2. Dreams: Mcginn

Front 1

When we sleep we have experiences with the mark of ___________-__________.

Back 1

sense-modality

Front 2

What makes this issue hard? There is a ____________ in dream experiences and waking life experiences.

Back 2

similarity

Front 3

Dreams are either in the __________ __________ (perceptual) and a species of _______________
or the _____________ _____________ (imaginative) and a species of the ________________

Back 3

McGinn says if they’re in they’re perceptual then they are from the ‘body’s eye,’ in which case they are a species of hallucination.
But if they’re imaginative then they are from the ‘mind’s eye,’ in which case they are a species of the image.

Front 4

ocwrnsip-?

Back 4

Oh, Can We Really Not SIP--?

Front 5

Oh, Can We Really Not SIP-?

Back 5

Observational attitude argument
Concurrent imagery argument
Wakefulness and perception argument
Recognition argument
Narrative argument
Saturation argument (sketched)
Imaginative Senseing argument
Pre-sleep images argument

Front 6

O

Back 6

1. Observational attitude -- when hallucinating, McGinn claims, one acts with an interested attitude, trying to see things better, hear other conversations, etc. You might say they’re curious. But, the dreamer does not show any of these observational interests.
Mcginn says: “the dreamer is hearing with the mind's ear when auditory experiences occur in the dream, not employing the body's ear in hallucinatory mode for then she would be listening to what sounds might be picked up in the proximity of her ears.” He totally contradicts this argument on his 7th argument for imaginative sensing. The mind’s ear? Hm. I have personally experienced employing the body’s ear in hallucinatory mode--as have many people I personally know. And in true hallucination fashion, sounds in the real world have played roles in my dreams, but, incidentally, they are wrong roles (by which I mean, my alarm clock noise has been misidentified as a duck quacking at me multiple times. This seems to be a hallucination... And weird, considering I have close to zero experience with real ducks. When McGinn considers a version of my objection in his paper he claims it is “ad hoc” ... which seems hilarious and ironic, given his claims’ concrete foundation.

Front 7

C

Back 7

2. Concurrent imagery argument, which is basically, my precepts and my imaginings frequently happen simultaneously in waking states. That is, I can see something with my eyes and see something totally different in my head at the same time. BUT, I don’t seem to be able to do this in dreams. This suggests that I can’t have an imagining in my imagining, for if dreams were a precept, i ought to be able to imagine things in it. **We can dream any circumstance; surfing alongside the eiffel tower -- but we can’t imagine in a dream; surf in a dream and imagine the eiffel tower as we’re surfing in the dream.** DREAMS ENTAIL ATTENTION THAT CANNOT BE DIVERTED, ONE TRACK MIND.

Front 8

wap

Back 8

3. Wakefulness and perception argument, basically that being awake fundamentally consists of perceiving things; being asleep seems to be unconscious and distinct. McGinn thinks there’s a tension between sleep states and perception such that to be awake is to be perceiving. Further, such a tension does not exist between images and sleep.

Front 9

R

Back 9

4. Recognition argument, basically that we recognize the identity of characters in our dreams, and this is based on the intention of imaginings; whereas precepts don’t have an ability to discern identity built in. When we recognize people through precepts we are making judgments, “oh, I think I recognize that person..” etc. But in dream states, because we intended for all the contents, we recognize every aspect because its presupposed. If we didn’t recognize it, it wouldn’t be in our dream. McGinn takes this to be a strong argument for images.

Front 10

N

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5. Narrative argument, basically that “the dream is a medium of creativity, a meaningful sequence of related elements. The dream has design. But how can the percept theory account for this?” Further, images can be shaped into narrative sequences, as they are in the case of daydreams. Images are subject to the will, and they are ideal items with which to patch together au inner story. Images, indeed, are a natural mental accompaniment to reading a story. Images aud stories are made for each other.

Front 11

Ss

Back 11

6. Saturation argument, SKETCHED basically that there is a sense in which dreams are sketched out and not filled in all the way. They are sort of missing details and so forth. McGinn thinks images are the same, whereas precepts are completed -- they are developed at every point.

