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42 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Empiricism and Rationalism |
Empiricism: Rationalism: |
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Synthetic and Analytic Statements |
Synthetic Statements: Analytic Statements: Statements where the subject IS contained in the predicate, that is to say; they ARE tautologous |
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Concept Empiricism and Innatism |
Concept Empiricism: Concept Innatism: |
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Knowledge Empiricism and Innatism |
Knowledge Empiricism: SOME synthetic knowledge is a priori |
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Knowledge Empiricism in detail |
ALL knowledge that isn't self evident or tautologous derives only from the senses. There is self evident a priori knowledge, but it is always true by definition - ALL useful/pragmatic/practical knowledge comes from the senses; some (less useful?) definitions are self evident |
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Thoughts Vs Sensations, David Hume |
Thoughts cannot be the same as experiences as they can't have the same power as experiences to the mind, thoughts are merely a copy of sensation and as such appear with less splendour |
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Ideas Vs Impressions, David Hume |
In the world there are thoughts/ideas and impressions, impressions are both physical perceptions and inner feelings and desires. Thoughts/ideas come only from impressions; they are merely combined, transposed, enlarged, or shrunk |
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Simple Ideas and Impressions, John Locke and David Hume |
Simple ideas consist of a single element such as the idea of red; ALL simple ideas must ultimately derive from simple impressions, for example, my idea of red must come from a sense impression of the colour red |
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Complex Ideas and Impressions, John Locke and David Hume |
Complex ideas involve various simple ideas merged together, for example, a gold mountain or a unicorn. Complex ideas can be derived from multiple simple impressions, or from complex impressions, for example, a painting |
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Inwards and Outwards Impressions, David Hume |
Not all impressions are sense impressions, emotions such as anger, or desires also count as impressions just inner impressions as opposed to outer impressions |
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The General Argument for Concept Innatism |
Empiricism claims that all complex ideas are derived only from experience - Yet experience never provides us with certainty, but we do have complex ideas that seem certain - And it also seems hard to find the simple ideas that might build some of our complex ideas So concept innatism must be correct instead |
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The 'Tabula Rasa' Idea, John Locke |
The mind is a blank slate at birth. He argues that our knowledge comes from experience, our experience paints us with knowledge, everything that we think of is derived from everything we have experienced |
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The 'Trademark' Argument, René Descartes |
1. I have an idea of a perfect being (God) 2. In every cause there must be at least as much reality as there is in the effect 3. But I am imperfect 4. Given that I am imperfect (3.) I cannot be responsible for the idea of perfection that I hold (1.) 5. Therefore given that every cause must be at least as great as its effect (2.), whatever cause my idea of perfection must be perfect 6. Therefore a perfect being exists and this is God who created me |
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The Theory of Forms, Plato |
We seem to have concepts of universals (such as beauty) yet never witness them in their pure form (only imperfectly in different people and objects). Mathematical concepts also are never seen in their true form yet are universally understood and are eternal and unchanging whereas everything in the world is temporary and fleeting. - Accounting for this Plato believed that our souls were immortal and that in a prior existence, we apprehended these perfect concepts or forms in their pure state in the world of forms - we have forgotten most of these forms but they are in us and, through the process of reasoning, we can achieve a perfect understanding/apprehension once again |
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The Divided Line, Plato |
Illusions, then beliefs, then practical reason about mathematical concepts, then pure reason |
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Using Intellect to Ascend to the World of the Forms, Plato |
The real chair, then the perfect chair, then perfect furniture, then mathematical objects, eventually the idea of the good |
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Issues with Platonic Realism |
Hard to see how we acquire knowledge of forms -We do not come into sensory contact with them as they don't exist in the physical spacetime. How do we come to know of them? Difficult to conceive of -Can a form have no concrete spacial location and yet have an abstractio spatial qualities, if it is the form of something spatial? - How can they exist if they have no physical existence and are outside time? Reductio ad absurdum arguments? - If there is a form of everything does this mean there is a for for things that are revolting? Unclear how forms cause particulars to exist -Particulars are sometimes said to participate in the forms, and the forms said to inhere in the particulars. Wouldn't this distribute the forms themselves? -Forms are sometimes called archetypes, meaning original models, of which particular objects, properties, and relations are copies. In what way can a physical thing be a copy of something that is not physical at all? |
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The Veined Block of Marble, Gottfreid Willhelm Leibniz |
