In this paper I will be critically evaluating U.T Place’s “Is consciousness a brain process?” and expressing and/or giving my views about his arguments. Topics on this paper will include the existence or continuum about sensations and mental imagery of the brain process, cognitive concepts (e.g., knowing, remembering, understanding), the relationship and difference between expressing formation of the grammatical predicate and grammatical subject with Place’s examples, the rule of language whether or not it is given a variety of object or state affairs, the phenomenological fallacy and lastly, answering the question if Place’s “Is consciousness a brain process?” constitutes special difficulties for an account of the place of nature.
First, …show more content…
He gives an example of an itch being a temporary propensity to scratch. He then follows it with the case of cognitive concepts like ‘knowing’, ‘believing’, ‘understanding’, ‘remembering’ and volitional concepts like ‘wanting’ and ‘intending.’ An analysis in terms of disposition to behave is fundamentally sound. Though, there would seem to be an intractable residue of concepts clustering around the notions of consciousness, experience, sensation and mental imagery, where he states that the sort of inner process story is unavoidable. It is though possible, of course, that a satisfactory behaviouristic account of this conceptual residuum will ultimately be found (Place, p. 44). Moreover, there is a sort of mental event that Place thinks is unlikely behaviouristic-ally analyzable, he states that he does not claim the statements about sensations and mental images are reducible to or analysable into statements about brain processes, in the way in which ‘cognition statements’ are analysable into statement about behaviour. Afterward, (a) he gives statements about consciousness are statements about brain processes being manifestly or immediately and evidently false by the fact that you …show more content…
In addition, there is a relationship between the meaning of the expression of forming the grammatical subject, such that whenever the subject expression is applicable to the predicate. (Place, p. 45) Place gave an example of the color red, that if you know that it is the color red then you must be able to describe it as colored. Another example is the ‘his table is an old packing case’ there is no relationship between the meaning of expressions in the table and the old packing case. But, in the is of composition it is as straight forward as ‘the old packing case is his table. While, on the ‘is’ if definition, it means that his table is the old packing case that he uses/he has. In the rule of language on the other hand, whenever a given variety of object or state of affairs has two characteristics or sets of characteristics, one of which is unique to the variety of object or state of affairs in question, the expression that is used to refer to the characteristics or set of characteristics which defines the variety of object or state of affairs in question will always entail the expression used to refer to the other characteristic or set of characters. (Place, p.45). it is okay to infer from logical independence to logical
First, …show more content…
He gives an example of an itch being a temporary propensity to scratch. He then follows it with the case of cognitive concepts like ‘knowing’, ‘believing’, ‘understanding’, ‘remembering’ and volitional concepts like ‘wanting’ and ‘intending.’ An analysis in terms of disposition to behave is fundamentally sound. Though, there would seem to be an intractable residue of concepts clustering around the notions of consciousness, experience, sensation and mental imagery, where he states that the sort of inner process story is unavoidable. It is though possible, of course, that a satisfactory behaviouristic account of this conceptual residuum will ultimately be found (Place, p. 44). Moreover, there is a sort of mental event that Place thinks is unlikely behaviouristic-ally analyzable, he states that he does not claim the statements about sensations and mental images are reducible to or analysable into statements about brain processes, in the way in which ‘cognition statements’ are analysable into statement about behaviour. Afterward, (a) he gives statements about consciousness are statements about brain processes being manifestly or immediately and evidently false by the fact that you …show more content…
In addition, there is a relationship between the meaning of the expression of forming the grammatical subject, such that whenever the subject expression is applicable to the predicate. (Place, p. 45) Place gave an example of the color red, that if you know that it is the color red then you must be able to describe it as colored. Another example is the ‘his table is an old packing case’ there is no relationship between the meaning of expressions in the table and the old packing case. But, in the is of composition it is as straight forward as ‘the old packing case is his table. While, on the ‘is’ if definition, it means that his table is the old packing case that he uses/he has. In the rule of language on the other hand, whenever a given variety of object or state of affairs has two characteristics or sets of characteristics, one of which is unique to the variety of object or state of affairs in question, the expression that is used to refer to the characteristics or set of characteristics which defines the variety of object or state of affairs in question will always entail the expression used to refer to the other characteristic or set of characters. (Place, p.45). it is okay to infer from logical independence to logical