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145 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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1. Marbury v. Madison
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a. Marshal: Constitution is the highest law and it is the court’s job to decided cases based on the law in accordance with the constitution.
b. It is the court’s interpretation of the constitution and what follows from it that will be dispositive upon the parties. |
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1. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee
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a. Holding:
i. SC can reverse the decisions of the highest state courts on issues of federal law. b. Alexander: i. You want federal law to mean the same thing in every state in the union and the only way to do that is to have the SC impose its interpretation on the state courts. |
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2. Cohen v. Virginia
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a. Holding:
i. Would be absurd for the SC to hear every criminal case simply because a State was a party. b. Significance: i. Cases that come within the original jurisdiction of the SC can also come within the appellate jurisdiction of the SC |
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a. Cooper v. Aaron
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i. Issue:
1. Because Arkansas was not a party to Brown v. BOE it did not feel bound by the decision ii. Holding: 1. The court said that since the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the constitution, it follows that the interpretation of the 14th amendment in Brown is the supreme law of the land iii. Significance: 1. Extended Marbury because it made the courts holding not only dispositive upon the parties in the case but binding to everyone as the correct interpretation of the constitution. a. Supreme Court decision is not just the law of that case, it is the law of the land 2. Prevents Departmental View such that executive cannot continue the same unconstitutional action without prohibition because it is between different parties |
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Considerations for overruling
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a. Whether rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability
b. Whether rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation c. Whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine d. Whether facts have so changed or come to be seen so differently as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification. |
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a. Pacific States Tel. & T. Co. v. Oregon
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i. Article IV requires Congress to guarantee republican form of government to each state.
ii. Court said that whether a state has such a form of government is not for it to decide, but for congress — treats as Political Question. |
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c. Nixon (judge) v. United States
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i. Issue:
1. Whether the court can rule on whether the procedures that were used by the senate during an impeachment hearing conformed to the meaning of “try” in article 1 §3 clause 6. ii. Holding: 1. It is a question for the Senate to decide what is meant by try. iii. Bases for deciding if something is a political question: 1. If there is a textually demonstrable commitment to providing issue to another branch. 2. Whether the constitutional issue commits to judicially manageable standard making iv. Souter (c): question of whether the court really means that it will avoid the question even if the impeachment were “tried” on ridiculous ground. v. Rehnquist (m): not complete political question, court simply giving deference. |
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ii. McCulloch v. Maryland
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1. Marshall: gives the clause an expansionist gloss as opposed to a gloss that would construe the enumerated powers narrowly
2. Issue: a. Federal: Whether Congress has the power to Charter a national Bank b. State: If Congress has the power, may the state impose a tax on the Bank 3. Holding: a. Marshall: Tax is invalid under the supremacy clause because it was a discriminatory tax that singled out the Federal Bank 4. Significance: a. We infer from the enumeration the listing of 17 separate powers that they do not total to total legislative control, while they might overlap, none of the powers are included in the others. b. Also, take away the difficulty of communicating exactly what is communicated in each power and how broad or narrow the power is may not be included in the language it’s self |
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1. Gibbons v. Ogden
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a. Issue:
i. Whether a Federal license statute granting Gibbons the exclusive rights to navigate a steam boat between NYC and NJ exceeded Congress’s power to regulate commerce between the several states. b. Holding: i. Congress could regulate the licensing of ships engaged in “the coasting of trade.” 1. Marshall establishes that the federal government has the power to license fairies and other commerce when it is traveling from one state to another ii. Marshall defined the power as one over “every species of commercial intercourse…which concerns more states than one.” |
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i. Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case)
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1. Expansion of federal regulatory authority
2. Issue: a. Whether congress has the power to regulate a shipments for non-commercial reasons 3. Holding: a. “Congress may arbitrarily exclude from commerce among the states any article, commodity, or thing, of whatever kind or nature, or however useful or valuable, which it may choose, no matter with what motive.” i. As long as an item crosses a state line, the reason for regulation is irrelevant 4. Dissent: a. Government’s use of a granted power cannot go beyond the reason that the power was originally granted |
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i. Houston East & West Texas RR v. United States(Shreveport Case)
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1. Issue:
a. Whether the federal government could regulate in-state rail road rates 2. Holding: a. The federal government could regulate intrastate actions that competed with regulated interstate activities and had the potential to distort the market |
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Hammer v. Dagenhart (Overruled by US v. Darby)
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1. Issue:
a. Federal Child Labor act banned the federal shipment of goods made by child labor but did not restrict itself to place where child labor was illegal. The shipment of those goods was interstate commerce. 2. Holding a. The court looks at the purpose of this saying that the purpose is to regulate child labor in the state and since congress is trying to regulate something that is not commerce it is not within Congress’s power i. Directly contradicted Lottery case ii. Court concerned with purpose |
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Mann Act
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1. Made it illegal to move a person across state lines for illicit sexual purposes
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1. Wickard v. Filburn
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a. The Supreme Court upheld Congress’s limits on the amount of wheat a farmer could grow for home consumption because the interstate price was a function of total wheat production
i. Reaffirmed in Raich. |
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2. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. Us; and Katzenbach v. McClung
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a. The Supreme Court upheld application of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to a local Barbeque restaurant on the grounds that segregation of public accommodations affected black interstate business travel, and that much of the food served at the restaurant had moved in interstate commerce.
i. By using the commerce clause and not the 14th amendment, the court was able to regulate actions by private citizens and not just those by a state ii. At this point it appeared that congress could regulate anything that appeared to move in some way in interstate commerce. |
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Perez v. US
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a. The Supreme Court upheld a federal prosecution of a Brooklyn loanshark on the grounds that loansharking was frequently tied to organized crime, which in turn affected interstate commerce.
b. Stewart (d): The 10th amendment has a force of its own in reserving powers to the states even if it may somehow fall under the enumerated powers |
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US v. Lopez and US v. Morrison
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a. The court declared federal acts regulating guns near schools and violence against women to be beyond the commerce power. The activities did not involve an instrumentality of interstate commerce nor an item in interstate commerce. Also, the activities were not commercial and did not substantially affect interstate commerce any more than other local activities.
