Bryce Hickle
Prof. Whitaker
Rhetoric
14 March 2017
Apple v. FBI: Apple should have complied
Syed Farook is one of the terrorists involved in the massacre that took place in San Bernardino in 2015 which resulted in the murder of fourteen people. Apple v. FBI was a legal dispute involving whether or not Apple should comply with a warrant demanding them to install a back door program into this dead terrorist’s cellphone. People who defended Apple’s position had made claims stating that it was legal for Apple to choose not to comply and that making a back door program would be either not possible, dangerous, or both. However, these statements are not true. Not only was it possible for Apple to comply with the FBI’s demands without endangering …show more content…
Some have tried to claim that it was dubious as to whether it was even possible for Apple to create a piece of software that performed what the FBI was demanding. This is a much more logically consistent counter argument because one cannot do the impossible, but the counter argument can be refuted via induction. Apple could automatically update iPhones without permission (Landau 1398). Apple has automatically updated iPhones without permission in the past (Landau 1398), and so Apple could do so again to install this back door. Also, based on the research lead by Dr. Choi (an expert in computer engineering), updates to the firmware of the smart phone could be utilized to create a back door program (39). Firmware (also known as embedded software) is software installed onto a piece of hardware that performs specific low level tasks such as battery maintenance, but it can also be used to install security updates in devices such as smart phones (Choi, Byung-Chul, et al. 39). Updates at this level of software can usually subvert most security mechanisms including encryption (Choi, Byung, et al. 39). So this is the method that Apple uses for automatic updates and installs, and would have been the method of installing the proposed back door program. The fact that Apple uses these techniques already prove that it would have been easy for Apple to perform the task that the FBI’s warrant …show more content…
“Secure Firmware Validation and Update for Consumer Devices in Home Networking.” Secure Firmware Validation and Update for Consumer Devices in Home Networking, vol. 62, no. 1, Feb. 2016, pp. 39–44. IEEE Xplore, ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7448561/authors. Accessed 28 Mar. 2017.
Crowley, Michael G, and Michael N Johnstone. “Protecting Corporate Intellectual Property: Legal and Technical Approaches.” Business Horizons, vol. 59, no. 6, 2016, pp. 623–633. ScienceDirect, doi:10.1016/j.bushor.2016.08.004. Accessed 28 Mar. 2017.
Potapchuk, John L. “A Second Bite at the Apple: Federal Courts' Authority to Compel Technical Assistance to Government Agents in Accessing Encrypted Smartphone Data, Under the All Writs Act.” Boston College School of Law, vol. 57, no. 4, 2016, pp. 1403–1446. ABI/INFORM Global, doi:10.2139/ssrn.2768374. Accessed 7 Mar. 2017.
Landau, Susan. “The Real Security Issues of the IPhone Case.” Science, vol. 352, no. 6292, 17 June 2016, pp. 1398–1399., science.sciencemag.org/content/352/6292/1398. Accessed 28 Mar. 2017.
Oyen, Timothy “Stare decisis.” LII / Legal Information Institute, 6 Aug. 2007, www.law.cornell.edu/wex/stare_decisis. Accessed 4 Apr.
Prof. Whitaker
Rhetoric
14 March 2017
Apple v. FBI: Apple should have complied
Syed Farook is one of the terrorists involved in the massacre that took place in San Bernardino in 2015 which resulted in the murder of fourteen people. Apple v. FBI was a legal dispute involving whether or not Apple should comply with a warrant demanding them to install a back door program into this dead terrorist’s cellphone. People who defended Apple’s position had made claims stating that it was legal for Apple to choose not to comply and that making a back door program would be either not possible, dangerous, or both. However, these statements are not true. Not only was it possible for Apple to comply with the FBI’s demands without endangering …show more content…
Some have tried to claim that it was dubious as to whether it was even possible for Apple to create a piece of software that performed what the FBI was demanding. This is a much more logically consistent counter argument because one cannot do the impossible, but the counter argument can be refuted via induction. Apple could automatically update iPhones without permission (Landau 1398). Apple has automatically updated iPhones without permission in the past (Landau 1398), and so Apple could do so again to install this back door. Also, based on the research lead by Dr. Choi (an expert in computer engineering), updates to the firmware of the smart phone could be utilized to create a back door program (39). Firmware (also known as embedded software) is software installed onto a piece of hardware that performs specific low level tasks such as battery maintenance, but it can also be used to install security updates in devices such as smart phones (Choi, Byung-Chul, et al. 39). Updates at this level of software can usually subvert most security mechanisms including encryption (Choi, Byung, et al. 39). So this is the method that Apple uses for automatic updates and installs, and would have been the method of installing the proposed back door program. The fact that Apple uses these techniques already prove that it would have been easy for Apple to perform the task that the FBI’s warrant …show more content…
“Secure Firmware Validation and Update for Consumer Devices in Home Networking.” Secure Firmware Validation and Update for Consumer Devices in Home Networking, vol. 62, no. 1, Feb. 2016, pp. 39–44. IEEE Xplore, ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7448561/authors. Accessed 28 Mar. 2017.
Crowley, Michael G, and Michael N Johnstone. “Protecting Corporate Intellectual Property: Legal and Technical Approaches.” Business Horizons, vol. 59, no. 6, 2016, pp. 623–633. ScienceDirect, doi:10.1016/j.bushor.2016.08.004. Accessed 28 Mar. 2017.
Potapchuk, John L. “A Second Bite at the Apple: Federal Courts' Authority to Compel Technical Assistance to Government Agents in Accessing Encrypted Smartphone Data, Under the All Writs Act.” Boston College School of Law, vol. 57, no. 4, 2016, pp. 1403–1446. ABI/INFORM Global, doi:10.2139/ssrn.2768374. Accessed 7 Mar. 2017.
Landau, Susan. “The Real Security Issues of the IPhone Case.” Science, vol. 352, no. 6292, 17 June 2016, pp. 1398–1399., science.sciencemag.org/content/352/6292/1398. Accessed 28 Mar. 2017.
Oyen, Timothy “Stare decisis.” LII / Legal Information Institute, 6 Aug. 2007, www.law.cornell.edu/wex/stare_decisis. Accessed 4 Apr.