1. Materialists have an ontological claim that everything that exists is made of matter. Therefore, having mental states does not indicate that there is something mental; to deny materialism is to say that there exist non-material entities. One way to deny materialism is to say that mind (or ideas/beliefs) are non-material entities.
2. Functionalism claims that mental contents are functional. The negation of it is to say that mental states are defined introspectively instead of causally/functionally. o NOTE1: Ontology is supposed to be neutral between materialism and non-materialism. Non-material ontology can say that some non-material entities exist (Or mental things exist, which is non-material). o NOTE2: It is important to notice the …show more content…
Whether intentional sentences about mental states are reducible to extensional sentences about brain is a semantic issue about language. We have a reductive thesis and a non-reductive thesis. Whether mentalistic language for psychology can be reduced to the scientific language of neuroscience is another way to describe the issue. o NOTE1: The semantic issue has noting to do with ontology but is the relation between intensional and extensional sentences. o NOTE2: One can be a non-reductionist and believe that intensional mentalistic language cannot be reduce to extensional language, and still be a materialist and a functionalist. Likewise, one can be a reductionist, and still be an introspectivist and a dualist.
6. Whether mental events can be explained in terms of brain events is an explanatory issue; saying something can or cannot be explained is different from saying sentences can or cannot be reduced. Someone who thinks that psychological language cannot be reduced to objective language of science may also hold that mental states can be explained in neurological terms; likewise, one can believe that psychological language can be reduced to physical language, but still cannot explain mental states in physical terms.
7. Nagel’s Argument:
1) There are subjective
2. Functionalism claims that mental contents are functional. The negation of it is to say that mental states are defined introspectively instead of causally/functionally. o NOTE1: Ontology is supposed to be neutral between materialism and non-materialism. Non-material ontology can say that some non-material entities exist (Or mental things exist, which is non-material). o NOTE2: It is important to notice the …show more content…
Whether intentional sentences about mental states are reducible to extensional sentences about brain is a semantic issue about language. We have a reductive thesis and a non-reductive thesis. Whether mentalistic language for psychology can be reduced to the scientific language of neuroscience is another way to describe the issue. o NOTE1: The semantic issue has noting to do with ontology but is the relation between intensional and extensional sentences. o NOTE2: One can be a non-reductionist and believe that intensional mentalistic language cannot be reduce to extensional language, and still be a materialist and a functionalist. Likewise, one can be a reductionist, and still be an introspectivist and a dualist.
6. Whether mental events can be explained in terms of brain events is an explanatory issue; saying something can or cannot be explained is different from saying sentences can or cannot be reduced. Someone who thinks that psychological language cannot be reduced to objective language of science may also hold that mental states can be explained in neurological terms; likewise, one can believe that psychological language can be reduced to physical language, but still cannot explain mental states in physical terms.
7. Nagel’s Argument:
1) There are subjective