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70 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Marbury v Madison
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Authority of federal courts to review the constitutionality of federal legislative and executive decisions – can’t give courts additional area of original jurisdiction.
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Martin v. Hunters Lessee
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Article III – established FQ jurisdiction.
SC has authority to review constitutionality of state court decisions because national gov. superior to state gov. *Need uniformity of constitutional interpretation Text: No text, but not precluded either (Case decides, not court) History: states gave up some sovereignty when ratifying C Supreme court jurisdiction over state courses in matters involving federal law. Under Fed Question established appellate jurisdiction |
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Ex parte McCardle
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Article III/Exceptions Clause – congress has authority to withdraw appellate jurisdiction from SC at any time before judgment entered. Congress repealed Act which McCardle brings suit under.
-Appellate jurisdiction is conferred w/ such exceptions and under such regulations as X shall make. |
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Klein
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X power to limit SC jurisdiction is limited, must be NEUTRAL.
X cannot decide the merits of a case under the guise of limiting jurisdiction. Cannot limit the powers of another branch (Separation of Powers) |
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McCulloch v Maryland
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Necessary & Proper clause – Article 1 § 8, question of enumerated powers. N/P clause is POWER, not limit
Means to execute enumerated powers - convenient, useful, or essential. (marshall wants broad interpretation- not limit gov, when action is convenient – not indispensible) it is consistent with N&P. C is a broad outline, by the nature of C, even w/o N/P clause, SC will evaluate relationship b/w act of X and broad enumerated powers to see if it's constitutional X can charter national bank/MD cant tax (when tax own citizens can check with vote). Rational relationship between means used by congress and Power vested. |
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Gibbons v Ogden
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CC- BROAD
Commerce not just the buying and selling of goods, includes navigation, Framers didn't contemplate a narrow definition Regulate = full power of the the thing to be regulated - if people disagree they can elect new leaders (political process) Interstate = among the several states, sometimes w/in state |
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Champion
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CC- Lottery case. Congress can regulate to the extent it sees fit even if it’s to ban.
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Hammer v Dagenhart
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Commerce Clause- (Overturned) -result of overturn is congress can regulate labor conditions. Can ban shipment of things not made according to child labor regulations across state lines
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NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel
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Commerce Clause - National Labor Relations act of 1935 is constitutional.
X has power under the constitution to regulate labor relations b/c effects entire country commerce - national economy/industries, not limited to transactions, maybe used to reach activities that could burden transactions If intrastate but such a close and substantial relation to interstate that their control is essential to protect commerce from burdens or obstruction, congress can’t be denied power to control |
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Wickard v Filburn
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CC- Aggregation theory (wheat case) X needs to regulate individuals engaged in ECONOMIC activity, because aggregate individuals have a SUBSTANTIAL effect on interstate commerce, even if indirect influence on commerce.
Rational Basis– here regulation was rationally related to congress’ goal of increasing wheat prices during Great Deperession |
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Darby
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Commerce Clause - Fair labor relations Act constitutional. Prevent states from using substandard labor practice to their own economic advantage through interstate commerce
-X motive irrelevant -10th am. isn't an independent limit on X authority over IC Means related to the end - crime to employ workers engaged in IC in violation of wage/hour provisions |
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United States v Lopez
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Limits CC – gun possession near school. Not economic activity that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Attenuated. - "would have to pile inference upon inference"
Three ways to regulate 1. Channels 2. Instrumentality 3. Substantial affect on ICC. (rational basis- courts defer to congress if reasonably related and activity regulated would have substantial effect) |
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US v Morrison
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CC - Rational basis – X can't regulate gender motivated violence
X findings ab violence against women too attenuated, Inference upon inference - don't want X to be able to regulate everything under CC no substantial effect. Can’t aggregate because violence against women is not economic. |
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Raich
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CC Aggregation - weed.
