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33 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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According to John Locke, “Science” in one person’s mind may only be what in another’s? [219]
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Just someone else’s opinion since they may know the concept but not the truths that are associated with it.
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How does David Hume define a miracle? [223]
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A violation of the laws of nature
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What is David Hume’s general maxim regarding the relationship between miracles and testimony? [224]
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That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous that the fact, which it endeavours to establish, and even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, which remains, after deducting the inferior
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Thomas Reid argues that there is a strong analogy between perception and testimony as sources of knowledge. For Reid, this analogy is especially strong between which forms of perception and of testimony? [234]
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original perception and natural language
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Thomas Reid claims that two principles are the basis for our social natures/general reliance upon testimony. What are these two principles? [236-237]
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a propensity to speak truth and to use language to convey our real sentiments.
A desposition to confide in the veracity of others and to believe what they tell us |
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For Reid, why is the credulity of children evidence that this principle is a part of human nature? [237-238]
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Because even in infancy we instinctively lean on others for help, we trust in the help and advice that is given to us until we are able to accomplish something on our own strength
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As defined by Richard Fumerton, what is the thesis of foundationalism? [260]
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that there are noninferentially justified beliefs
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Fumerton cannot believe that the coherence theory of truth can overcome what obvious difficulty? [260]
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the possibility of mutually exclusive but internally consistent set of propositions
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According to Hume, all knowledge (even mathematical) “resolves itself into probability.” Why is this so” [270-271]
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Because we can never be completely sure of something just have a probability of how sure we are because our sentiments have varying degrees of authority and we must take into account errors in the past that could have happened, so we can never be completely sure of any knowledge as it is still reduced to a probability of how sure we think we are.
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: For Hume, belief is more properly an upon which part of our “nature”? [272]
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sensitive rather than cognitive
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Hilary Kornblith asserts that “reason-giving” and “rationalization” differ at least as to their motivation. What motivates each? [276-277]
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reason giving is motivated by a desire to have our beliefs conform to the truth
rationalization has the motivation to make ourselves feel better, avoid congnitive dessonance, or the like. |
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For Kornblith, social conditions can contribute to skepticism regarding reason by influence our sense of what? [279]
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Plausibility
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Kornblith argues that the counter-argument to skepticism (that it is self-defeating by giving reasons not to trust reason) fails in which two ways? [280-281]
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the skeptics argument may be seen as a simple reductio
the skeptic wishes to endorse the position that reason giving is so frequently a mater of mere rationalization and our plausibility judgments so frequently off the mark that the reason should not be taken at face value |
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Induction has at least two meanings. What are they? [293]
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A species of non deductive reasoning in which the conclusion generalizes on the information given in the premise
Non-deductive inference kind of reasoning in which the premises purportedly support the conclusion without entailing it. |
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Hume divides all objects of human inquiry into which two categories? [298]
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Relations of Ideas
Matters of Fact |
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Hume argues that knowledge of cause and effect relationships arises entirely from what? [299]
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Experience
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According to Hume, what is the supposition that all of our “experimental conclusions” depend upon? [304]
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The future will be conformable to the past.
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What is the “great guide of human life” on Hume’s account? [308]
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Custom; without custom we would be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses.
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Paul Edwards’ notes that there are three arguments used by people who object to the common-sense response to the “problem of induction.” What are these three arguments? [312-313]
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Have we ever a reason assuming that all the large number of observed instances of a phenomenon are positive to suppose that an instance which is still unobserved is also positive
Cases are known where at a certain time a large number of positive instances and not a single negative instance had been observed and where the next instance nevertheless turned out to be negative The number of positive and negative necessary conditions for the occurrence of any event is infinite or at any rate too large to be directly observed by a human being. |
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Edwards cites Bertrand Russell’s distinction between “interesting” and “uninteresting” doubt regarding the problem of induction. What is the difference between these two kinds of doubt? [313]
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uniteresting doubt is about the occurrence of a given event on the ground that not all the conditions which are known to be necessary are in fact known to be present
interesting doubt is whether an event will take place although all the conditions known to be necessary are known to obtain. |
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How does Edwards define “ignoratio elenchi by redefinition”?
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the same sentence expresses both the proposition which ought to be proved and the proposition which is confused with it and where in the latter employment of the sentence one or more of its parts are used in a sense which is different from their ordinary sense or senses.
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According to Edwards, what is the main sense of “reason for an inductive conclusion”? [317]
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What we mean when we claim that we have a reason for a prediction is that the past observations of this phenomenon or of analogical phenomena are of a certain kind; they are exclusively or predominantly positive, the number of positive observations is at least fairly large and the come from extensively varied sets of circumstances.
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On Goodman’s interpretation, “Hume’s problem” actually concerns what? [323]
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The question of inductive validity
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: Goodman analyzes Hempel’s definition of valid induction; Hempel understands induction as concerning what relationship between statements? [323]
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Comparable relation of confirmation between statemenents
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As presented by Goodman, what is the “raven paradox”? [324-325]
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that statement that a given object is neither black nor a raven confirms the hypothesis that all non black things are non ravens. This hypothesis is logically equivalent to the hypothesis that all ravens are black. Hence we arrive at the unexpected conclusion that the statement that a given object is neither black nor a raven confirms the hypothesis that all ravens are black.
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John Foster offers a possible solution to the problem of induction, which is dependent upon what notion? [333]
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The notion of objective natural necessity.
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According to Foster, what is the only primitive form of empirical inference? [335]
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Inference to the best explanation.
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Foster calls his solution to the problem of induction what?
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Nomoligical-explanatory solution
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How do Colin Howson and Peter Urbach define a tautology? [344]
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a sentence like “if it is not the case that it is not raining here now then it is raining here now” V~a, ~(a&~a)
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According to Howsan and Urbach, what are the two different interpretations of probability? [346]
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The probability of calculus expresses the fundamental laws regulating the assignment of objective physical probabilities to events defined in the outcome spaces of stochastic experiments
Epestimic – it expresses numerically degrees of uncertainty in the light of data |
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On David Stove’s account, what is the law of large numbers? [352]
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if the probability of the event E at each trial is X, then the probability is extremely high that in a large number of trials E will occur with a relative frequency which is close to X.
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Who first proved the law of large numbers? [353]
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Jacques Bernoulli’s in Ars Conjectandi
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Why is what Stove calls a gambler’s inference a difficulty for those who wish to (re)solve the problem of induction? [354]
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There is a universal tendency to believe that the difference between a larger and a small number of trials makes an inference more conclusive.
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