Front 12

Is

Back 12

7. Imaginative sensing argument -- contradicting the observational argument, basically that we fabricate senses in our dreams from external sources. The external stimulus gets incorporated into the dream by way of an interpretation of it that fits the content of the dream. I think this is a clear case of imaginative hearing: the imagination has imposed an "aspect" on the stimulus that is partly constrained by its acoustic character and partly pure fancy.

Front 13

P-sa

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8. Pre-sleep images -- in studies people often report imagining things before going to bed. You’re filling your mind with images in this way simulates the dreaming state. Almost like you prime your mind for dreams by intentionally thinking about something. It seems that if it were hallucination from precept, you wouldn’t procure the content by imaginings.

Front 14

1. Worry about hallucination?

Back 14

But I might object that he hasn’t spelled out in enough detail what ‘hallucinating’ is, because it might be much more of a nuanced occurrence than the straw man he keeps knocking down. I really feel it difficult to believe that imagination does not play into hallucination.

Front 15

2. Weird argument

Back 15

PSYCHIC SPLIT to will
Another major objection is that there does not seem to be will present in dreams, whereas will is available in imagination in waking hours. To answer this, McGinn posits a ‘psychic split,’ that is, a division of the self. There is the dream producer and the dream consumer. He agrees even with Freud’s concept of ‘the dream work’ (Note: agreeing with Freud generally not a good indicator of truth when writing in general).

Front 16

Overview of stances?

Back 16

McGinn thinks that we have beliefs about dreams much the same way we do about fictions -- we can have a deep immersion in a work, but it is distinct from actual actual beliefs. Beliefs about fiction are weaker and relativized to the fiction.

Front 17

Believe about _________ the same as we do ___________

Back 17

dreams, fictions

Front 18

So engrossed that WHHHHAT?

Back 18

McGinn explains that he gets so engrossed by dreams that he gives his assent to it. He then qualifies it by saying if not assent, something very similar to assent. This is obviously contradictory though, because assent assumes a bunch of things -- first of all, that you’re deciding whether or not you like your dream? Weird, but more importantly, wrong. And second, this obviously imports some kind of will, which is absent in dreams.

Front 19

For McGinn and Ichikawa dreams require...

Back 19

they require our complete attention

Front 20

McGinn argument for beliefs

Back 20

1) When I dream that p I experience certain emotions
2) Those emotions can only arise from a certain attitude towards p, based on a certain BELIEF that p.
3) When I dream that p, I believe that p.
This parallels the paradox of fictional emotions: inconsistent triad:
4) When I read in a fiction that p, I experience fear, elation, and other emotions.
5) Those emotions arise from an attitude that p, can only arise from a belief that p.
6) Therefore, when I read in a fiction that p, I do not believe that p.

Front 21

Personal objection to both

Back 21

When I’m imagining something in my head (while awake) I never actually feel an ‘experiencing’ sensation in my imagination. The only sensation I am experiencing is from the fact that I am a character presently awake imagining some state of affairs -- but this is very distinct from obtaining an experiencing state as a character in my imagination experiencing the imagined state of affairs. I think this puts pressure on the ‘image’ view, because when I am dreaming I am very much feeling an experiencing sensation -- when in my dream, I am convinced of the state of affairs. There are differences from dream experiencing and real experiencing, I am sure, but I am not aware of them enough to import them into this argument. It seems, given both of these, that I am not able to experience an imagination-mediated experiencing sensation.

Given that, I’m left to consider my imagination might be a precept -- which, according to McGinn, would be a hallucination. This seems plausible in that I have visceral remembrances from troubling dream states from which I was emotionally influenced. This also puts pressure on McGinn’s view, because he says emotions are not ______ in dreams. I find this claim patently false, and for once in a philosophical argument, I am able to know I’m right based on emotional experience. However, my dreams are left to be precepts (hallucinations)? This it seems like precepts (from the body’s eye) require, at a minimum, require one’s eyes to be open. Even those hallucinating, it seems, are doing so with eyes open.