Production of commodity for home use has substantial effect on interstate market for that commodity. Can be drawn into market based on demand. Home consumption affected national market for weed. Control all to control any Substantial effect SC doesn't about lack of findings, b/c obvious rational basis If entire regulatory scheme (drug control) could be threatened by letting this slip, X can regulate. Scalia - permissible under Lopez/Morrison (left this issue open |
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Comstock
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Necessary and Proper – broadened commerce clause- authorized gov to detain mentally ill/sexually dangerous. Fed gov has power to punish crime/thus need prisons/ civil commitment. States didn’t have to pay, fed government paid.
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Garcia
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Commerce Clause and 10th amendment –
X can not over-reach the states in traditional areas of government function. Minimum wage and overtime (Fair Labor standards act upheld) can regulate employment relations. Can regulate employers (including state governments). State not being told how to legislate as employer. favor centralized government. (State interests are protected by "procedural safeguards inherent in structure of fed. system" MAJORITY: when X acts under CC regulating the states, the fact that it is a state being regulated doesn't matter - valid as applied to states if valid as applied to private parties. DISSENT: majority holding reduces 10th am. |
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New York
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Fed gov. cannot compel state to enact/enforce a particular law or type of law.
Take title if didn’t comply and assume liability provision of radioactive waste act overstepped congress commerce clause power. Coercive/violate state sovereignty and 10th amendment (procedural due process). Encouragement v coercion. commandeering legislative process. |
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Printz
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CC: cannot circumvent X prohibition on mandating state regulation of fed programs by imposing directly on state officers. Can't require state exec branch to perform even ministerial functions
Handgun act requiring national background check unconstitutional because it required state officials to work for fed government. Can’t use states as instruments of fed gov. Fed can not compel action in state. (Procedural Due Process) Interferes w/ state sovereignty. Tells state gov (state officials) what to do. |
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South Dakota v Dole
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Spending clause – Conditions on fed. funds allowed to further broad policy objectives by conditioning funds on compliance. (Not limited by enumerated powers b/c indirect)
court is more deferential to spending clause. Drinking age 21, 5% of highway funds. 4 prong test for Spending clause 1. General welfare 2. Unambiguous (no strings attached) - let states make knowing, cognizant choice based on the consequences. 3. Relation bb/w fed. interest in particular national projects/programs (reasonably related to purpose for which funds expended) - safe highways 4. No other constitutional bar. If states have a choice it is not a violation of 10th amendment. coercion - amount of $$ tied to condition not too much p. 238 |
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Missouri v Holland
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Treaty is the supreme law of the land as long as it is constitutional. Migratory bird case.
X has the power to give effect to a treaty authorized under the Executive’s treaty power (Article II Section 2) through legislation, even if that legislation standing alone would be an unconstitutional interference with States’ rights under the Tenth Amendment. If treaty valid then necessary and proper means to enforce treaty. |
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Dormant Commerce Clause
(Exam Structure) |
Discriminate on:
1. Face (Phila) 2. Purpose (Hood, Dean Milk) 3. Means (Phila) 4. Effect (Hunt, BUT Exxon) Strict Scrutiny except: a. legit state objective b. least discriminatory means If Not: Undue Burden (Burden on IC (excessive in relation to local benefits) v. Local interest, easier for state, lower burden of proof.) Balancing Test -> Market Participant *A law may be sustained under DCC but violate Priv and Immun. Clause* |
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Philadelphia v New Jersey
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DCC: Facially Discriminatory
No importation of out of state waste. Waste not distinguishable from out of state waste. Purpose: to protect environment not sufficient. Means: discriminatory because placing the burden on other states to solve a problem shared by all. Ban is not least discriminatory means Need distinctive feature to exclude - other than origin |
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Southern Pacific
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Limits length of trains. Serious burden on interstate commerce because effected number of cars in other states. Had to run more trains to cost more $. Did little to improve safety.
face- NO Purpose - safety means effect - not actually any safer (Balancing test) Not clearly discriminatory, so use Balancing test (Burden on IC) line of reasoning |
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Kassel
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DCC: Protectionist motivations usually struck down.
