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18 Cards in this Set

  • Front
  • Back

wildlife management

  • as with the fisheries, we have the problem of an open access resource that is subject to overexploitation
- need to control access in order to avoid “Tragedy of the Commons”
- must also recover depleted resources
  • history of control techniques have focused on the take and the provision of habitat
- licensing, limits, and state control

- Pittman-Robertson


- national wildlife refuge system

managing the wildlife commons

  • North American continent was a true frontier at the time of colonization
- abundant resources relative to capital and labor
  • age of acquisition and defining of property rights
- indigenous people had different property rights
  • history of large declines in wildlife game populations in 19th and early 20th centuries
- bison, passenger pigeon, heath hen, beaver, etc.

managing and rehabilitating the North American wildlife resource

  • depletion of most wildlife resources resulted from overharvest and habitat loss
  • recovery depended on controlling both of these factors
  • necessary to determine property rights structure before access issues could be resolved

who owns wildlife?

  • in this country wildlife is owned by no one
  • held for the people in "sacred trust" by state and federal governments until legal ownership has been acquired through legally killing the game
  • the Public Trust Doctrine became established in fisheries and wildlife through the Supreme Court case Martin vs. Waddell (1842)
  • right of access extended from English Common law

Lacey Act

  • take away market incentives
  • turn profit maximizing behavior to utility maximizing
  • prohibitions on take or marketing

biological approaches to wildlife management

  • Pittman-Robertson
- habitat restoration
- research: scientific management
  • refuges
- further habitat provision
  • stocking
- providing production inputs
  • seasons
- tie harvest to biological needs of species

direct methods for reducing take of wildlife

  • licenses/taxes
  • quotas: bag/creel limits, absolute harvest limits
  • size restrictions: minimum size, points
  • timing restrictions: seasons
- for biological reasons
- for management reasons
  • location restrictions: reserves, refuges, etc.
  • effort restrictions: gear limitations
  • often use combination of many or all of these


provision of habitat

more land available for habitat protection 
creation of federal wildlife refuges
current National wildlife refuge system acreage (see pic)
  • increased urbanization and land abandonment after the turn of the century
  • more land available for habitat protection
  • creation of federal wildlife refuges
- Pelican Island Refuge in FL established by presidential proclamation in 1903

- others established by Congress were made primarily by carving out of existing federal lands, mainly for waterfowl protection


- acreage has increased from 435,000 ac (1910) to >93,000,000 ac (1999)


  • current National wildlife refuge system acreage (see pic)

paying for wildlife management

  • current state funding totals about $1 billion/yr
- >90% from license sales
  • other large components of state budgets come from state tax dollars and federal matching funds
- about $200 million/yr
  • funding for separate federal wildlife programs totals about $700 million
  • overall, cost of state and federal wildlife programs totals about $2 billion/yr
- need is much greater (at least 2-3X current amounts)

wildlife damage/control

  • many see wildlife as unnecessary, irrelevant, dangerous, economically disruptive
  • monetary impacts associated with wildlife do exist
  • wildlife damage often affects assets (cattle, forests, cropland, buildings) privately held by individuals
  • wildlife causing damage are publicly owned
  • determining who should pay for wildlife damage management, and how much the wildlife resource should be "managed" to reduce damage, are contentious issues

economic benefits of wildlife

  • most state and federal studies attempt to show that there are substantial jobs and benefits associated with wildlife
  • often based on limited survey information because much of the values must be inferred
  • nevertheless, some very large values can be obtained

dealing with problems of open access recreational resources

  • managers generally favor unrestricted access because F&G budgets are based on utilization
- do not want to limit effort because effort is a benefit but congestion is a cost
  • basic policies have attempted to increase the amount of recreational activities (i.e. stocking, seasons, access improvements, catch and release, size and bag limits)

approaches to improve state-based management of wildlife

  • allow private landowners to profit from wildlife on their land
  • encourage landowners to provide habitat for non-game species with flexible land-use rules
  • charge fees on state lands and enter into fee arrangements on federal lands
  • allow state game agencies to set hunting fees and diversify those fees to reflect an array of demands in the hunting market

endangered species economics

  • ESA addresses need for protection of habitat
- primary focus is on public lands but needs on private land are apparent
  • original law focused on “take” of endangered species with strong regulatory control
  • fundamental property right concerns dealing with distribution of costs for protection and benefits for provision
- incentive problems

ESA economics




costs and benefits

  • gradually became clear that the main issue is not the total social cost of preserving endangered species, but how these costs are distributed

  • although the benefits of the law are distributed widely throughout society, its costs are concentrated on a small but vocal minority

ESA economics




risk-averse behavior


  • risk-averse landowners would rather avoid future hassles and develop their land before government scientists can find an endangered species there
  • the 3 S's: shoot it, shovel it over, shut up

ESA responses to property rights concerns

  • no surprises
- Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs) and the provision of assurance
  • encouraging beneficial behavior
- safe harbor agreements
  • revising the law
- providing further private property predictions

where does this leave us?

  • common property is not inherently tragic
  • goals of management will vary depending on the type of problem
  • want policies that encourage innovation
- need to be aware that innovation will change the optimal management scenarios
  • cognizance of transaction costs
- MB=MC
  • cognizance of affected parties