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64 Cards in this Set
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The Year of Crisis (1919)
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1) The Spartakist revolution. In early January Spartakist radicals protested againstthe Ebert Govern and this led to an attempt on January 5th toseize power. The attempt was doomed. Within a few days Freikorps units were inplace and the revolutionaries were crushed. To ensure that the far left were destroyed Liebknecht and Luxemburg were executed by Freikorps units on the 15th of January. The far left nowsaw Ebert not just as a traitor, who they could never work with.
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The Year of Crisis (1919)
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2) The General Election January 19th. The General Election using proportional representation produced a hung Parliament, which was dominated by moderate parties. The National Assembly met in Weimar because Berlin was too violent. No one party was strong enough to form a Government by itself. The "Weimar Coalition" (SPD, DDP, Centre) was formed with Scheidemann of the SPD as Chancellor. The new Government was made up of the November criminals and was hated by the far right and the far left!
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The Year of Crisis (1919)
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3) February11th: Ebert was elected President. He was determined to be politically neutral and act in the interests of the German nation. This was important to the survival of Weimar,as he always selected a Government that was likely to succeed, even if it contained political rivals of the SPD.
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The Year of Crisis (1919)
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4) February to May: The Bavarian revolution. The far left were not a spent force in January 1919 and continued to strike against the New Republic. Eisner was assassinated in February by a right wing extremists and this led far left forces to seize power. Bavaria moved further and further to the left and Ebert feared it might be the springboard for a full scale left wing revolution. In April/May 30,000 Freikorps Units smashed the Bavarian Red Army making Bavaria a haven for the political right.
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The Year of Crisis (1919)
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5) JuneVersailles. A body blow was struck tothe Republic when the Treaty of Versailles was signed. The moderates were once again attacked asNovember criminals and there was a reaction against both Versailles anddemocracy. Many Historians see the imposition of Versailles with itshumiliating terms and economic damage, as the key reason for the failure ofWeimar.
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The Year of Crisis (1919)
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6) July The new Constitution wasratified. It was seen not as the sign of a new confident vibrant democracy butas evidence of a betrayal of traditional values. The far right resented the concessions tosocialists, Catholics, the Jewish Community and feminists and resolved to tearthe Constitution apart. The revolution from below had accomplished a great dealbut the reality was that Germany was in turmoil and in a state of political andeconomic crisis that it would be difficult to survive.^]½8
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Political parties and the WeimarConstitution (1918 – 1929)
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The establishment of a new political order in 1918/19 was a turning point in German history and there is no guarantee that the new Republic would fall to the forces of the far right. In January 1919 there was great support for democratic parties, which gained between them over 76% of the national vote. Despite the Spartakist revolt and the anger of the nationalists in January 1919 there was a real chance that democracy would flourish.
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Political parties and the WeimarConstitution (1918 – 1929)
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This may have been the case had the allies decided at Versailles to moderate their terms and accept the argument presented by the moderates now running Germany that they could not be held responsible for the war and deserved a lighter punishment, to enable democracy to become established.
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Party Self Interest- One of the key problems facing Germany was that post war the political parties were if anything even more fractured and self interested than in 1914. This meant that politics was unstable at the center, as even moderate coalitions were likely to collapse without issues such as Versailles destabilising them.
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1)The left.There were three parties of the left in the post war period until 1920, when the left wing radicals in the USPD merged with the KPD. The left continued to represent the interests of the working class but certainly at national level refused to co-operate. The SPD remained suspicious of the middle class DDP and resented the Catholic Agenda, which was not surprising, as it was a Lutheran working class party. The SPD`s suspicion of other parties led them to stay out of Government between 1923-28.
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Party Self Interest
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2)The KPD was not prepared to co-operate with the SPD, viewing the SPD as traitors and murderers. The KPD remained committed to a revolutionary strategy in the period 1919-23, hoping to complete the revolution of November 1918. In the mid 1920`s it became more interested in winning power through the ballot box and in the crisis period 1929 -32 grew in numbers, aiding the far right, who exploited fear of communism!
