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24 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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R v Hughes
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For an event to be more than a minimal cause of another event, one has to find something blameworthy about the way the party acted.
-If the driving was completely blameless, it was to be a minimal, coincidental cause which cannot suffice as a legal cause -In this case NAI was not established and was of no assistance because the victim did not voluntarily and deliberately kill himself. |
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R v Lewis
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Taxi driver's actions were held to be more than a minimal cause of the student's death
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R v Mallet
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A result can be caused notwithstanding that is was very unlikely, and bad luck was not taken into account.
-one reason not to do the original act is that the result might happen |
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R v Kennedy
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If A does an act, after which B does an act which is 1. Free, voluntary, informed, and 2. breaks the chain of causation between A's act and outcome by rendering A's act no longer a substantial and operating cause,
-then B's act is a novus actus interveniens. OBJECTIONS: -'free voluntary and informed' excludes kids, mentally handicapped. |
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Faulker v Talbot
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The woman did not 'cause' the boy to touch her - he was perfectly happy to do it
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R v Pagett
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If someone is acting in order to assist law enforcement this will not be a break in the chain of causation.
-Also, he was acting in self-defence instinctively in response to Pagett's actions |
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R v Martin
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The indirect nature of the way in which the defendant's acts had caused the harm presented no bar to liability.
-Stampeding was not out of free choice. |
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R v Roberts
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The issue is not whether the victim acted reasonably, but whether her actions were reasonably foreseeable.
-If they are within the range of response which might be expected from a victim in her situation, the defendant will be taken to have caused it. OBJECTIONS -Tadros: culpability rather than causation (question of fact), Herring: D may be responsible but not to blame (stolen car example) -Lisa Churkassky: This test defies orthodoxy in Kennedy. |
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R v Williams & Davies |
The rule in R v Roberts is modified, allowing for allowing for any particular characteristic and for the fact that in the agony of the moment he might act without proper thought. |
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MPC v Caldwell |
Recklessness is where: (1) D does an act which in fact creates an obvious risk that property will be destroyed or damaged and (2) when he does the act he either has not given any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk or has recognised that there was some risk involved and has nonetheless gone on to do it. |
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Chief Constable of Avon v Shimmen
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No matter how small, risks should not be taken unless there is good reason to do so
-given the circumstances, some types of risks may be unjustifiable |
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Elliott v C (a minor) |
14-year-old girl with learning difficulties set fire to a shed after setting fire to some white spirit. |
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R v Cunningham [1957]
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Defendant must have been aware/foreseen there was a risk that conduct could have caused result and gone on to take the risk.
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R v G and R
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Defendant must have been aware/foreseen there was a risk that conduct could have caused result and gone on to take the risk; AND
-it is, in the circumstances known to him (subjective), unreasonable to take that risk (objective). |
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Booth v CPS
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If the appellant had foreseen the risk of a collision, inherent in that risk of a collision was not only the risk of personal injury but the risk of damage to property.-Conviction was still safe even though magistrates might have used the wrong test of objective recklessness
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Jones v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority
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The suicidal person was held not to have foreseen a risk of causing harm to anyone else other than himself.
-In Booth, D was conscious of the risk but surprised it, but here the suicide victim was of a certain state of mind where the risk simply did not occur to him. |
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Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.8
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Subjective test is not that difficult for the prosecution, because in practice:
Even if one does not have direct evidence, the jury may make inferences that the accused should have been able to foresee the result through his/her own understanding of the situation so long as it is a natural probably risk. |
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R v Parker
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The inherent association of the conduct with its consequence means one could be taken to appreciate the risk without the awareness being at the forefront of his mind
-cf Jones, where the suicidal victim was not conscious suppressing it based on state of mind -HERRING: Not convincing, brings it close to the objective test. -->*Herring's test: was there a good reason D did not see the obvious risk? in this case, NO. |
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R v Coley, McGhee and Harris
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Due to one's mental illness, one may not have foreseen the risks of one's conduct.
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DPP v Majewski
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Voluntary intoxication may not constitute a lack of mens rea for crimes of basic intent (cannot be raised as evidence any claim of no mens rea)-D was found even to be reckless in getting himself drunk and in a state where they could be so committed
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R v Allen
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Sexual assault is a crime of basic intent, so the appellant was unable to rely on his intoxicated state to negative the mens rea.
-You don't have to be seriously drunk, and even if you do not foresee that the alcohol has a stronger effect on you than you think. |
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R v Brady
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But if D would not have seen the risk even if he had been sober at the time, then he would not be reckless (did not come under Majewski).
-Fell off balcony rail, held them with both hands and feet but accidentally fell |
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R v Bailey
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D had foreseen that his behaviour would turn aggressive, unpredictable and uncontrolled. Therefore he could not rely on intoxication as defence.
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R v Hardie
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When one does not foresee effects of drugs on behaviour, intoxication may be a defence.
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