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57 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Gillispie v. Goodyear |
- P said D “assaulted her” - no facts to support conclusion - Complaint must allege material facts and not conclusions to constitute acause of action. - R 8a2 |
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US v. Board of Harbor Commissioners |
- A R 12(e) motion is inappropriate if the requirements of R 8 aresatisfied and the opposing party is fairly notified of the nature of the claim. - D filed R 12(e) for a more definite statement to respond asrequired by R 7.- US used “safe harbor” - 11b3 - claims would likely haveevidentiary support in discovery. |
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McCormick v. Kopman |
- suing driver who hit husband (crossed the line) and the tavern where husband got drunk (b/c the husband crossed the line) - P is entitled toplead inconsistent claims R 8d2 in the alternative and to adduce all evidence has on those claims, butmay not recover on all counts and may not plead something he knows is false R 11. - Where the injuredparty (key witness) is deceased, pleading alternative sets of facts is oftenthe only way to proceed. |
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State v. Zaman |
- a county sheriff can serve process on a non-Indian within the boundaries of the reservation - Langford v. Monteith “when a state has civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian, it has jurisdiction to serve process on that non-Indian on a reservation” - the cases relied on by the appeals court were about INDIANS. This is about a non-Indian. Totally different. Overturned appeals ruling. - Dissent: the rationale of Francisco can be extended to non-Indians. Reservation should be considered “out of state." (but only for indians! gah). Also argues that you could use the Navajo Rules of Civil Procedure to serve the party out of comity and respect for the tribe and reservation. |
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Zuk v. Eastern Penn Psychiatric Institute |
- copyright on videos. Attorney failed to investigate the rule of law and the 3 year SoL - Rule 11 sanctions are proper when counsel fails to make an adequate inquiry into both the facts and the law. - Purpose of Rule 11: to deter, not tocompensate. Must consider: attorney’s history, ability to pay, defendant’s needfor compensation, degree of frivolousness, damage to the integrity of thesystem, and willfulness of the action. |
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Mitchell v. Archibald |
- the court is required to accept only well-pleaded facts as true in deciding whether the motion to dismiss was properly granted and is not required to accept legal conclusions that may be alleged or that may be drawn from the pleaded facts. - they had already admitted that they were not parked on AK's property. Instead of amending the complaint, they appealed, cementing in their position. |
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Swierkiewivz v.Sorema |
- old man gets fired and files for discrimination - It is inappropriate toapply a heightened pleading standard to require P to plead a prima facie caseto an employment discrimination case. - If you want to have arequirement of greater specify for particular claims, must obtain by theprocess of amending the Federal Rules and not by judicial interpretation.- Dismiss only it isclear under “ANY set of facts that could be proved. - when one or more things of a class are expressly mentioned others of the same class are excluded. FRCP 9(b) doesn’t mention employment discrimination, so it doesn’t apply
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Twombly |
- phone carrier case (Sherman Antitrust Act) - no factual context suggesting agreement in parallel conduct in complaint - P is required to setforth factual allegations in his claim for relief that make his claim plausibleand not merely conceivable on its face, a claim that is merely conceivable andnot plausible will not survive a motion to dismiss. - Must raise claimabove a speculative level. Must SHOW that they are entitled to relief. |
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Iqbal |
- In a complaint, theCourt assumes the facts presented are true but does not assume that legalconclusions are true (Twombly) - only a complaint that states a plausibleclaim for relief will survive a motion to dismiss. P made conclusory allegations and bareassertions and Twombly rule is not limited to antitrust cases. - This case looks pretty good under 8a2 buut...whatevs. |
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Shepard v. Darrah |
- secretary messed up dates - In order to determine whether a motion for default should be entered, the court must determine whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced, whether the defendant has a meritorious defense, and whether defendant’s conduct was culpable (intending to frustrate judicial proceedings) - Rule 55 - Default Judgment |
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David v. Crompton and Knowles |
- wanted to change answer to ROGS to denial that they were liable, but the SOL was up - answer will be deemed admitted when the matter is obviously one as to which defendant has knowledge or information, which it was. |
