims and were aimed at the advancement of legitimate congressional objectives for program diversity. The FCC's minority preference policies were closely related to, and substantially advanced, Congress's legitimate interest in affording the public a diverse array of programming options. The availability of program diversity serves the entire viewing and listening public, not just minorities, and did not unduly burden nonminorities.

Front 73

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena

Back 73

Adarand Constructors had submitted the low bid on a subcontract for a federal highway project. Mountain Gravel, the prime contractor, would receive additional federal funds for awarding subcontracts to businesses owned by “socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.” Mountain Gravel awarded the contract to a higher bidder on this basis. The government’s policy included a presumption that minority-owned businesses were socially and economically disadvantaged. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (J. O’Connor), writing for the majority, extends the Fourteenth Amendment requirement to the states in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment. Namely, strict scrutiny is applied to all race-based classification, regardless of benign or remedial motive.

Front 74

Grutter v. Bollinger

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Petitioner, Barbara Grutter, applied for admission to University of Michigan Law School in 1997 with an undergraduate GPA of 3.8 and an LSAT of 161. She was denied. Petitioner, who is white, is challenging the law school’s use of race as a factor in the admissions process. The law school in this case was conducting highly individualized reviews of each applicant, and Justice O’Connor determined that race was only one of many factors considered to determine the applicant’s eligibility. Schools have a compelling interest in having diverse student bodies

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Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1

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The Seattle School district and Jefferson County district have applications that require a parent to state what the race of his or her child is. When determining where to place a child or where to transfer a child both school districts use race as the qualifying factor on where to send the child. Seattle allows students to choose a high school but when too many students choose a school they decide based on siblings in schools and the race of the child. Jefferson was originally ordered to desegregate its schools. In attempts to correct the problem Jefferson has a ratio that there should not be more than 50% black students at a particular school. A parent with a child from each district that was denied a transfer to another school based on the race of their child brought suit. In order for a state actor to engage in discriminatory actions it must do so in a way that is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. The only interests recognized by this court are: 1 to remedy past intentional discrimination; and 2 to achieve exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas and viewpoints. That is not present here. As to the first interest, Seattle has never been order to desegregate and Jefferson has since become unitary so the need is no longer present here. As to the second interest, both schools separate the students based on specific racial demographics and not in the theme of diversity. These schools need to employ serious good faith considerations of workable race-neutral alternatives.

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Bernal v. Fainter

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Aliens could not become notaries under Texas law. A state law that discriminates on the basis of alienage must withstand strict scrutiny. "Political function" exception--a state may bar aliens from positions intimately related to the process of democratic self-government. ie teachers, police, probation officers, public office. Holding: Notary is not a political function and law does not meet strict scrutiny. Can't say aliens don't have necessary integrity. Not appropriately tailored. Federal government can make restrictions on aliens that states can't.

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Reed v. Reed

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Idaho law gave males a preference over females as administrators of estates.

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Frontiero v. Richardson

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By statute, a serviceman may claim his wife as a dependent for purposes of qualifying for increased quarters, medical and dental benefits, and other increased support. However, a servicewoman may claim her husband as a dependant only if he is dependent on her for more than half of his support. The Petitioner, Frontiero (Petitioner), alleges that this policy denies her the equal protection of laws afforded by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) notes that women have a past history of discrimination against them in the United States and thus a requirement of strict scrutiny for gender-based classifications is appropriate. The government offered no concrete evidence suggesting that there is any actual administrative time or cost saving by this classification. Even so, J. Brennan notes that, “[W]hen we enter the real of ’strict judicial scrutiny,’ there can be no doubt that “administrative convenience” is not a shibboleth.” Concurrence. Justice Lewis Powell (J. Powell) concurs in the judgment, but disagrees that sex-based classifications are always suspect and subject to strict scrutiny.

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Craig v. Boren

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The State of Oklahoma prohibited the sale of “nonintoxicating” 3.2% alcohol beer to men under the age of 21 and women under the age of 18. Suit was brought against the State, alleging the law violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) argues that case precedent dictates that an intermediate level of scrutiny should be applied in analyzing the statute. Specifically, the gender-based classification must serve an important government objective and be substantially related to the achievement of such objective.
The District Court unequivocally found that the objective to be served by the statute is increased traffic safety. J. Brennan is not persuaded by the Appellees’, Craig and others (Appellees), statistics that the statute closely serves the stated objective. As such, it is not constitutional.