c. Court concerned with allowing to obscure a relationship to interstate commerce for fear that it could lead to total power in the legislature. d. Thomas (c): Commerce is merely the buying and selling, not all economic activity. e. Souter (d): Impressed with data showing that violence against women harm interstate commerce and thinks that this is simply artificial line drawing. f. Breyer (d) Implausible to distinguish between economic and non-economic activity, treat as political question. |
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b. 3 categories that congress can regulate under commerce clause (Morrison)
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i. The channels of interstate commerce
ii. The instrumentalities of interstate commerce or persons or things in interstate commerce. iii. Those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce. |
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US v. Butler
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i. Issue:
1. Whether government could pay farmers to reduce their production as a way of regulating market prices ii. Holding: 1. Court calls the offer a coercive offer because the farmer is in competition with people who are taking the federal government’s money. Requiring the farmer to subject himself to regulation is more coercive than the government offering payment in exchange for the farmer meeting stipulated requirements. iii. Dissent: 1. Spending for the general welfare is designed for special purposes and a grant will only be given on the condition that the person will do what the grant is for |
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a. A tax may be considered a regulation based on
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i. Objective factors:
1. Whether it exceeds the optimal revenue-raising level ii. Subjective factors: 1. Evidential factors such as: a. Whether intent or knowledge are required, b. How detailed and specific is the activity being taxed, c. What is the enforcement agency, d. Whether the activity is prohibited by the states, etc. |
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1. South Dakota v. Dole
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a. South Dakota can be required to raise its drinking age to 21 in order to receive federal highway money
b. Limitations on Spending Power: i. In pursuit of general welfare ii. State must be cognizant of the consequences of their participation iii. Conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated to a federal interest in a particular project or program iv. Constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds c. O’Conner (d): This type of action will allow congress to regulate almost any area of a state’s social, political, or economic life on the theory that interstate transportation is somehow enhanced. i. Alexander: this debate is important because it is a way for congress to circumvent the regulatory control |
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1. Sabri v. United States
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a. Issue:
i. Whether applying federal corrupt practices act to state officials who receive a bribe was a necessary and proper implication of the spending power. b. Holding: i. Congress has the power under the spending clause to appropriate federal funds to promote the general welfare, and it has corresponding authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to see to it that taxpayer dollars appropriated under that power are in fact spent for the general welfare. |
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1. Missouri v. Holland
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a. Holding:
i. Court upheld statute implementing a treaty with Canada that obligated both countries to seek legislation protecting birds that traversed both countries, where otherwise Congress would not have had this power to regulate. |
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US v. Darby
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a. Federal Fair Labor Standards act contained prohibition of shipment of goods made by non-complying labor and court holds that this is constitutional and whether congresses purpose was to cover wages and hours by regulating interstate shipment was irrelevant
i. Overrules Hammer v. Dagenhart and essentially resuscitates The Lottery Case ii. Congress may regulate instate commerce that is related to interstate commerce |
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3. National League of Cities v. Usery (1976)
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a. The court breathed life into the tenth amendment by striking down the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state employment.
i. Says 10th Amendment takes away Congress’s power to regulate “core functions of the state government” |
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4. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985)
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a. The Court pulled back and seemed to make enforcing the limits of the Commerce Clause into a political question.
i. Eliminated the core functions analysis provided in National League of Cities |
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NY v. US
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a. The Court struck down a federal law for violating state sovereignty where Congress was requiring state legislative action.
6. Note: The Court had previously upheld the requirement that state courts of general jurisdiction hear federal causes of action a. Testa v. Katt |
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Printz v. US
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a. The Court struck down a federal law for requiring state enforcement of federal law.
b. Points out three possible problems of allowing federal government forcing state officials to enforce federal laws: i. Blurs the accountability of state officials ii. De-unified federal taxation because state would have to pay additional money to regulate federal activities iii. Does sheriff meet the required federal enforcement policies? |
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1. Dean Milk Co v. Madison
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a. Struck down as protectionist, because there were less restrictive alternatives available, a ban on milk pasteurized beyond a certain distance from the city
b. Less Restrictive Alternatives i. Where it is obvious that there is a less restrictive alternative it seems that the reasoning was probably discriminatory ii. Alexander: Is there really a less restrictive alternative? |
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2. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission
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a. Struck down as protectionist a ban on apples using grading system other than North Carolina’s
i. Less restrictive alternative of allowing multiple grading systems ii. Once less restrictive alternative shown, only reason to use system is to discriminate. |
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1. Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Dairy
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a. Minnesota banned plastic milk carton in favor of locally made pulpwood cartons for “environmental protection”
b. The Minnesota Supreme court found that the law had a protectionist interest but the Supreme Court reversed establishing that it would not look beyond the face of the law in regards to the dormant commerce clause. c. Law is valid as long as it serves a valid non-protectionist interest and does not discriminate on its face, unless LRA |
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1. Baldwin v. Selig
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a. New York regulated minimum milk prices for sales by producers to dealers and prohibited the sale in NY of milk brought outside the state
b. It is essentially a tariff on out of state producers and limits market i. Court says we have to view the economy as a common market |
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2. Philadelphia v. N.J.
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a. State law forbidding importation of waste from out of state was discriminatory
b. The court says there is a legitimate environmental interest but that has to be limited in a non-discriminatory way, such as setting a tonnage limit on the waste. i. Views waste as a commodity |
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3. Bacchus Imports v. Dias
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a. State tax exemption for local wines that could only be grown in Hawaii
b. Court viewed the localized subsidy as a discriminatory tax against outside wines i. Court was looking beyond the face of the law and to intent |
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4. Wyoming v. Oklahoma
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a. Court struck down law requiring Oklahoma utilities to use Oklahoma coal
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5. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy
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a. Mass. taxed all sales of milk by wholesales to Mass. Retailers. Proceeds of tax then went to a fund used to make a subsidy payment to Mass. milk producers.