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Party Self Interest
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3) The Centre Party. The Centre Party was divided into left and right wing factions and held together only by a common Catholic identity. Initially the Centre Party was very supportive of the new Republic, as it saw it as a vehicle to promote a distinct Catholic identity and as a barrier against communism. In the early years of the republic it was led by radical Catholics but moved to the right.
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Party Self Interest
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4) The DNVP. The DNVP opposed Weimar from the start and attacked the new Constitution, the decision to accept Versailles, the Dawes and Young Plan. Many members of the DNVP were anti Semitic. This negative attitude made it difficult for the mainstream right to act in the national interest. In the mid 1920’s more progressive members of the DNVP did enter Government but from the late 1920`sunder Hugenburg’s leadership the party became even more hostile to Weimar and forged links with the extremist Nazis!
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Party Self Interest
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5) The Nazis. Hitler emerged in 1920 as the leading figure in the Nazi movement but faced a threat from the more left wing Strasser[finally eliminated in 1934]. The Nazis were a racist party, committed to creating a national community and with a hatred of communism. In the early 1920`s they were committed to a revolutionary strategy, which culminated in the failed Munich Putsch, which was backed by Ludendorff.
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Party Self Interest
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5) The Nazis appeared to be a fringe movement in the early 1920`s and during the mid 1920`s sought to win power through the ballot box, when Hitler was dubbed Albert Legalite. Hitler was seen as a heroic figure after the Munich Putsch by the far right and gained from Hugenburg`s error in 1929, when the DNVP and Nazis campaigned against the Young Plan.
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The Weimar Constitution- The selfinterest of the political parties, combined with the impact of Versailles onGerman society were destabilising factors but tragically the Constitutionitself proved very divisive because of the Bill of Rights and becauseproportional representation encouraged the continuation of self interestedparties and because of structural flaws. It was in theory a stabilising factor, as all Germans over 20 voted bothfor the Reichstag and the President and there were checks and balances.
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1) The Bill of Rights was very democratic but controversial set of rights given to the German people. Seen to favour those groups that had been discriminated against pre war and the new rights for workers,Catholics, Jews and feminists angered and alienated the far right who saw it as a further betrayal of pre war Germany. Also resented by business leaders, Lutherans who had wanted to maintain the Protestant supremacy and by anti-Semitic groups, who flourished in Weimar.
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The Weimar Constitution
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2)Proportional Representation added to the problems facing Weimar, as it allowed the self interested parties to survive, rather than being forced to merge into larger groupings to create more stable Governments. In addition it allowed the electorate to express their outrage at Versailles and the Ruhr occupation in a dramatic fashion by voting for anti democratic forces. It allowed extremist parties the opportunity to have access to the Reichstag and build up a national presence.
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The Weimar Constitution
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3) The President was in theory an ersatz Kaiser and took on the role of Head of State and Commander in Chief of the Army. Elected every 7 years and had to have a majority of the electorate voting for them in the first or second round of voting. In theory had control over the armed forces who could be deployed under Article 48 to impose martial law. He appointed the Chancellor and could also support a Chancellor to rule without reference to the Reichstag if necessary.
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The Weimar Constitution
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4)The Chancellor’s role was to act in the national interest but this did not always work (Cuno for example made the mistake of refusing to pay reparations and this led to the Ruhr crisis) Weak Chancellors could be removed by a vote of no confidence.
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The Weimar Constitution
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5) The Reichstag had real power, in contrast to the pre war situation. Elections were held every 4 years, or more frequently if Governments collapsed, using PR. The Reichstag was in theory ideally suited to finding consensus but inreality the self interest of parties meant that it became increasingly polarised, reflecting the crisis that Germany was in. Many Governments were minorities, especially following the SPD decision not to enter Government between 1923 and 1928.
