Reading...
Play button
Play button
Use LEFT and RIGHT arrow keys to navigate between flashcards;
Use UP and DOWN arrow keys to flip the card;
H to show hint;
A reads text to speech;
55 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
|
Mental imagery
|
mentally re-experiencing a sensation or stimulus quality in the absence of the actual stimulus
example: imagine a sunset |
|
|
William James
|
-1890
included a chapter in his textbook on imagination -argued that we have vague memories and that there are many sensory modalities involved in imagination -there is a strong link between neural processes involved in sensation and those used for imagination |
|
|
analog code
|
many theorists argue that information about a mental image is stored in an analog code, a representation that closely resembles the physical object.
|
|
|
Sir Francis Galton (1822-1911)
|
-self reported measures
-attempted to form an image and report on its vividness findings- differences between gender, scientists versus nonscientists, questions about imagery will be revived in the cognitive revolution 80-90 years later people may think differently in different eras |
|
|
Connectionist theory
(mental representation) |
-information, experience, and mood are all represented in terms of a pattern of neural firings across the brain
that pattern may be re-activated during memory retrieval and mental imagery |
|
|
analogical representation
|
representation that closely resembles the physical object.
-mental imagery is a close relative of perception -its sensory in nature, or possibly coed in a sensory manner -recapitulates the experience of sensing that stimulus: visual, auditory, olfactory |
|
|
analog-code approach
triangle |
people who support the analogical representation say that mental imagery is a lot like perception. if you look at a picture of a triangle, your brain perceives the triangle and encodes the relationship between the three lines within that triangle. similarly, your mental image of the triangle is registered in a similar fashion, preserving the same relationship among the lines.
|
|
|
propositional representations
|
-an abstract, language-like representation; storage is neither visual nor spatial, and it does not physically resemble the original stimulus
uses logic, but no sensory information language: letters, numbers, words |
|
|
propositional-code approach
triangle |
mental imagery is a close relative of language, NOT perception
-if someone asks you to create a mental image of a triangle, your brain will register a language-like description of the lines and the angles, though the precise nature of the verbal description has not been specified. |
|
|
Imagery and Memory
|
memory for words that are concrete nouns elicit imagery as opposed to words that are more abstract, with less probability of an associated image
|
|
|
dual-coding theory
|
Paivio:
if you form a mental image of an object associated with a referent word, then you will remember that word better than if you never formed an associated image -this is because you are encoding the stimulus twice, both propositionally and analogically |
|
|
Mental rotation
|
-Shepard and Metzler
|
|
|
Mental imagery
|
mentally re-experiencing a sensation or stimulus quality in the absence of the actual stimulus
example: imagine a sunset |
|
|
William James
|
-1890
included a chapter in his textbook on imagination -argued that we have vague memories and that there are many sensory modalities involved in imagination -there is a strong link between neural processes involved in sensation and those used for imagination |
|
|
analog code
|
many theorists argue that information about a mental image is stored in an analog code, a representation that closely resembles the physical object.
|
|
|
Sir Francis Galton (1822-1911)
|
-self reported measures
-attempted to form an image and report on its vividness findings- differences between gender, scientists versus nonscientists, questions about imagery will be revived in the cognitive revolution 80-90 years later people may think differently in different eras |
|
|
Connectionist theory
(mental representation) |
-information, experience, and mood are all represented in terms of a pattern of neural firings across the brain
that pattern may be re-activated during memory retrieval and mental imagery |
|
|
analogical representation
|
representation that closely resembles the physical object.
-mental imagery is a close relative of perception -its sensory in nature, or possibly coed in a sensory manner -recapitulates the experience of sensing that stimulus: visual, auditory, olfactory |
|
|
analog-code approach
triangle |
people who support the analogical representation say that mental imagery is a lot like perception. if you look at a picture of a triangle, your brain perceives the triangle and encodes the relationship between the three lines within that triangle. similarly, your mental image of the triangle is registered in a similar fashion, preserving the same relationship among the lines.
|
|
|
propositional representations
|
-an abstract, language-like representation; storage is neither visual nor spatial, and it does not physically resemble the original stimulus
uses logic, but no sensory information language: letters, numbers, words |
|
|
propositional-code approach
triangle |
mental imagery is a close relative of language, NOT perception
-if someone asks you to create a mental image of a triangle, your brain will register a language-like description of the lines and the angles, though the precise nature of the verbal description has not been specified. |
|
|
Imagery and Memory
|
memory for words that are concrete nouns elicit imagery as opposed to words that are more abstract, with less probability of an associated image
|
|
|
dual-coding theory
|
Paivio:
if you form a mental image of an object associated with a referent word, then you will remember that word better than if you never formed an associated image -this is because you are encoding the stimulus twice, both propositionally and analogically |
|
|
Mental rotation
|
-Shepard and Metzler
-asked participants to judge pairs of line drawings and say if they were the same or not by mentally rotating them. the more they needed to rotate the image, the longer or more difficulty they experienced. -practice, however, can improve performance on a task that is very similar to the one you were practicing. example: tetris older people perform more slowly than younger people on the task, but age doesn't influence other mental-imagery abilities |
|
|
Kossyln, Farah, Corballlis
neuroimaging |
Kosslyn studied the brain's activity via PET scans to see which areas of the brain the participants used during the mental rotation task.