b. Tax was non discriminatory but the court strikes it down because although the tax was non-discriminatory the subsidy essentially eliminated the effect of the tax on Mass. milk producers i. Problem arose because they pared the tax with a subsidy. If subsidy would have come from a different pot of money it may have been acceptable. |
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6. Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Harrison
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a. Discriminatory tax applied to customers from out-of-state held unconstitutional
b. Dissent: Viewed the tax as a subsidy of Maine charities. i. This is the general problem as there are a lot of cases that will turn on whether something is viewed as a discriminatory tax or as a permissible subsidy. |
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7. Granholm v. Heald
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a. Ban on direct sales by out of state wineries struck down as discriminatory
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8. New Energy v. Limbach
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a. Ohio says will grant a tax credit if you use Ohio produced ethanol and will give a tax credit for use of Ethanol of another state as long as that state does the same for Ohio produced ethanol.
b. Court said that there is nothing wrong with subsidizing your own industry, but cannot impose a discriminatory tax on n out of state industry |
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1. Carbone v. Clarkstown
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a. Law requiring all local waste to be shipped to municipally funded waste transfer station held unconstitutional
b. But see United Haulers for retreat from Carbone i. Law requiring trash be brought to local collection plant. ii. Majority held that a state or local statue does not discriminate against interstate commerce when if favors local government at the expense of all private industry. Held it was up to other checks to battle against a state controlled monopoly. iii. Invokes market participant doctrine |
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2. Hood v. DuMond
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a. NY puts a limit on selling NY milk to Mass
b. State restrictions imposed with the availed (1) purpose AND (2) practical effect of curtailing the volume of incoming commerce to (3) aid local economic interests is invalid. i. A state cannot favor its own consumers over those elsewhere |
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3. Sporhase v. Nebraska
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a. Restriction on export of water
b. There was an exception where Nebraska allowed the export if the importing state allowed its water to be export into Nebraska, but the court said this would not save the law based on the Ohio ethanol case. |
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4. Foster-fountain Packing v. Haydel
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a. Statute requiring Louisiana caught shrimp to be packed in Louisiana packing plants struck down as discriminatory against other packing facilities.
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1. Pike v. Bruce Church
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a. Requirement that Arizona grown cantaloupes be packed in Arizona struck down
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Exxon Corp v. MD
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a. Ban on vertical integration of gasoline business affecting out of state companies held constitutional
b. Court upheld the law however because the law did not have a discriminatory outcome on its face, and the mere negative impact was not enough to run afoul of the dormant commerce clause. |
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2. Commonwealth Edison v. Montana
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a. Severance tax on coal, which was mainly consumed out of state, was constitutional because fairly related to services provided by taxing state
i. Fairly related test ii. Alexander: court just assumes that there are benefits to the state in providing some services |
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Parker v. Brown
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i. Upheld California statue that to increase the price of raisins required producers to give a marketing committee control over the sale of two-thirds of their raisins
ii. Cooperative was Ok because it raised the prices of raisins both in and out of the state |
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Maine v. Taylor
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i. Maine could prohibit the importation of baitfish because of the effect it could have on the local baitfish population.
ii. If the only benefit was to protect the Maine baitfish industry this would be an illegitimate law, but there was a sense that there was an environmental hazard element |
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a. Reeves v. Stake
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Court upheld South Dakota owned concrete plant giving preference to South Dakota customers because it was acting as a market participant.
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i. South Central Timber Development, Inc, v. Wunnicke
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• Alaska was a participant in the timber market by owning timber fields.
• Could not use its leverage in that market to exert a regulatory effect in the timber processing market, in which it was not a participant, by forcing timber cut from its fields to be processed in Alaska plants |
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United Building & Construction Trades v. Camden
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• Court invalidated an ordinance of Camden, New Jersey that required at least 40% of the employees or contractors working on city construction projects be Camden residents
• Violated Privileges and Immunities clause by discriminating against out of state residents includes discrimination against non-city resident. As long as out of state commerce is being discriminated against, it doesn’t matter if instate commerce is being discriminated against |
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i. Metropolitan Life Ins. V. Ward
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• Favoring local insurance business was held to be an illegitimate state purpose.
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So. Car. V. Barnwell Bros
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• Restriction on width of trucks upheld despite major obstacle to interstate truck traffic
• The Supreme Court upheld the SC law, it acknowledge the effect on interstate traffic going through SC but upheld the law based on health and safety reasons that it would be safer to have narrower trucks on the highway |
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So Pacific v. Arizona and Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways
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• Arizona law restricting the length of trains
• Court held that while the shortened trains would provide some type of safety benefit, they would create other safety concerns • Rare that a court conducts this type of cost benefit analysis |
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• Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways
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o Iowa limited the length of trucks passing through the state but had exceptions for border towns and livestock transport.
o Court struck down as an obstruction of interstate commerce saying that to avoid the law trucks would have to drive around the states. o Brennan (c): Wants to strike down the statute on the grounds that Iowa is not taking its fair share of interstate traffic and is trying to push the dangerous traffic into other neighboring states Alexander: it is strange to suggest that there is some type of interstate traffic that Iowa should be picking up |
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Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines
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• Court invalidated an Illinois law that required round mud flaps on trucks and trailers on Illinois Highways when straight mud flaps were legal in at least 45 states.
o Is the court really competent to make a decision on mud flaps? o How do you balance that interest? |
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1. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
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a. Regulation of sale and control of instate corporation upheld even if most shareholders are out-of-state because court says law does not discriminate because it affects buyers and sellers wherever they are and says Indiana can regulate Indiana corporations.
b. Dissent: Out of state shareholders may want to sell their shares in a way that Indiana prevents but this law permits the majority to prevent out of state shareholders to out of state offers who want to purchase their stock. |
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Edgar v. Mite
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Court struck down an Illinois statute that had many of the same restrictions as in CTS but the difference for the court was that the statute dealt with corporations that were not Illinois corporations. State may not regulate beyond its borders
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Brown-Forman Distillers Corp v. NY
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a. Court struck down NY statute requiring liquor distillers to sell liquor at a price that was no higher than the lowest price that it was sold in any other state.
b. Violated the DCC as an attempt to regulate laws out of state |
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Complete Auto Transit v. Brady 4 Part test
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1. The tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state
2. The tax is fairly apportioned 3. The Tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce 4. The tax is fairly related to the services provided by the state |
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Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana
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1. Court upheld a severance tax on coal even though 90 percent of the coal was shipped out of state
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Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax
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a. Court says that under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses the state may not tax income earned outside of its borders, but arriving at precise territorial allocations of value is often elusive
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Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
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1. President Truman orders Sawyer, secretary of Commerce to take over the Steel industry. Court upholds an injunction against this action.