Leibniz suggests that the ideas inside our minds are like shapes carved out of a block of marble by our sensory impressions - Our predisposition to uncover/sculpt one set of shapes rather than another |
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Common Candidates for Innate Knowledge |
The laws of nature (‘I know that all events have a cause’) Logical and mathematical truths ('I know triangles have three sides') Ethical truths (‘I know that lying is wrong’) Metaphysical truths concerning transcendent objects like God, the soul, and Plato’s Forms (‘I know that God exists’) |
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The Intuition and Deduction Thesis |
Necessary or a priori truths that aren't innate can be uncovered by the rational intellect through either Rational Intuition, or Rational Deduction |
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Rational Intuition and Deduction |
Rational Intuition: Rational Deduction: Seeing something to be true because it follows as a consequence from other self evident truths (which are more basic and more self evident). Inferential chains are formed as you deduce one truth from another. |
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Plato's Cave |
The cave contains men chained up forced to look upon a wall in which they see shadows in the shape of men, and voices are heard. Above them is a ledge in which a fire burns and in front these shadows are cast and these voices are projected. One man escapes the cave so as to see how the world really is and he looks upon the sun. We are the men in the cave and through rational intellect we can escape into the world of the forms. |
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Plato's Simile of the Sun |
The sun provides things with the power to be seen, but also is necessary for their very existence. In the same way the good provides the objects of knowledge with the power to be known, but also the existence and essence of these objects of knowledge is dependent on the good |
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The Slave Boy Example, Plato |
Socrates gets a young ignorant slave boy to understand the mathematical concept of how to produce a square of double the size simply by asking him questions. As he only asks questions then this knowledge must already be inside him. |
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Platonic Dualism |
The soul must be immortal, and one can recollect what one doesn't happen to know or remember in life. |
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The Myth of Er, Plato |
In this account Plato puts forth the idea that we have innate knowledge because we have lived past lives and have existed in the word of the Forms. We simply forget these things as we drink from the river Lethe as we travel back to the world of the living |
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Gottfreid Willhelm Leibniz's Argument for Concept Innatism |
1. Like Plato, Leibniz thinks that the soul inherently contains various notions which are roused up by external objects on suitable occasions. The mind contains 'living firs or flashes of light' made visible by the stimulations of the senses 2. The Problem of Induction is that particular instances can't confirm universal necessity; for it needn't be the case that what has happened will always be the same way, the length of day and night on the forth pole for example. 3. So necessary truths "must have principles whose proof doesn't depend on instances/the testimony of the senses" 4. Even though without the senses it would never occur to us to think of them. prompted by the senses, not proven. 5. The senses merely prompt and corroborate reason, like checking procedures in mathematics 6. We form necessary truths with only reason, animals who have no reason remain 'brute empirics', as reason is the only thing that can establish reliable rules and construct necessary inferences 7. Ideas derived from 'reflection', Locke admits, comply comes from what is innate in our minds; being, unity, substance, duration, change, action, perception, pleasure. 8. These ideas are present in our minds like veins in a block of marble, our minds are more inclined to take one shape than another but work is needed to 'polish into clarity' 9. Ideas and truths are innate in us as inclinations, dispositions, tendencies, or natural potentialities. Experience 'unearths from within' |
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John Locke's Attack on Innatism |
Innatists face a dilemma a) 'universal consent' > this argument is empirically false since 1. children and idiots do not have this knowledge 2. there are many disagreements in ethics and theology b) 'capacity to form knowledge' > this is trivial because you could say every proposition we come to know is innate in this sense |
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Attack: There are no Innate Concepts |
Concepts which cannot derive from experience may be simply empty meaningless words. Leibniz is wrong to assume just because we perceive innate notions of self, substance, etc. that they are innate. - Locke: We develop them by reflection. Plato's concept of universals is incoherent - We develop general ides by generalising on the basis of experience not from ascent to the world of the forms The notion of self and Cartesian substance -Berkeley: We derive our notion of self from our experience of self: we perceive, at first, then become aware that something perceives - We form our notion of primary qualities such as extension, motion, etc. by abstracting from our experiences. Berkeley: Our notion of matter is in any case contradictory, as it can't be derived from our senses God, our notions of which as they are, are derived from expereince - Dawkins: Our early childhood experience is of the dominant power of our parents, and we retain this notion, some of us into adult life - In a pre-scientific world people sought an explanation for seemingly uncaused events |
