Reading...
Play button
Play button
Use LEFT and RIGHT arrow keys to navigate between flashcards;
Use UP and DOWN arrow keys to flip the card;
H to show hint;
A reads text to speech;
52 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
|
Selective engagement
|
one of the Grand Strategy postures as defined Robert Art in "A Grand Strategy For America," and actually selected as the most desirable one. The idea is to choosing to prevent or to become involved only in those conflicts that pose a threat to the country’s long-term interests. The power maintains a set of forces to defend major interests only. Offshore balancing is like this, but less interventionist. Weaknesses: does not give you the ability to engage all potential threats at once, does not have any ideological romance, does not have any nice policy recommendations for the situations to get involved in.
|
|
|
Plan Orange
|
Original plan based on a war between the US and Japan alone developed in 1924. Based around Mahan's theories of naval engagement. The United States would hold off supplies from Japan, then sail north to a decisive battle with the Japanese navy. The American war planners failed to appreciate that technological advances in submarines and naval aviation had made Mahan's doctrine obsolete. In particular, the American planners did not understand that aircraft could sink battleships, nor that Japan might put the U.S. battleship force (the Battle Line) out of action at a stroke--as it did at Pearl Harbor. The strategy was replaced by island-hopping.
|
|
|
Monroe Doctrine
|
efforts by European governments to colonize land or interfere with states in the Americas would be viewed by the United States of America as acts of aggression requiring US intervention. This doctrine would persist for two centuries after Monroe created it. The doctrine was notably invoked during the Cold War to prevent Soviet incursion and aid to Communist elements in South America.
|
|
|
Counterforce vs. Countervalue
|
Counter-force strikes eliminate military capabilities, while counter-value strikes target civilians. The argument in favor of counter-force strikes is that one side might launch a counter-force strike against the other; the victim would recognize the limited nature of the attack and respond in kind, leaving the military capability of both sides largely destroyed. The war might then come to an end because both sides would recognize that any further action would lead to attacks on the civilian population from the remaining nuclear forces – a counter-value strike. Critics of this idea claimed that since even a counter-force strike would kill millions of civilians it is unlikely that escalation to a full-scale counter-value war could be prevented. During the 50s, when we had nuclear superiority, it was all about countervalue.
|
|
|
Flexible response
|
is the idea a range of nuclear engagement along with conventional warfare which wouldn't necessarily cause an all-out nuclear war. Kennedy outlined this policy which was supposed to allow the United States to respond to a spectrum of situations. This is defined in opposition to Assured Destruction by Jervis, and argued against strenuously because Jervis believes it will lead to limited nuclear engagements, which will inevitably lead to all-out nuclear war anyway.
|
|
|
Stability – Instability (Paradox)
|
The concept (originated by Glenn Snyder) that AD is a stable situation, and any situation below is an unstable situation, so each side is free to engage in provocations and military exercises at the lower levels. Jervis disagrees, feeling that AD leads to stability, fewer wars and crises in general, and political outcomes being decided by neither military or nuclear superiority.
|
|
|
Vietnamization
|
the goal of the American military effort was to buy time, gradually building up the strength of the South Vietnamese armed forces, and re-equipping it with modern weapons so that they could defend their nation on their own. It was originated under Nixon and took place from 1969-1975. Nixon was hoping to make overtures towards the Chinese and end their support of North Vietnam. The Phoenix Program was one of these initiatives, by which the US hoped to eliminate civilian support for the Viet Cong.
|
|
|
Bush Doctrine
|
The doctrine endorsed by Bush after September 11th, which has the following components (and weaknesses): preventive war (hard to justify, hard to prove how a state’s going to be a threat), regional transformation (regional balancing is a better idea, no real theory to explain how democracy would arise, violate national sovereignty in often democratic governments, spreads us thin, long-term, does not increase US stability), unilateralism (institutions can be a means to an end, isolates us from our allies, bear burden of war costs)
|
|
|
Gulf of Tonkin
|
incident that prompted the resolution that allowed LBJ to expand war operations in Vietnam, not actually sure what went on, 1964, Congress’ blank check to LBJ to begin prosecuting the Vietnam War without a formal declaration of war. It supposedly involved a North Vietnamese Naval attack on the Maddox.
|
|
|
Unipolarity
|
is the belief that we live in a system dominated by a single power with no other powers of note. Krauthammer and Wohlforth subscribe to this theory, while Mearsheimer thinks we live in a multipolar world. Krauthammer and Wohlforth believe, based on power projection capabilities, economic, military, and political dominance. Mearsheimer believes that the United States is still on top, but it's more of a "first among equals" situation.
|
|
|
Mandelbaum’s argument
|
the US should not intervene in humanitarian crises because the military is not an effective tool for solving these crises. Moreover, foreign policy is not social work. The US military cannot solve structural issues within a country, and in general nation-building is a bad idea. We're also notoriously bad at real exit strategy, etc.
