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118 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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What is Consequentialism
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o “the theory that human actions derive their moral worth solely from their outcomes or consequences.” – Dictionary.com
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What problem does Consequentialism strive to solve?
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o People need an alternative to using their own intuitions in determining what normative principles are good ones to keep
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Why is using ones own intuition a problem?
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o People’s intuitions are shaped by their culture/language and context
o There is no reason for a person to endorse “good” norms that does not first require that the person think the norms are good, i.e, Begging the Question |
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How can the intuition problem be overcome?
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o If there is general normative pluralism (one belief can’t be chosen over another belief using the reflective equilibrium method alone), then Stich claims to appeal to the consequences of using the norms
o A person should prefer a set of norms (norms of reasoning) if the consequences of that norm set are better than the consequences of another competing set. Which rules will leave us better off? |
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How can the comparison presented by the intuition problem be accomplished?
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o The consequence can be assigned a value based on the number of important intrinsic values it helps us achieve
o A person can then count one outcome better than another then if it embodies more of the important intrinsic values |
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Why can Stich make his argument regarding intuitions?
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o Stich is a intrinsic value pluralist, therefore, he believes there are many things that can hold intrinsic value for a person
o If there are multiple items/concepts/etc. of intrinsic value, there may exist a hierarchy for the various intrinsic values |
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What would the Epistemic Pragmatists, and Stich, claim regarding Cognitive processes then?
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o Cognitive processes should be considered as tools for achieving and evaluating things of actual intrinsic value
o Truth, justification, knowledge, etc. are merely instrumental values |
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What is Stich’s perception of Consequentialist standards of evaluation?
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o Consequentialist standards of evaluation can provide a context independent standard of “goodness” for norms of reasoning
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What is Stich’s argument for preferring the Consequentialist’s standards of evaluation?
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o A norm of reasoning N seems more intuitively plausible than N*
We believe N will yield more truths than N* o The consequences of reasoning with N*, in fact, have greater intrinsic value than N o Even though N seems more intuitively plausible, we should prefer N* |
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What are the problems with Stich’s argument for Consequentialist’s standards of evaluation?
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o Accepting a concept solely because it “seems intuitively plausible” is what Stich has been arguing against
o For this argument to work, intrinsic values would need to be invariable from one group to the next o If intrinsic values were invariable, they could be considered context independent. |
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What is Cost/Benefit Analysis (CBA), as a function of Consequentialism?
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o As part of the Consequentialist method for determining a norm or reason’s “goodness”, CBA recommends adopting a set of norms that has the highest expected value
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How and why is Cost Benefit Anaylsis effective for comparing competing norms of reason?
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o Choices made using the CBA method will lead to the highest probability of getting things that people intrinsically value
o The efficacy of this system is not what is important; sometimes the equations generated by a CBA method are incalculable. What is important is that CBA offers a stable way to evaluate competing norms according to their epistemic values. |
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What does a Cost Benefit Anaylsis argument look like?
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o Suppose N1, N2,…, Nn are alternative collections of norms
o For each Ni there is a set Oni of possible outcomes o For each Oni there is a collection of conditional probabilities [Pj(Oni/Ni)] o Let Vj(Oni) be a measure of the intrinsic value of the jth member or Oni o The expected value of Ni relative to the jth member of Oni is the product of the value of the outcome j and the probability of its occurrence o The expected value of Ni = the expected value of Ni relative to the entire set of possible outcomes |
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What is Relativism?
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o “A theory holding that criteria of judgment are relative, varying with individuals and their environments.” – Dictionary.com
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What are some relative properties?
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o X is a citizen; X is legal; X is rich; etc.
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Why is “X is a citizen” considered “relative”?
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o For X to posses the property in question, X requires some specification of a relation to something else, something that is extrinsic to X
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How are relative properties different than relations?
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o Relative properties are seen as a feature of individual things
o Relations are properties between something and another thing |
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Is epistemic pragmatism relativistic?
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o Yes, in three ways (as titled by Prof. Tolliver):
Value Relativism; Circumstantial Relativism; Risk Aversion/Risk Embracing Relativism |
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What is Value Relativism?
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o “Since the goodness of cognitive processes depends upon which values they are successful in promoting, the goodness of cognitive processes will vary from one group of persons to another as their intrinsic values differ”
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What is Circumstantial Relativism?
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o “The probability that the cognitive processes that conform to a set of norms that promote a given set of intrinsic values will actually succeed in producing outcomes that embody those values with the environmental circumstances of the cognizers”
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Risk Aversion/Risk Embracing Relativism
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o “How eager or reluctant should we be to reject our current views and adopt new ones at prospect to some non-aero increase in the expected value of the new view?”