Iowa has shorter max length than neighboring states. Argue safety in shorter trucks. Exceptions for iowa residents near border weakens safety argument. Undue burden- only state in the midwest w/ this limitations, trucks would have to reassemble or go around Iowa. (but usually undue burden analysis more deferential to state) Too protectionist |
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Dean Milk
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DCC: Discriminatory Effect - 5 mile radios precludes anything coming from outside the state
Restriction on pasteurized milk. Had to be within 5 miles. State says it is to protect against poor pasteurization methods. Reasonable and effective means to do the same thing so not least discriminatory means. |
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Hunt v Washington Apple
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DCC: crossing the line b/w furthering in state interests and interfering with IC
Face - NO Means - NO Purpose- NO guard against consumer confusion and promote uniformity Effect: YES- heavy burden on WA to change grading system and NC not really affected at all. Alters business costs Leveling effect - strips competitive avantage DISCRIMINATORY b/c no consumer protection actually achieved, creates more confusion. If shipping apples to NC need USDA label or no label. Discriminatory because trying to protect own growers – burden is on NC to prove less discriminatory means. Can. Not facial, not means, not purpose, but by effect. Economic consequences cause Washington to change labels. |
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Exxon
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DCC: Facially Neutral Statute
Disproportionate burden to OOS businesses is OK b/c accidental and does not directly derive from the fact that the burdened future firms are OOS. Not all OOS burdened CC protects interstate market, not particular firms, from burdensome regulation. No preemption b/c DCC only preempts an entire field from state regulation when lack of national uniformity would impede flow of IC. **Try to find in state interests affected by the law, and OOS interests NOT affected** Any producer or refiner of petrol cant operate a MD gas station. Purpose: to prevent unfair competitive advantage in market. At time no producers or refiners in MD. In state and out of state affected so okay. No specific advantage given to anyone. Going after full market. Doesn’t say cant sell just cant own and operate. |
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H.P. Hood
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State admits purpose is to protect local interests. Cant let state favor their own.
NY refusale to give MA milk distributor a license to operate an additional receiving station in NY violates CC b/c NY seeking economic advantage, not health/safety. Will cause rivalries b/w states. DISSENT: states should be given some leniency to protect themselves - Dissent maybe counterproductive to free enterprise, alternatively could a rue that states shouldn't be so independent b/c they will all eventually go to war economically |
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West Lynn Creamery
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DCC violation: NO Mkt Part. Exception
All milk taxed in MA, but given back to MA farmers in subsidy. Not permissible bc combination of TAX and SUBSIDY (subsidy alone wouldn't be violation) Market Participant exception: state engaged in market as buy or seller rather than just regulator. Can favor their own then because they (tax payers) fund the economic activity. |
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South Central Timber
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NO MKT PARTICIPANT EXCEPTION:
Alaska stelling state owned timber with condition that partially processed in Alaska before leaving the state. No market participant exception because Alaska is not in the processing market so they cant regulate it. Priviledges and Immunities: trigger “citizenship or residence” in state tuition. Should all be treated fairly when traveling from state to state MP Exception = when state acts as an ordinary business (buying/selling like a private firm), exempt from DCC b/c doesn't raise the same concerns. Should be able to factor their own citizens when using taxpayer dollars and resources. |
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United Building v City of Camden
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Market Participant Exception to P&I clause
No discrimination against municipal residence allowed under P&I. Need close fit b/w the discrimination used and the evil the state is trying to combat. Municipal ordinance that 40% of all workers working on city construction have to be Camden residents. Remand- city has to show out of state citizens cause problem, city would benefit, and that this remedy would solve problem. Fundamental to Interstate harmony? Substantial Reason? Close fit b/w reason and restriction? |
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Gade
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Preemption- when Fed. regulating area usually reserved to the states, presumption against preemption.