|
|
|
Cooperative Security
|
Is the concept that peace is indivisible, so we have to work with allies and other nations to create peace and stability everywhere. Multilateralism is a key component of this strategy. It also calls for intervention into humanitarian crises. (Problems associated with it are collective action problems (as in free riders,) it relies too much on arms control, and it requires the US to get involved all the time.)
|
|
|
Alfred T. Mahan
|
Was a naval strategist who wrote The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783. Mahan decided that destroying the enemy fleet in a single, decisive battle was the major objective of naval combat. Mahan advocated for a fleet of armored battleships above all else. His theories influenced Operation Orange.
|
|
|
Plan Dog
|
Was a November 1940 memo written by Harold Stark. It stated that the US should go to war against Germany and Japan due to great power considerations, and set out the policy of "Europe First." The argument was that Britain could no longer go on its own any longer, and that the US should (D) go on the offensive against Germany and hold position in the Pacific. It was thought that the continued existence of the British Empire could do the most for the status quo.
|
|
|
Containment vs. Rollback
|
Are two opposing ways to deal with the soviets after WWII. Conservatives generally favored rollback, while Truman, Kennan, and others were in favor of containment with emphasis on nuclear deterrence. Truman, Kennan and others were in favor of containment (using nuclear deterrence, etc.) Eisenhower more or less abandoned the idea of containment in favor of rollback.
|
|
|
Extended Deterrence
|
the idea extending our nuclear deterrent over other states despite the lack of American troops in the region. Problems with this concept include getting pulled into a war we don't really want to fight and credibility problems relating to whether the US is willing to weaken itself dramatically for the sake of other states. Credibility problems can be handled with trip wires or burning bridges.
|
|
|
Carter Doctrine
|
Was announced in 1980 by Carter as a response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, proclaiming that the United States would use military force if necessary to defend its interests in the Persian Gulf. This included the creation of a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force to provide military aid and assist in emergency situations in the Gulf. This doctrine lasted into the Gulf War.
|
|
|
MAD
|
Stands for Mutually Assured Destruction -- when two states have that ability to annihilate each other (not necessarily equivalent nuclear capability.) Jarvis finds this an infinitely more desirable paradigm than flexible response. No matter who shoots first, both actors are going to die, which creates a unique state of deterrence.
|
|
|
End of History
|
a concept originated by Fukuyama after the end of the Cold War. In it, he states that the ideological forces of the West and democracy have triumphed because no powers remain to oppose us. He considers this the end of history in a Marxist-Hegellian sense. Our ideology has won over fascism and socialism. Religion and nationalism remain potential threats, but are not major dangers to Western civilization.
|
|
|
Truman Doctrine
|
A 1947 exhortation by Harry Truman to Congress to request 400 million dollars for aid to Greece and Turkey, as well as authorization to send American military and economic advisers to the two countries. The United States would help "free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures," pretty clearly referring to the USSR. This was the hard side of containment policy, while the Marshall Plan was the soft side.
|
|
|
DPT
|
the idea that democracies rarely go to war against other democracies. The first possible explanation is normative:democracies have a set of shared values and are economically independent thus are less likely to go to war with each other. The second is institutional -- because of democracies are based on popular support, leaders are less likely to go to war needlessly and kill their citizens. (Problems with this: often the data does not bear this out; democracies often use other methods to undermine democracies; wars are rare and so are democracies.)
|
|
|
Primacy
|
one of the Grand Strategy postures. Primacy involves maintaing an extremely large military force that can be anywhere and attempts to consolidate, exploit and expand the US relative advantage (according to Posen.) Unilateralism and independence from international institutions is a key component of this posture. Weaknesses include the huge expense, the likelihood of ending up in quagmires like Iraq, and the paranoid tendency to see threats absolutely everywhere.
|
|
|
General Giulio Douhet
|
an Italian air power theorist. He was a propent of strategic bombing in aerial warfare. Douhet believed air power would eventually make armies obsolete. The Douhet model rests on the belief that in a conflict, the infliction of high costs from aerial bombing can shatter civilian morale. He also believed that bombers don’t need fighter escorts, which WWII disproved.
|
|
|
Joint Board
|
Created on Sep 11 1941, was an extension of Plan Dog. It described where US interests are (most importantly, maintaining the territorial integrity of the Western hemisphere. It also advocated an alliance with Britain and Russia.
|
|
|
Balancing vs. Bandwagoning
|
Balancing is the idea that states will tend to oppose more powerful states. Bandwagoning is the opposite; states will avoid the retribution of a sufficiently powerful actor in the system by allying with it. The "domino theory" of regional transformation is based on bandwagoning. The Cold War situation is an example of balancing.