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What is Nihilism?
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o “An extreme form of skepticism: the denial of all real existence or the possibility of an objective basis for truth” – Dictionary.com
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What is the Nihilistic argument as it relates to epistemic pragmatism?
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o The members of some culture C believes that their inferential methods are good and,
o Those methods “work” for them, then o Those methods are good and so are the beliefs that result from them |
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Why is Nihilism a problem?
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o If we accept Epistemic Pragmatism, we must give up trying to distinguish good reasoning from bad
o If there is no absolute, context independent, standard of good reasoning, we have no basis for saying that methods of inquiry that we think are bad should not be followed by cultures that genuinely subscribe to them |
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What is Stich’s reply to Nihilism?
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o Epistemic Pragmatism does not entail nihilism. We can criticize the inferential practices of another culture and the beliefs that result from their application of these methods if those methods fair badly in a consequentiality evaluation of those methods
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What are the implications if Epistemic Pragmatism is true?
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o If Epistemic Pragmatism is true, there is no common standard of goodness of inferential methods that applies across cognitively diverse cultures
o Likewise, if there is no such standard for the evaluation of methods, then there is no such standard for the evaluation of the truth and falsity of beliefs o Therefore the beliefs of a of cognitively diverse culture are cannot be compared with each other by any common measure or standard of accuracy |
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How can we claim to ourselves that our beliefs are true if other cultures disagree with us and there is no standard of “rightness” that can declare their beliefs are mistaken?
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o By our own lights, if what we believe is true and they disagree, their beliefs are false
o By our own lights, we cannot know that our beliefs are true because their beliefs may be true |
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What is the Circularity Objection?
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o Attempts at cognitive evaluation will fail because of their vicious circularity
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Where does the Circularity problem arise?
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o In forming an argument, the superiority of one’s own cognitive process overrides the cognitive process of others
o It is problematic to use a cognitive process whose “goodness” is in question to establish that it is in fact “good” |
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What is a tangible example of the circularity issue?
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o Consulting a Ouija board to establish that Ouija boards are better than the scientific method for answering important questions
o Even if the board answers “yes”, we would not have established the board as superior o Therefore, any pragmatic argument in favor of one’s own cognitive process is viciously circular and bad |
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What is Stich’s reply to the Circularity issue?
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o The results of a pragmatic evaluation of one’s cognitive methods, compared to another, may result in the endorsement of the other
o There is no formal begging of the question involved in evaluating personal cognitive methods |
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What is the feasible inference of applied Epistemic Pragmatism?
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o According to the professor, we have no interest in knowing whether someone’s performance meets an ideal standard, even when the standard is consequential
o Our brains can’t meet ideal standards of rationality and there are probably biological constraints on our cognition |
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What should we be concerned with?
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o What we should be concerned with is whether we live up to feasible standards, not whether we perform in accordance with an ideal standard
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What makes a usable inference pattern?
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o The answer depends on the reasons for asking the answer
o Stich thinks that there is no general answer |
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What is Cognitive Enbiggening?
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o “To make or become bigger, related to cognition” – Wikipedia/Derek Hybrid
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What is the goal of Cognitive Enbiggening?
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o Stich claims the goal of cognitive evaluation should be facilitating steps toward subsequent cognitive improvements
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Are there any examples of Cognitive Enbiggening?
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o Gilbert Herman’s example
o Karen was given an aptitude test which resulted in high scores in Science and Music and low scores in History and Philosophy o In her academic career Karen did well in Science (which matched her test) and History (which conflicted with her test) o After consideration Karen concluded the test accurately reflected her aptitudes; her History course must have just been easy |
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What can we conclude from the Karen example of Cognitive Enbiggening?
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o Karen bases some of her beliefs on others
o Karen’s belief that the History course was easy is a justification for her low aptitude score o Karen’s belief about her History score is not based on either her aptitude for History or that her History course was an easy one |
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Karen is later told that she received the wrong test scores and that her actual scores were lost, how does this information affect Karen’s aptitude beliefs?
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o Assuming no additional information we would expect Karen to give up her belief that the History course was just easy
o She should reconsider taking courses that the test “proved” she excelled in that prior experiences challenge o She should reconsider taking courses that the test “proved” she does poorly in that prior experiences challenge |
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Does Karen, in light of the new knowledge regarding her score, make our predicted changes?