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Gottfreid Willhelm Leibniz's Arguments for Knowledge Innatism |
1. The senses are not sufficient to provide us with all of our knowledge as they give us nothing but instances. Sensory truths are contingent. 2. Necessary truths, such as in pure mathematics, exist and must have principles that depend on instances, despite the fact that without these instances it would never occur to us to think of them. 3. So they cannot be derived from the senses 4. But must be either innate, or rationally intuited, or rationally deduced |
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Prompted vs Proved, Gottfreid Willhelm Leibniz |
1. We CAN have unconcious ideas - We sometimes need assistance remembering things 2. We know necessary truths, which we can't derive from experience, as all experiential truths are contingent - Sense experience is necessary but not sufficient to uncover them - We unconsciously use our knowledge of necessary truths, which then become explicit through the action of experience on our minds 3. Innate knowledge and ideas are a predisposition for experience to uncover that concept - Experience triggers innate concepts by uncovering them. We then see them to be true - The potential knowledge of necessary truths is innate, not the actual knowledge 4. Universal consent isn't the same as universal knowledge - We have access to necessary truths which are universal, but our desires conflict with these sometimes - This is why it looks like there isn't universal agreement |
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Modern Ideas of 'triggering' |
We know that many dispositions and capacities are genetically determined Experience has a role to play, but it triggers the prior capacity only These capacities 'come on line' at specific points in individual development - Example 1: Birdsong (European/American) - Example 2: The 'Intentional Stance' in humans (Teddy Bears to People) - Example 3: Chomsky's 'Poverty of Stimulus' (Language Learning) - Example 4: 'Object Permanence' in babies Experience is necessary but not sufficient: it triggers the acquisition of some knowledge, but not its source |
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David Hume's Fork |
On one prong there is a priori analytic necessary knowledge On the other there is a posteriori synthetic knowledge These are the only kinds of knowledge |
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Synthetic A Priori Knowledge |
Some a priori knowledge may not be analytic - [transcendental/metaphysical] 'every event has a cause' - [logical] 'no object can be red and green all over at the same time' - [moral] 'happiness is an intrinsic good' Are these true by definition? True because of our sensory experience? OR true via an act of Rational Insight? |
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An Example of Synthetic A Priori Knowledge, Immanuel Kant |
The proposition "every event has a cause", "event" arguably is not defined in terms of "cause" - One's knowledge of "events" might arise through experience, but not derive from it (prompted not proven) - And one learns something fundamental and very useful about the world from the proposition - And once learned, the truth of the proposition is evident independently of experience This kind of knowledge is called by Kant "synthetic a priori knowledge" In this sense, we have innate knowledge of cause |
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Rational or A Priori Intuition |
A priori intuition - Immediate, non-inferential grasp or apprehension - "Seeing" that an item of knowledge is necessarily true - Not propositional/to do with words - So unlike beliefs and more like the immediacy of perceptual sensations This allows us to see synthetic a priori knowledge - 'happiness is an intrinsic good' Kant: We have the faculty/power of the mind for acquiring this knowledge |
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Why is Synthetic A Priori Desirable? |
The apperception of synthetic a priori truths via an act of intellectual intuition - Gives us the certainty of a priori propositions - AND gives us useful content in a way that tautologous or analytic a priori propositions do not Synthetic a priori knowledge, therefore, would be - True independently of experience, certain - AND useful, interesting |
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Cartesian Examples: The Intuition and Deduction Thesis at Work |
'The apperception of synthetic a priori truths via an act of intellectual intuition or deduction' This description applies to: - The Cogito (Meditation 2) - The Trademark Argument for the existence of God (Meditation 3) -The Ontological Argument for the existence of God (Meditation 5) - Descartes' "proof" of the existence of the external world (Meditation 6) |
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Is the Intuition and Deduction Thesis Correct? |
Empricists reply: - There are some arguments against the notion of the infallibility of rational insight like the Monty Hall Problem (Goat and Car Doors) , etc. - Many deductive arguments are flawed or inconclusive (Ontological Arguments for the Existence of God, the Trademark Argument for the Existence of God, etc.) The conclusions drawn using rational deduction are merely analytically true |
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Truth Problem: The Cartesian Circle |
1. I clearly and distinctly perceive God to exist 2. And God guarantees that anything I clearly and distinctly perceive to be true IS true |
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The Problem of Introspection |
Is whether perception is clear and distinct something we can perceive inside our own mental processes? A dilemma arises here: - 'No' leads to the need for a new criterion for what is clear and distinct - 'Yes' faces counter examples, e.g. conflicting or confused intuitions and intuitive judgements that turn out to be false |
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Confused Intuitions |
Paradoxes - Zen's Paradox Achilles and the tortoise |