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The Weimar Constitution
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6) The Reichsrat took on the role of scrutinising legislation and could block laws[but the Reichstag could reverse Reichsrat decisions]. It was made up of representatives of the 17 Lander and aimed to give voters yet another chance to exercise control over politicians.
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The Weimar Constitution
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7) The Lander. Hugo Pruess managed to reduce the power of the Lander but there was a huge demand for regional Governments to maintain key powers. There were 17 Lander in total, each able to make laws and in control of education, the police and judiciary. Lander and Central Government could have very different political outlooks (for example,Bavaria was dominated by right wing politicians following the Freikorps seizure of the region and was out of step with the more moderate central Government.)
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The enemies of Weimar
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On far right were the Freikorps plotting the destruction of the Republic, the fledgling Nazis, exarmy officers like Ludendorff plotting the destruction of the Republic, regular army officers at whose whim the Republic would survive or collapse andmuch of the judiciary, whose sympathies lay with right wing extremists. The judiciary`s prejudice against Weimar was seen in the short sentences give to right wing terrorists, the failure to convict Ludendorff of treason in 1920 and1923 and the short sentence given to Hitler in 1923.
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The enemies of Weimar
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It was also seen in cases such as the Erzberger libel trial, when he went to court to sue for damages, having been accused of corruption and lost and had to resign in 1920! The DNVP and the BVP [ the right wing break away Catholic Party in Bavaria] posed a political threat at the political centre, as did the Nazis from 1924. The education establishment shared the prejudice against Weimar. All were united against the KPD, which too sought the destruction of Weimar.
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The impact of Versailles 1924
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German politicians had no choice but to sign the final Treaty of Versailles and accept the consequences that followed. Scheidemann and his Cabinet resigned in disgust at the final terms but their successors accepted political reality, as the alternative was allied invasion and continued naval blockade and death from malnutrition.
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The impact of Versailles 1924
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The acceptance of Versailles by the moderates had a corrosive effect upon Weimar, as it dealt a terrible psychological blow to the German people, which was seized upon by the Nationalists in the Army, the old elites amongst the middle class voters and even some figures on the left of politics. The November Criminals had once again contributed to the destruction of Germany and there were further reasons to destroy their illegitimate Republic.
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The impact of Versailles 1924
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The Versailles contributed to political and economic instability and was a key factor exploited by Hitler during his rise to power. Versailles tipped the balance against the democratic parties and destabilised politics in the long term. Over a decade later popular hatred of Versailles and the November criminals was to boost support for the Nazis. Versailles in some ways took on its greatest significance as a psychological blow to the German nation rather than the real impact, which left Germany as one of the leading nations of Europe!
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The destabilising nature of Versailles 1919
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- Versailles caused an immediate economic problem for Germany, as the economy was already in a weakened state due to wartime debt,loss of overseas trade during the war, the reduction in living standards due to inflation and the impact of the Naval Blockade. The only positive gain from Versailles was that the naval blockade ended allowing Germany to import vital resources, but this was at a greater cost than in 1914, as the mark had depreciated.
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The destabilising nature of Versailles 1919
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-- The war had wreaked havoc on the economy reducing living standards as there had been food, fuel and clothing shortages causing untold human misery. Prices had risen steadily in response to shortages and because of the Government decision to print money to pay interest on wartime loans. The mountain of debt and inflationary pressure combined had pushed Germany to the brink of collapse and know Versailles had added to the crisis.
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The destabilising nature of Versailles 1919
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Versailles had a crippling impact on the economy by taking coalfields such as the Saarland, iron ore, industrial regions and agricultural regions. German politicians found it even harder to generate economic growth and real recovery, as the economy had shrunk by about 10%.
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The destabilising nature of Versailles 1919
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In addition the loss of the Empire and trade further slowed down recovery. Absorbing these losses would be difficult but in addition Germany faced the issue of reparations. The final sum was not set until 1921 but every year the Germans would have to surrender a significant amount of output. Weimar politicians were devastated by the harsh economic terms but had no choice to accept them.
