Con Law

Front 1

Marbury v. Madison

Back 1

(1803) No Jx but ruled anyway. 3 issues: Did Marbury have a right to the commission? Yes. Witholding was "violative of a vested legal right" 2. Do the laws afford hima remedy? Yes, the laws could provide relief against teh executive when he owes duties to a particular person and not a political question. 3. Is a writ of mandamus the appropriate remedy? Yes, Marshall establishes the power of the judiciary to review executive actions when there is a legal duty to act. Note: Brilliant political decision. Expanded courts power by invalidating Judiciary Act (designed to expand jurisdiction). Also, prevented Jefferson from refusing to act on his orders by not actually ordering him to do anything, just saying he was wrong.

Front 2

Martin v. Hunter's Lessee

Back 2

The supreme court has the power to review state court decisions. Article 3 says the judicial power shall be vested into one supreme court and judicial power includes reviewing determinations of federal questions. Sct. makes a textual argument (power vested in ONE supreme court) must hear all cases. Theorizes that S. Ct can hear cases from state court

Front 3

Baker v. Carr

Back 3

Challenged malapportionment of state legislatures under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the past, apportionment challengers have generally based their challenge on the Guaranty Clause of Art. IV, Section: 4 of the Constitution (guaranteeing republican form of government). These claims are nonjusticiable as they address issues solely directed to the political branches of the government by the Constitution. This is a separation of powers issue. In Baker v. Carr, the claim is that the Appellants are being denied equal protection of the laws by being underrepresented in the state legislature. The Supreme Court rules that the equal protection challenge in this case is separable from the political questions. An apportionment case may be reviewed on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, so long as these grounds are independent from political question elements.

Front 4

McCullogh v. Maryland

Back 4

(1819) 1. Bank is constitutional. Introduces the idea of Judicial Review. 2. States cannot tax the federal government. (supremacy and representation issues)

Front 5

Gibbons v. Ogden

Back 5

(1824) Competing ferry service. Held that federal government had the power to regulate interstate commerce through the commerce clause. Also held that federal commerce laws were supreme.

Front 6

South Dakota v. Dole

Back 6

(1987)National Minimum Drinking Age Act, withholding 5% of Federal-Aid Highway Act funds from states that did not adopt a minimum legal age of 21 for the purchase and possession of alcohol upheld. Spending power has 4 restrictions: 1. The condition must promote "the general welfare;" 2. Be unambiguous. 3.The condition should relate "to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs;" and 4. Other constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds.

Front 7

Massachusetts v. Mellon

Back 7

The state of Massachusetts along with private individuals asked the Court to stop federal funds from being used for the Maternity Act. The challenge to the act was premised on the argument that the expenditures emanated from an additional taxation on the People, and violated the Tenth Amendment by virtue of it being a deprivation or seizure of property (tax funds) without due process. Dismissed because the state did have the option to refuse the federal funding reserved for the provision of the program at the state level. For the individual petitioners, there had been no proof of rights being denied without due process – Frothingham had failed to demonstrate a direct injury since the nature of taxation is inherently public, any burden upon him would be “comparatively minute and indeterminable.” Ultimately, the Court dismissed the case and refused to review its merits because there was no actual controversy (the State) in addition to a lack of standing (the private/individual petitioners).

Front 8

Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for the Separation of Church and State

Back 8

The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare conveyed a 77-acre parcel to the Valley Forge Christian College. AUSCS sued on behalf of its 90,000 “taxpayer members,” alleging that Congress violated the Establishment Clause with its grant of property. No standing. Because Respondents sue on an administrative action authorized under the property clause, they fail the first prong of the standing test developed in Flast v. Cohen, requiring Congressional action under the taxing and spending clause.

Front 9

Flast v. Cohen

Back 9

Congress had funded writing, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious schools. Flast and other Appellants brought suit, claiming that these expenditures violated the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses of the First Amendment of the Constitution. The only claim to standing provided was that all Appellants were taxpayers. Court held no standing. Supreme Court states that standing refers to the plaintiff(s) having a “personal stake in the outcome” of the case. In the taxpayer context, the Supreme Court outlines two requirements to show this personal stake: 1) The taxpayer must challenge the constitutionality only of exercises under the taxing and spending clause of the Constitution. Expenditures which are incidental to a regulatory statute or other incidental expenditures do not give rise to taxpayer standing. 2) The second requirement is that the moving party must allege that Congress acted beyond the scope of a particular constitutional provision. It is insufficient to allege spending beyond the powers delegated under Art. I, Section: 8 of the Constitution.

Front 10

Allen v. Wright

Back 10

Parents of black public school children sued the IRS, alleging that by not denying tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools, the IRS was harming their children in two ways. First, the IRS conduct was in fact giving federal financial aid to racially segregated institutions. Second, the conduct encourages the operation and expansion of such schools and this interferes with desegregation of the public schools.

Front 11

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife

Back 11

The ESA was created to protect endangered and threatened animals. Under the authority of the ESA, the Secretary declared that the ESA applied to actions outside of the United States. Upon further review, the Secretary reinterpreted the ESA to be applicable to actions only within the United States or the high seas. The Plaintiffs, organizations dedicated to wildlife conservation, filed an action against the Secretary seeking an injunction requiring the Secretary to reinstate the initial interpretation of the ESA. No standing. The case and controversy requirement of Article III creates three minimal elements in order to have standing. The plaintiff must have suffered (i) an “injury in fact”; (ii) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (iii) it must be likely that this injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. In this case, the Plaintiffs failed to establish injury in fact or redressability. Because of the limited effect of the ESA, it is too speculative to claim that not enforcing an injunction on the Secretary would result in an injury in fact to any of the Plaintiffs. Likewise, it is too speculative to assume that any redress by the courts would have substantial impact on threatened species outside of the United States. The Plaintiff’s claim that they suffered a “procedural injury” established by a citizen-suit provision within the ESA is also without merit. To permit standing based on this Congressional Act would usurp the power of the Executive to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”

Front 12

DeFunis v. Odegaard

Back 12

Marco DeFunis, Jr. sued the University of Washington Law School, a state operated university. DeFunis argued that the University’s admissions policies and criteria were racially discriminatory. However, DeFunis was allowed to attend the law school during the case and was in his third year when the case was heard by the Court. Further, the University has agreed to let him graduate upon completion of his last year. Court found the case to be moot. There must be an actual case or controversy for the court to have jurisdiction. (Art III) DeFunis no longer had a stake in the case.

Front 13

Roe v. Wade

Back 13

The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare conveyed a 77-acre parcel to the Valley Forge Christian College. AUSCS sued on behalf of its 90,000 “taxpayer members,” alleging that Congress violated the Establishment Clause with its grant of property. No standing. Because Respondents sue on an administrative action authorized under the property clause, they fail the first prong of the standing test developed in Flast v. Cohen, requiring Congressional action under the taxing and spending clause.

Front 14

Champion v. Ames

Back 14

(1903) Harlan held that trafficking lottery tickets constituted interstate commerce that could be regulated by the U.S. Congress under the Commerce Clause.

Front 15

Hammer v. Dagenhart

Back 15

(1918) Congress does not have the right to regulate commerce of goods that are manufactured by children, therefore voiding the Keating-Owen Act of 1916. Drawing a distinction between the manufacture of goods and potential "inherent evil" of goods themselves introduced into interstate commerce.