4. Jackson (c): Three part division of Presidential Power a. One end: President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of congress, his authority is at a maximum b. Other end: Where congress has denied the power, the president must rely on his inherent powers coming under the constitution. Congress cannot take this power away from him. c. In the middle where the President and Congress may have concurrent authority, “congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.” |
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Dames & Moore v. Regan
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1. When Regan secured the release of the hostages with Iran there was an entrance into an executive agreement that suspends claims by American companies against Iranian assets. The international Emergency Economic powers act authorized the president to do some of the things that he did, but it did not authorize the suspension of claims.
2. The court upholds Regan’s action because it says that enactment of legislation closely related to the question of the President’s authority evinces legislative intent. a. Alexander: Couldn’t Congressional omission of this subject in the granted powers have meant that they intended to not grant the power? |
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In re Debs
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1. Supreme Court upheld Presidential injunction preventing railroad strike that President thought would be crippling to interstate commerce.
2. Not a case where the president was enforcing a statute; the president was going on his own and acting as a protector of interstate commerce. |
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The Pentagon Papers
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1. SC struck down injunction sought by President preventing publication of classified documents on the grounds of national security. Court struck down on free speech grounds, and also because it was worried about the fact that the president was acting where he had not been authorized to
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US v. Nixon
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i. Watergate was being investigated by the senate and because of political pressure Nixon authorized a special prosecutor and the special prosecutor asked for the recordings and Nixon declined. District court subpoenaed the tapes and Nixon still refused claiming executive privilege.
ii. Court accepts the idea that there is such a privilege and recognizes the function of that privilege because in order to get candor you have to promise the participants that what they say is private. Court cites to the function of the president and say that certain things flow from that function including some degree of confidentiality in relation to that privilege iii. Court limits privilege in a criminal prosecution and absent a need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets |
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Nixon v. Fitzgerald
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i. The acts in Fitzgerald were acts of an official nature, not personal acts by the President. Fitzgerald sued Nixon after he was fired as a whistleblower.
ii. Court held that the president is absolutely immune from suits for damages predicated on his official acts but does not cite the constitution and simply predicates this on the importance of not requiring the President to be forced to have to defend against damage suits while sitting as president. |
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Clinton v. Jones
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a. Court held the threat of frivolous suits and curtailment of official duties was insignificant and that the suit could go forward.
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Myers v. US
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i. President attempted to remove Myers, who was the sitting Post Master, without stating any grounds and without cause. Myers said there were only certain reasons that justified removal.
ii. SC upholds Presidential power to remove postmaster without any cause, saying that the “President’s selection of administrative officers is essential to the execution of the laws by him so must be his power of removing those for who he cannot continue to be responsible.” |
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Morrison v. Olson
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i. Sets up a framework to investigate members of the executive branch by having the Attorney General conduct a preliminary investigation and then reports to a special division of the DC Court of Appeals and the special division then appoints a special prosecutor who can only be fired for cause by the attorney general.
ii. Court says the independent investigator is an inferior under the appointments clause and thus might be insulated from presidential removal if it does not trench too much on the president’s constitutional power i. Sets up a framework to investigate members of the executive branch by having the Attorney General conduct a preliminary investigation and then reports to a special division of the DC Court of Appeals and the special division then appoints a special prosecutor who can only be fired for cause by the attorney general. ii. Court says the independent investigator is an inferior under the appointments clause and thus might be insulated from presidential removal if it does not trench too much on the president’s constitutional power i. Sets up a framework to investigate members of the executive branch by having the Attorney General conduct a preliminary investigation and then reports to a special division of the DC Court of Appeals and the special division then appoints a special prosecutor who can only be fired for cause by the attorney general. ii. Court says the independent investigator is an inferior under the appointments clause and thus might be insulated from presidential removal if it does not trench too much on the president’s constitutional power i. Sets up a framework to investigate members of the executive branch by having the Attorney General conduct a preliminary investigation and then reports to a special division of the DC Court of Appeals and the special division then appoints a special prosecutor who can only be fired for cause by the attorney general. ii. Court says the independent investigator is an inferior under the appointments clause and thus might be insulated from presidential removal if it does not trench too much on the president’s constitutional power i. Sets up a framework to investigate members of the executive branch by having the Attorney General conduct a preliminary investigation and then reports to a special division of the DC Court of Appeals and the special division then appoints a special prosecutor who can only be fired for cause by the attorney general. ii. Court says the independent investigator is an inferior under the appointments clause and thus might be insulated from presidential removal if it does not trench too much on the president’s constitutional power i. Sets up a framework to investigate members of the executive branch by having the Attorney General conduct a preliminary investigation and then reports to a special division of the DC Court of Appeals and the special division then appoints a special prosecutor who can only be fired for cause by the attorney general. ii. Court says the independent investigator is an inferior under the appointments clause and thus might be insulated from presidential removal if it does not trench too much on the president’s constitutional power i. Sets up a framework to investigate members of the executive branch by having the Attorney General conduct a preliminary investigation and then reports to a special division of the DC Court of Appeals and the special division then appoints a special prosecutor who can only be fired for cause by the attorney general. ii. Court says the independent investigator is an inferior under the appointments clause and thus might be insulated from presidential removal if it does not trench too much on the president’s constitutional power |
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Wiener v. US
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i. Court held that the President did not have the authority to remove individuals from the War Claims Commission at will. The Court found that Congress had intended to create a body that was free from the control of either the Executive or the Congress. The "intrinsic judicial character" of the Commission's duties required that it be able to adjudicate claims on the merits of each claim free of external Executive pressure.