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o According to Herman, no, Karen would retain all the beliefs and intentions generated from the aptitude test scores
o Her beliefs and intentions perseverate |
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Is it wrong that Karen would perseverate her old beliefs?
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o Her perseveration looks bad because her intentions are contrary to her interests
o A cognitive improvement might be if Karen could develop new cognitive habits that did not support her perseveration o Herman argues that her perseveration may be a good thing |
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Why can Herman claim that Karen’s perseveration is a good thing?
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o There are times when there may be good reasons for perseveration
o People may perseverate because they don’t remember their belief justifications o People my simply forget why the acquired the “new” beliefs o Once a person settles their mind “that p”, people simply don’t bother to retain the details regarding their persuasion to “that p” |
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According to Herman, why might a person forget the details of their persuasion?
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o The argument may contain facts that have no intrinsic value for us
o In Karen’s case, the score values were not something she have interest in o Karen remembers the indications and uses them as premises in future reasoning o Retaining all of the premises of our reasoning, and all relations/connections, would use up memory resources without much pay off |
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Does Herman’s argument hold any positive conclusions?
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o According to Herman, it is feasible to adopt an alternative collection of cognitive processes that would make us immune to perseveration
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How would Herman’s theory about perseveration work in practice?
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o Karen’s perseveration has led her conclusions that work against her interest, at least in the short run
o But the cost of avoiding these consequences is keeping track of all of her reasons for everything she believes and plans to do o So we should not evaluate Karen’s reasoning badly because it involves perseveration and we should not try to put in place cognitive habits that eliminate her perseveration |
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What is a proper linear model?
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o It is a predictive formula, that is a sum of a collection of factors or “cues” that are weighted, to optimize the correlation between their sum and a target property
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How is a proper linear model generated?
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o From data sets, i.e., lists of values for quantities in some domain of phenomena
o They are the statistical analysis of relationships among quantities |
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How successful is a proper linear model?
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o According to Bishop & Trout (B&T): when based on the same evidence, the predictions of SPRs are at least as reliable as the predictions of human experts
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What are some of the intuitively plausible, but false, explanations of the proper linear model’s success?
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o Human experts often don’t have access to the correlational data on that the model does
o Even if the human expert does have the same data, they are incapable of using it as effectively as the model |
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What is an improper linear model?
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o Unlike the proper linear model, it doesn’t include a set of optimizing weights
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What is bootstrapping in SPRs?
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o Repeatedly sampling the same sample
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Is bootstrapping effective?
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o Yes
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What is a “bootstrapping model” (BM) of improper linear models?
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o This model contains a set of weights on cues that are optimized to match an expert’s predictive judgments
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Why is a bootstrapping model effective?
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o It is an improper model, that properly models, an expert’s judgments
o Cues are isolated so that only information in the data set that an expert would consider are used o Intuitively we can treat the expert’s judgments as a sample of the population |
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What are the advantages of using a bootstrapping model over other models?
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o It is very efficient with large data sets
o The model performs better than the expert they are designed to mimic |
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If the BM “learns” to predict from an expert, how can the model “know” more than the expert?
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o A false belief is that the model does not make the same performance errors a human would
o In fact, we don’t know why this model works; however, the fact we don’t know does not diminish that it does work |
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What is a random linear model?
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o A model were weights are assigned randomly to the positively relevant parameters
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Are random linear models effective?
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o They are as reliable as other models and more effective than human experts
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What is a unit weight model?
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o A model that assigns equal weight to all the positive cues so that each cue has an equal say in the SPR prediction
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How effective are unit weight models?
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o On average, they are as reliable as proper models
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What are the advantages of a unit weight model?
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o They require only a slim portion of the evidence
o They are simple to use o They are reliable |
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Is it unfair to compare humans to SPRs?
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o Experts do worse than SPRs because they base their predictions on evidence that can’t be quantified and put into a formula
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What is B&T‘s response to the comparing humans to SPRs?
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o The argument doesn’t offer evidence supporting its claim
o Any evidence an expert might use, can be coded o Extra evidence doesn’t help as seen in the Interview effect |
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What is the Interview Effect?
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o When human experts add unstructured interviews to information (records, letters, dossiers, etc.) they perform worse than with the information alone
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What are some explanations of the Interview Effect?
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o Most interviews are high stress events with neither the interview or interviewee at their best
o 1st impressions can swamp all other data o The added information from the interview is frequently misleading |
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What is the flat maximum principle (FMP)?