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The destabilising nature of Versailles 1919
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It has to be noted that even though the treaty was harsh the German economy was potentially the strongest in Europe and that careful economic management would have allowed Germany to overcome both the impact of the war and the impact of Versailles. However German politicians chose to mismanage the economy hoping that this would lead to a reduction in the reparations Bill and perhaps it might be cancelled.
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The destabilising nature of Versailles 1919
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Successive Governments in the period 1919 -23 chose to continue to print money to pay for new housing, schools and welfare benefits, even though this was inflationary.Their economic strategy was based on deficit financing, which meant that instead of cutting spending and raising taxes aiming to balance income and expenditure they inflated the economy.
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The destabilising nature of Versailles 1919
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Politicians knew that there were limits to the amount of tax that could be raised on the rich and on business and this made their strategy seem logical, as boosting the economy created jobs and yielded higher tax returns and eroded the wartime debt.
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The destabilising nature of Versailles 1919
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The underlying aim was to prove that Germany was in a state of economic turmoil and needed a more sympathetic approach. However it appeared to other states that Germany was recovering faster than other European economies. The German debt and inflationary problem became far worse as a result of both attitudes to Versailles and the direct impact of Versailles.
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The destabilising nature of Versailles 1919
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The policy of economic mismanagement reached new heights when the reparations bill of £6600 million was set in 1921 by the Reparations Commission. It led to yet another Government resignation in protest against the terms of Versailles and to the policy of fulfillment.
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The destabilising nature of Versailles 1919
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Joseph Wirth chose the dangerous policy of fulfillment as his solution to reparations and attempted to prove that Germany could not meet its obligations by mismanaging the economy. He won concessions and for a time reparations were suspended. However French anger at nonpayment forced him to sell marks on the currency exchange to buy gold, which led to disaster, as the mark collapsed and imports increased in cost adding to the inflationary pressure in Germany.
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The destabilising nature of Versailles 1919
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In 1920 14 marks could buy $1 but by the end of 1921 it took 64.9 marks . The Germans demanded yet another reparations holiday in July 1922. The Reparations Commission declared in December that Germany could fund reparations and this gave the French and Belgians good cause to invade, as Wirth`s successor the nationalist Cuno refused to pay them.
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The destabilising nature of Versailles 1919
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In January 1923 the French and Belgians invaded. Cuno’s response was to order passive resistance, which led to economic stagnation and mass unemployment, as the workforce in the Ruhr went on a patriotic strike. The Government paid the strikers by printing more money but they had lost a huge amount of income, as the Ruhr region was no longer capable of paying taxes.
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The destabilising nature of Versailles 1919
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In addition the reduction in production pushed prices up still further and the French decision to block coal deliveries to other parts of Germany caused a fuel shortage, which could only be eased by importing coal at huge cost. The hyper-inflationary crisis led money to became utterly worthless and people were paid by the barrow load.
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The destabilising nature of Versailles 1919
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In the Autumn of 1923 Gustav Stresemann, leader of the DVP and former opponent of Weimar became Chancellor of Germany. Stresemann led a Government made up of SDP, DDP, DVP and Centre Party with the sole aim of ending the crisis. His inspired Chancellorship had only lasted for 100 Days. To achieve his ends Streseman nwould have to accept Versailles and this meant outraging Nationalist opinion,meaning that Versailles would continue to have a malign impact on Germany.
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The destabilising nature of Versailles 1919
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Stresemann called off passive resistance and agreed to start to re-pay reparations. This was a first vital step towards economic recovery but it cost him his Chancellorship,as the army saw him as a traitor! In addition the hyper-inflationary crisis did not just lead to economic crisis but also led to the near destruction of Weimar, as the far left and the far right both tried to seize power in 1923.