Front 16

United States v. Darby

Back 16

(1941) United States Supreme Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, holding that the U.S. Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate employment conditions. The unanimous decision of the Court in this case overturned several long-standing precedents, notably Hammer v. Dagenhart

Front 17

Wickard v. Filburn

Back 17

(1942) The federal government has the power to regulate interstate commerce through the Interstate Commerce Clause of the Constitution. In Filburn the Court unanimously reasoned that the power to regulate the price at which commerce occurs was inherent in the power to regulate commerce. The issue was not how one characterized the activity as local, but rather whether the activity "exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce" Could be in the aggregate

Front 18

Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States

Back 18

(1964) The Court held that Congress acted well within its jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce clause in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, thereby upholding the act's Title II in question. While it might have been possible for Congress to pursue other methods for abolishing racial discrimination, the way in which Congress did so, according to the court, was perfectly valid. It found no merit in the arguments pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment, finding it hard to conceive that such an Amendment might possibly be applicable in restraining civil rights legislation.

Front 19

Katzenback v. McClung

Back 19

(1964) Because some food served in Ollie's Barbecue originated out of state, The U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress had the power, under the Commerce Clause, to ban racial segregation in the restaurant.

Front 20

New York v. United States

Back 20

(1992) The "take title" provision of The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act was an attempt to "commandeer" the state governments by directly compelling them to participate in the federal regulatory program. The federal government "crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion."

Front 21

Printz v. United States

Back 21

(1992) The "take title" provision of The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act was an attempt to "commandeer" the state governments by directly compelling them to participate in the federal regulatory program. The federal government "crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion."

Front 22

United States v. Lopez

Back 22

(1995) Gun Case. Was the first United States Supreme Court case since the Great Depression to set limits to Congress's power under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Set 3 spheres that congress can regulate.1. Channels of interstate commerce 2. the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce 3. activities that substantially affect or substantially relate to interstate commerce.

Front 23

United States v. Morrison

Back 23

(2000) Violence Against Women Act of 1994 were unconstitutional because they exceeded congressional power under the Commerce Clause. Used the Lopez three part test. The majority concluded that acts of violence such as those that VAWA was meant to remedy had only an "attenuated" effect, not a substantial one, on interstate commerce. Even if it did effect ISC in the aggregate, the effects were "indirect" and therefore could not be regulated.

Front 24

Gonzales v. Raich

Back 24

(2005) The regulation (ban on homegrown medical marajuana) is squarely within Congress' commerce power because production of the commodity meant for home consumption, be it wheat (Wickard) or marijuana, has a substantial effect on supply and demand in the national market for that commodity.

Front 25

National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius

Back 25

Affordable Care Act. Supreme Court upheld individual mandate under tax and spending clause (didn't work under commerce clause) Struck down the medicaid provision. 1) Severability (ability to deny part of an act and uphold another part) 2)medicaid provision was not essential to act 3)criticized for "rewriting" act--states are free to accept it if they want 4) Struck down because coerces states Dole is applied.

Front 26

City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey

Back 26

A New Jersey law prohibited the importation of solid or liquid waste that originated or was collected from outside of the State. The stated purpose of the statute was to protect the quality of the environment of New Jersey. Protectionism measures can be unconstitutional for their means as well as their ends.
Whatever the purpose of the statute, it may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of out-of-state commerce, unless there is some reason, apart from their out-of-state origin, for doing so.
On its face, the statute imposes on out-of -state commerce the full burden of conserving the state’s landfill space.
The statute violates the principle of non-discrimination both on its face and by its effect.

Front 27

Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission

Back 27

North Carolina adopted a statute requiring all containers of apples shipped into the state display “no grade other than the applicable U.S. grade or standard.” The statute applied to apples shipped from all States, even those whose standards surpassed the USDA’s, such as Washington State’s. Washington state apple growers, who could only comply with the North Carolina statute by drastically altering their packaging methods, challenged the statute as an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. North Carolina defended the statute, arguing that it constituted a valid exercise of its police powers to protect its citizenry from fraud and deception. Although facially neutral, the statute had the effect of not only burdening interstate sales of Washington apples, but also discriminating against them.
For example, the statute raised the costs of doing business in North Carolina for Washington growers, while leaving the costs for North Carolina growers unaffected. In addition, by prohibiting Washington growers from marketing their apples under their state’s more stringent grading system label, the statute has a “leveling effect” which operated to benefit local growers. Moreover, non-discriminatory alternatives to the statute could have been used to accomplish the State’s local objectives. North Carolina could have permitted out-of-state growers to display their state labels only if they also used the USDA label.

Front 28

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.

Back 28

An Arizona law requires that all cantaloupes grown in Arizona and offered for sale must be packed in closed standard containers approved by government officials. Loren Pike, the Defendant state’s official in charge of enforcing the law, issued an order prohibiting the Plaintiff, a cantaloupe farming company, from transporting uncrated cantaloupes from their Arizona ranch to the California packing place. The closest available packing shed to the Defendant state was California and calculated they would suffer $700,000 in losses unless the order was enjoined. The Plaintiff filed suit in district court to enjoin the order on the ground that it was unconstitutional because it violated the Constitution’s Commerce Clause. Supreme Court developed a test for determining whether nondiscriminatory state laws violate the dormant commerce clause. Where a nondiscriminatory law effectuates a legitimate local interest and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. Where there is a legitimate local interest it must be measured against the burden it composes. Arizona's interest do not outweigh the $200,000 cost to the plaintiff.

Front 29

Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice

Back 29

Wisconsin statutes do not allow trucks longer than 55 feet or pulling more than one other vehicle to be operated on highways within that State without a permit. Appellant motor carriers were denied permits to operate 65-foot double trailer units on certain interstate highways in Wisconsin on the ground that their proposed operations were not within the narrow scope of the regulations specifying when "trailer train" permits will be issued. The challenged regulations violate the Commerce Clause because they place a substantial burden on interstate commerce and make no more than the most speculative contribution to highway safety. The great number of exceptions to the general 55-foot rule, and especially those that discriminate in favor of local industry, weaken the presumption of validity in favor of the general limit because they undermine the assumption that the State's own political processes will act as a check on local regulations that unduly burden interstate commerce.

Front 30

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer

Back 30

In 1952, after the employees of steel companies threatened to strike, the President of the United States Harry Truman (President Truman) ordered the Secretary of Commerce to seize the Nation’s steel companies. The steel companies sued. Justice Hugo Black stated that there was no statute that expressly conferred upon President Truman the power to seize the mills. There are no provisions of the Constitution, or combination of provisions thereof, which gave the President the authority to take possession of property as he did.

Front 31

Immigration & Naturalization Services v. Chadha

Back 31

(1983) Legislative veto violated the constitutional separation of powers inconsistent with the bicameralism principle and Presentment Clause of the United States Constitution.

Front 32

Morrison v. Olson

Back 32

Title VI of The Ethics in Government Act allows for the appointment of an “Independent Counsel” by a special court, upon the recommendation of the Attorney General. The purpose is to investigate and if necessary, prosecute government officials for certain violations of federal criminal laws. The Act provides that the independent counsel can be removed from office only by impeachment or by personal action of the Attorney General for good cause. The Appointments Clause, reads “the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper . . . in the courts of Law . . . . ” Art II. This language seems to clearly give Congress the power to vest the appointment of an executive official in the “courts of Law.” Thus, Congress is authorized to make “interbranch appointments.” There’s no separation of powers problem with regard to the Act because the statute (1) appropriately puts the removal power in the hands of the Executive Branch: an independent counsel may only be removed by the Attorney General for good cause and (2) does not impermissibly interfere with the functions of the Executive Branch.