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o For a certain class of prediction problems, if the sign of the coefficients are right (i.e., so long as + and – relevant cues are properly identified), any linear model will predict about as well as any other
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What are the necessary criteria for the Flat Maximum Principle?
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o The judgment problem must be complex
o The evidential cues must be reasonably predictive o The evidential cues must be somewhat redundant |
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What explains the success of proper linear models
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o Condorcet’s Jury Theorem based explanation
o Hastie and Daws Explanations |
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What is the Condorcet’s Jury Theorem based explanation?
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o Linear models are like jury’s, each focusing on a piece of data that provides some information relevant to the decision
o Jury’s judgments are the conglomeration of the information during deliberations and the linear model is the sum information contained in each positive cue |
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What is the Hastie and Daws explanation?
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o Proper linear models can accurately represent monotone interactions
o We live in a monotonic social world |
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What is B&T’s response to Hastie and Daws?
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o Their explanation is implausible because SPRs seldom model the causal structure of the world
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What is the Covariation Illusion?
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o Humans are bad at detecting covariations when they do not conform to our background beliefs; furthermore, humans misperceive covariations where none are, but are expected to exist
o Unless the theories, et. al., are accurate, we are not likely to be good at identifying what cues are most likely to covary and so predict the target properly |
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What are the limits on memory, attention, and computation?
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o Humans aren’t good at keeping even medium-sized amounts of information in short-term memory when solving a problem
o Humans central conscious attention capacity is limited o Humans are not good at judging weights and calculating results from assigned values |
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Why do humans receive incomplete feedback?
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o Humans lack control groups to compare the results of any reasoning
o Feedback often doesn’t constitute a representative sample o Humans confabulate explanations of feedback on their locus of control |
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What is the Epistemic Resistance to SPRs?
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o Even when we recognize the SPRs generate better results, when our judgment differs from the SPR we emphasize the result of our judgment over the SPR
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What is B&T’s response to Epistemic resistance to SPRs?
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o People don’t believe that the SPR are reliable as they seem
o People are over confident in the reliability of our judgments and reasoning strategies |
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What is the Broken Leg Problem?
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o Remember the example of the employee with the broken leg
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What are the challenges presented by the Broken Leg Problem?
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o Even when we have reliable reasoning rules, we often have trouble recognizing the appropriate occasion to use them
o The challenge is to correctly evaluate the strength of one’s evidence that a particular case is an exception to when to use a SPR |
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What is a solution to the Broken Leg Problem?
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o It must be a part of Ameliorative Psychology, an area of psychology devoted to evaluating and improving decision-making
o People need a theory of the temptations to selectively defect from SPRs and recommendations for avoiding excessive defections |
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What is a grounded SPR?
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o One where people have an explanation of its success?
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What is an ungrounded SPR?
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o Any and all non-grounded SPRs
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How is a grounded SPR advantageous?
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o They can provide occasions for reasonable defections from a reliable SPR
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What is the problem with ungrounded SPRs?
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o They invite defections, but people who give into temptation from their own beliefs will result in poorer judgments
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What three features contribute to epistemic excellence?
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o Reliability on a wide range of problems
o Tractability – How difficult it is to employ o The significance of the problems it is meant to tackle |
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What is Robust Reliability? What are the two methods described in class?
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o Reliability on a wide range of problems
o Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG); Less is more effect |
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What is a Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG)?
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o Predicts violent recidivism among Canadian psychiatric patients
o It is reliable on a larger range of people |
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What is the “less is more effect”?
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o Less knowledge can, under certain circumstances, yield more reliability; for example, the recognition heuristic
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What is the recognition heuristic?
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o “If one of two objects is recognized and the other is not, then infer that the recognized object has the higher value with respect to the criterion.”
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What is the goal of employing cost-benefit reasoning?
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o Construct high-reliability, low-cost reasoning strategies
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What is the “Take the Best” style of cost-benefit reasoning?
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o When making a judgment amongst criterion, test each one individually and choose the first that discriminates between the alternatives
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What are the pro’s and con’s of “Take the Best” style judgments?
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o Pro: Uses fewer cues in judgments; as reliable than other, costlier strategies
o Con: More frugal than other choices |
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What is the Flat Maximum principle?
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o “allows a relatively low cost choice” between different SPRs of approximately equal reliability
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What is Applied Epistemology?
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o Concerns thinking about how people can better think about the world
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What is Diminishing Marginal Expected Utility, as it relates to applied epistemology?
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o The rate of benefit from investment of cognitive resources is not constant
Increasing resources expended on the reasoning strategy brings fewer benefits |
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What are the four ways a person can become a better reasoner?