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Wigglesworth |
- Union suit - Rule 13(a) - original claim is in fed. court for subject matter jurisdiction - counterclaim does not arise from the same events - court adopts the same evidence test and decide that the counterclaim is a permissive c-claim (NOT a compulsory c-claim) and dismiss the c-claim suit |
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Krupski v. Costa |
- cruise ship suit, mistakenly sued the wrong person and didn't find out until after the SoL - Relation back underRule 15 (c) (1)(C) depends on what the prospective D knew or should have knownduring the R 4m period, it does not depend on the amending P’ s knowledge orits timeliness in seeking to amend the pleading. The kind of deliberate butmistaken choice on the part of the plaintiff does not foreclose a finding thatRule 15c1Cii has been satisfied. |
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Davis v. Ross |
- suing her boss, wants to know how much he makes for punitive damages - For evidence to be discoverable Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that material need only be relevant to the subject matter of the action for good cause. - If the Plaintiff sues to recover for mental pain and anguish, she waives her pt/doc privilege and discovery is allowed - Information of Defendant’s net worth may not be discovered until a verdict awarding punitive damages is made. |
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Kozlowski v. Sears |
- flamma jammas - A party is notexcused from production because of the costly nature and time-consuming natureof the endeavor |
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McPeek v. Ashcroft |
- sexual harassment at work, info on old emails - It is reasonable torequire e-discovery when there is only a remote possibility that a search willyield relevant evidence. To contain the costs and time involved, the Court canset forth limits to the search so at a certain point of time, the search can bestopped, and then assessed, to see if the results and expenses justify anyfurther search. |
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Hickman v. Taylor |
- tug sinks, attorney interviews survivors - A party may notobtain evidence that would invade the privacy of another party’ s professionalactivities (work product) absent an adequate reason (even though this wasn't an attorney/client situation) |
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UpJohn Co. v. US |
- attorney interviews LOADS of employees of the company - every employee has the attorney-client privilege - the notes are protected by the work-product doctrine anyways - but remember, you can't hide FACTS. - 8 rules to govern this (see notes) |
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Cine Forty-Second Street Theatre Corp |
- Grossly negligent failure to obey an order compelling discovery may justify the severest disciplinary measures (dismissal) available under Rule 37. |
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Adickes |
- Rule 56 SJ - arrest conspiracy case in a goods store - SJ may NOT be grantedunless the moving party can show that there is no genuine issue of fact. - shouldhave just said, “she doesn’t have evidence!” instead of alleging differentcircumstances and then not having facts to prove it (in light of Celotex). Burden didn’t shift |
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Celotex |
- Rule 56 SJ - asbestos wrongful death suit - “Celotex satisfied its initial burden of production in moving for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff lacked evidence to establish an essential element of her case at trial.” b/c they didn't introduce new claims - Just needs to say that the non-moving party doesn't have sufficient evidence on an essential element of the case. - There was NO evidence in the record that Catrett’s husband EVER came in contact with the asbestos. |
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Orme |
- Rule 56 SJ - AZ school salmonella case (made 1/100 meals) - A scintilla ofevidence (from Matsushita) or a low probability that a party is responsible for a claim is notgrounds to deny summary judgment. |
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Manego |
- guy sued people in his city - Difference in motive for a conspiracy did not create a separate transaction. - A party must includein their claim all possible theories arising out of a single transaction or asingle set of facts (that a reasonable person would expect to be tried together)and include all facts necessary to support the allegations or else lose theright to do so. |
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Landrigan |
- 1st suit: actual use of excessive force. 2nd suit: covering-up an alleged use of excessive force. - They don’t dismiss the second suit because: “the factual basis for the cover-up was distinct from the factual basis for the misconduct.” |
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Moitie |
- It is not a violation of public policy to applyres judicata and bar a P from re-litigating an unappealed adverse judgment, evenif other other Ps in similar actions against common Ds successfully appealedthe judgments against them. - The P had the opportunity to appeal and shouldhave instead of bringing a new suit. |