Front 33

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.

Back 33

Congress passed a Joint Resolution authorizing the President to ban the sales of arms to countries involved in the border dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay. The President immediately made an Executive Order banning such sales. The Defendant was indicted for conspiracy to sell fifteen machine guns to Bolivia in violation of the Joint Resolution and the Executive Order. Held there is a fundamental difference in the role of government in foreign affairs and domestic affairs. The federal government has both constitutional and inherent authority to conduct foreign affairs as it sees fit. The President is the United States’ sole representative to foreign nations. In order to achieve the United States’ foreign policy aims, the President is better able than Congress to judge conditions that exist in foreign nations and is afforded substantial discretion and wide latitude in those decisions. The President has confidential information as well as consular, diplomatic and foreign affairs officers to help in his decision.

Front 34

Dames & Moore v. Regan

Back 34

On November 4, 1979, the United States Embassy in Iran and United States diplomats were held hostage so President Carter froze all Iranian assets in the United States. In January 1981, President Carter signed an executive agreement containing a provision terminating all legal proceedings against the Iranian government in the United States Courts and requiring United States citizens to arbitrate all claims against Iran. President Carter did so under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The Plaintiff, Dames and Moore (Plaintiff) brought suit claiming that the executive agreement was unconstitutional and beyond the President’s power. An Executive Agreement has the same force and effect as a treaty and can alter the rights of the United States Citizens. The President of the United States does not have the plenary power to settle claims against foreign governments through an Executive Agreement. However, where Congress is seen to assent to the president’s action, then the president can settle such claims. Here, although what President Carter did under the IEEPA was not specifically sanctioned, Congress gave the president substantial powers to seize and handle foreign assets, so President Carter’s actions were appropriate.

Front 35

War Powers Resolution

Back 35

a federal law intended to check the president's power to commit the United States to an armed conflict without the consent of Congress. The resolution was adopted in the form of a United States Congress joint resolution; this provides that the President can send U.S. armed forces into action abroad only by declaration of war by Congress, "statutory authorization," or in case of "a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces."

The War Powers Resolution requires the President to notify Congress within 48 hours of committing armed forces to military action and forbids armed forces from remaining for more than 60 days, with a further 30 day withdrawal period, without an authorization of the use of military force or a declaration of war. The resolution was passed by two-thirds of Congress, overriding a presidential veto.

Front 36

Slaughter House Cases

Back 36

(1873) Miller: Court held to a narrow interpretation of the amendment and ruled that it did not restrict the police powers of the state. Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities clause affected only rights of United States citizenship and not state citizenship. The Court viewed due process in a procedural light rather than substantively. The Court further held that the amendment was primarily intended to protect former slaves and not broadly applied. . Ecconomic Due Proces: expressly rejected the substantive due process claim. Not held to be a depravation of property within the meaning of that provision. Rejected the idea that the due process clause could be used to safeguard a right to practice a trade or profession from arbitrary goverment interference. Field Dissent: amendment as not confined to protection of freed slaves, but rather as embracing the common law presumption in favor of an individual right to pursue a legitimate occupation (natural right)

Front 37

Adamson v. California

Back 37

At murder trial, appellant chose the strategy of not taking the stand and subjecting himself to cross-examination regarding former crimes of burglary, larceny and robbery that he had committed. Under a California statute, his attempt to protect himself from impeachment of his veracity nonetheless allowed prosecution to make reference to his refusal to testify, and he was convicted. Appellant argues that the California statute’s allowing opposing counsel to comment on his refusal to testify ran counter to the Fifth Amendment’s ban on a defendant’s compulsion to testify, and that the Fifth Amendment applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The due process clause does not include all of the federal Bill of Rights. Here, it did not protect a defendant’s freedom from giving testimony by compulsion in state trials. The court rejected the argument that the Fifth Amendment’s protection versus self-incrimination was made effective by freedom from testimonial compulsion that is a right of national citizenship within the Fourteenth Amendment. They also rejected the idea that protection versus self-incrimination was a personal privilege or immunity secured by the Federal Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment prevents a state from abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, but a state may abridge the privileges and immunities flowing from state citizenship as long as due process is not violated. The decision to not testify did not serve as an admission of any element of the crime. Proof of the commission of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt still remained with the prosecution, thus the federal constitutional due process standard was met.

Front 38

Lochner v. New York

Back 38

(1905) Bakery Case; held a "liberty of contract" was implicit in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.In the Lochner era, the Supreme Court invalidated scores of federal and state statutes that sought to regulate working conditions during the Progressive Era and the Great Depression.

Front 39

Nebbia v. New York

Back 39

(1934) Court held that the state of New York could regulate the price of milk.a state may adopt an economic policy that can reasonably be said to promote public welfare, and enforce such policy by appropriate legislation. Due process demands only that the law not be unreasonable or arbitrary. (Starting to depart from Lochner)

Front 40

United States v. Carolene Products Co.

Back 40

(1938) Court, found that the law, being "presumptively constitutional" was essentially a legislative judgment, and hence was not for the courts to overrule. Applying rational-basis review, the Court held that the law was supported by substantial public-health evidence, and was not arbitrary or irrational. Footnote 4: Court applied minimal scrutiny (rational basis review) to the economic regulation in this case, but proposed a new level of review for certain other types of cases.Legislation aimed at discrete and insular minorities, who lack the normal protections of the political process, should be an exception to the presumption of constitutionality, and a heightened standard of judicial review should be applied.

Front 41

Griswold v. Connecticut

Back 41

(1965) Constitution protected a right to privacy.Douglas wrote for the majority that the right was to be found in the "penumbras" and "emanations" of other constitutional protections. Justice Arthur Goldberg wrote a concurring opinion in which he used the Ninth Amendment to defend the Supreme Court's ruling. Justice John Marshall Harlan II wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that privacy is protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Byron White also wrote a concurrence based on the due process clause.

Front 42

Eisenstadt v. Baird

Back 42

Appellee was convicted for exhibiting and distributing contraceptive articles under a law that forbid single as opposed to married people from obtaining contraceptives. The dissimilar treatment of similarly situated married and unmarried persons under the Massachusetts law violates the Equal Protection Clause.
First, the deterrence of premarital sex cannot be reasonably regarded as the purpose of the law, because the ban has at best a marginal relating to the proffered objective.
Second, if health is the rationale of the law, it is both discriminatory and overbroad.
Third, the right to obtain contraceptives must be the same for married and unmarried individuals.

Front 43

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern PA v. Casey

Back 43

(1992) Stare Decisis. The Court's lead plurality opinion upheld the constitutional right to have an abortion but lowered the standard for analyzing restrictions of that right, invalidating one regulation (spousal notification) but upholding the others. Abandoned the trimeseter framework and adopted viability as the point at which the state interest in the life of the fetus outweighs the rights of the woman and abortion may be banned entirely "except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother". Also replaced the heightened scrutiny of abortion regulations under Roe, which was standard for fundamental rights in the Court's case law, with a lesser "undue burden" standard

Front 44

Michael H. & Victoria D. v. Gerald D.