Implicit Pre-emption when physical impossibility - state laws pose an obstacle to achieving the overall fed. scheme. -"Occupying the field" - statute comprehensively taking over problem and imposing a solution, state law would undermine uniform laws dealing w/ that problem. Conflict? > Intent? > Preemption? regulations covering crane safety implicitly preempt state law in this area because state law would stand as an obstacle to the purpose of the regulations. Had to get their own safety stuff approved was for same purpose as federal legislation |
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Separation of Powers
(Cases) |
Baker v. Carr,
Nixon, Bush, Youngstown, Morrison v. Olson, Mistretta, Chadha, Clinton, Curtiss Wright, Dames and Moore, Prize Cases, War Powers Resolution |
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Baker v Carr
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Justiciability: no Political questions (6 factors)
- constitutionality of legislative apportionment schemes is NOT a political Q |
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6 elements for political question
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1. Textually committed to another branch
2. Lack of manageable standards 3. Can't decide without policy decision 4. Disrespect to other branches 5. Unusual need to stand firm (diplomatic relations/war powers) 6. Embarrassment of not speaking with one voice Only need 1 to invoke political question. (explain all 6 on exam) none here so can be judged by courts. |
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Nixon
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Separation of Powers - textually committed, impeachment
Nixon impeachment – text of con (art 1 § 3 clause 6) says “sole power” to senate for impeachment trial – textually committed political question. Says wasn’t “tried” by full senate but it was senates “sole power” to decide how to try. Substantive and not legal question |
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Bush v Gore
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Equal protection violation , uncertainty was making the country look bad, no political question and thus judicial case. Expediency was needed here
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Youngstown
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Steel seizure by Truman. Not legal. Jackson gives 3 categories for pres power
1. Pres + Express/ implied authorization of X (max power) 2. No clear statement from congress, would depend on independent presidential responsibility “twilight” 3. Presidents acts against the express or implied will of congress- lowest power Potential for emergency power. |
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Morrison v Olsen (3 parts)
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Special prosecutor who reports to attorney general to investigate any execute branch wrongdoing. Morrison to investigate Olson (high ranking executive official). Can be removed by attorney general for good cause only. Special court appoints.
1. inferior officer– removed by someone superior (attorney general), limited duties, jurisdiction, and tenure. 2. "good cause" removal is OK b/c doesn't impede on core exec. function - not essential to Pres. power to remove officers at will. 3. Does not impeder the president's ability to perform duties *Balancing test p. 352 par. 2 Scalia (Formalist) - any intrusion is too much, court shouldn't be balancing intrusions bc poses substantial risk to branches SOP - judicial branch wouldn't tolerate the same intrusion. |
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Mistretta
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Delegation:
-need sufficient guidance (intelligible principle, limits discretion of the other branch) Functionalist (balancing of powers)- congress gives commission sentencing formulation – also gave sufficient guidance to delegate this power to them. No increase in power of one branch or decrease in the power of another. Congress gave executive branch sufficient direction so the executive branch was not making law. -Judiciary plays major role in sentencing, allowing some judges to participate in this executive role of creating guidelines doesn't threaten the fundamental structural protections of the C. |
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Chadha
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Legislative Veto
X can only legislate if there is BICAMERALISM and PRESENTMENT -Cumbersomeness/delays don't justify abandoning C provisions -Some exceptions where only one house needed p. 402 Formalist– focuses on wording of constitution. Efficiency not goal of constitution. Framers did make specific times when they allocated power to only one branch. Dissent – functionalist- congress needs lawmaking veto from a policy point of view. |
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Clinton v New York
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line item veto is unconstitutional (formalist). Congress produces a statute and president cancel parts of it. Constitution says pres has to approve or veto a bill in whole. Framers clearly laid out all steps for bill to become a law.
DISSENT (Scalia) - text is silent, nothing stopping Pres, wouldn't increase his power if this was allowed. Possible argument:Functionalist- not repealing by changing 2 lines, rather creating legislature which executive is authorized to do. |
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Curtiss-Wright Corp.