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Semtek v. Lockheed |
- Federal common lawgoverns in determining the preclusive effect of a federal court judgment thatwas based upon state law, the state being the state in which the federal courtsat in case. - the Maryland court has to look at California law to see what they say about filing again in another state. Cali law says thats ok, so Maryland can hear the case. |
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Little v. Blue GooseMotor Coach |
- deceased driver already declared negligent - A previouslylitigated issue may be collaterally estopped from re-litigation when a materialfact has been determined in a former suit between the same parties (or betweenparties with whom the parties to the subsequent suit are in privity) |
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Hardy v. Manville |
- asbestos issue preclusion case - Collateral estoppel is inappropriate when the prior judgment is ambivalent. |
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Comm of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen |
- assigned his patent contract license to his wife b/c her tax bracket is lower than his. He won. But now...new laws. Precluded? - We leave the original one alone. But, there was sufficient change in the legal climate to render inapplicable collateral estoppel for future suits. |
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Taylor v. Sturgell |
- wants documents to restore his plane (FIA) - You aren't bound by another judgment if you weren't made a party and served OR if you are one of the 6 exceptions (see notes) |
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Hansberry v. Lee |
- race housing market issue - a selection of representatives for purposes of litigation, whose substantial interests are not necessarily or even probably the same as those whom they are deemed to represent does not afford that protection to absent parties which due process requires. |
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Bernhard v. Bank of America |
- Sues executor first, then sues the bank later after losing - You cannot sueanother party to try and win on an issue that you lost to another party on -you should have named the other party in your first action (name all Ds). - gets rid of mutuality of estoppel |
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Blonder-Tongue |
- identical to Bernhard. - Due process does not allow someone tosue on the same issue twice. - A new defendant is allowed toraise collateral estoppel as a defense. |
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Clark v. Associates |
- P sought deep pocket D - but the D successfully impleaded employees who carried out the repossession. - A third partycomplaint for indemnity, which does not give the third party defendant a claimto the original plaintiff, is proper. |
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SMU v. Wynne andJaffe |
- 4 attorneys try to sue their bosses anon. - R 17 - Absent anexpressional congressional grant of the right to proceed anonymously (Rule 10a)and a compelling need to protect privacy in a very private manner (specialexceptions to Rule 10a), one cannot bring suit under a fictitious name oranonymously. |
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Kedra |
- suit against cops for discrimination. Different cops, different family members - When a claim arisesout of a number of events over a lengthy period of time, joinder (of Ds) is notimproper, for purposes of Rule 20a, if the claims arise out of the sametransaction, occurrence or series of reasonably related transactions oroccurrences). - suit could have been litigated together or separately - After evidenceis more clear the court will determine if it is appropriate to separate suchtrials (20b) |
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Insolia |
- Smoking cases. - Where the P’s claimsdo not arise from the same transaction or series of the transactions norlogically related to one another, joinder under rule 20a is improper. Unlike Kedra. - Joining would createrisks of jury confusion, waste of judicial resources, and ultimately prejudicethe D’s ability to defend its rights. |
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Tashire |
- Car accident between a Greyhound bus and a truck - Interpleader allows astakeholder whose liability is limited by a fund to institute its own action inwhich all the potential claimants would be required to litigate their claimssimultaneously. |
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Walter v. Reno |
not sure yet |
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Castano v. The AmericanTobacco Co |
not sure yet |
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Pennoyer v. Neff |
- Just because you find property later doesn’t mean that it makes a void judgment valid. You have to have jurisdiction BEFORE any judgment happens. - make sure you attach the property the day you file the complaint. |
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Harris v. Balk |
- Expanded Pennoyer toinclude intangible property (debt). Now, one can be sued where it’s debtor goes. |