the primary motor cortex would be activated when the subject manually rotated it in their hands. They showed no activity in the cortex when they had just watched the electric motor rotated the figure |
|
|
Kosslyn and Imagery and Size
|
reasoned that mental image of an elephant next to a rabbit would force people to imagine a relatively small rabbit.
people were significantly faster at answering a question about an image when their mental image was large, rather than small |
|
|
imagery affects perception
|
enhances the detection of tones and odors
|
|
|
Segal and Fusella Detection Tasks
|
-created a visual or auditory image
example: volcano, tree, sound of oboe, or typewriter -present an actual stimuli: a blue arrow or a harmonica sound would experience modality-specific interference whenever viewing the stimulus, its being "used" so it takes longer to process another visual so it takes longer -if harmonica is being imagined and the sound of a harmonica is given as the stimulus, it would be very quick detection -if harmonica and oboe, it takes a long time because there is interference in the same MODE. |
|
|
Paivio
imagery and shape |
-asked participants to make judgments about the angle formed by the two hands on a mental clock.
the high imagery participants made decisions much quicker than low-imagery participants -this supports ANALOG codes |
|
|
Farah
domain specific processes |
are active for imagery
visual areas for visual imagery auditory for auditory imagery damage to some visual areas leads to inability to form mental images |
|
|
occipital lobe
|
primary visual cortex
|
|
|
temporal lobe
|
what system
|
|
|
parietal lobe
|
where system
|
|
|
frontal lobe
|
working memory/ explicit retrieval
|
|
|
Kossyln
|
same areas of brain are used in imagery and perception
|
|
|
Relationship between Mental rotation and intelligence
|
fluid intelligence
mental rotation- visuo-spatial reasoning high correlations with mental rotation performance and visual and verbal reasoning and controlled attention/working memory |
|
|
developmental coordination disorder
|
children who are behind in their ability to coordinate movement of their body
have increased difficulty on mental rotation tasks possible cause: in ability to manipulate mental representations and images leads to difficulties anticipating movements necessary for navigating in their environment can overcome this! |
|
|
sex difference in children's mental rotation abilities
|
females score lower on mental rotation tasks
|
|
|
issues of automaticity and control
|
spontaneous imagery
cued by related concepts, contexctual information, mood, etc |
|
|
controlled attempts to conjure memory
|
is easier than controlled attempts to block imagery
|
|
|
Kosslyn
Self Image (2001) |
showed participants video footage of themselves, it was either distorted so that they were skinnier or fatter, or the same.
they would ask participants what they thought, if it was really themselves or if it was distorted participants with anorexia nervosa had distorted self image |
|
|
imagery and rumination
|
is rumination a verbal phenomenon, or can it be visual or kinesthetic?
-it can be all three, you an distort reality through imagery. example: i "feel" fat. i "feel" out of shape. |
|
|
attentional bias and imagery
|
deprivation may lead to spontaneous imagery, either while conscious or in your dreams
example: if you are starving yourself, you may spontaneously start dreaming or thinking about food |
|
|
Xenon Pylyshyn
Epiphenomenon |
just because we have the experience of mental imagery does not mean we have analogical representations
not everyone uses imagery epiphenomenal is when images are simply "tacked on" later, after propositional information has been retrieved from memory storage so... in the instance of the triangle, you think it out using the propositional verbal description and then at the end you see the analog code this doesn't happen simultaneously/ its not dual coding |
|
|
images and propositional codes
Pylyshyns Arguments |
some tasks can be done without mental imagery (mental rotation, mental distance)
there are differences between perception and imagery (details) not everyone claims to experience mental imagery |
|
|
fMRI and Imagery
|
oxygen rich blood flows to areas of the brain that are activated
|
|
|
Farah and Kosslyn
fMRI research |
-auditory imagery activates the auditory cortex
-motor imagery activates the motor cortex (when imagining holding an object or rotating it in your hand) -bodily movement activates the cerebellum (when imagining hitting a tennis ball) |
|
|
cognitive maps
|
a mental representation of the external environment that surrounds us
|
|
|
biases in judging distance
|
if we are driving somewhere, we imaging we get there faster if it is a more busier route (lots of surroundings)
example: the elevator problem |
|
|
heuristic
|
a general problem solving strategy
|
|
|
90 degree angle heuristic
|
we preresent angles on a map as being closer to 90 degrees than in reality
|
|
|
symmetry heuristic
|
we remember figures as being more symmetrical and regular than they truly are in reality
|
|
|
rotation heuristic
|
a figure that is slightly tilted will be more vertical or more horizontal than in reality
|
|
|
alignment heuristic
|
a series of geographic structures will be remembered as being more lined up than they really are (tend to line up USA and europe)
|
|
|
our representations and images are...
|
often influenced by factors other than whether the image is vivid or detailed
|