Back 44

Carole had an adulterous affair with Michael while married to Gerald. A child was born while Carole and Gerald were together, but was likely Michael’s child. Michael and the child by guardian ad litem brought suit to establish paternity and a right to visitation. Michael contends as a matter of substantive due process that because he has established a parental relationship with Victoria, protection of Gerald and Carole’s marital union is an insufficient state interest to support termination of the relationship. However, Michael’s interest must be a fundamental liberty to be constitutionally protected.

Front 45

Bowers v. Hardwick

Back 45

(1986) Upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia sodomy law that criminalized oral and anal sex in private between consenting adults. Byron White, framed the legal question as whether the constitution creates "a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy." Justice White's opinion for the majority answered this question in the negative, stating that "to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, facetious."

Front 46

Lawrence v. Texas

Back 46

(2003) Overruled Bowers, holding that it had viewed the liberty interest too narrowly. The majority held that intimate consensual sexual conduct was part of the liberty protected by substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. the Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual," the majority did not appear to apply the standard of review, strict scrutiny, which would be appropriate if Lawrence recognized a "fundamental right." Had a fundamental right been present, any burden on that right would only have been held constitutional had it survived "strict scrutiny" and been found to be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. Scalia insists the majority, instead, applied "an unheard-of form of rational-basis review that will have far-reaching implications beyond this case."

Front 47

Civil Rights Cases

Back 47

Several individuals of color were denied admission to theaters, cabs, cars, and inns based on their race. These individuals claimed that this violates their under a federal law passed in 1875 that entitles all individuals in the United States the right to equal treatment in places of public accommodation and the quasi-public facilities of this country. These individuals won their lawsuits under this act, and the Defendants appeal claiming that this act is an unconstitutional. Such discrimintation has nothing to do with slavery. It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of discrimination, which a person may see it fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take in his coach or cab, or admit to his concert. If the laws make unjust discriminations according to the Fourteenth Amendment is it up to Congress to provide an adequate remedy. There is a point at which a former slave becomes a normal citizen and ceases to be a special favorite of the laws. In conclusion the Court finds that there is no ground of authority in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, and therefore invalidates the rule in question in this case.

Front 48

Evans v. Newton

Back 48

Upon his death, the senator devised land to Macon, Georgia that was to be used as a park for whites only. The city was named trustee, and a Board of Managers was created under the trust to administer the park. The park was eventually opened by the city and Negroes were allowed to use it. The City argued they could not enforce segregation in a public park. The Defendants, individual Managers from the Board of Managers (Defendants) sued to remove the city as trustee so as to effectuate the Senator’s will. The city resigned as the trustee and a state court appointed private trustees to continue the exclusion of Negroes from the park. The Plaintiffs, a group of Negroes (Plaintiffs), intervened alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution’s Equal protection clause. Supreme Court held that operating a park is a public function and therefore subjected to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.

Front 49

Shelley v. Kraemer

Back 49

Petitioners Shelley, who were black, bought a home in a neighborhood in which thirty out of thirty-nine parcel owners had signed a restrictive covenant which stated that no home was to be sold to any person who was black, which led to the suit by the neighborhood to undo the sale of the property to Shelley. The Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection applies in this case to prohibit the enforcement of the restrictive covenant at issue due to the fact that the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment apply only where there is state action, which is found in this case due to the action of the Supreme Court of Missouri in enforcing the agreement, the result of which is to deprive the Petitioners of their property.

Front 50

Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority

Back 50

A coffee shop, located in a government owned parking garage, refused to serve the Appellant, Burton, simply because he was black. The construction and maintenance of the building were derived completely from governmental funds and the Appellee was responsible as the facility landlord. The Coffee Shoppe received a benefit from the state by being located in the parking garage. At the same time the state received the benefit of increased revenue from the restaurant’s customers. Therefore, a “symbiotic relationship” existed, whereby the state “elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination.” When a state leases its property in the manner present in this case, then the 14th Amendment applies as if it were a covenant written into the lease agreement.

Front 51

Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis

Back 51

Appellee, an African-American, was the guest of a member of Appellant Moose Lodge No. 107 in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania to a function at Appellant’s facility. While at the facility, Appellee was refused service by Appellant. Appellee claims that because the Pennsylvania liquor board had issued Appellant a private club license that authorized the sale of alcoholic beverages on the premises of Appellant, that the state action requirement is satisfied. Appellee named both appellant and the Pennsylvania liquor board as Defendants seeking an injunction that would revoke Appellant’s liquor license as long as it continues its discriminatory practices. The actions of Appellant do not rise to the level of state action because the bar and the land upon which it sits is owned by appellant, there is nothing in the facts of this case showing a symbiotic relationship between the appellant and the state, and there is no state funding of appellant organization. Other than regulating the terms of which Appellant can sell liquor the Pennsylvania Liquor Board plays no part in establishing or enforcing the membership or guest policies of the club. Furthermore, there is no evidence in this case showing that the Pennsylvania liquor law, as written or applied, discriminates against minority groups in any way.

Front 52

Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.

Back 52

Petitioner sought damages and injunctive relief against Respondent for terminating her electrical service for alleged nonpayment, claiming she had not been afforded notice, hearing and an opportunity to pay amount due. She claimed that under state law, she was entitled to reasonably continuous electrical service and that the Respondent’s termination constituted state action without procedural due process. The lower courts dismissed her claim. Although Respondent had a monopoly, that fact is not determinative in considering whether Respondent’s termination of service constituted state action. Approval by a state utility commission of such a request from a regulated utility, where the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission has not put its weight on the side of the proposed practice by ordering it, does not transform a practice initiated by the utility and approved by the PPUC into “state action.” All of Petitioner’s arguments taken together show no more than that the Respondent was a heavily regulated private utility, enjoying a partial monopoly and that it elected to terminate service to Petitioner in a manner which the PPUC found permissible under state law.

Front 53

Railway Express Agency v. New York

Back 53

Appellant operates about 1,900 delivery trucks in New York City. To increase revenue, Appellant sold the use of the sides of the truck as advertising billboards to its clients. Appellee passed a law specifically prohibiting such advertising unless it was connected to the business of the vehicle. This classification has a relation to the purpose for which it was made and does not contain the kind of discrimination against which the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution protects. The burden of showing unreasonableness should always be on the person questioning the regulation. Even a law that appears to be too narrowly drawn will survive rational basis review because complete deference is given to the state for its reasoning.

Front 54

Loving v. Virginia

Back 54

The state of Virginia enacted laws making it a felony for a white person to intermarry with a black person or a black person to intermarry with a white person. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the statutes served the legitimate state purpose of preserving the “racial integrity” of its citizens. The State argued that because its miscegenation statutes punished both white and black participants in an interracial marriage equally, they cannot be said to constitute invidious discrimination based on race and, therefore, the statutes commanded mere rational basis review. The mere fact that a statute is one of equal application does not mean that the statute is exempt from strict scrutiny review. The statutes were clearly drawn upon race-based distinctions. The legality of certain behavior turned on the races of the people engaging in it. Equal Protection requires, at least, that classifications based on race be subject to the “most rigid scrutiny.” The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution) prohibits classifications drawn by any statute that constitutes arbitrary and invidious discrimination. The fact that Virginia bans only interracial marriages involving whites is proof that the miscegenation statutes exist for no purposes independent of those based on arbitrary and invidious racial discrimination.