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Foreign Affairs Powers
Broad delegation of leg. power to Pres. upheld export limitations. President can conduct many foreign affairs that congress cannot: negotiation, access to information, needs discretion and freedom from stat. restriction that wouldn't be allowed in domestic affairs Category II from Youngstown – even with no express authorization pres actions are acceptable if there is legislative intent from relevant legislation. (X authorized Pres. to ban sale of arms to countries engaged in a particular conflict). |
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Dames and Moore
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Youngstown Category 2: X Silent (Zone of Twilight)
No specific authorization saying pres can suspend Iranian litigation, but can infer broad discretion from 2 statutes. Category II, neither act speaks specifically about what pres is doing. Congress “implicitly” approved practice of claims settled by exec. Implicit is Category II usually. |
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Prize Cases – look up more about this
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President, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, had the authority to proclaim a blockade as a method of waging war.
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War Powers Resolution
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Invoked in Libya.
1. To enter hostility with a foreign country pres needs congressional approval in certain circumstances. 2. Without WPR president could just send troops into another country. 60 days president must withdraw troops unless congress declares war. P thinks intrusion on core exec. function as CinC, should be preeminent in foreign affairs. WPR imposes restrictions not in C - Pres's never comply w/ WPR, just act consistently with it Compliance would be acquiescence - Youngstown would lead to argument that long practice of acquiescence |
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Hamdi
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What process is due to a citizen of the us held as an enemy combatant?
State of war is not a blank check for president to determine right of citizens. Plurality opinion: habeus corpus does not need to apply, only entitled to some process- to deny facts that have been alleged against him. Argue categories under AUMF (authorizes pres to use N&P force against anyone terrorist) |
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Hamdan
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Pres did not have authority to impose military tribunals instead of trial. Majority says- Deviated from congress’ method that they set out for military tribunal trials, uniformity principle still applies. Pres. didn't show it was impracticable to apply the standard court martial rules to the trial.
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Individual Rights & Due Process Clause
(Cases) |
Slaughterhouse
Lochner, Griswold, Roe v. Wade Casey Carhart Moore Lawrence Cruzan Glucksburg |
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Slaughterhouse Cases
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Largely discredited, not overruled. Monopoly to slaughterhouse, 14th amendment, P&I invoked. However P&I so specifically defined that doesn’t apply here. P&I protects rights of US citizenship and not state citizenship
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Lochner v New York
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(Overruled) fundamental rights were economic – repudiated. Majority said that as long as infringement comes within state’s police powers it is okay. Court says hours and wages are not good subjects to police power.
*Negative connotation, manipulating C to achieve a certain result. (Saying labor law isn't legit state interest is an ideological assessment RB test for economic substantive due process (Nebbia) |
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Griswold v Connecticut
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Fundamental Right (Marriage/Procreation)
CT law prohibiting contraceptives violated the “right to marital privacy”: privacy is not explicit but still protected. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the survival of this race. Majority- right, general zone of privacy in the penumbra of BoR, Amendments. Doesn’t use lochner. Concurring and most used opinion- intimacy of husband and wife is essential feature of marriage. |
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Roe v Wade
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Right to privacy- fundamental rights those that relate to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, education. State has an interest in protecting prenatal life and maternal health.
Fundamental right – plaintiff try to use Griswold, Roe, and casey broadly to create other fundamental rights Counterargument- when something is a FR it is judicial activism, encroachment on legislative powers. P argues FR and fails SS; if not FR then LI and fails RB. Defense- make it specific D argues Li and passes RB, even if tighter standard of FR, it passes SS. |
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Planned Parenthood v. Casey
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Before viability denying abortion = undue burden, after state has legit interest.
Undue burden test is in the middle of SS and RB. -whether the regulation is reasonable, morality is insufficient argument Reaffirmed 3 things from roe 1. Right to choose abortion before viability w/o interference from the state 2. State can restrict after viability except where dangerous 3. state has legit interest in protecting both health of woman and life of fetus |
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Carhart
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Courts willing to uphold most abortion restrictions short of overturning roe.