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Hess v. Pawloski |
- A state has the powerto establish personal jurisdiction by statute. - MA statute asserted PJ over a nonresident whowas involved in an accident on the state’s highway. Use of highway was consentto in PJ. - Theory of implied consent – P implied consent by driving on the road. |
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International Shoe |
- got sued for not contributing to WA unemployment fund - Due process requiresonly that in order to subject a D to a judgment in personam, if he be notpresent within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contactswith it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditionalnotions of fair play and substantial justice. |
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McGee |
- mom sues insurance company, only contact in cali - Cali has PJ over insurance company b/c of the ONE CONTACT |
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Hanson v. Denkla |
- Payment from DE to FL - forum state. - Adds “purposeful availment” requirement to InternationalShoe. To take advantage of the benefits and protections of its laws. - Unilateral acts of a third party donot count toward minimal contacts. |
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World-Wide Volkswagen |
- RejectedStream of Commerce theory – they did not seek to serve the market in OK and jurisdictionisn’t dragged around everywhere the product goes. - no contacts, no PJ |
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Burger King |
- BK sues Mich. franchise in FL - Two step test(adopting WWV contact then fairness assessment, and Hanson purposeful availmentrequirement): Did D purposefully avail themselves of operating in theforum?Yes, then fairness requirement - D must then show that PJ forum would beunconstitutional. D failed both. - New: Defendant carries the burden now! |
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Shaffer v. Heitner |
-all quasi in rem actions must meet Shoe standard.Ownership of stock did not constitute a “contact” in accordance with Shoe. - Having property in a state does not give the state jurisdiction over causes ofaction unrelated to the property unless the person also passes the minimumcontacts test articulated in the International Shoe decision. - Typein rem 1 is still available but quasi in rem type 2 is not used anymore |
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Gray |
- If a corporationelects to sell its products for ultimate use in another state, it is not unjustto hold it answerable there for any damage caused by defects in those products.Develops stream ofcommerce theory. Applies McGee |
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Nicastro |
–ONE expensivemachine in the forum. - A targetedtransmission of goods into the forum state, and a not a mere prediction thatthe goods will reach the forum state, permits the exercise of personaljurisdiction. Foreign manufacturerfailed purposeful availment Hanson requirement. Nation targeting, not statetargeting. |
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Burnham v. SuperiorCourt |
- went to visit his kids in Cali, got served - Due process does notprohibit a state court from exercising PJ over a D based on the in stateservice of process when the D is voluntary present in the forum. Assessment of minimum contacts of fairness(Shoe) not necessary. In state service (voluntary presence) is sufficient. |
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Pavlovich v. SuperiorCourt |
- internet troll - Failed Calder test,no PJ. A D’s knowledge that his tortious conduct may cause harm in the forumis relevant but insufficient to establish the express aiming at the forum, (asrequired by Calder test) to assert personal jurisdiction. Sliding analysis- doing business over the internet v. posting information. No PJ |
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PanavisonInternational v. Toeppen |
- cybersquatter - upheld the exerciseof personal jurisdiction in California over an Illinois “cybersquatter,”finding that purposeful availment was satisfied where defendant deliberatelytargeted his activity at plaintiff, a forum resident, with the intent tointerfere with plaintiff’s business in the forum state. |
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Griffis v. Luban |
- internet slander - Failedeffects test, no PJ for similar reasons as Pavlovich. No evidence tosupport that D expressly aimed her allegedly tortious conduct at the forum. |
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Bates v. C&SAdjusters, Inc |
- Venue is properunder 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(2) in any district in which a substantial part of theevents or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. - Venue existed where Preceived the letter even though they didn’t intend to send it there (wasforwarded on). |
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Piper Aircraft Co. v.Reyno |
- plane crash, legalsecretary in CA appointed as executrix. Held: go to Scotland. - So long as therewas a remedy available in the alternate forum, it did not matter ifthe remedy was clearly insufficient. - Test: Balance public interestsand private interests. |
