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113 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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ambiguous
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A word or senterce has more than one meaning. (Ch. 6,8)
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cognitive economy
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The hypotheiis that only nonredundant information is stored in semantic memory, thus making storage economical. (Ch. 6)
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connectionism
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A computer-based approach to modeling cognition, based on the ideas of simple ,units or nodes interconnected with weighted pathways or lInks also called neural net modeling and parallel distributed processing (PDP) modeling, (Oh. 2, 6)
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context
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The accumulated or activated inforrnation, say in a sentence, that assists comprehension or guides memory retrieval (Oh. 2, 6,7,8,9)
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defining feature
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A necessary semantic feature for a concept to be categorized as belonging to a certain category (e.g:, animate for
BIRD). (Ch. 6) |
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facilitation
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The positive influence on mental processing of a prime, usually a speedup of processing or an increase in accuracy; also called benefits. (Oh. 6)
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feature list
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See pattern recognition and Semantic features; The classification and identification of a pattern;Simple, one-element chargcteristics or properties of semantic concepts; in the Smith Feature Overlap Model, stored asafearurc list. (Oh.6)
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implicit versus explicit memory
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Memory or memory processes that occur without any necessary involvement of consciousness ver sus those that occur with conscious awareness. (Ohs. 1, 6, 10).
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inhibition
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The negative influence on mental processing of a prime, usually a slowing down of processing or a decrease in accuracy; also called costs. (Oh. 6)
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intersection
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That place in the semantic network where two separate patterns of spreading activation meet. (Oh. 6)
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lag
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In a priming task, the number of intervening stimuli between a prime and a . target. (.Ch.6)
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lexical decision task
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The experimental task in. which a string of letters is presented and the participant is timed in deciding whether the string is a word. (Oh. 6)
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network
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The collection of interrelated concepts and their pathways in semantic memory. (Cli. 6)
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node
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A point or location in the semantic space, roughly corresponding to a concept or a simple fact about a concept. (Cli. 6)
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Pathway
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A labeled, directional association or link between concepts, especially in seman tic memory. (Cli. 6)
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priming
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The activation of information in memory, making it more accessible for subsequent use. (Ch. 3, 6, 9)
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prime vs. target
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In a priming task, the prime is the first-presented stimulus, and the target is the stimulus that follows the prime. (Cli. 6)
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semantic features
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Simple, one-element chargcteristics or properties of semantic concepts; in the Smith Feature Overlap Model, stored asafearurc list. (Oh.6)
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semantic memory
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That portion of long-term memory in which general world (conceptual) knowledge is stored, including language; loosely speaking, the mental encyclopedia and dictionary. (Oh. 5, 6)
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semantic relatedness
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The principle that related concepts are stored closely together in semantic memory, with strong connecting pathways between them. (Ch. 6)
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sentence verification task
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An experimental task in which simple sentences are presented to participants for their timed yes/no decisions. (Oh. 6)
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Stimulus Onset Asynchrony (SOA)
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In a priming task, the interval of time between the onset of the prime and the onset of the target. (Oh. 6)
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spreading activation
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The mental activity of accessing and retrieving information from the semantic network. (Oh. 6).
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typicallity effect
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The result that typical members of a category are judged more rapidly than atypical, uncommon members. (Ch. 6).
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autobiographical memory
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Memory for ordinary, natural experiences and information that we encounter in a lifetime. (Ch. 7)
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default value
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In script theory, the common or typical value of a frame; the value that is assumed to be true unless it’s changed by a detail in the story; (e.g., the menu in a restaurant script),. (Ch. 7)
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false alarms/false positives
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Saying “yes” to a distractor item; identifying an item as having been presented when it was not. (Oh. 7)
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false memories
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Memory for information that was never presented, or for events that never happened. (Oh. 7)
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flashbulb memories
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A hypothesized special kind of vivid, nearly “photographic’ memory for an event, usually of some highly significant occurrence. (Oh. 7)
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frames
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In script theory, details about specific events within a script, or slots to be filled with those details. (Ch. 7)
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headers
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In script theory, early words and concepts in a story that help identify the correct script. (Oh. 7)
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leading questions
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A question that suggests the desired answer. (Oh. 7•)
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memory impairment
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A genuine change or alteration in memory for an experienced event because of the effect of some later event. (Oh,7)
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missinformation acceptance
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Accepting additional information as having been part of some earlier experience without actually remetnbering that Information. (Cli, 7)
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propositions
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Simple idea units in text or discourse; a set of conceptual nodes connected by labeled pathways, the entire collection of which expresses sentence meaning, (Ch. 7, 8,9)
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reconstructive memory
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The process in which we construct a memory by combining elements from the original event or material with knowledge we already possess; as distinct from reproductive memory, which refers to accurate retrieval of exactly what was stored about the event or material. (Ch. 7)
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recovered memories
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Memories that are “remembered” after a long period during which they were “forgotten,” especially due to repression; see also false memories. (Ch. 7)
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repression
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Intentional forgetting of painful or traumatic experiences, from Freudian theory; see also recovered memories. (Oh- 7)
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schema, schemata
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A stored framework or body of knowledge about sonic topic; see also reconstructive memory. (Oh. 7)
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scripts
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Large-scale semantic arid episodic knowledge structures that accumulate in memory and guide interpretation and comprehension; see especially schema and reconstructive memory. (Ch. 7)
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semantic integration
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The tendency to store together in memory related pieces of information, even if they did not occur together in experience. (Ch. 7)
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source memory
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Memory for the exact source of information. (Oh. 7)
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source misattribution effect
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The inability to
distinguish whether some original event or a later event was the true source of information. (Oh. 7) |
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technical/content accuracy
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The recollection of exact, specific information, or the scoring of recall based on the exact stimulus material, (Ch.