Front 55

Strauder v. West Virginia

Back 55

A West Virginia statute limited jury service to white men. Strauder, a black man, was convicted of murder by a trial court in West Virginia. Strauder appealed his conviction. Justice William Strong said the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution gave to blacks the right to be free from unfriendly legislation directed at them on the basis of their race. The West Virginia statute concerning juries is the quintessential legislation the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution was designed to prohibit. The fact that blacks as such are singled out and expressly denied by statute the right to participate in the administration of justice, as jurors, places a brand upon them and impedes their ability to secure the equal justice the law aims to secure for all others.

Front 56

Palmore v. Sidoti

Back 56

Respondent petitioned the court for a modification of a previous child custody judgment based on changed conditions after the Caucasian mother married an African-American man. The trial court awarded custody to the respondent. The effects of racial prejudice cannot justify a racial classification removing an infant child from the custody of its natural mother who was found to be an appropriate person to have such custody. The court based its decision solely on the issue of race, without a focus on the parental qualifications of the natural mother or her present husband. This raises important federal concerns arising from the Constitution’s commitment to eradicating discrimination based on race. The court stated the child’s welfare was the controlling factor, but made no effort to place its holding on any ground other than race. A core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with all governmentally-imposed discrimination based on race. To pass constitutional muster, racial classifications must be justified by a compelling governmental interest. The goal of granting custody based on the best interests of the child is indisputably a substantial governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause. It would ignore reality to suggest that racial prejudices do not exist, but the possible injury they might inflict are not permissible considerations for removal of an infant child from the custody of its natural mother. The law cannot give private biases effect, either directly or indirectly.

Front 57

Korematsu v. United States

Back 57

President of the United States Franklin Roosevelt (President Roosevelt) issued an executive order authorizing military commanders to prescribe military areas from which any or all persons may be excluded. Thereupon, a military commander ordered all persons of Japanese descent, whether or not they were United States citizens, to leave their homes on the West Coast and to report to “Assembly Centers.” The Petitioner, a United States citizen of unchallenged loyalty, but of Japanese descent, was convicted under a federal law making it an offense to fail to comply with such military orders. At the time the exclusion was ordered, it was justified. Justice Hugo Black stated that although the exclusion order imposed hardships upon a large number of American citizens, hardships are part of war. When, under conditions of warfare, our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect them must be commensurate with the threatened danger.

Front 58

Yick Wo v. Hopkins

Back 58

The city of San Francisco passed an ordinance that required Laundromats located in wooden buildings to have a permit. The ordinance established a board which would decide who would and would not get the permit. The facts suggest that not a single Chinese applicant was ever granted a permit, despite the fact that Chinese operated Laundromats constituted nearly 90% of the city’s laundry business at the time. The Plaintiffs were held in violation of the ordinance and issued a fine. Plaintiffs then sued under the 14th amendment, citing a violation of equal protection. Yes, the ordinance is invalidated and the appeal ruling is overturned. The court noted that the ordinance did not have any discrimination detectable within its text. However, its enforcement did violate the equal protection clause because its execution was racially unequal. The court held that the new rule should be that the Supreme Court may shoot down state or local laws that are neutral in their text, but discriminatory in their execution. The court wrote that the enforcement of the law was “a practical denial by the state of that equal protection of the law,” and, as such, was a violation of the constitution. Moreover, the court also noted that equal protection is afforded to non-citizens within US borders, as many of the Chinese Laundromat operators were non-citizens.

Front 59

Washington v. Davis

Back 59

A higher percentage of black applicants than white applicants failed a qualifying test administered by the District of Columbia Police Department. Some of the unsuccessful black applicants claimed these effects constituted unconstitutional discrimination against them. Justice Byron White (J. White) said our cases have not embraced the proposition that a law can be a violation of equal protection on the basis of its effect, without regard for governmental intent. Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it alone does not trigger the rule that racial classifications are subject to the strict scrutiny standard of review. The police force’s efforts to recruit black police officers are evidence that the police department did not intentionally discriminate on the basis of race.
The exam is rationally related to the legitimate government purpose of ensuring that police officers have acquired a particular level of verbal skill.
Concurrence. Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Steven) said that frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be a showing of what actually happened. A Constitutional issue does not arise, however, every time some disproportionate impact is shown.

Front 60

Personnel Administrator v. Feeney

Back 60

Respondent claims that by having a hiring preference for veterans over non- veterans for civil service positions, the Petitioner is discriminating against women. The benefit of this act was offered to any person who was a veteran. The law is a preference for veterans of either sex over non-veterans of either sex. It was not designed to favor men over women.

Front 61

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.

Back 61

The Respondent, Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (Respondent), applied to the Petitioner, Village of Arlington Heights (Petitioner), for rezoning of a parcel from single family to multi-family, low-income housing. The rezoning was denied and Respondent sued citing racial discrimination. There was simply no evidence of discriminatory intent or purpose behind this decision to deny the rezoning. The entire area had been zoned for single-family homes since the late 1950’s. In fact, single-family homes surround the site in question.

Front 62

Batson v. Kentucky

Back 62

Petitioner, Batson, was indicted in Kentucky on charges of burglary and receipt of stolen goods. During trial of the matter, the judge conducted voir dire and excused certain jurors for cause. When it came time for peremptory challenges, the prosecutor used his to remove all of the black persons left on the venire, which left Batson, a black man, to be tried by an all-white jury.. Defense counsel objected before the jury was sworn in, and the judge overruled the objection on the grounds that peremptory challenges could be against “anybody they want.” Petitioner was convicted on both counts. Justice Powell, for the court, wrote the opinion, opining that when it appears the prosecutor is using challenges in violation of equal protection, the State bears the burden of proving a reason for the challenges.

Front 63

Plessy v. Ferguson

Back 63

A Louisiana statute required railroad companies to provide separate, but equal accommodations for its Black and White passengers. The Plaintiff, Plessy (Plaintiff), was prosecuted under the statute after he refused to leave the section of a train reserved for whites. Justice Henry Brown (J. Brown) stated that although the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution was designed to enforce the equality between the races, it was not intended to abolish distinctions based on color, or to enforce a commingling of the races in a way unsatisfactory to either. Laws requiring the separation of the races do not imply the inferiority of either. If the law “stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority,” it is because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. Therefore, the statute constitutes a valid exercise of the States’ police powers. The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution does, however, require that the exercise of a State’s police powers be reasonable. Laws enacted in good faith, for the promotion of the public good and not for the annoyance or oppression of another race are reasonable. As such, the statute was reasonable.

Front 64

Brown v. Board of Education

Back 64

Black children were denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws that permitted or required segregation by race. The children sued. Chief Justice Earl Warren (J. Warren) stated that even if the “tangible” factors of segregated schools are equal, to separate black children from others of similar age and qualifications solely on the basis of race, generates a feeling of inferiority with respect to their status in the community and may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely to ever be undone.

Front 65

Brown II

Back 65

This case was decided in order to define the manner in which relief, as held in Brown I, is to be accorded. Case remanded to the lower courts to take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion. School authorities have the primary responsibility of desegregating their schools. The courts will then determine whether the action of the school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles. Because of their proximity to local conditions and the possible need for future hearings, the courts which originally heard the cases can best perform this judicial appraisal. The courts will require that the defendants make a prompt and reasonable start towards full compliance with Brown I. Once such a start has been made, the courts may find that additional time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective manner. The burden rests on the school authorities to establish that such time is necessary in the public interest and is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date.