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Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan

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MUW is the only single-sex collegiate institution maintained by the State of Mississippi. The Respondent was otherwise qualified for admission to the school’s nursing program, but he was denied admission on the basis of being male. Applying intermediate scrutiny, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (J. O’Connor) notes that the State of Mississippi has not advanced an important state interest for operating a single sex nursing school. In particular, she notes that women did not lack opportunities to be trained as nurses in Mississippi without the presence of MUW. J. O’Connor also argues that the means to achieving even an important governmental objective (although she found none) are absent, as MUW allows male auditors in the nursing classes. If men are already in the classroom, the state is not technically operating a single-sex nursing program.

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J.E.B. v. Alabama

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Respondent, on the behalf of a mother with a minor child, filed against Petitioner for paternity and child support. During jury selection, Respondent used their peremptory challenges to remove the male jurors, reasoning that female jurors would be more sympathetic to a woman trying to collect money from a delinquent father. Petitioner challenged the challenges, arguing that removing jurors based upon gender is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Alabama courts rejected Petitioner’s claim, reasoning that discrimination based upon gender is not protected like race. The majority of the United States Supreme Court held that parties should not be allowed to discriminate based upon gender when selecting a jury. The state should not be allowed to promote cynical stereotypes of the manner in which men and women weigh evidence. Women, similarly to African-Americans, have historically been discriminated against, and the Equal Protection Clause prohibits that manner of reasoning.

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United States v. Virginia

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VMI was the sole single-sexed school among Virginia’s 15 public institutions. VMI’s mission is to produce “citizen soldiers”, (male) leaders of the future. VMI achieves its mission through its “adversative method”, which is characterized by physical rigor, mental stress, absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy, etc. At trial, the District Court acknowledged that women were missing out on a unique educational opportunity, but upheld the school’s policy on the rationale that admitting women could not be done without compromising the school’s adversative method. Pursuant to a decision by the Court of Appeals, the State established the Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (VWIL) for women. VWIL offered fewer courses than VMI and was run without the adversative method. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (J. Ginsburg) stated that Virginia has shown no “exceedingly persuasive justification” for excluding all women. “Benign” justifications offered in defense of absolute exclusions will not be accepted automatically. The notion that admitting women would downgrade VMI’s stature and destroy the school’s adversity system was hardly proved. Generalizations about the way women are or what is appropriate for them will no longer serve to justify denying opportunity to those whose talents and capabilities make them exceptions to the average description. Moreover, VWIL does not qualify as VMI’s substitute. VWI’s student body, faculty, course offerings and facilities do not match VMI’s.

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Illegitimacy Cases

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Generally subject to strict scrutiny. Immutable characteristic.

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City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.

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A zoning ordinance for the City of Cleburne (the City) permitted a wide variety of uses on a proposed cite of land, including for hospitals, for sanitariums and for homes for the aged, but excluded the operation of homes for the insane or feebleminded. The City, acting pursuant to the ordinance, denied an applicant a special use permit for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded. The Court of Appeals held that the ordinance and the denial violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Justice Byron White (J. White) stated that to withstand Equal Protection review, legislation that distinguishes between mentally retarded persons and others must be rationally related to further a legitimate governmental interest. The ordinance fails on both scores. The governmental interests, e.g., the avoidance of apprehensiveness of mentally retarded persons, are not legitimate. Moreover, the means the government employs are not rationally related to the achievement of its stated interests.