|
|
|
George F. Kennan
|
an advocate of containment theory. He wrote a 1947 piece for Foreign Affairs wherein he stated that “United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” Kennan didn't believe the Communist Alliance was a monolithic bloc and that the United States should attempt to exploit cracks in it. Moreover, it should attempt to engage in behavioral modification on the Soviet Union and play more or less a waiting game.
|
|
|
The Tet Offensive
|
An initiative that the Viet Cong began in early 1968 that was intended to spark urban uprising. Although the Viet Cong lost proportionally more troops than the United States, the offensive marked a turn in public opinion against the war. LBJ decided not to run for re-election as a partial result of the offensive.
|
|
|
Domino Theory
|
The idea that a single regional transformation will cause transformation across the board. This is based on principles of bandwagoning. One weakness of the theory is that the United States does not necessarily lose credibility by not defending everywhere. Moreover, US interests are not uniform everywhere across the board.
|
|
|
Neo Cons
|
(See: Bush doctrine) Neo Cons, notably Norman Podhoretz, believe in unilateralism, a distrust of institutions, regional transformation, and aggressive support for democracies.
|
|
|
John Mueller
|
Wrote "The Search for the Breaking Point in Vietnam" where he marvelled at the astounding losses the Vietnamese were willing to bear. The evidence suggests that the Communists in Vietnam were virtually unique in the history of the last 160 in their willingness to tolerate casualties. All indications were that there was no "breaking point" when it came to the Vietnamese. Possible solutions, including an invasion of North Vietnam (which would have dragged the Soviets and Chinese into it), nuclear weapons (which would have to be used at annihilation levels), and simple escalation of the war are rejected. Mueller also makes the point re: terrorism that terrorism is less of a threat than conventionally stated; few Americans die from it even in the past ten years. Although weapons of mass destruction are a reasonable threat.
|
|
|
Unilateralism
|
the idea that the US should "go it alone" without the help of institutions and allies. This has obvious drawbacks.
|
|
|
Neo-Isolationism
|
The idea that the United States should leave the world alone except when it comes to extreme threats to itself. This is a viable strategy for the United States
due to geography, power status, and nuclear deterrence. It is, however a terrible idea for a variety of reasons. |
|
|
Billy Mitchell
|
American air force proponent of Douhet’s theories; Mitchell also pointed out a battleship's vulnerability to air attack under "war-time conditions." Mitchell predicted war with Japan in 1925 and extolled the virtues of a powerful air force.
|
|
|
Russett on WWII
|
Bruce Russett is a skeptic of the United States involvement in WWII. He points out that Germany was not a threat to US sovereignty and that the US' allies would have been able to force a stalemate at the very worst. The United States could have maintained non-military involvement with little consequences against US national security. He is skeptical of moral arguments, pointing out that Stalin was no worse than Hitler in many ways. Moreover, the Chinese were more than capable of bogging the Japanese down on the Pacific side.
|
|
|
Perimeter vs. Strong point defense
|
Two opposing ideas about containment. Strong point defense involves containment with the Soviet Union in various key zones. Money will be spent in in Europe, Middle East, NE Asia. A perimete defense is about stopping Soviets from expanding anywhere. Strong point dominated up until the 50s, when America shifted to perimeter defense. Kennan favored strong point defense, as described by Gaddis. NSC-68 sort of introduced the idea of perimeter defense and stated that when one free state falls, it's bad for all others.
|
|
|
Nuclear superiority
|
is the status of having more nuclear weapons than one's opponent. Most importantly, nuclear superiority should involve an elimination of second-strike capability on the part of one's opponent. The United States lost nuclear superiority in the mid-fifties and not coincidentally changed its policies from rollback to containment. Jervis famously thought that nuclear superiority was not the real issue; the destructive power of nuclear weapons is such that the arms race misses the real risks behind nuclear war.
|
|
|
Rolling Thunder
|
An aerial bombardment campaign against North Vietnam undertaken from March 1965-1968. The objectives included -- To bolster the sagging morale of the Saigon regime in the Republic of Vietnam; To convince North Vietnam to cease its support for the communist insurgency in South Vietnam; To destroy North Vietnam's transportation system, industrial base, and air defenses; and to interdict the flow of men and material into South Vietnam. It didn't work due to the limited ability of air campaigns to stop guerilla warfare; moreover, supplies did not stop coming from Laos / Cambodia. Mueller and Gaddis mention this operation.
|
|
|
Linebacker
|
aerial interdiction campaign against the North Vietnamese in 1972. Its purpose was to stop the flow of supplies into South Vietnam by the Viet Cong for the Easter Offensive. Linebacker successfully convinced Hanoi to return to the negotiating table. Operation Linebacker II shifted to B-52 Stratofortress bombers instead of tactical fighter craft.