7) |
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thematic effect
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Recalling based on the theme or suggested meaning of a passage, rather than recalling the exact passage; see also reconstructive memory. (Ch. 7)
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Von Restorff effect
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Elevated recall of information that was highlighted in some way during original acquisition; improved retention for a list item made distinct or different from the rest of the list. (Cli. 7)
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algorithm
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A specific rule or solution procedure that is guaranteed to• furnish the correct answer if followed correctly. (Ch. Ii)
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availability heuristic
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A decision strategy based on how easily relevant examples or information can be retrieved from memory. (Ch. 11)
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conditional reasoning
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If-then reasoning, in which we make a logical determination of whether the evidence supports, refutes, or is irrelevant to the stated if-then relationship. The IF is the antecedent, and the ThEN is the consequent. (Oh. 11)
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confirmation bias
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A situation in which one searches for evidence consistent with one’s decisions, beliefi, or hypotheses. (Oh. 11)
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distance effect
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The greater the distance or difference between two stimuli being compared, the faster the decision that they differ. (Ch. 11)
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familiarity bias
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A bias in reasoning in which one’s familiarity with the information misleads reasoning about the information. (Oh. 11)
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heuristic
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An informal “rule of thumb” strategy or approach that works under some circumstances but is not guaranteed to yield the correct answer. (Oh. 11)
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just noticeable difference
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The amount by which a stimulus must be changed in order for the change to be detected. (Oh. 11)
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mental model
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One’s knowledge of a domain and how the domain works. (Cli. 11)
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modens ponens
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In the conditional-reasoning problem “If p then q,” collecting evidence p, thus supporting the conclusion “Therefore,
(Cli. 11) |
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modus tollens
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In the conditional-reasoning problem “If p then q” collecting evidence not q, thus supporting the conclusion “Therefore, not p.” (Ch. 11)
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naive physics
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People’s misconceptions about how objects move or behave in the real world. (Ch, 11)
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psychophysics
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The study of how perceptual experience differs (torn the physical stirnulanon that is being perceived. (Cli. 11)
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representativeness heuristic
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A decision strategy in which an outcome is judged by how representative it is of the process or population that generated it (e.g., judging coin tosses by how random they look). (Oh. 11)
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semantic congruity effect
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Judgments are speeded when the things being compared are congruent with the instructions (e.g., instructions to “choose the larger” of two large things). (Oh. 11)
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simulation heuristic
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A decision strategy in which we forecast or predict an outcome of some future or imagined event. (Ch. 11)
Slots: See frames. |
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syllogism
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: A three-statement logical form in which the first two state the premises, and the third states the conclusion (e.g., “All A are B. All B are C. Therefore all A are C.”). Also called categorical syllogism; (CIt. 11)
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symbollic distance effect
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The distance effect in situations in which two symbols are being compared, rather than two perceptual events (e.g., comparing the numbers 2 and 3, or the concepts warm and hoe). (Oh. 11)
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top-down bias
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A situation in which existing knowledge biases one’s reasoning. (Ch. 11)
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undoing
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Part of the simulation heuristic, in which minor changes in a situation “undo” or prevent some outcome. (Ch. Ii
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ACT
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Anderson’s Adaptive Control of Thought model. (Ch. 12)
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analogy
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A relationship between two similar situations, problems, or concepts. (Ch. 12)
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domain knowledge
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Expertise; knowledge about some particular topic. (Oh. 12)
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functional fixedness
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A tendency in problem solving to use objects and concepts in the problem environment only in their customary and usual way. (Oh. 12)
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gestalt
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in Gestalt psychology, a whole pattern or configuration. (Oh. 12)
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goal and subgoal
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The desired end point or solution of the problem-solving activity. (Oh. 12) ; An intermediate goal along the route to eventual solution of a problem. (Cli. 12)
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GPS
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See general problem solver. Grammar: A system of rules for generating language. (Oh. 8)
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insight
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A deep, useful understanding of the nature of something, especially a difficult problem in a problem-solving situation, often thought to occur suddenly. (Oh. 12) -
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mapping
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In problem solving, the one-to-one correspondences between elements of problems, as in analogies. (Oh. 12)
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means-end analysis
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A problem-solving heuristic in which the problem solver repeatedly finds the difference between the current state and the goal state, then finds and applies an operator that reduces that difference. (Oh. 12)
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negative set
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In problem solving, a bias or tendency to solve problems in one particular way, using only a single approach even when a different approach might be more productive. (Ch. 12)
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operator
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The set of legal operations or “moves” irs solving a problem. (Ch. 12)
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problem space
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The initial, intermediate, and goal states of a problem, and the problem solver’s knowledge at each step; the overall setting within which a problem is solved. (Cli. 12)
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procedural knowledge
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Knowledge of how to do things; the long-term memory store for procedures. (Ch. 12)
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production
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An If-Then (condition-action) pair of statements, especially in a model of problem solving. (Ch. 12)
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satisficing
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The heuristic in which one finds a solution that is satisfactory, although not necessarily the best possible solution. (Ch.. 12)
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verbal protocol
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A transcription and anaLysis of a participant’s verbalizations during problem solving. (Cli. 12)
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verbal report
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Statements made by people about their thoughts, ideas, and strategies• during cognitive processing. (Ch. 1, 12)
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well-defined problems
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Problems in which the initial state, operators, and goal state are well specified. (contrast w/ill defined problems)
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In terms of recognition, there are 2 ways that you can know that you have seem something...