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Romer v. Evans

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Amendment two was added to Colorado’s state constitution by a statewide referendum. It prohibited the state or local government from adopting measures that would protect homosexuals as a class from discrimination. The Respondents, Evans and others (Respondents), argued that Amendment two did nothing more than deny homosexuals special rights. The stated purpose of the amendment was to prevent the deterioration of the sexual morality favored by most Coloradans. The state trial court permanently enjoined enforcement Amendment two. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed on the trials court’s decision. Justice Anthony Kennedy stated that Amendment two relegates homosexuals to a solitary class and withdraws from them, but no others, legal protections arising from discrimination. Its reach includes the State’s public accommodation laws, as well as laws prohibiting discrimination in the housing, insurance and education markets. A law making it more difficult for one group of citizens to seek assistance from the government than another is a denial of the Equal Protection of the laws in the most literal sense (i.e. the means do not fit whatever ends sufficiently to pass rational basis review). Moreover, the means of Amendment two are so broad in relation to its ends (to prevent the deterioration of sexual morality) that we cannot credit them. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) is left with the conclusion that Amendment two constitutes a classification for its own sake. “Class legislation is obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment.” (i.e., the ends are illegitimate).

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Shapiro v. Thompson

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The one-year residency requirement is unconstitutional because it discriminates against “need . . . families” who have not met the residency requirement even though the status of these families is no different than families meeting the residency requirement. The one-year residency requirement is not supported by a compelling state interest. The statutory provisions violate the constitutional right to travel because it has the effect of “inhibiting migration by needy persons into the State.” The residency requirement also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the requirement denies “public assistance to poor persons otherwise eligible solely on the ground that they have not been residents of the [state] for one year at the time their applications are filed.”

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Zablocki v. Redhail

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A Wisconsin statute required all its residents, who had minor children not in his or her custody and which he or she is under an obligation to support, to obtain court permission to marry, to demonstrate compliance with the support obligation, and to state that the children covered by the support order are not or not likely to become public charges. The statute was challenged as a violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution (Constitution) because it hindered a couple’s right to marry. Supreme Court held that “When a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, [such as the fundamental right of marriage], it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests . . . .” The Wisconsin statute “clearly does interfere directly and substantially with the right to marry” and fails to pass strict scrutiny.

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Harper v. Virginia State Board of Education

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A State poll tax violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The tax divides the eligible voters of the State into two classes: those who can afford the tax and those who cannot. As such, it invidiously discriminates against those who cannot afford the tax.

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Kramer v. Union Free School District

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New York Education Law requires the ownership of real property within a school district or custody of children attending the district to be eligible to vote in school district elections. The Petitioner is currently living with his mother within the school district. His denial of voting rights was based solely on his lack of real property ownership or custody of children. The State’s legitimate interest seems to be restricting a voice in school matters to those “directly affected.” J. Warren notes that the system of exclusion excludes some members that have a direct interest (individuals whose children are not yet school age) and includes some with little interest (individuals with no children who just incidentally own real property in the district). As such, it cannot be narrowly tailored.

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Reynolds v. Sims

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This case was a challenge to the malapportionment of the Alabama legislature. The challengers claimed discrimination against voters in counties whose populations that had grown proportionally far more than others since the 1900 census. The complaints noted that the existing districting scheme was based on the1900 census, even though the state constitution required legislative representation based on population and decennial reapportionment. If a state should provide that votes in one part of the state should receive more weight than votes from another part of the state, the right to vote of those in disfavored areas is diluted. With respect to the allocation of legislative representation, all voters, as citizens of the state, stand in the same relation regardless of where they live. So long as the divergences of a strict population standard are based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy, some deviations from the equal population principle are constitutionally permissible, but neither history alone, nor economic or other sorts of group interests, are permissible factors in attempting to justify disparities from population-based representation. Further, equal protection requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis.

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Harris v. McRae

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Since September 1976, Congress prohibited the use of any federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions under the Medicaid program except under certain specified circumstances including the endangerment of the mother and for victims of rape or incest. This restriction is known as the Hyde Amendment. The constitutional freedoms provided for in Roe v. Wade do not extend to access to public funds. The Hyde Amendment does not place a governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy, but withholds funding in certain circumstances. Furthermore, the Court states that a woman’s freedom of choice does not carry with it a constitutional entitlement of the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected resources. The Hyde Amendment is also upheld as having a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective of protecting the potential life of the fetus.