Front 66

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education

Back 66

In the wake of Brown II, many school districts still sought to maintain vestiges of their pre-Brown I segregated systems. Defendant school districts brought suit, alleging that District Courts had overreached their authority, broad as it may be, under Brown II. The authority is broad, but is appropriate only where local districts have failed to bring themselves into compliance with Brown I on their own accord. Remedial authority does not put judges “automatically in the shoes of school authorities.” Mathematical racial quotas are an allowable exercise of judicial authority, when used as a starting point after a “total default” of the school board’s duty. Single-race schools are not per se a “mark of a system that still practices segregation by law.” The court “should scrutinize such schools,” and the burden is on the school district to demonstrate that the school’s racial makeup is not the result of past or present de jure segregation. The courts may redefine district lines to desegregate the systems, even though such redistricting may cause initial inconvenience and burdens. Busing is an appropriate remedy, as well, as long as the time involved in the busing does not risk the health of the children or significantly impinge on the educational process.

Front 67

Keyes v. School District No. 1

Back 67

Petitioners proved that for nearly ten years since 1960 the Denver, Colorado school system implemented an unconstitutional policy of racial discrimination by operating a segregated school system. The defense argued, and the District Court held, that even though one part of the Denver system was guilty of segregation, it did not follow that the entire system was segregated as well. The Court modified and remanded the lower court decision and held that when part of a school system is found to be segregated, a "prima facie case of unlawful [systematic] segregative design" becomes apparent. The school district involved assumes the burden of proving that it operated without "segregative intent" on a system-wide basis. This case is significant because it represents one of the first instances in which the Court identified segregation in northern schools.

Front 68

Milliken v. Bradley

Back 68

Attempts to integrate the Detroit schools had been unsuccessful. The District Court redefined the area in question from the city itself to the outlying school districts in the metropolitan area, a total of 54 school districts, including the Detroit district itself. The proposed redistricting would cause significant administrative and financial problems for the resulting school system. Chief Justice Warren Burger (J. Burger), writing for the majority, notes that there are many practical difficulties in the proposed plan. It is unclear what the status of currently elected school officials would be in the new “super district;” how taxes would be levied and distributed and who should make curriculum decisions. The scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and scope of the constitutional violation. In the present case, the discriminatory acts of a single district must be a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation. Thus, if district lines were drawn on the basis of race, or if discriminatory acts of one district caused segregation in another, an interdistrict remedy may be in order. However, this is not the case here.

Front 69

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke

Back 69

The University of California, Davis Medical School reserved 16 spots out of the 100 in any given class for “disadvantaged minorities.” The Respondent, when compared to students admitted under the special admissions program, had more favorable objective indicia of performance, while his race was the only distinguishing characteristic. The Respondent sued, alleging that the special admissions program denied him equal protection of laws under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The special admissions program is unconstitutional, but race may be considered as a factor in the admissions process. Justice Lewis Powell (J. Powell), writing for the court, says that the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) should not pay attention to past discrimination in reviewing the policies of the University, as this is tantamount to allowing political trends to dictate constitutional principles. J. Powell determines that accepting a minimum number of minorities simply to reduce the traditional deficit of such individuals in the medical profession is facially unconstitutional, as it gives preference to an individual on the basis of race alone. The major determination of the Supreme Court is whether or not racial preference may be used to promote diversity of the student body. J. Powell argues that setting aside a specified number of minority slots is not congruent to the purported goal – minority students in themselves do not guarantee a diversity of viewpoints in the educational environment.

Front 70

Fullilove v. Klutznik

Back 70

In 1977, Congress enacted legislation requiring that at least 10 percent of federal funds granted for local public works programs had to be used to obtain services or supplies from businesses owned by minority group members. H. Earl Fullilove and other contractors filed suit, claiming they had been economically harmed by the enforcement of the statute. The defendant was Philip M. Klutznick, Secretary of Commerce. The Court held that the minority set-aside program was a legitimate exercise of congressional power. The Court found that Congress could pursue the objectives of the minority business enterprise program under the Spending Power. The plurality opinion noted that Congress could have regulated the practices of contractors on federally funded projects under the Commerce Clause as well. The Court further held that in the remedial context, Congress did not have to act "in a wholly 'color-blind' fashion."

Front 71

Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education

Back 71

When the schools laid off some nonminority teachers, while retaining other minority teachers with less seniority, Wendy Wygant, a displaced nonminority teacher, challenged the layoff in district court. Holding that the Board could grant racial preferences without grounding them on prior discrimination findings and that the preferences did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, since they remedied discrimination by providing "role models" for minority students, the District Court upheld the layoff provision's constitutionality. The Court argued that Wygant's layoff stemmed from race and, therefore, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court noted that the government, when embarking on affirmative action, had two duties: first, to justify racial classification with a compelling state interest and second, to demonstrate that its chosen means were narrowly tailored to its purpose.

Front 72

City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.

Back 72

Richmond, Virginia created a set-aside program which required that a percentage of subcontracts for construction projects be reserved for minorities. Without a showing that a race-based initiative was created to remedy past racial discrimination and that it supports a compelling governmental interest, the race-based initiative is unconstitutional and cannot withstand strict-scrutiny. The judgment is affirmed.
All classifications based on race must be supported by a compelling government interest and withstand strict-scrutiny. The Supreme Court finds that the Plan failed to consider race-neutral measures that would encourage more minority participation in the construction program. Also, the 30% quota allowed by the Plan was not “narrowly tailored to any goal, except perhaps outright racial balancing.”
The race-based measure of Richmond, Virginia’s construction set-aside program makes only a “generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination..."

Front 73

Metro Broadcasting v. FCC

Back 73

Under the first policy challenged by Metro Broadcasting, Inc., minority applicants for broadcast licenses were given preference if all other relevant factors were roughly equal. The second policy, known as the "distress sale," allowed broadcasters in danger of losing their licenses to sell their stations to minority buyers before the FCC formally ruled on the viability of the troubled stations. Held that the FCC's minority preference policies were constitutional because they provided appropriate remedies for discrimination victims and were aimed at the advancement of legitimate congressional objectives for program diversity. The FCC's minority preference policies were closely related to, and substantially advanced, Congress's legitimate interest in affording the public a diverse array of programming options. The availability of program diversity serves the entire viewing and listening public, not just minorities, and did not unduly burden nonminorities.

Front 74

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena

Back 74

Adarand Constructors had submitted the low bid on a subcontract for a federal highway project. Mountain Gravel, the prime contractor, would receive additional federal funds for awarding subcontracts to businesses owned by “socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.” Mountain Gravel awarded the contract to a higher bidder on this basis. The government’s policy included a presumption that minority-owned businesses were socially and economically disadvantaged. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (J. O’Connor), writing for the majority, extends the Fourteenth Amendment requirement to the states in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment. Namely, strict scrutiny is applied to all race-based classification, regardless of benign or remedial motive.