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Humphrey’s Executor
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i. Congress could limit the grounds for removal of a commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission because it was not a purely executive agency, in that it was quasi legislative, judicial, and executive.
ii. Alexander: The fact that it makes rules does not distinguish it from other executive agencies. This is the seed of Independent Agency cases |
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Bowsher v. Synar
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i. Congress tried to control itself by giving the controller general the power to order certain budget cuts that the President would then have to implement
ii. Burger (m): There was a constitutional defect in this law and it was that congress could remove the controller general by a joint resolution plus the signature of the president. Burger viewed the controller general as an executive officer of the US and congress does not have the power to remove a federal officer except through impeachment. 1. To make law must follow the Chadha process of going through both houses and the President. |
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a. Buckley v Valeo
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i. Invalidated the Federal Election Campaign Act’s provision for the Federal Election Commission because it assigned appointment of commissioners.
ii. Any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the US is an Officer of the US and must therefore be appointed in the manner prescribed by the appointments clause. |
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1. INS v. Chadha
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a. Attorney General was authorized to suspend the deportation of an otherwise Deportable Alien, but one house of congress could override the attorney general not withstanding what the attorney general had found.
b. Holding: i. This action was essentially Congress making a law and required bicameral legislation rather than simple action by one house. One house is not authorized to make law. c. Powell (c): Congress was functioning in a judicial function in violation of the principles of separation of powers and this essentially violated the prohibition on Bills of Attainder (congressional declaration of guilt). d. White (d): Legislative veto was not a law but simply a condition subsequent of a law that had already been passed by Congress. i. Alexander: Condition subsequents are very beneficial in laws. |
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Clinton v. NY
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a. Line item veto act gave the President the power to cancel, in whole, types of provisions that had been passed by the legislature.
b. Holding: i. The cancelation of items in the balanced budget act using the line item veto act was unconstitutional in that it violated Art. I § 7 by allowing the President to amend an act by cancelling parts and there is only one way to amend an act of Congress and that is by passing another act. 1. President must veto bills, not simply items in a bill. c. Dissent: if the line item veto act and the balanced budget act had been written together then what the President was doing would be something that had clearly been delegated in the act and feels that it should make no difference that one act was simply made earlier than the other. i. Argues that giving the President the power not to enforce an act is the same as giving the President the power to veto certain parts of it. |
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Bowsher v. Sunar
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a. Controller General created by the legislature was placed in the executive branch and could only be removed through the impeachment process.
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2. Buckley v. Valeo
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a. Invalidated the Federal Election Campaign Act’s provision for the Federal Election Commission because it assigned appointment of commissioners.
b. Any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the US is an Officer of the US, and must therefore be appointed in the manner prescribed by the appointments clause. |
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1. MWAA v. CAAN
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a. Airport board consisted of nine congressmen.
b. The court struck down the method for choosing the airport authority. If it was a function of the executive branch it could not be appointed in that way, if not no member of congress could hold an executive branch office under Art. 1 §6 cl 2. |
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Mistretta v. US
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a. US sentencing commission was set up to establish ranges of sentences under federal criminal law. Not all members were judges.
b. Court characterized as an executive branch function that was not housed in the executive branch. Court says it is OK for judges to operate as an executive official, as part-members of the executive branch as long as no conflict of interest. i. One problem was that the President had the powers to remove judges from the commission, but the court said this was OK because he was not removing them as judges he was only removing them from the executive branch. 2. Judges can make rules relating to their judicial function |
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i. Schenck v. US (Clear and Present Danger)
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a. “The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”
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ii. Dennis v. US (Learned Hand Balancing)
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a. “In each case courts must ask whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.”
i. Alexander: ii. How do you put a value on the loss of speech? iii. The court will likely not see a lot of positives on that side of the balance so the speech usually loses on this type of test |
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Brandenburg v. Ohio
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1. Doctrine for this area — End of the current progression
2. KKK in Ohio, Klan had a rally and Brandenburg urged that “if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might have to be some revenge taken” 3. SC Reverses conviction a. TEST: The constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. |
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Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project
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1. Court upheld constitutional prohibition on giving advice and training to groups that advocated terrorist activities
2. Court ignored Brandenburg a. Speech was not directed at providing imminent violence b. This case took Brandenburg beyond purposeful |
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i. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
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1. Marshall trying to quite proselytizing Jehovah’s Witness in violation of a statute
2. SC said fighting words were unprotected by freedom of speech. a. Does not require specific words, it is more circumstantial i. Where words would provoke someone to fight in the circumstances where they were uttered. ii. Ie: you can call police whatever you want because they are trained to restrain themselves iii. Has to be the reasonable unreasonable person 3. Two step approach: a. Does not require intent to promote the harm ii. Almost every case involving fighting words has been reversed by the court so there is very little law beyond Chaplinsky supporting this doctrine |
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i. Finer v. New York
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1. You don’t have to use all the resources in the world to protect the speaker, at some point you just tell the speaker to stop.
2. This is the only case where the court upholds the conviction of the speaker for not obeying a police order to stop. |
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ii. Edwards v. South Carolina
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1. Court found that it was simple enough for police to protect the speaker
2. Last time this doctrine was used |
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i. Rice v. Paladin Enterprises
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1. Someone used the book outlining how to be a hit man to commit a murder and the question is whether the publisher should be liable.
2. Only case where liability was approved on the ground of aiding and abiding, settled out of court. |
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i. New York Times v. Sullivan
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2. Held that CL tort of defamation was subject to constitutional restrictions of the first amendment (really however it is under the 14th amendment because the 1st amendment does not apply directly to the states, this falls under the Due Process Clause)
Actual Malice Test: Plaintiff must prove that the statement was made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not |
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1. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc
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a. Lawyer was representing a family and was called a communist architect in the newspaper
b. A private figure on a matter of public concern, plaintiff must prove falsity and prove that statement was made with fault, could recover as long as statement was negligent (unreasonable risk)—no malice required i. Could recover actual damages with falsity and negligence ii. Could recover Punitive damages if you could prove malice iii. P |
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i. Hustler v. Falwell
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1. Court held that public figures and public officials offended by a mass media parody could not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress without a showing of NYT malice.
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ii. Florida Star v. B.J.F.
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1. Florida paper published the name of a rape victim that it received though a police report that failed to redact it.
2. Court says that the press cannot be sanctioned for disclosing the name because once it had been disclosed to them, they cannot be sanctioned for repeating it. |
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iii. Bartnicki v. Vopper
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1. Federal law against taping conversation without permission, but content of the conversation was a matter of public interest, was illegally intercepted and taped and then tape was given to a radio station.