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The destabilising nature of Versailles 1919
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The impact of the hyper-inflationary crisis in the long term is believed by many Historians to have undermined Weimar`s long term chance of survival. Although there were winners from the crisis there were millions of losers and many of them turned to more extreme parties in the future.
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The destabilising nature of Versailles 1919
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Owners of large businesses gained as they were able to pay off debts and seize control of smaller weaker competitors. Some businesses gained as the mark was so low in value that their exports were very competitive. Others such as Huge Stinnes borrowed money at relatively cheap rates in early 1923 and bought up competitors before paying off his debts, when the mark had fallen in value. Heended up controlling 20% of German industry. The Government gained, as many of the wartime debts it owed could be paid at virtually no cost.
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The destabilising nature of Versailles 1919
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However the majority of Germans were losers and in particular the middle class, who had fixed incomes and savers who relied on investment income and those who had war bonds. This group was ruined, unless they were in a position to pay off their mortgages and they increasingly supported the far right in the future. The most significant problem in the short term was starvation and malnutrition and a decline in health, which reminded Germans of their suffering during the war and helped undermine the Republic still further.
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Political crisis
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Versailles was the cause of political instability at the heart of Government. There were resignations in 1919- 1923 each linked to aspects of the Treaty, adding to the instability created by proportional representation. In addition voting trends from 1920 demonstrated that many voters had lost faith in democracy leading to a succession of minority Governments. . In 1920 the far right DNVP won over 15% of the popular vote and in the 1924 General Election the DNVP made further gains and the Nazis gained a foothold in the Reichstag!
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Political crisis
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The new Republic had been unstable from the start and had never been accepted as legitimate by extremists on the far right . The far right branded the democrats November criminals for signing the armistice and saw Versailles as a further betrayal. Ludendorff had created the myth of the stab in the back and this idea became very popular.
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Political crisis
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Ebert had made the mistake of supporting the creation of Freikorps at the end of 1918 and they had embarked on a rampage of violence in 1919 during the German civil war, when they ruthlessly crushed the far left. The Freikorps resented Versailles and the decision to reduce their numbers and to disband them in 1920, one of the consequences of cutting the army to 100,000 .
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Political crisis (The Kapp Putsch)
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The Kapp Putsch. In 1920 Wolfgang Kapp, a former Civil Servant and member of the Fatherland Party aided by the `white General` Luttwitz made the decision to seize power with the support of the Ehrhardt Marine Brigadeand the Baltikum Freikorps Units. A force of 12,000 Freikorps marched on Government buildings in Berlin and installed a new Government led by Kapp.
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Political crisis (The Kapp Putsch)
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It seemed that the bold move had succeeded as the Government fled to Stuttgart. Ebert tried to use Article 48 to force the Army to support the Government but General Von Seeckt refused to fire on fellow soldiers. Ludendorff declared his support for the Putsch giving it greater credibility.
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Political crisis (The Kapp Putsch)
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However Kapp found that he was a leader without power, as he did not enjoy the full backing of the Civil Service and SPD,USPD and KPD trade unionists went on a General Strike, in support of the Government. In addition the people of Berlin did not welcome the Kapp Putchists with open arms, as the Freikorps had expected and Freikorps units in other parts of Germany met fierce resistance.
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Political crisis
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In Hamburg the Freikorps were defeated by Red Guards demonstrating that the KPD were far from a spent force. The General Strike organised by SPD and KPD activists crippled vital services in Berlin and within six days the Kapp Putsch was over.
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Political crisis
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The attitude of Von Seeckt proved just how unreliable a partner the army. The democrats proved just how weak they were by choosing Von Seeckt as Chief of High Command within weeks ofthe Putsch. General Reinhardt who had argued in favour of supporting the Republic was dismissed and so was Noske. Not only did the Government appoint Von Seeckt but there were limited punishments for the Freikorps Units and their allies.
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Political crisis
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The Freikorps were banned but their ex members drifted into the new right wing para-military groups such as the Nazis and Stalhelm and terror organisations. Kapp died awaiting trial and only one of the conspirators was found guilty of plotting against the state.
