Philosophy Exam 2

Front 1

Leibnez's Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals

Back 1

If objects A and B are identical, they have all their properties in common.

Front 2

Equivalence Relation

Back 2

The relation that holds in between two elements if and only if it is transitive, reflexive, and symmetric.

Front 3

Numeric Identity v. Qualitative Identity

Back 3

Numerical Identity requires total qualitative identity, and can only hold between a thing and itself. Example: mental token=physical token. Things with qualitative identity share properties, so things can be more or less qualitatively identical.

Front 4

General Problem of Identity Over Time

Back 4

The question about how someone can be the same person over time. "The same" is a very subjective phrase and it is hard to identify what aspects are "the same". This is troubling because it seems that we are changing from one moment to the next.

Front 5

Spatio-temporal Continuity

Back 5

It is necessary to have a continuous path between 2 elements, such as x at t1 and y at t2, through time.

Front 6

Immaculate Replacement

Back 6

This notion is a way to object the notion of personal identity over "spacetime".

Front 7

Causal Continuity

Back 7

One of the necessary conditions of identity over time. Object 1 at t1 is numerically identical to object 2 at t2 only if he state of object 2 at t2 is causally dependent of the state of object 1 at t1.

Front 8

Sortal/Kind Continuity

Back 8

Object o1 at t1 is numerically identical with object o2 at t2 only if o1 and o2 are the same kind/sort of object: e.g. a tomato, a cat, or a table.

Front 9

Theseus' Ship

Back 9

A puzzle of identity dealing with gradual replacements of parts.

Front 10

Brain Transplant Thought Experiments

Back 10

Thought experiments that demonstrate that the commitment to strict personal identity over time leads to conflicts.

Front 11

Q-remembering/Q-memory

Back 11

S Q-remembers past experience E if and only if: S has a belief about E which seems in itself like a memory belief, someone did have such an experience, S's belief is dependent on this experience in the same way in which a memory of experience is dependent on it.

Front 12

In some detail (i.e. in a paragraph ortwo), explain what the Memory Continuity Criterion of Personal Identity is.This should involve (i) stating the original Lockean formulation of it (put inmodern terms) and the motivations behind the original formulation; (ii) raisingone serious objection to the original formulation; and (iii) sketching a way(or ways) to address the objection. Please try to be clear and distinct.

Back 12

o TheInitial Statement of Locke’s “Memory Criterion” states that a person B existingat time (t2) is the same as person A existing at an earlier time (t1); if andonly if person B remembers from inside or can remember at t2 actions orexperiences of A occurring at t1. The initial motivations are that they havespecial access to memories of their own past experiences and actions provides afoundation for remembering from the inside and intuitions.

o Oneserious objection would have to be that it is circular. Generally, “S wasappropriately related to E at the time of its occurrence” suggests that‘remembering from the inside’ cannot be defined without presupposing the notionof personal identity. The remedy for that statement would be to realize that itis inadequate. The adequate version of the statement must be a causalcondition.

Front 13

In some detail (i.e. in a paragraph ortwo) outline Parfit’s “Sorites Argument” Against Dualism. Then briefly indicatehow the dualist could respond to it. Please try to be clear and distinct.

Back 13

o SoritesArgument Against Dualism can be pictured as a heap of sand. Would taking onegrain or 1% of the heap make the heap of sand not a heap anymore? The mainquestion is whether 1% would change its existence. Parfit believes that if wehave all the facts, than that is everything we have to know about it and thatquestion of whether my replica and myself are the same person is an emptyquestion. In different spectrums, many would think that the resulting person isyou, while others might think that your replica is not you. The Dualist mayrespond by stating that the 1% or sharp cut-off is implausible, and even ifthere was a sharp cutoff, there is no evidence about where the location is.

Front 14

In some detail (i.e. in a paragraph ortwo) outline Parfit’s “Fission (Division, Duplication) Argument” Against StrictPersonal Identity Over Time. Please try to be clear and distinct.

Back 14

o TheFission Argument Against Strict Personal Identity Over Time is the argumentcommitment to strict personal identity over time can lead to conflicts. Thereare many wrong beliefs such as survival is an all-or-nothing matter, personalsurvival requires strict personal identity, and there is a whole differencefrom my replica and a person that is me. The evidence that these statements arewrong is that in a person with 2 disconnected hemispheres, there are 2 streamsof consciousness. An example of fission would be what if Ted splits into Ed andFred? What happens to ted? According to Parfit, he states that survival withoutidentity is survival and psychological continuity is in place, and it as goodas survival. Therefore, Ed is psychologically continuous with Ted and Fred ispsychologically continuous with Ted. But both are not identical with Ted.