2. SC says that the law protecting the privacy of the conversation was OK but once that conversation is illegally taped and the tape is given to someone else, it is a violation of the first amendment to sanction a person who later plays the tape devoid of illegal conduct. |
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i. Cohen v. California
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1. Fuck the draft sweatshirt worn in the courthouse
2. Government cant clean up public debate in any principle way stating that one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric. a. Same idea can be evoked in different ways but may not have the same emotive force. i. Alexander: Medium is the message |
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c. Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises
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i. Under the current copyright doctrine you can only own the expression of an idea not the idea itself
ii. Court said public interest in ex-president’s memoir did not outweigh the owner’s ownership interest in the content of the speech itself. |
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d. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
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i. Human Cannonball that you had to pay admission to see was filmed by a local news team
ii. Zacchini sued claiming that this was an unauthorized broadcast of his performance 1. Alexander: You can own content of speech and when someone makes an unauthorized transmittal of that speech they are causing harm and it is a one step harm violation of your copyright. |
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e. United States v. Eichman
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i. Court held that Flag Protection Act was unconstitutional because the regulation was only relevant when the person wanted to express an ideal contrary to what the government wanted to present.
ii. Dissent: government interest in protecting the American flag outweighed the free speech interest. |
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2. US v. O’Brien
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a. Burning of draft card against a statute prohibiting willful destruction of a draft card
b. O’Brien claims freedom of speech as a burning draft card is a symbol c. Government has an interest in not using that particular symbol in that particular way i. Alexander: 1. All speech is conduct 2. Think about not speech v. conduct, but is the government interested in regulating the message or is it interested in regulating the medium which that message is conveyed |
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3. Texas v. Johnson
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a. Court invalidated flag burning statutes because government was clearly interested in the message as opposed to the medium.
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4. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence
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a. Court upheld a band on sleeping or camping in public parks because there was a clear government interest in maintaining the parks.
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2. Hague v. CIO
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a. Rejected the notion that land held by the government could be treated in the same way that a private owner would be allowed to treat his property
b. Roberts: public spaces are spaces for among other things communication, but there is a subordination to “general comfort and convenience and in consonance with peace and good order.” |
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3. Schneider v. Irvington
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a. Invalidated several ordinances prohibiting leafleting on public streets or other public places
b. Court said that while the medium did contribute to a public bad (littering) it was not a sufficient interest because the court said there were alternatives that could be used to fight liter. |
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4. Forsyth County v. The Nationalist Movement
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a. You cannot charge the speaker the cost of providing police presence to protect against the hostile audience.
i. Most likely could not charge the speaker for when its audience litters with leaflets |
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5. Heffron v. International Soc for Krishna Consciousness
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a. Prohibited from handing out leaflets at the state fair without a permit for a booth because people had legitimate interest in not being bothered while at the fair.
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6. Ward v. Rock Against Racism
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a. Government may put a decibel restriction on a sound device
i. Court had previously upheld volume restrictions on sound truck |
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7. Chicago Police Department v. Mosley
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a. Dealt with an ordinance which banned all picketing near a school, when in session, except during a peaceful labor dispute.
i. This ban was not permissible because the ban was not a blanket ban since it made an exception based on the content by allowing the teacher’s union to picket. 1. Court evokes the equal protection clause by b. TAKE AWAY: Time, place and manner restrictions are OK UNLESS they discriminate in some way against the message. c. Alexander: i. Could also be seen as the state attempting to subsidize the teacher’s union |
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8. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee
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a. Issue:
i. Whether airports should be included with sidewalks, streets, and parks as public forums. 1. Court by 5-4 rejects the idea that airports are a public forum, like sidewalks and streets. Says there can be new public forum that develop but that the airport was not considered one. b. Resolution i. Court struck down the ban on leafleting but allowed the New York Port Authority to prohibit solicitation of funds because of the hindrance it would cause passengers in their pursuit of air travel. |
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1. Rust v. Sullivan
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a. Dealt with a federal program providing money for family planning counseling and with it came a restriction that the family planning could not discuss abortion.
i. Court thinks of this as the government speaking though the doctors who receive the funds b. Court says the government can speak and take positions, the first amendment restricts the way it may regulate private speakers but it doesn’t prevent the government from taking positions itself |
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2. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum
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a. 10 commandments in a park, won’t allow another group to erect monument
b. Court upholds a restriction on other monuments, and says that when you see these monuments you have to view it as the government speaking |
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3. National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley
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a. Chairperson was allowed to ensure that artistic excellence was met in accordance with view of diverse beliefs and views of decency
b. Court said government may discriminate based on content when it is subsidizing. |
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4. Rosenberger v. University of Virginia
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a. Court held that the government could not subsidize groups along a line that supported viewpoint discrimination when it is not advocating a position. Because the university was paying printing costs for a number of organizations in an attempt to encourage any kind of speech it could not discriminate against religious organizations.
i. This is in tension with cases like Rust or Pleasant grove. |
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1. Calder v. Bull (Ex post Facto)
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a. Connecticut probate statute that was retroactive and was challenged as an ex post facto law (Art. 1 § 10)
b. Court decides that prohibition against ex post facto laws only refers to criminal laws i. Chase (m): There are natural principles of justice and we cannot assume that the legislatures (state or federal) are given powers to do things against these principles of natural justice. 1. This is an echo of Lord Coke position in Dr. Bonham’s Case: a. “When an act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will control it, and adjudge such act to be void. ii. Iredell (d): If something is not written down as a prohibition on the legislature than the judges cannot rule that an act is void. c. Alexander: there is a constant debate between what judges are entitled to do based on deontological reasons as opposed to statutory reasons |
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2. Washington v. Glucksberg(Due Process Clause)
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a. Justice Souter (m): There are un-enumerated substantive limits on governmental actions and courts will use the due process clause as a textual backing to invoke un-enumerated rights.
i. Modern descendent of justice Chase |
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3. Fletcher v. Peck (Impairment of Contract)
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a. Court struck down an act of the Georgia Legislature that purported to rescind a sale of public land and reclaim title for the state, and would have deprived subsequent, good faith purchasers of property conveyed by original grantees.