Front 75

Grutter v. Bollinger

Back 75

Petitioner, Barbara Grutter, applied for admission to University of Michigan Law School in 1997 with an undergraduate GPA of 3.8 and an LSAT of 161. She was denied. Petitioner, who is white, is challenging the law school’s use of race as a factor in the admissions process. The law school in this case was conducting highly individualized reviews of each applicant, and Justice O’Connor determined that race was only one of many factors considered to determine the applicant’s eligibility. Schools have a compelling interest in having diverse student bodies

Front 76

Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1

Back 76

The Seattle School district and Jefferson County district have applications that require a parent to state what the race of his or her child is. When determining where to place a child or where to transfer a child both school districts use race as the qualifying factor on where to send the child. Seattle allows students to choose a high school but when too many students choose a school they decide based on siblings in schools and the race of the child. Jefferson was originally ordered to desegregate its schools. In attempts to correct the problem Jefferson has a ratio that there should not be more than 50% black students at a particular school. A parent with a child from each district that was denied a transfer to another school based on the race of their child brought suit. In order for a state actor to engage in discriminatory actions it must do so in a way that is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. The only interests recognized by this court are: 1 to remedy past intentional discrimination; and 2 to achieve exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas and viewpoints. That is not present here. As to the first interest, Seattle has never been order to desegregate and Jefferson has since become unitary so the need is no longer present here. As to the second interest, both schools separate the students based on specific racial demographics and not in the theme of diversity. These schools need to employ serious good faith considerations of workable race-neutral alternatives.

Front 77

Bernal v. Fainter

Back 77

Aliens could not become notaries under Texas law. A state law that discriminates on the basis of alienage must withstand strict scrutiny. "Political function" exception--a state may bar aliens from positions intimately related to the process of democratic self-government. ie teachers, police, probation officers, public office. Holding: Notary is not a political function and law does not meet strict scrutiny. Can't say aliens don't have necessary integrity. Not appropriately tailored. Federal government can make restrictions on aliens that states can't.

Front 78

Reed v. Reed

Back 78

Idaho law gave males a preference over females as administrators of estates.

Front 79

Frontiero v. Richardson

Back 79

By statute, a serviceman may claim his wife as a dependent for purposes of qualifying for increased quarters, medical and dental benefits, and other increased support. However, a servicewoman may claim her husband as a dependant only if he is dependent on her for more than half of his support. The Petitioner, Frontiero (Petitioner), alleges that this policy denies her the equal protection of laws afforded by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) notes that women have a past history of discrimination against them in the United States and thus a requirement of strict scrutiny for gender-based classifications is appropriate. The government offered no concrete evidence suggesting that there is any actual administrative time or cost saving by this classification. Even so, J. Brennan notes that, “[W]hen we enter the real of ’strict judicial scrutiny,’ there can be no doubt that “administrative convenience” is not a shibboleth.” Concurrence. Justice Lewis Powell (J. Powell) concurs in the judgment, but disagrees that sex-based classifications are always suspect and subject to strict scrutiny.

Front 80

Craig v. Boren

Back 80

The State of Oklahoma prohibited the sale of “nonintoxicating” 3.2% alcohol beer to men under the age of 21 and women under the age of 18. Suit was brought against the State, alleging the law violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) argues that case precedent dictates that an intermediate level of scrutiny should be applied in analyzing the statute. Specifically, the gender-based classification must serve an important government objective and be substantially related to the achievement of such objective.
The District Court unequivocally found that the objective to be served by the statute is increased traffic safety. J. Brennan is not persuaded by the Appellees’, Craig and others (Appellees), statistics that the statute closely serves the stated objective. As such, it is not constitutional.

Front 81

Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan

Back 81

MUW is the only single-sex collegiate institution maintained by the State of Mississippi. The Respondent was otherwise qualified for admission to the school’s nursing program, but he was denied admission on the basis of being male. Applying intermediate scrutiny, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (J. O’Connor) notes that the State of Mississippi has not advanced an important state interest for operating a single sex nursing school. In particular, she notes that women did not lack opportunities to be trained as nurses in Mississippi without the presence of MUW. J. O’Connor also argues that the means to achieving even an important governmental objective (although she found none) are absent, as MUW allows male auditors in the nursing classes. If men are already in the classroom, the state is not technically operating a single-sex nursing program.

Front 82

J.E.B. v. Alabama

Back 82

Respondent, on the behalf of a mother with a minor child, filed against Petitioner for paternity and child support. During jury selection, Respondent used their peremptory challenges to remove the male jurors, reasoning that female jurors would be more sympathetic to a woman trying to collect money from a delinquent father. Petitioner challenged the challenges, arguing that removing jurors based upon gender is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Alabama courts rejected Petitioner’s claim, reasoning that discrimination based upon gender is not protected like race. The majority of the United States Supreme Court held that parties should not be allowed to discriminate based upon gender when selecting a jury. The state should not be allowed to promote cynical stereotypes of the manner in which men and women weigh evidence. Women, similarly to African-Americans, have historically been discriminated against, and the Equal Protection Clause prohibits that manner of reasoning.

Front 83

United States v. Virginia

Back 83

VMI was the sole single-sexed school among Virginia’s 15 public institutions. VMI’s mission is to produce “citizen soldiers”, (male) leaders of the future. VMI achieves its mission through its “adversative method”, which is characterized by physical rigor, mental stress, absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy, etc. At trial, the District Court acknowledged that women were missing out on a unique educational opportunity, but upheld the school’s policy on the rationale that admitting women could not be done without compromising the school’s adversative method. Pursuant to a decision by the Court of Appeals, the State established the Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (VWIL) for women. VWIL offered fewer courses than VMI and was run without the adversative method. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (J. Ginsburg) stated that Virginia has shown no “exceedingly persuasive justification” for excluding all women. “Benign” justifications offered in defense of absolute exclusions will not be accepted automatically. The notion that admitting women would downgrade VMI’s stature and destroy the school’s adversity system was hardly proved. Generalizations about the way women are or what is appropriate for them will no longer serve to justify denying opportunity to those whose talents and capabilities make them exceptions to the average description. Moreover, VWIL does not qualify as VMI’s substitute. VWI’s student body, faculty, course offerings and facilities do not match VMI’s.

Front 84

Illegitimacy Cases

Back 84

Generally subject to strict scrutiny. Immutable characteristic.

Front 85

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.

Back 85

A zoning ordinance for the City of Cleburne (the City) permitted a wide variety of uses on a proposed cite of land, including for hospitals, for sanitariums and for homes for the aged, but excluded the operation of homes for the insane or feebleminded. The City, acting pursuant to the ordinance, denied an applicant a special use permit for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded. The Court of Appeals held that the ordinance and the denial violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Justice Byron White (J. White) stated that to withstand Equal Protection review, legislation that distinguishes between mentally retarded persons and others must be rationally related to further a legitimate governmental interest. The ordinance fails on both scores. The governmental interests, e.g., the avoidance of apprehensiveness of mentally retarded persons, are not legitimate. Moreover, the means the government employs are not rationally related to the achievement of its stated interests.