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o Resource Reallocation
o Adopt a more reliable, but no more expensive, reasoning strategy ( = ) o Adopt a more reliable, but more expensive, reasoning strategy ( + ) o Adopt a less reliable, but cheaper, reasoning strategy ( - ) |
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How does Resource Reallocation help a person can become a better reasoner?
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o Maximize accuracy by optimizing marginal expected reliability (MER)
o The MER of a reasoning strategy is the benefit gained from the last resource expended on the strategy |
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How does adopting a more reliable, but no more expensive, reasoning strategy help a person can become a better reasoner?
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o The simplest way to improve reasoning is to replace a current method with a equally expensive, more reliable method
o Many SPRs improve reasoning in this fashion |
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How does adopting a more reliable, but more expensive, reasoning strategy help a person can become a better reasoner?
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All reasoning strategies have opportunity costs
o Devoting cognitive resources to one problem typically prevents a person from spending time/energy on something else. |
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How does adopting a less reliable, but cheaper, reasoning strategy help a person can become a better reasoner?
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o By adopting a new reasoning strategy that leads to decreased local reliability, a person can reallocate resources so as to increase global reliability
o Think of the example of the test taker |
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What is Strategic Reliabilism?
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o An articulation of the general assumptions that guide the prescriptions of Ameliorative Psychology
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What is Robust Reliability:
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o Recommendations from Ameliorative psychology that maximize efficient allocation of cognitive resources and true vs. total judgments
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What are the Cost/Benefit considerations of Strategic Reliablism?
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o Ameliorative psychology should recommend reasoning strategies that have the best cost/benefit ratios
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Does Standard Analytic Epistemology (SAE) ignore cost/benefit considerations and why?
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o Yes; the incommensurability of values
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What is B&T’s response to SAE’s incommensurability argument?
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o Incommensurability values are important, even if they are flawed
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What is Epistemic Significance?
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o Recommendations from Ameliorative psychology that can be applied to a range of significant problems
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What are the three characteristics of Epistemic Significant arguments?
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o The significance of a problem X is a function of the weight of the reasons X devotes resources to solving the problem
o Moral obligations provide reasons for action o Particular circumstances can provide reasons for action that vary from person to person |
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What is the method of the Standard Analytic Epistemology (SAE) arguments?
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o The Stasis Requirement
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What is the Stasis Requirement?
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o It leads to a methodology for evaluating theories which requires those theories to be in reflective equilibrium with intuitive judgments
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What is the Aristotelian Principle?
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o Good reasoning tends to lead to better outcomes than bad reasoning
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Do B&T think that a method based on the Stasis Requirement is the best?
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o No; they advocate for using Strategic Reliablism
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Is Strategic Analytic Epistemology (SAE) Cultural Imperialism, and what argument best supports your choice?
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o Yes; SAE theories reflect the judgments of an idiosyncratic group - there is cultural diversity in Epistemic Judgments – acceptance/rejection of a SAE provides information on that group – SAE implies a description theory of its practitioners – normative standards are universal – therefore, SAE is an illegitimate imposition on members not belonging to the initial group
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Is Strategic Analytic Epistemology a bad descriptive theory, and why?
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o Yes; it is a descriptive theory of a narrow group
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Regarding SAE’s, are Epistemic judgments value judgments, and why?
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o Yes; Epistemic judgments must conform to standards of correctness and their theories can’t be derived from theories of actually epistemic judgments
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Regarding SAE’s, why can’t Quinean naturalized Epistemology be normative?
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o Naturalized epistemology is entirely non-normative, it’s just psychology
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True or false, SAE theories express a priori knowledge?
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o True
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What is B&T’s opinion on SAE a priori knowledge?
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o SAE theories express a priori beliefs, not knowledge
o Philosophers epistemic judgments are analogous to folk physics |
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Is SAE an expression of the expertise in matters of belief and reasoning that a analytic epistemologist possess, and why?
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o Yes; Philosophers posses a kind of expertise in the domain of evaluating beliefs that is analogous to the expertise of doctors and lawyers though B&T would challenge this thought
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What is the argument for the “dilemma” in Strategic Reliablism theories?
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o Either Strategic Reliablism recommends only justified beliefs or it doesn’t
o If it does, there is no need for SAE theories o If it does not, then so much the worse for ASE theories and they should be rejected in favor of Strategic Reliabilism o Therefore, either there is no need for SAE or SAE theories should be rejected in favor of Strategic Reliablism o Therefore, Strategic Reliablism will do |