|
|
|
Dual containment
|
Was the strategy by the Clinton Administration with regards to Iran and Iraq. It attempted to isolate both countries using international diplomatic and economic pressures. While allies had been placing pressure on Iraq for years, they were cool towards taking the same actions with Iran. Some problems with the strategy included the added expenses of placing troops to threaten both countries; the lack of offshore-balancing and the risk of buck-passing to other allies (which realists dislike.) The administration began engaging Iran in dialogue after 1997.
|
|
|
Limited Aims War
|
a potential strategy for wars. Instead of annihilation, the aims are simply to hold a piece of territory. This type of war is weak against counterinsurgencies and wars of attrition.
|
|
|
RMA
|
stands for the "Revolution in Military Affairs," and was described by Max Boot as a new style of warfare that eschews the bloody slogging matches of old. It seeks a quick victory with minimal casualties on both sides. Due to precision and accuracy, special forces, and psychological warfare revolutions, the Afghan model of warfare (highlighted by Biddle) is possible. Boot makes the point that the second Gulf War makes even the 1940 Blitzkrieg pale in comparison.
|
|
|
Offshore balancing
|
the strategy favored by most realists including Mearsheimer. It consists of passing the buck to regional powers and ensuring no regional hegemons form on the great power's watch. Intervention is only necessary when the power's interests are threatened or there is the threat of a regional hegemon rising. Britain used this strategy extensively in the past. Weaknesses of this strategy include: it cannot ensure peace, it's a reactive strategy, and it lacks the "pacifier" effect which could encourage wars to happen due to a lack of American troops.
|
|
|
Manifest Destiny
|
the idea that the US has a God-given right to extend itself from coast to coast. The term was first used by Jacksonian Democrats in the 1840s but eventually came to be used as a justification for wars that expanded the US westward into areas like the Oregan Territory and much of Texas. Some consider it the foundations of American Imperialism; Mearsheimer takes it as evidence that we are indeed an offensive power.
|
|
|
Preventive vs. preemptive
|
Seriously. Come on. You have to know this at this point.
|
|
|
Grand Strategy
|
Is defined as the balancing of foreign policy goals with the military means to achieve these goals. Put simply, what areas of the world are we willing to fight and die for? Art defines the six interests for the United States as: prevent an attack on the United States homeland, prevent giant Eurasian wars, ensure the security of the United States' oil pipelines, ensure an open economic order, support democracy and human rights, and protect the global environment. The first, fifth, and sixth are threatened.
|
|
|
NSC-68
|
created in 1950 and is known as the "blueprint" for Cold War foreign policy. It made the case for a military buildup to confront a "hegemonic threat" the likes of which the United States had never encountered before. NSC-68 recommended military (hard) solutions over Kennan's diplomatic (soft) solutions. The costs of the recommendations would dwarf the 20% of the GDP the US was currently spending. Goals included: Defending the Western hemisphere and assorted allies, protecting and providing a mobilization base while the offensive forces required for victory were being built up, destroying Soviet war-making capabilities, and providing aid to allies.
|
|
|
Americanization
|
the funneling of troops into the Vietnam War under the Johnson administration. It took place from 1965 to 1969. American forces rose from 16,000 to 553,000 by 1969. It was the opposite of Vietnamization. A delicate balance had to be achieved between adding enough troops to defeat the North Vietnamese and keeping troop levels low enough to avoid the unwanted attention of other superpowers.
|
|
|
Clinton’s Grand Strategy
|
Switched to Dual Containment from offshore balancing in the Gulf, decreased the number of troops in Europe but increased NATO involvement, kept a moderate amount of forces in NE Asia to hedge against a Chinese threat. Selective cooperation and humanitarian intervention were components of the strategy, as well as "engagement and enlargement." Clintonians thought that if liberal theories based on institutions, democratic cooperation and multilateralism, and the spread of the free market were adhered to, peace could be kept in Europe and Asia.
|
|
|
Regional Transformation
|
A major tenet of NeoCon theory involves turning enemy states into allied democracies, particularly in the Middle East. Based on bandwagoning logic, the idea is that the more states that are transformed in a given region, the easier the task of regional transformation will be.
|
|
|
Afghan Model
|
Analyzed by Stephen Biddle, the Afghan Model of warfare involves the use of allies replacing American conventional ground troops by exploiting U.S. airpower and small numbers of American special operations forces (SOF). Although some claim the model can succeed against all but first world armies, the model cannot deal with a major imbalance in skill and motivation, and there are risks involved in relying on indigenous allies. It is offshore balancing on a micro scale.
|
|
|
Schelling’s manipulation of risks: type II deterrence
|
A vs B
Fighting over C If you’re A, you can: 1) Tripwire – leaving small contingent of forces in the area you want to protect 2) Burning Bridges 3) Salami tactics |
|
|
Gunfighter
|
• Both sides have Splendid first strike capability
o Massive incentives to shoot first • Very little coercive leverage |