Front 86

Romer v. Evans

Back 86

Amendment two was added to Colorado’s state constitution by a statewide referendum. It prohibited the state or local government from adopting measures that would protect homosexuals as a class from discrimination. The Respondents, Evans and others (Respondents), argued that Amendment two did nothing more than deny homosexuals special rights. The stated purpose of the amendment was to prevent the deterioration of the sexual morality favored by most Coloradans. The state trial court permanently enjoined enforcement Amendment two. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed on the trials court’s decision. Justice Anthony Kennedy stated that Amendment two relegates homosexuals to a solitary class and withdraws from them, but no others, legal protections arising from discrimination. Its reach includes the State’s public accommodation laws, as well as laws prohibiting discrimination in the housing, insurance and education markets. A law making it more difficult for one group of citizens to seek assistance from the government than another is a denial of the Equal Protection of the laws in the most literal sense (i.e. the means do not fit whatever ends sufficiently to pass rational basis review). Moreover, the means of Amendment two are so broad in relation to its ends (to prevent the deterioration of sexual morality) that we cannot credit them. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) is left with the conclusion that Amendment two constitutes a classification for its own sake. “Class legislation is obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment.” (i.e., the ends are illegitimate).

Front 87

Shapiro v. Thompson

Back 87

The one-year residency requirement is unconstitutional because it discriminates against “need . . . families” who have not met the residency requirement even though the status of these families is no different than families meeting the residency requirement. The one-year residency requirement is not supported by a compelling state interest. The statutory provisions violate the constitutional right to travel because it has the effect of “inhibiting migration by needy persons into the State.” The residency requirement also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the requirement denies “public assistance to poor persons otherwise eligible solely on the ground that they have not been residents of the [state] for one year at the time their applications are filed.”

Front 88

Zablocki v. Redhail

Back 88

A Wisconsin statute required all its residents, who had minor children not in his or her custody and which he or she is under an obligation to support, to obtain court permission to marry, to demonstrate compliance with the support obligation, and to state that the children covered by the support order are not or not likely to become public charges. The statute was challenged as a violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution (Constitution) because it hindered a couple’s right to marry. Supreme Court held that “When a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, [such as the fundamental right of marriage], it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests . . . .” The Wisconsin statute “clearly does interfere directly and substantially with the right to marry” and fails to pass strict scrutiny.

Front 89

Harper v. Virginia State Board of Education

Back 89

A State poll tax violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The tax divides the eligible voters of the State into two classes: those who can afford the tax and those who cannot. As such, it invidiously discriminates against those who cannot afford the tax.

Front 90

Kramer v. Union Free School District

Back 90

New York Education Law requires the ownership of real property within a school district or custody of children attending the district to be eligible to vote in school district elections. The Petitioner is currently living with his mother within the school district. His denial of voting rights was based solely on his lack of real property ownership or custody of children. The State’s legitimate interest seems to be restricting a voice in school matters to those “directly affected.” J. Warren notes that the system of exclusion excludes some members that have a direct interest (individuals whose children are not yet school age) and includes some with little interest (individuals with no children who just incidentally own real property in the district). As such, it cannot be narrowly tailored.

Front 91

Reynolds v. Sims

Back 91

This case was a challenge to the malapportionment of the Alabama legislature. The challengers claimed discrimination against voters in counties whose populations that had grown proportionally far more than others since the 1900 census. The complaints noted that the existing districting scheme was based on the1900 census, even though the state constitution required legislative representation based on population and decennial reapportionment. If a state should provide that votes in one part of the state should receive more weight than votes from another part of the state, the right to vote of those in disfavored areas is diluted. With respect to the allocation of legislative representation, all voters, as citizens of the state, stand in the same relation regardless of where they live. So long as the divergences of a strict population standard are based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy, some deviations from the equal population principle are constitutionally permissible, but neither history alone, nor economic or other sorts of group interests, are permissible factors in attempting to justify disparities from population-based representation. Further, equal protection requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis.

Front 92

Harris v. McRae

Back 92

Since September 1976, Congress prohibited the use of any federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions under the Medicaid program except under certain specified circumstances including the endangerment of the mother and for victims of rape or incest. This restriction is known as the Hyde Amendment. The constitutional freedoms provided for in Roe v. Wade do not extend to access to public funds. The Hyde Amendment does not place a governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy, but withholds funding in certain circumstances. Furthermore, the Court states that a woman’s freedom of choice does not carry with it a constitutional entitlement of the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected resources. The Hyde Amendment is also upheld as having a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective of protecting the potential life of the fetus.

Front 93

San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez

Back 93

The State of Texas provides for free primary and secondary education for the children of the State. The state provides a set amount of funding for each district based on the number of students in the district. The district makes up the difference in operating expense with funds from local property taxes. This reliance on property taxes results in a large disparity in per student spending between property rich and property poor districts. Respondents allege that this denies the children in poor district Equal Protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. If education is a fundamental right, classifications affecting access to education are subject to strict scrutiny. There is no mention of education in the Constitution. Thus, there is no explicit constitutional guarantee. The question is now one of whether education is implicitly a fundamental right. The Court notes that Respondents do not argue that there is some quantum of education that is fundamental and which the class is not receiving. Nor do they argue that the class is entitled to the best education provided by public schools in Texas. Without explicit or implicit constitutional protections, the fiscal decisions of the State of Texas are beyond review of the Court, unless they lack a rational basis. Such a lacking is not found by the Court. Thus, the Court applied the rational basis test to require the Texas law to be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.

Front 94

Plyler v. Doe

Back 94

In 1975 the Texas legislature passed a law withholding funds for the education of children of illegal aliens. This law also authorized local school districts to deny entry in the public schools of the state to these children. If the State is to deny a discrete group of children the free public education it offers to others residing within its borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest. The state does not adequately show such an interest in this case. The state must show that its classification of a subject class has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. The Court finds it difficult to understand the states goals in limiting the education of children of illegal immigrants. Whatever these interests may be they are insubstantial when looking at the costs of not educating these children for the State and the Nation.

Front 95

Strict Scrutiny

Back 95

Compelling state interest by the least restrictive means available (narrowly tailored). Race, illegitimacy, alienage.

Front 96

rational basis

Back 96

Any law that is passed is subject to Rational Basis Test and have to have a rational reason and legitimate state interest.

Front 97

intermediate scrutiny

Back 97

exceedingly important government interest substantially related, exceedingly persuasive justification. Gender-based discrimination.

Front 98

Suspect classifications

Back 98

immutable characteristics, historically discriminated against, apparent classification

Front 99

Fundamental Rights and Interests Under Equal Protection

Back 99

Interstate Migration, Marriage & Family, Access to Franchise & One Man/ One Vote, and Access to the Courts

Front 100

Fundamental Rights Under Due Process

Back 100

Conception & Abortion, Intimate Association; Marital & Familial Rights; Health & Life, Refusal of Treatment

Front 101

Commerce Clause

Back 101

Gives congress power to regulate commerce within states. The court upholds very broad interpretations of the commerce clause. In very few cases, Congress exceeds its power under the commerce clause. However, the federal government cannot regulate state and local officials and governments. We can aggregate a lot of trivial instances together to see their impact on commerce within a state. United States v. Lopez
1) channels of interstate commerce
2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce.
3) substantial effect on interstate commerce
includes aggregation (Wickard v. Filburn)
must involve economic or commercial activity (Lopez, Morrison)

once something is within congress's powers under the commerce clause, there is no limit to the regulation. Could completely prohibit it.

Front 102

Dormant Commerce Clause

Back 102

The Commerce Clause expressly grants Congress the power to regulate commerce "among the several states." The idea behind the Dormant Commerce Clause is that this grant of power implies a negative converse — a restriction prohibiting a state from passing legislation that improperly burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce. The restriction is self-executing and applies even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute.

Front 103

suspect classifications

Back 103

immutable characteristics (born with, didn't choose), historically discriminated against