-Not facially invalid. Nebraska law prohibited delivery of substantial portion, but fed stat. gave precise "anatomical landmarks" -Didn't bar standard D&E abortions NO Undue Burden: on woman's right to control reproduction - X can show respect for life within woman and further gov. legit interest in regulating medical profession. Legit interest fulfilled w/o undue burden - some women regret their choice, doctor might not disclose all details. |
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Moore
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Fundamental Right
Family institution is deeply rooted in national history and tradition, deserving of C recognition.. Fundamental right to define family |
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Lawrence
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TX Anti-Sodomy statute violated SDP - "most private human conduct, sexual behavior, in the most private of places, home"
-No Legitimate State Interest O'Connor:Moral disapproval doesn't justify a law discriminating against groups of people. Morality can never be the basis for upholding this kind of statute even under RB test. *UNCLEAR WHICH TEST THE COURT USED, ONGOING DEBATE A/B WHETHER MORALITY IS LEGIT STATE INTEREST* *Broad Right to Privacy *Scalia Dissent - passes RB |
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Cruzan
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Refusing unwanted medical treatment = liberty interest
State interest in safeguarding human life is strong enough to require clear and convincing evidence of patient's intent. * if patient is incompetent, state can refuse to allow termination of medical procedures unless clear/convincing evidence |
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Glucksberg
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Assisted suicide is not a fundamental right - not deeply rooted in nation's history and tradition
State had rational basis: preserving human life, protecting integrity of medical profession, protecting vulnerable people |
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Roth
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Procedural due process - Expectation:
Must have a legitimate claim of entitlement (that the gov. doesn't have discretion to deny something) Not hired after one year, NO LIBERTY INTEREST, bc not barred from other employment NO PROPERTY INTEREST - entitlement is determined by reference to state law (Law said rehiring decisions in non-tenured cases are completely discretionary so Roth had no entitlement) NO PRESENT ENJOYMENT - not already tenured and they are taking it away from him |
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Defining Fundamental Rights?
(Cases) |
Meyer: P- direct upbringing, S- speak foreign language in school
Pierce: P - direct upbringing, S - send to religious schools Griswold: P- privacy autonomy, S - Married couples contraceptives Roe/Casey: P - privacy autonomy, S - abortion pre-viability Moore: P - family privacy, S. Grandmother live w/ grandchild P = Broad (more likely supported by precedent), S = Narrow |
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Loudermill
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Cannot use state process that doesn't conform to federal norms of procedural due process
Need: 1. notice 2. opportunity to be heard 3. neutral decision maker |
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Procedural Due Process
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1. Liberty or Property Interest (State Law):
Expectation (roth) v. Entitlement (Sindermann) 2. If yes, need -notice -opportunity to be heard -neutral decision maker |
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Mathews
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SLIDING SCALE: (For procedural Due Process Step 2)
-severity of harm to P (P interest) -risk of error -administrative cost (gov. interest) |
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Standing
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injury in fact
causation redressability (No ideological Ps, citizen, taxpayer) |
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Ripeness
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Fitness for Review
Hardship to P from Delay *must wait until you are injured, fed ct. shouldn't embroil themselves unnecessarily under article 3 |
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Substantive Due Process
(Exam Structure) |
*Define the Right* (History/Tradition)
Fundamental Right? (Strict Scrutiny) State must show: 1. Compelling interest 2. Narrowly tailored means Liberty Interests: (Rational Basis) 1. Legitimate Interest 2. Rationally Related |
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Mootness
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Exceptions:
-voluntary cessation (DeFunis p. 97) "Capable of repetition but evading review" |
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Valley Forge
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Philosophical Objections - no standing.
No actual injury, violation of church and state isn't direct. Possible plaintiffs = groups w/ an economic stake, could have said they were deprived in an unconstitutional manner. |
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cases where no one has standing
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sending troops abroad (everyone is theoretically affected, P has unconstitutionally sent troops to another country. Plaintiff is usually a service member and issue is dismissed as a political question.
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