b. Marshall (m): Invoked Art. 1 §10 saying that the state had impaired the obligation of contracts i. Alexander: this does not look like the general impairment of the right of contract because the contract had been fully executed, in a way it was no different than Georgia taking the land and giving it to someone else, which would not have violated the takings clause of the US constitution because the takings clause did not yet apply to the states. a. Marshall was looking around for some textual hook and the contracts clause was the best thing. b. This was really a taking of property but there was no taking of property clause and Marshall just thought this was unfair. |
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4. Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge (Impairment of Contract)
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a. Mass legislature authorized competing toll bridge opperations
b. Court said no impairment of the right to contract. |
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5. Stone v. Mississippi (Impairment of Contract)
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a. State granted charter to a lottery and then state outlawed lotteries, company sued and said that this was an impairment of the right of contract
b. Contracts clause has been interpreted to say that the state can impair the obligation of contract if it pays just compensation just as it would under the takings clause but only to contract rights that exist at the time the law was passed. |
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2. Slaughter House Cases
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a. State granted a monopoly to run slaughterhouses, competitors then brought suit saying it was violating 14th amendment.
b. Justice Miller (m) in regards to Privileges and Immunities: i. Reads it as a nullity and said the only thing he finds as a privilege and immunity under US citizenship are things protected by US law. 1. Alexander: but those federal rights are already protected, and Justice Miller does not say anything else making P & I essentially a dead letter never to arise again. Following this case things that would have been tried under P&I were under Due Process |
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1. Allgeyer v. Lousiana
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a. Struck down a law prohibiting any act in the state to effect a contract for marine insurance on state property with a company not licensed to do business in the state, as a violation of the 14th amendment by depriving residents of their liberty to contract for insurance.
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2. Lochner v. New York
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a. Invalidated a NY statute, limiting the number of hours a baker could work per week under the liberty to contract based on the Due Process Clause for 14th Amendment.
1. Justice Peckham (m) thinks that paternalism of this kind is a violation of the 14th amendment (Justice Harlan disagrees) a. Holmes Dissent (d): problem was that by allowing substantive due process to be recognized you are allowing the court a free opening to impose its own judgment at a particular time. Accused court of reading a laissez faire basis into the DP Clause |
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3. Muller v. Oregon
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a. Court upheld the regulation of working hours for women saying that the woman’s health was an object of public interest.
i. Alexander: Two paternalistic things upheld that Lochner rejected: 1. Protection for your own sake; and 2. Protection for the sake of the society which has a stake in the person’s health. |
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b. Adair v. US
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i. Invalidating a statute eliminating yellow dog contracts (employee agrees not to join union)
ii. Harlan (m): “The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he considers proper to be the same as the right of the purchaser to prescribe the conditions.” |
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c. Coppage v. Kansas
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i. Legislature under the due process clause was prohibited from interfering with the bargains struck between employees and employers.
1. Employees were as capable of protecting themselves as employers |
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d. Pierce v. Society of Sisters
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i. Ore. Passed a law mandating people going to public schools
ii. SC held that under the due process clause the state did not have a sufficient interest to override parent’s liberty to control the education of their children. |
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e. Myers v. Nebraska
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i. Nebraska law outlawing the teaching of German
ii. SC struck down on similar grounds to Pierce |
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Nebbia v. NY
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i. NY law sets retail price for milk at an artificial level creating a surplus of milk and court upholds the price fix when challenged by a grocer.
1. Alexander: This marks the demise of the Lochner era and then there are a series of cases where the court retreats from striking down economic regulations of this time. |
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b. US v. Carolene Products Co
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i. Federal law under commerce power that prohibited shipment of milk substitute.
1. Willing buyer and willing seller are prohibited from engaging in industry 2. Fed government argued that this was an unhealthy substance but this is really one of many laws lobbied for by the dairy industry iii. Cited for FN 4 ¬— Exceptions to presuming a law constitutional 1. Theory for how the court should behave with respect to legislation: 2. (Paragraph 1) Presume laws are constitutional unless something appears on its face to be a violation of the constitution or more specifically the first ten amendments (or the 14th amendment due process clause including the first ten amendments) |
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c. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma
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i. Law required that you have a new prescription every time you get lenses made for glasses
ii. If SC could think of any logical reason to uphold a law, it would uphold it as it did in this case. |
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BMW v. Gore
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i. Court invalidated a state-court punitive assessment as grossly excessive.
1. Have seen some revival in this area 2. Court does not give a formula for how much is too much 3. Alexander: These are intended to punish, illegitimate because they punish people for wrong doing without the structure of the criminal process. SC says here that because punitive damages are unregulated they won’t give a formula but says that they are exceeded. |
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4. Home Building and Loan Assn v. Blaisdell
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a. Alexander: One of the most important constitutional interpretation cases
b. Minn. Enacted a mortgage moratorium statute, law allowed mortgagor to stay on land after default as long as they paid a reasonable rental to the bank i. Law challenged on the impairment on the obligation of contract c. Majority: Court says have to interpret the contracts clause in the context of the kind of emergency that is the great depression, that this is a reasonable tinkering with the terms of contract with response to this great national emergency. Believe that the constitution allowed for adjustments based on special circumstances d. Dissent: The framers of the constitution were aware of economic downturns and in downturns debtors would rush to legislature and ask for legislation to be passed to grant them relief from their debts. There are usually more debtors than creditors and so the legislators passed relief legislation like this law. Art. 1 § 10 was put in to the constitution to prevent this type of legislation.. i. Responding to the current crisis of debtors has long term effects on the national credit market because banks have an extra risk that the legislature would change the rights. |
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5. US Trust Co. v. New Jersey (1977)
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(reaffirmed life in the contracts clause)
a. NJ port authority had raised money for projects and raised bonds and pledged not to take on additional mass transit operations. But then NJ decided port authority must take on mass transit operations and repealed covenants in bonds. i. Bond holders sued under impairment of contract b. Holding: i. Court said impairment may be reasonable if it is necessary to serve a government interest, “however complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate because the state’s self-interest is at stake.” State can’t get out of debt by simply saying that the state has better uses for the money. ii. Alexander: there was some question how much a legislature can tie the hands of future state legislatures by granting contracts. |
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6. Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus
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a. Minn. Passed act dealing with private pensions and imposed pension obligations on companies and allied steel had pension rights with its employees that only vested at a certain point of time and law would have made these pensions vest sooner.