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Political crisis (The Ruhr Red Army April1920)
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The Ruhr Red Army April 1920. Them align effects of Versailles were felt again within days of the failed Putsch,when left wing workers continued the strike in the Ruhr and armed themselves in readiness for a revolution. In the Ruhra Red Army of about 50,000 men, who did not enjoy the support of the KPD or USP Dleadership hoped to inspire communist revolts across Germany.
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Political crisis (The Ruhr Red Army April1920)
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The Government deployed Freikorps in the Ruhr to crush the far left, including some of the Freikorps, who had tried to seize power in Berlin just days earlier! Freikorps units brutally slaughtered the far left in April 1920 and massacred civilians, including two red cross nurses.
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1923 A YEAR OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS (The Army Plot 1923)
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The Army Plot 1923. The army were a very powerful force in 1923 and during the hyper-inflationary crisis senior army officer plotted to seize power with the aid of groups such as the Nazis but abandoned the plans. Ablack Reichswehr Putsch failed in October. The Nazis hoped to take advantage of the hyper-inflationary crisis and the Army plot and fear of communism to destroy Weimar.
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1923 A YEAR OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS (The Army Plot 1923)
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Far left activists in Saxony and Thuringia had tried to seize power in October and create a communist Republic but had been crushed. Hitler, hoped that he could emulate the March on Rome and force his wayto power. He had the backing of Ludendorff and wanted the support of the right wing leader of Bavaria Gustav Von Kahr and General VonLossow
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1923 A YEAR OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS (The Army Plot 1923)
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On the 8th of November Nazi Units seized control of a rally in a Beer Hall, which VonKahr was holding. Kahr and Lossow were forced to support the Putsch but escaped from the scene. On the 9th the Putsch was crushed by the Bavarian police and 14 Nazis were killed. Von Seeckt had reluctantly agreed to back the Government, when Ebert gave him powers under Article 48.
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1923 A YEAR OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS (Consequencesof the Munich Putsch)
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Consequences of the Munich Putsch. Ludendorff was once again not put on trial. At the trial of the conspirators Hitler`s speech launched him to national prominence and enabled the Nazis to make a political breakthrough in 1924. It was in these months that he wrote Mein Kampf. It also marked a change of strategy in the future he would try and seize power legally!
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1923 A YEAR OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS (Consequences of the Munich Putsch)
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Ludendorff was found guiltless of any conspiracy at the trial and was acquitted and emerged a hero of the far right, just ashe had been during the Kapp Putsch. Hitler was jailed for five years and sent to Landsberg. He was released after just ten months.
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Terrorism
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Anger at the November Criminals and Versailles inspired a wave of right wing terrorist attacks, funded by sympathetic ex Army officers. The terrorist`Consul Organisation`, was set up by the ex Freikorps leader Erdhardt. The main targets were the ‘November Criminals’.
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Terrorism
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Right wing terrorists were treated sympathetically by the right wing judiciary and often received token sentences, in contrast to their left wing counterparts. Finally in 1922 the state passed anti terrorist laws but they proved to be of limited value against the wave of army inspired assassinations. The age of terror only came to an end in the mid 1920`s when Weimar seemed to have entered a more settled phase, apparently dominated by Stresemann.
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-CONCLUSION
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Versailles alone could not destroy Weimar but it was a key element in the chaos that gripped Germany in the period 1919 -23 and it continued to influence Weimar politics in the next few years. It had an impact on both the economic crisis and political crisis that Weimar was experiencing intensifying both and creating instability in this period and for the remainder of the life of Weimar.
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--CONCLUSION
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It helped to ensure that voters became less supportive of democracy and ensured that the extremists were able to claim to be patriots ready to end the yoke of the Versailles Peace Treaty, which both the far left and the far right claimed was destroying Germany. It continued to haunt politicians during the so called ` golden years` of Weimar between 1924 and 1929.
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