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San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez

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The State of Texas provides for free primary and secondary education for the children of the State. The state provides a set amount of funding for each district based on the number of students in the district. The district makes up the difference in operating expense with funds from local property taxes. This reliance on property taxes results in a large disparity in per student spending between property rich and property poor districts. Respondents allege that this denies the children in poor district Equal Protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. If education is a fundamental right, classifications affecting access to education are subject to strict scrutiny. There is no mention of education in the Constitution. Thus, there is no explicit constitutional guarantee. The question is now one of whether education is implicitly a fundamental right. The Court notes that Respondents do not argue that there is some quantum of education that is fundamental and which the class is not receiving. Nor do they argue that the class is entitled to the best education provided by public schools in Texas. Without explicit or implicit constitutional protections, the fiscal decisions of the State of Texas are beyond review of the Court, unless they lack a rational basis. Such a lacking is not found by the Court. Thus, the Court applied the rational basis test to require the Texas law to be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.

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Plyler v. Doe

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In 1975 the Texas legislature passed a law withholding funds for the education of children of illegal aliens. This law also authorized local school districts to deny entry in the public schools of the state to these children. If the State is to deny a discrete group of children the free public education it offers to others residing within its borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest. The state does not adequately show such an interest in this case. The state must show that its classification of a subject class has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. The Court finds it difficult to understand the states goals in limiting the education of children of illegal immigrants. Whatever these interests may be they are insubstantial when looking at the costs of not educating these children for the State and the Nation.

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Strict Scrutiny

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Compelling state interest by the least restrictive means available.

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rational basis

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Any law that is passed is subject to Rational Basis Test and have to have a rational reason and legitimate state interest.

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intermediate scrutiny

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exceedingly important government interest

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Suspect classifications

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immutable characteristics, historically discriminated against, apparent classification

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Fundamental Rights and Interests Under Equal Protection

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Interstate Migration, Marriage & Family, Access to Franchise & One Man/ One Vote, and Access to the Courts

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Fundamental Rights Under Due Process

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Conception & Abortion, Intimate Association; Marital & Familial Rights; Health & Life, Refusal of Treatment

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Commerce Clause

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Gives congress power to regulate commerce within states. The court upholds very broad interpretations of the commerce clause. In very few cases, Congress exceeds its power under the commerce clause. However, the federal government cannot regulate state and local officials and governments. We can aggregate a lot of trivial instances together to see their impact on commerce within a state. United States v. Lopez

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Dormant Commerce Clause

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The Commerce Clause expressly grants Congress the power to regulate commerce "among the several states." The idea behind the Dormant Commerce Clause is that this grant of power implies a negative converse — a restriction prohibiting a state from passing legislation that improperly burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce. The restriction is self-executing and applies even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute.

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Roe v Wade

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Texas statutes made it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion except when medically advised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. Appellant Jane Roe sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes were unconstitutional on their face and an injunction to prevent defendant Dallas County District Attorney from enforcing the statutes. Appellant alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant, and that she was unable to receive a legal abortion by a licensed physician because her life was not threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy and that she was unable to afford to travel to another jurisdiction to obtain a legal abortion. Appellant sued on behalf of herself and all other women similarly situated, claiming that the statutes were unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but the right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.
The abortion laws in effect in the majority of the States are of relatively recent vintage, deriving from statutory changes generally enacted in the latter half of the 19th century. At common law abortion performed before quickening (the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero) was not an indictable offense, and it is doubtful that abortion was ever a firmly established common law crime even when it destroyed a quick fetus.
Three reasons have been advanced for the historical enactment of criminal abortion laws. The first is that the laws are the product of a Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct, but this argument has been taken seriously by neither courts nor commentators. The second reason is that the abortion procedure is hazardous, therefore the State’s concern is to protect pregnant women. However, modern medical techniques have altered the situation, with abortions being relatively safe particularly in the first trimester. The third reason is the State’s interest is in protecting the prenatal life. However, this is somewhat negated by the fact that the pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of abortion.
For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first trimester, the abortion decision must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician, and may not be criminalized by statute. For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the first trimester, the State may regulate abortion in ways reasonably related to maternal health based upon the State’s interest in promoting the health of the mother. For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may regulate and even proscribe abortion, except where necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life, based upon the State’s interest in the potential of the potential life of the unborn child. Dissent. Justice Rehnquist. The right to an abortion is not universally accepted, and the right to privacy is thus not inherently involved in this case.