i. Claimed an impairment of obligation of contract because they would not be able to fund the pensions at an earlier time. b. Holding: i. Court upholds the claim saying that the law changed the company’s obligation in an area where reliance was vital. And there was no showing by the state that the change was necessary to meet an important general social program c. Brennan (d): Act imposes new additional obligations on a particular class of person and thus should be based not on the contracts clause but on the due process clause of the 14th amendment. Laws should not be nullified because they do not alter a duty already obligated to be preformed. d. Alexander: could view this as a taking of property, that it is imposing a duty on the company to give its property to the employees |
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7. Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power and Light
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a. Kansas statute prohibited ERG from raising prices as dictated by a previous contract with the state.
b. Court held that the law did not violate the contracts clause because ERG’s” reasonable expectations had not been impaired by the Kansas Act” and because the act was purported by a legitimate state interest. i. Distinguishes Allied ii. Alexander: this case is hard to explain |
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8. Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton
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a. Alabama raised tax, but said companies could not pass tax on to customers even if they had a contract said that they could.
b. Court said this was OK i. Distinguishes Allied ii. Alexander: this case is hard to explain. |
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1. Griswold v. Connecticut
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1. Griswold v. Connecticut
a. Background: Substantive due process at least in terms of unenumerated rights was the hallmark of the Lochner period and was increasingly disfavored. i. This was a stage case was staged to see if court would enforce statute prohibiting giving married people information in regards to preventing contraception. b. Justice Douglas (m): Not going to enforce rights not specifically mentioned in the constitution and then attempts to negotiate around Lochner. 1. Says while this right does not come within any specific enumerated right, there are penumbras and emanations which together create a “Zones of Privacy” and then says that this law intrudes on that zone of privacy. |
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2. Eisenstadt v. Baird
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a. Alexander: worth mentioning primarily for the form of argument
b. Issue: i. Whether Griswold extended the right to contraceptive only to married people. c. Holding: i. Denial of contraceptives to an unmarried person was a violation of the equal protection clause. ii. Alexander: Bogus Equal Protection type of argument 1. Argument: a. Married people have right to contraceptives under DP Clause b. Single persons have that right as individuals c. Therefore the distinction between married and single persons is unjustifiable and therefore it violates the equal protection clause 2. This is bogus because the key part is the second part. The inequality is really a fifth wheel, because the equal protection argument is not doing any work. |
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4. Maher v. Roe
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a. Government had programs that would subsidize the costs of live birth but would not subsidize the cost of abortion thus in allocating money to poor people for health needs, the government discriminated against poor people who wanted to get an abortion.
b. Court held that there was a basic difference between state interference and state encouragement of an alternative activity and this in no way infringed on women’s right to abortion. |
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5. Planned Parenthood v. Casey
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a. Post-roe case dealing with regulation of abortion, 24 hour waiting period, and spousal notice requirement
b. Court adopts the undue burden test: whether regulation imposes an undue burden on the exercise of the right i. Court says 24 hour waiting period is not an undue burden, but spousal notification is an undue burden ii. Where does the court get its values for deciding what is undue? c. Significance: i. Plurality opinion by O’Conner, Kennedy & Souter 1. Lengthy discussion of when the court ought to overrule one of its precedents a. Justices say not sure if Roe is a correct decision but it is a precedent that falls under stare decisis, but this is not absolute and there is a question of whether to overrule or not. b. Plurality says admitting error in earlier case would undermine legitimacy because people will have a weakened perception of the court i. Alexander: divisiveness has never been reason not to overrule |
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6. Bowers v. Harwick
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a. Test of Georgia’s anti-sodomy law as a violation of the substantive due proves right
i. Court upholds the law saying that if the majority of the state thinks homosexual sodomy is immoral, that it is sufficient state interest to justify the curtailment of liberty. b. Blackmum (d): i. How do we define the class of activities proscribed in Roe 1. Narrowly: contraceptive, abortion 2. Generally: ability to make decisions about personal life a. The more general, the more activates it includes. ii. Do the prior precedents establish a narrow or wide zone? iii. Is an assertion by a legislature that an activity is immoral, is that sufficient to justify prohibiting the activity? |
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7. Lawrence v. Texas
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a. Again dealing with the question of when a court should overrule its own precedent
i. Overrules Bowers b. When the court wants to say something is a fundamental right it will describe the activity with a high degree of generality i. Ie: homosexuality is intimate relations c. Here the court does not say that homosexuality is a fundamental right, the court rather says that the government does not have a legitimate interest in proscribing it. i. Because not legitimate interest the law will be kicked out no matter what it is regulating. |
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2. Goldberg v. Kelly
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a. State terminates the welfare claim, during the pendency of the hearing, the person does not get the welfare he was due until the hearing. Kelly argues that he should continue to receive money until it is shown that he is ineligible.
b. Issue: who gets to hold the welfare money during the pendency? c. Main argument: i. Constitution does not require that the state give welfare at all. So it says that by giving him a hearing at all it is doing more than it had to do d. Court said there was a property right here that was significant enough to trigger due process such that Kelly was entitled to continue to receive funds during the pendency. |
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3. Arnett v. Kennedy & Bishop v. Wood
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a. Two step process for analyzing Procedural Due Process:
i. Must have something taken that have a legally cognizable right to ii. Decide whether afforded sufficient protection by the procedure afforded b. Provides a property right if the statute granting the benefit sets up a hearing should the property right be denied. i. Alexander: This is a circular argument though because you only have a right to a hearing if property right and only have property right if have right to a hearing. |
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4. Matthews v. Eldrige
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a. Court said government could hold the disability benefits during the pendency, because someone would not die waiting for them and because the initial determination was more likely to be correct because it was made by doctors and reversals are rare
b. Question is how much more accurate will added benefits of hearing give the individual i. The more extensive the hearing, the more the costs to government and the other interests ii. It is a weighing process |
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5. Curators v. Horowitz
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a. Where med student kicked out of school, court held she was entitled to a hearing of whether she was doing satisfactory work, however, the hearing was a group of faculty members evaluating her during the course of her performance
b. Note: i. Court has held that sometimes the only required hearing is a good faith inspection by a government officer |
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6. Fuentes v. Schevin
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a. Repossession of debt
b. The question is who gets to hold the washing machine during the pendency of the trial i. How important is the benefit? ii. How likely it that sears will prevail? |