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1. explicit recollection of that word
2. an enhanced feeling of familiarilty |
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RTT
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helps you test the stability of the association
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Why can't we come up with a stimulus as easily as we can generate the response?
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2 possiblities
1. Assoc is weaker 2.** there is an equally strong assoc, but the code that you'd been using for the stimulus isn't complete** ie It's not that the association is weaker, but that they don't have enough info to reproduce it. |
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What are the two kinds of transfer?
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1. general transfer = getting your head into the task
2. specific transfer = you take specific info from the first task and apply it to the second one. |
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transfer
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something from the past interferes with your ability to LEARN something new.
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proactive interference
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impact of something that you've learned in the past interfereing with your ability to remember something once it has been learned.
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In terms of general transfer, if you have just learned AB list, you'll learn CD list in half of the time because of 2 things.....
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1. learning to learn
2. warm up - getting your head into it |
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proactive interference
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When older information interferes forward in time with your recollection of the current, or newer, information. (Cli- 4, 5)
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retroactive interference
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When newer information interferes backward in time with your recollection of older information. (Ch. 4, 5)
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stimulus selection
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-we pay attention to the minimal amount you need to learn the task
- this is part of the reason that we can't easily backward association |
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Glaze decided that some nonsense syllables were pretty recognizable and others were not. What two reasons did he give for this?
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1. interletter association value
2. meaningfulness |
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What accounts for the rate of learning?
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gestalt principles
*inter-item associations do not account for the rate of learning* |
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organizing (aka learning) does what two things?
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1. connects the stuff together
2. creates an algorithm (organizational structre that will help you re-create what you need). |
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to increase the importance of + transfer
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-use huge response pools.
-there will be backwards and forwards associations going on at the same time, but the foward association will be stronger because learning the first will help you learn the second |
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Under what circumstances will you not have positive transfer?
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- small response pool
- both forward and backward associations will be going on but the backwards association will cause interference if the first list doesn't help you to learn the second (small response pool). |
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What evidence do we have for incremental learning ?
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With repeated trials, you'll make an error at first and then get it correct on the second try. (All or none would suggest that you'd get it wrong at first and continue to get it incorrect).
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Gestalt principles do not hold for _____ but do account for ____.
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Gestalt principles do not hold for the association between cues and knowledge states, but do account for the way in which we put responses together.
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transitional error probability
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what is the likelihood that a person will say each word in a sentance but make a mistake on the word that follows it?
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valid arguments (2)
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1. modus ponens: affirming the antecedent
if p then q evidence p therefore q 2. modus tollens: denying the consequent if p then q not q therfore, not p |
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invalid arguments (2)
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1. denying the antecedent
if p then q evidence not p therefore, not q 2. affirming the consequent if p then q evidence q thefore p |
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antecedent
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p
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consequent
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q
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Difference between representativeness heuristic and availability heuristic?
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Representativeness heuristic - we make estimates based on how similar an event seems to its population
availability heuristic-we judge the likelihood of events by how easily they can remember examples or instances |
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simulation heuristic
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make a prediction of a future event or imagine a diff outcome.
-involves undoing, which changes some outcome by changing the events that led up to it. |
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diff between functional fixedness and negative set
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functional fixedness-use obj in ordinary ways during prob solving
negative set-attempt to solve problems with old strategies (studied w/ water jug). |
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According to the multiconstraint theory, people are constrained by 3 factors when they try to use or develop analogies. What are they?
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1. problem similarity
2. problem structure 3. purpose of the analogy |
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means-ends analysis
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illustrated by tower of hanoi, is a prob solving heuristic in which you det the diff betw current state and desired state and make adjustments accordingly
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models of problem solving
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GPS (general prob solver)-demonstrated the importance of means-ends analysis
ACT (adaptive control of thought)- consists of declarative memory (long term), production (procedural) memory (an if then component that occurs in working memory), and working memory |