Front 22

_______ denies beliefs in dreaming, and _______ denies percepts.

What does Ichikawa do?

Why is it distinct from McGinn?

Back 22

Sosa denies beliefs in dreaming, and McGinn denies percepts.

Ichikawa's project is to deny both percepts and beliefs.

This is distinct from McGinn, who endorses beliefs.

Front 23

For Ichikawa, dreams involve....

Back 23

imaginative experiences

“dreams typically involve neither misleading percepts nor false beliefs, but instead involve imaginative experiences.”

Front 24

He takes it that in dreams you ___________ ____ ____________ of __________, which he calls __________.

Back 24

He takes it that in dreams you experience the simulation of percept, which he calls imagery.

Front 25

McGinn's examples, according to Ichikawa?

What does he maintain though, and from whom?

Back 25

Ichikawa dismisses McGinn’s examples of images not percepts, saying that they are not clear examples. The one he holds on to is the will, which is borrowed from Wittgenstein and Sartre. The image involves will whereas percepts do not. To imagine is to act .

Front 26

Side trip worry: will

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I find myself somewhat sympathetic to Sosa’s view that there are cases in which we imagine things that we do not choose....Think for instance of sometone being “haunted” by an image. This is obviously not referring to being haunted in a literal way, but in an emotional way. (But Wittgenstein is right, too, when he says that even when we have an image we don’t wish to have, we can still have the will that it goes away...)

Front 27

Ichikawa's best argument?

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The best argument that he makes, I believe, is the one about phones waking you up. He explains that when we are in a dream state we might hear a phone, and it wakes us up. But how could thi s be if we were dreaming, and dreaming is a percept? (or involves our percepts, rather)? Obviously, then, if having one of our percepts respond to something wakes us up, it must be some other process by which we are dreaming.

Front 28

His belief disagreement written out formally?

BELIEF:

IMAGININGS:

And these latter we call?

Back 28

BELIEF:
my dreaming that p entails my believing that p.

IMAGININGS:
when I dream that p, I do not in general believe that p; instead, I imagine that p.

Call the belief-like states we experience while dreaming dream beliefs.

Front 29

Ichikawa argues that studies show children...

Back 29

HE argues that recent studies have shown that children’s avility to dream seems to develop along with their ability to imagine.

Front 30

What would happen if we actually believed dreams?

Back 30

He thinks we can’t actually believe dreams because if we did we would be extremely confused when we woke up about all of the laws of physics and so forth that we didn’t believe in our dream.

Front 31

He doesn't think dream states motivate action in _____ _____?

Back 31

He doesn’t think that dream states motivate action in real life.

Front 32

He says that McGinn accepts ________ but not ________. He says that McGinn doesn’t accept the _______ ____ ________ in dreams because without some kind of _______, we could not have _______ _________ ___ __________, which he claims we do.

Back 32

He says that McGinn accepts images but not imaginings. He says that McGinn doesn’t accept the absence of belief in dreams because without some kind of belief, we could not have affective responses to dreams, which he claims we do.

Front 33

How does Ichikawa think we have emotions, then?

Back 33

He ultimately claims that dreams don’t involve emotions except in the way that fictions do.

So, when really boiling their arguments down, they end in close to the same position. McGinn also said we have emotional responses to dreams in much the same way we do fictions. Where they differ, then, is in their regard for belief and fiction/dream. Ichikawa takes more of a Walton line (whom he names), while McGinn claims we can only have emotional responses to that which we have, in some sense, a belief in.

Front 34

The boiling down differences?

Back 34

He ultimately claims that dreams don’t involve emotions except in the way that fictions do.

So, when really boiling their arguments down, they end in close to the same position. McGinn also said we have emotional responses to dreams in much the same way we do fictions. Where they differ, then, is in their regard for belief and fiction/dream. Ichikawa takes more of a Walton line (whom he names), while McGinn claims we can only have emotional responses to that which we have, in some sense, a belief in.